



EUROPEAN  
JOURNAL  
*of*  
TRANSFORMATION  
STUDIES

2022

Vol. **10** No. **2**

EUROPE OUR HOUSE

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# EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF TRANSFORMATION STUDIES

2022  
Vol. 10, No. 2

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e-ISSN 2298-0997



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## **REGULAR PAPERS**

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# PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE LIMITED INTEGRATION IN THE GLOBALIZATION PROCESSES OF THE MENA REGION<sup>1</sup>

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## **Abstract**

The paper provides an overview of the the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) area. The aims is, through the analysis of the complex political and economic scenario, to understand the lack of integration and participation to the globalization process of this region. Concrete development will only be possible through a significant expansion of the private sector, which, however, cannot play a leading role in the absence of a reliable banking system. Positive political changes will be an essential complement to the economic transition, especially as civil society seems to increasingly demand them.

**Key words:** *Mena, Integration, Globalization, Private Sector, Banking System*

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<sup>1</sup> Although the paper is the result of a common work, paragraphs 1 and 4 are to be attributed to Lucia Simonetti and paragraphs 2 and 3 to Vittorio Amato.


## 1. THE MOSAIC OF THE SOUTHERN SHORE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

Today the Mediterranean is a geopolitical singularity, a region that is both extremely fragmented and extremely interconnected. Fulcrum of violent crises, ideological and geopolitical clashes, but also a new epicenter of infrastructural, economic and energy connectivity between Europe, Africa and Asia.

Much of these intersections, connections and contradictions are contained in the area that the World Bank defines as MENA (Middle East and North Africa)<sup>2</sup>.

From a political and economic point of view, it is a highly heterogeneous region, made up of different realities in terms of size, natural environment, energy resources, levels of income, human capital, social and political structures and institutions. In common perception, however, it is often considered to be composed of a set of relatively similar states. The reason probably lies, on the one hand, in a series of common (although not identical) historical, religious, cultural and ethnic elements, and on the other in a set of political, diplomatic and economic challenges characterized by a common matrix.

**Figure 1. The countries of the Middle East and North Africa region**



Source: adapted from World Bank

In this intricate scenario, the centers of power have multiplied and the political agendas have become increasingly competitive so much that it is increasingly difficult to identify a dominant structural logic in the new order. The fragmentation of the regional system and the weakness of the state apparatuses have favored the progressive rise of non-state actors (criminal organizations, traffickers, jihadists, terrorist or-

<sup>2</sup> The list of countries is available on the World Bank website, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena>

ganizations), which only states with stronger apparatuses, such as Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, have managed to some extent to contain<sup>3</sup>.

The equilibrium of the region has long been based on the permanence in power of the old Arab-nationalist regimes, which for fifty years have governed strategic countries, such as Iraq, Syria and Egypt, but also Libya and Tunisia. The US intervention in Iraq in 2003 first and the revolts against the ruling elites (the so-called Arab Springs), which since 2011 have affected several countries, both on the northern shore of the African continent and in the Middle East, have changed this arrangement, triggering a profound crisis in the regional system. The uprisings, which initially raised the hope of democratic change, subsequently strengthened the conflict in the countries concerned and increased insecurity and instability. The transition towards a true democracy in the area therefore still appears to be a hope, with the sole exception of Tunisia which seems to be able to recognize a real path of democratization.

At present, the war on the Islamic State, the sectarian war in Iraq, the civil war in Yemen and Syria, the imploding situation in Libya, the weakness of Egypt are the most obvious manifestations of a transformation in which all parties in cause are trying to carve out their own sphere of advantage.

The unpredictable and unstable nature of power relations in MENA countries is relatively more evident in the Middle East, where, to date, there is no state that has the recognized capacity or authority to allow it to take a leading role. In the area, the confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia prevails, which however has been developing not as a direct conflict but rather as a contest for regional influence, in which the respective regional projections have been perceived as essential elements of both affirmation and security national team (Aliboni, 2019). Another feature is the high level of internationalization of conflicts with weak states (Syria, Yemen, Iraq) which have become a terrain of interference for both regional and global players.

In the North African context, on the other hand, there is a dispute between Algeria and Morocco in the search for a sub-regional hegemony. Despite the difficult relations, mainly inherent to the Saharan question, each side has worked to avoid an armed resolution of the dispute. Nonetheless, the divergences between the two states seem to have further fragmented the region, producing a kind of bipolar structure.

The MENA region therefore experiences a changing and complicated reality, in which past and present events can also be read as a consequence of the region's inability to bear the impact of globalization processes, fully taking part in them.

The differences, in this sense, are however quite significant. The states that have never radically compromised the legacy of their traditional markets, embracing, in addition, the logic of modern markets, have proved to be the most capable

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<sup>3</sup> The threat from Sahelian jihadist organizations is significantly stronger in the Middle East, where they operate with large-scale violence against civilians.

of adapting and integrating into the process of economic globalization. The monarchies of Jordan and Morocco, for example, which have welcomed forms of democracy, albeit to different degrees, have reached a higher level of development than the Praetorian republics which project the coercive powers of the state into the economic life of their countries. It is interesting to note that the countries in the region that first joined the structural economic reforms with the support of the World Bank were Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey and that they were also the first ones to enter into partnership agreements with the EU. Lebanon has closely followed these countries but the well-known events of the long civil war have delayed the adoption of reforms.

In general terms, therefore, several monarchies have been more receptive to the idea of economic reform than the praetorian republics, some of which have nearly destroyed their traditional markets and their business classes to consolidate the power of their leadership. Saddam Hussein's Iraq is a well-known example in this regard. Hussein destroyed the business class of Iraq by replacing it with a highly corrupt system based on favouritism and patronage, a system which, paradoxically, has been further consolidated by international sanctions, making reconstruction even more difficult.

In the MENA region, there are also evident differences in the banking systems which, to a large extent, reflect the colonial heritage. Basically, three models have emerged in this sector: the Anglo-Saxon model, in which the allocation of capital is guided by the preferences of individual investors (Lebanon and the Gulf States, where even Islamic banks have adopted elements of the Anglo-Saxon tradition); the French model, in which the allocation of capital is influenced by the state, with a dominant role played by state-owned banks (Israel and several Praetorian-type republics) and a German model, with highly concentrated and integrated commercial and financial sectors, where universal banks play a dominant role; this, like the French model, represented the financial response to the persistent shortage of capital (Morocco and Turkey). There is also a deeply entrenched traditional and informal banking sector throughout the region, known as hawala, which represents a low-cost, market response to the basic financial needs of the region's population and the fact that large banks essentially tend to satisfy only the requests of wealthier or politically backed customers.

However, it can be argued that the MENA region does not rank among the areas with the most financially developed banking systems in the developing world. In MENA countries, credit to the private sector is equal to 57% of GDP, and reaches about 60% for Mediterranean countries outside the European Union. Consider, for an appropriate comparison that East Asia stands at 152%. There is, of course, a significant heterogeneity between the individual state realities. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, for example, have a significantly higher level of banking sector development than oil importers and non-GCC oil exporters (Rabah and Senbet, 2020).


## 2. THE ECONOMIC SCENARIO

It is the opinion of many analysts that two important factors fuelled the political instability of the Mena area. Firstly, the growing unemployment, which in recent years has reached very high levels especially among young people, and secondly the persistence of profound economic inequalities among the population, in particular following the privatization process of national economies that began at the end of the years 1980s.

According to the latest data released by the World Bank (2020), in fact, in a region with almost 500 million inhabitants, where two thirds of the population is under 35, youth unemployment in the period preceding the Covid crisis was on the rise since a three-year period, reaching over 27% in 2019 (fig. 2), of which 40% were women. Almost half of the population (42%) lived on incomes of less than \$ 5.50 per day (PPP 2011).

The inequality indices for the area show that, although the southern Mediterranean countries are not in a significantly worse position than most of the other emerging regions, the trend is increasing. In this sense, two distinct phases can be identified, which highlight a trend towards a reduction in inequalities during the second half of the 1990s, followed by an increase, from the middle of the last decade to the present. It seems, therefore, that two decades of globalization and Euro-Mediterranean cooperation have failed to have a concrete impact on the problem of income inequality. Furthermore, at the regional level, the middle-income class does not seem to have benefited greatly from the two decades of growth (Ferragina and Nunziante, 2018). Indeed, it can be said that the economies in the Middle East and North Africa have two faces. The official sector is represented by the formal sector, concentrated and atrophic, often governed by state-owned enterprises and politically connected private companies. It is a model that, avoiding competition, generates excessive profits and a completely distorted allocation of resources. This “distorted” formal economy then coexists with a widespread informal economy, in which many workers operate in a context of poor protection and very low wages.

**Figure 2. Total youth unemployment as a% of the workforce**



Source: World Bank Statistical Database

Many countries in the area have failed to take advantage of the growth opportunities that other developing regions, such as Emerging Asia, are successfully exploiting. The countries of the southern shore have slipped below the level of human development that could be expected, also in consideration of the level of per capita income. The gap between this area and regions such as Latin America and South East Asia is widening inexorably also in this respect. The UNDP reports on human development in the Arab world have repeatedly highlighted several problems that are seriously affecting the region in this respect<sup>4</sup>.

Across the region, education systems lag behind those in other developing regions. The inadequacy of ICT infrastructures and the relatively low levels of literacy and digital skills, particularly in rural areas, constitute an important obstacle to the full development and integration of the region in the digital economy. Although the number of internet users is constantly increasing (fig. 3), access to the network is still very limited, albeit with different levels of penetration, ranging from just over 30 subscriptions per 100 people in Egypt, to 90 Internet subscriptions for 100 people in the United Arab Emirates.

Over the past decade, MENA countries have invested 3-5% of gross domestic product in ICT infrastructure, a higher figure than in Latin America, Europe and Central Asia, but lower than in South and East Asia. The gap, however, still remains relevant. Indeed, the “Technological Trends in Mena Region 2018” Report clarifies that the investment and maintenance needs of infrastructures to support digital technologies in MENA countries up to 2020 were much higher, and amounted to approximately 106 billion US dollars per year (6.9% of the annual regional GDP).

Furthermore, the issue of gender inequalities is still critical. It is interesting to note, in this sense, that gender inequalities in the MENA region are particularly acute in some fields (the most striking example is that of employment), while in others they are in line with societies with equivalent levels of development or lower. If we consider, for example, the health aspects, despite the extreme variability of the conditions and starting points of the individual countries, a positive picture emerges, in which the indicators relating to life expectancy and rates of fertility and maternal mortality show a general improvement.

In recent decades, access to formal education for women has also been on the rise throughout the region. In general, progress in education is positively correlated with participation in the world of work. In the region, on the other hand, there is a disconnection between education and employment, with a growing level of education that is accompanied by low and stagnant participation rates in the world of work, a peculiarity to which the World Bank (2013) refers as “MENA paradox”.

The percentage of working women, therefore, still remains the lowest in the world, with only 21% of women in the region being economically active (Nazier, 2019).


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<sup>4</sup> The UNDP Reports on Human Development in Arab Countries, edited by the United Nations Development Program, are available online at: <http://www.arab-hdr.org/>

The problem is most critical in Bahrain, Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia where female unemployment is 2 to 3 times higher than the region's average. Not surprisingly, in parallel, the gender pay gap in MENA countries is one of the highest in the world, at around 40%, especially in the private sector. In a trend scenario, it is projected that it will take over 150 years to close the gender pay gap.

It is evident, even from this limited presentation of socio-economic indicators, that the MENA region has not been expressing its potential for several decades. With a few exceptions, this observation applies to oil-exporting countries as well as to countries that do not export oil, which still seem to struggle to build the foundations for future economic and social development.

**Figure 3. Internet users (% of the population)**



Source: World Bank Statistical Database

### 3. THE WEIGHT OF HISTORY AND THE CONSTRAINTS OF RESOURCES

Among the various elements of uniqueness that characterize the economic profile of the MENA region, the most important is probably the dependence of many countries in the area on oil exports or transfers from oil-exporting countries to support consumption and development.

Indeed, the Mena region represents a crucial space in the present and in the future of energy production. Overall, considering all energy sources of fossil origin (oil, natural gas and coal), it accounts for 13.4% of the total world reserves. Looking at the production data, the impact of the Mena area on the world total rises to 20.5% (Forte and Canitano, 2019).

There are, however, important structural differences, due to the different distribution of energy resources. Countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia are poor in resources and rich in manpower. Others, such as Algeria, Iran,

Syria and Yemen are, at the same time, rich in resources and manpower, while the Gulf countries are rich in oil and have been importing labour for a long time. Despite this, all have lagged behind other developing countries in terms of human development. The dependence of the economy on oil seems to have diminished the incentives to engage in a broader reform aimed at development, since in exporting countries, income from oil has long represented a practical, albeit unstable, means of supporting consumption. On the other hand, it must be considered that the oil sector cannot be a sustainable source of employment, capable of absorbing the growing workforce of the young populations of energy exporting countries: the energy industry is in fact typically capital intensive and generates fewer jobs than in other sectors. Economic diversification should therefore be a political imperative for the creation of jobs in the MENA area, especially in a scenario of increasing youth unemployment<sup>5</sup>.

In addition to energy products and a limited range of Mediterranean agricultural products, the region tends to export low-value finished products and import most components due to its highly inefficient vertically integrated manufacturing base.

To understand this situation, the concept of economic complexity, which is closely associated with economic development and greater added value in trade, is useful. The Economic Complexity Index tracks both the “diversity” of products in the export basket (i.e. the number of products a country can competitively export), and the “ubiquity” of products in the export basket (i.e. the number of countries capable of exporting a product competitively). In the MENA region, the economic complexity index in oil-exporting countries is lower than it is in many emerging markets and even other commodity exporters. Excessive dependence on oil and oil-related exports implies a very limited added value and therefore less “complex” products (Yalta A. Y., Yalta T., 2019). Only 4.2% of the region’s manufacturing exports are classified as high-tech, compared to about 24.5% in East Asian and Pacific nations.

A dominant concern in the MENA region is its high and growing dependence on international markets for major staple food products, due to the growing scarcity of arable land and water resources. This has led to the adoption of a series of policies which nevertheless seem absolutely unsuitable if we look at the region’s resource endowment, due to a vision of food security that aims to reduce dependence on imports, particularly about cereals<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, reliance on a single product has made some major economies in the region sensitive to fluctuations and extremely volatile conditions for their trade, while government spending patterns tend to exacerbate the effects of fluctuations in product prices. Kuwait, Oman and Iran have established sovereign wealth funds that require a portion of oil revenues to be placed abroad, in order to mitigate the impact of oil price swings on the non-oil-related national economy. Other countries in the region have found themselves facing extreme fluctuations in their revenues, which represent an inadequate basis to fuel long-term sustainable growth whose benefits can be shared more generally (Amato, 2012).

<sup>6</sup> While the MENA region is one of the most deficient in terms of arable land and water, it has the lowest water rates in the world and subsidizes water consumption with around 2% of GDP. Consequently, the productivity of water use is only half the world average. The elements of uncertainty relating to the continuity and security of food supplies have prompted some Mena countries to adopt the land grabbing strategy, acquiring fertile land abroad.

The value of gross agricultural production per hectare of agricultural land, which is a global indicator of land use productivity, is extremely low, and only sub-Saharan Africa performs worse. This value reflects the high percentage of arable land destined for low-yielding temperate climate crops, as well as the low productivity of pastures in desert areas<sup>7</sup>.

A look at the level of interconnection of the region shows how, on the southern shore, where import substitution was an essential feature of the old development model, the level of protectionism (measured in terms of both tariff and non-tariff barriers) remains very high, causing an increase in costs and a penalty for exporters and making diversification more and more difficult with respect to the oil sector.

The region also lags behind in terms of the level of participation in global value chains, not only global but also regional. This represents a major element of great criticality, considering that the growth of productive integration between Mediterranean countries could profitably involve other sectors of the economy such as logistics and maritime transport, also favouring a reduction in migratory pressure from the southern Mediterranean towards the northern shore.

The lack of regional and global integration therefore reduces MENA's growth prospects and represents a disadvantage from the point of view of attracting foreign direct investments. The level of foreign direct investment in the area is, in fact, still low (fig. 4). Potential investors are discouraged by an environment for business characterized by inadequate manpower training, political instability, insecurity, excessive bureaucracy, heavy government interference and delays, strong trade barriers, high costs for shipping goods, long lead times for customs formalities. Many countries in the area, notably Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Egypt, have some of the most daunting entry barriers to economic activity in the world. Foreign investment is also hampered by coercive state structures, which tend to stifle any economic initiative by inducing suspicion and generalized reservations in the region regarding integration into the globalization process which, vice versa, has been a strategic element in getting the economy off the ground. other developing areas.

Much of the flows in 2017 were concentrated in the United Arab Emirates and Egypt (which accounted for around 37% and 27% of flows in the region), followed by Morocco (9.5%), Lebanon (9.4%) and Oman (6.7%). Most of the FDI in the region went to energy, real estate, financial services and consumer products.


Intra-regional FDI is concentrated on real estate (59% of the total value of projects), food and tobacco products (8.2%) and renewable sources (7.5%). Their level remains low, despite the existence of a variety of preferential and regional trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties. The top four beneficiary nations, Egypt, Saudi Ara-

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<sup>7</sup> Not all countries have such poor results. Egypt, with rich soils, irrigated grain production and an almost total absence of pastures, produces over USD 6,000 of product per hectare of agricultural land. Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait also produce over 1,000 dollars of product per hectare, with very little area dedicated to cereals (Oecd-Fao Agricultural Outlook, 2018-2027).

bia, Jordan and Algeria received half of the investments flowing into the region in the period 2003-2017 (OECD, 2018)<sup>8</sup>.

**Figure 4. Foreign direct investment of the MENA region with the world, millions of US dollars**



Source: Unctad, 2020

Given that in the countries of the area the capital to be allocated to investments is very rare, companies have few opportunities to enhance the technical or physical capacity of their activities. Furthermore, many companies in the region are opposed to dealing with inextricable bureaucratic formalities, which impose enormous costs on their activities. Underdeveloped, opaque and sometimes corrupt judicial systems add extra burdens, undermining the rule of law, transparency and predictability that markets need to thrive. Most of the analyses highlight how the cost of setting up a business is significantly higher in the area than in East Asia or Central Europe, due to the bureaucracy and other barriers to market access.

Gaps in the authorities' accountability and transparency only worsen the situation. All these shortcomings explain the certainly not good place occupied by the countries of the region in the global governance ranking; the oil producing countries of the region are the ones with the lowest levels. The Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency International (IPC, 2018) shows that, despite the progress made by some countries, most of the region is failing in the fight against corruption.

<sup>8</sup> In some cases, special economic zones and free trade zones have acted as facilitators of FDI inflows. In the United Arab Emirates, for example, free zone trade accounts for 88% of non-oil exports and has generated significant local employment, increasing exports and accelerating economic growth. Again, conditions are extremely variable. In other cases, in fact, problems such as working conditions and the lack of benefits for the local economy were reported (OECD, 2018).


#### 4. SCENARIO AND PERSPECTIVES

After the economic crisis linked to oil prices, with GDP peaking in 2017, following the production cuts imposed by OPEC and Russia, a period of recovery, albeit gradual, seemed to begin for the Middle East and North Africa (fig. 5). Thanks to the increase in the price of oil, many governments, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Oman, had in fact begun to relax their fiscal consolidation policies and to adopt measures to increase capital spending, in order to promote national economic diversification programs, also adopting policies to support vulnerable families to quell growing social tensions.

The pandemic has interrupted these attempts, impacting on systems already quite compromised, and causing fear of the collapse of weak health systems, highly inadequate from the point of view of both infrastructures and medical personnel, a consequence of insufficient investments in health (the health expenditure varies from 0.6% of GDP in Yemen to 4.5% in Algeria). The conflicts in Yemen, Libya and Syria also complicate the possibility of responding effectively to health challenges (Dacrema E., Talbot V., 2020).

In an already highly restrictive scenario from the point of view of individual freedoms, emergency plans have further increased the control of governments over their citizens, generating the real risk that the restrictions may persist and transcend the need to limit the pandemic.

**Figure 5 . GDP per capita (annual% increase)**



Source: World Bank Statistical Database

No less worrying are the social, economic and social consequences associated with the slowdown in growth at a global level, particularly in China and in European countries with which the area has close economic and energy relations.

While it is currently impossible to provide concrete data on the actual economic impact of the pandemic, the first negative effects can still be noted. Disruptions in global economic activity have reduced demand for the region's goods and services, particularly oil, but also tourism and remittances, two key sectors for Mena countries. In fact, tourism accounts for 16% of GDP in Tunisia, 12% in Egypt, 11% in Morocco and the United Arab Emirates, just to mention some data (ISPI Mena Watch data, 2020). The various countries of the region are trying to cope with the emergency using tools such as measures to strengthen the health system (for example Morocco) or to support the economy and growth (quite substantial in the case of the rich monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)).

However, the fall in the price of oil and the persistence of low prices could influence oil producing and exporting countries that also transcends the economic dimension, being able to compromise the stability of governments in which political and social consensus is based on the redistribution of oil revenues.

The economic dependence of many countries on the southern shore on the extraction of fossil fuels in progressively depleting, or in any case no longer strategically important as in the past, makes it necessary to reprogram one's future by identifying alternative strategies for development and economic growth. Strategies that must necessarily be inclusive for large sections of the population to allow the growth process to feed itself and not remain dependent on the ability to attract investments from abroad which can at any time be transferred elsewhere (Forte et al., 2018). In fact, for sustainable growth over time it is necessary for internal consumption to grow and increasingly move towards local productions, fuelling the virtuous circle of manufacturing development.

The region therefore still faces numerous challenges from various points of view. Concrete development will only be possible through a significant expansion of the private sector, which, however, cannot play a leading role without developing the means necessary for the allocation of capital in favour of those companies characterized by a greater possibility of assuming a competitive position in the within the international division of labour. In MENA countries, the private sector is very limited when compared to the size it has taken on in most other developing countries. This limitation is attributable to a lack of capital, an excess of regulation and excessively high barriers, customs and otherwise. The entry costs for new businesses are discouraging since the weight of regulations, high taxation, Byzantine legal systems combined, sometimes, with an open favouritism towards national champions, reduce competitiveness in the entire region and discourage foreign investments that they should normally be an important catalyst for development.

Governments in the region must therefore adopt comprehensive strategies to improve the economic situation and development prospects by simplifying regulations, privatizing public holdings, especially in the banking, telecommunications and services sectors, breaking down customs and non-customs barriers, improving business legal

transparency, as well as the state's ability to enforce laws in a consistent and transparent manner.

In many countries, two thirds of the population are under thirty years of age while the European population is aging in an inevitable way, configuring a potentially complementary demographic structure. European immigration policies lead us to think that a sharp increase in migratory flows from the region would not be politically acceptable. Nonetheless, both sides need to assess how this demographic reality could be exploited to better respond to future employment needs.

In any case, no strategy can be successful if changes are not introduced such as to provide for more democratic political structures, more transparent legal and regulatory institutions, free and independent media, a wider margin of manoeuvre for a more developed civil society, a higher level of equality between the sexes and updated teaching methods, capable of equipping workers with skills appropriate to the global economy.

Democracy and social and economic development must go hand in hand, as only inclusive political institutions can produce inclusive economic institutions capable of creating incentives for solid and equitable development.

Positive political changes, therefore, will be an essential complement to the economic transition, especially as civil society seems to increasingly demand them. If the countries of the region do not take valid measures to meet these needs, the consequences could again generate a dangerous chain reaction throughout the area.

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# TBILISI URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: ON THE VERGE OF SUCCESS/FAILURE

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## **Abstract**

The movements selected for the study “Defend Vake Park” and “No to Panorama Tbilisi!” developed in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, in almost one period of time. However, the results of the movements are different: the first can be attributed to the category of successful movements and the second - to the category of unsuccessful ones. By studying various secondary and primary sources and interviewing actors involved in activism, we argue that the results of selected movements were influenced by the following factors: properly planned strategy, investor/investment factor, and favorable political context.

**Key words:** *Urban Activism, Urban Redevelopment, Georgia, Political Context, Strategy*

## **INTRODUCTION**

Unlike western countries, where research of social movements has been a popular subdiscipline for a decade, it is a relatively new phenomenon in post-soviet countries. Its emergence began with the weakening of the strict policies of socialist countries and the collapse of communism. Georgia, like other post-communist countries, after gaining independence (1991), faced the significant challenges of underdevelopment of state institutions, ethnic conflicts, civil war and foreign military conflicts, inflation, unemployment, and so on – simply, the crisis of statehood. It took the country more than a decade to escape this situation. Therefore, against this background, care for urban historical/cultural heritage and ecological health was less on the agenda. After the Rose Revolution (2003), various reforms were carried out in political, cultural, economic, social and other areas; After strengthening state institutions, the issue of re-urbanization of cities was gradually put on the agenda. One of the main components of modernization and re-urbanization - attracting investors and making significant investments in the development of the cities, has, over time, led to the distortion of various historical monuments or entire historic districts. At the same time, growing urbanism politics also resulted in an acute shortage of green space in the city. The given processes brought about a practically complete amortization of the historically/culturally and ecologically unique urban fabric. Finally, it resulted in urban civic activism.

Such processes are not unique to Georgia. It has become a side event of the modern world's big cities too, where usually central districts are adjusted for tourists. Zagreb Central Flower Garden Events (2006-2008), Movement Against Hamburg Renewal Policy in 2009 and Anti-Tourism Movement in Barcelona (2014) are examples of mobilization against the phenomenon of: "cities for people, cities for-profit" [Brener et al. 2012]. For our research, we have selected two cases of activism in Tbilisi (the capital of Georgia, with a population of over a million): "Defend Vake Park" and "No to Panorama Tbilisi!". The following factors conditioned the selection of the given movements: both were distinguished by the age and professional diversity of the actors involved: with (art) historians, politicians, citizens, artists, and public figures. They were developed in the same city during the same period (2013-2019), and the actors involved were virtually the same. However, the strategy, repertoire, inter and out-group communication activism, as well as the results of them, differ. Therefore, the question arises: what are the main factors influencing the divergent outcomes of these movements? Accordingly, our discussion is focused on explaining the reasons for the movements' results as the core puzzle. We have analyzed the political process and its opportunities, inter and between-group constitution, government and activist strategy, and communication between actors involved. As a result, we argue that the main factors determining different outcomes of studied movements are proper strategy, appropriate political context, and investor strength.

## **1. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: THEORETICAL APPROACHES**

Introducing the concept of urban social movements in the social sciences is associated with the name of Manuel Castells (1977). For him, the urban social movement is the result of the unification of trade unions, political groups, and urban organizations [Pickvance 2003]. Although Castells initially discusses it from the standpoint of Marxist theory and describes the development of urban movements as a result of class antagonism, he later expands his view to focus on collective consumption, trade unionism, human rights, and culture [Castells 1983]. Gradually, the study of the relationship between urban development and the growth of social resistance becomes even more relevant [Slater 1997; Leitner et al. 2008]. However, the research was still limited to focusing on macro effects and usually paid less attention to the connection of urban social activism with the political process [Andretta et al. 2015]. For example, for Castells (1983), a social movement's development in urban space can be formed when the actors of this movement are, at the same time, members of a more significant movement. Unlike such a macro approach, Pickvance (2008) emphasizes the need for specific political and social conditions to make a basis for civic activism development in urban space. According to Pruitt (2007), citizens try to gain control over their urban environment through urban social movements. One of the aspects of establishing this control is the achievement of urban planning through which citizens can protect their favorite places from demolition, radical change, or alienation. The study of urban and civic activism is conducted from different points of view. For collective behavior theorists, people involved in civic activism are viewed negatively; they are framed not as political actors but as irrational and socially marginalized [Buechler 2000; Della Porta, Diani 2006]. Many authors do not support this theory, for whom people involved in social movements are considered to be wholly rational and thoughtful people [Turner, Killian 1972; McCarthy, Zald 1987; McAdam, 1982]. One of the widely used approaches is to study social movements in the framework of resource mobilization theory [Wilson 1973; Tilly 1973, 1975; Gamson 1975; Oberschall 1973; Lipsky 1968;]. For example, for McCarty and Zald (1977), the aggregation of resources based on collective goals and some self-organization is essential for the success of social movements. There is always a degree of dissatisfaction in society. It is precisely the organization and articulation, as well as the representation of the interests of previously excluded groups from policy-making [Jenkins, Perrow 1977; Tilly 1978] and support of an elite group that makes it possible to mobilize support for grass-root [Turner, Killian 1972].

Another general theory in studying the results of social movements is political process theory, according to which as a stimulus and facilitator of the resistance movement is the emergence of political opportunities in the system [Eisinger 1973; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1983; Caren 2007]. Nevertheless, both theories are criticized: political process theory because of its too much focus on the political process and resource mobilization theory – because of its political leveling process. Another

important aspect is “a debate between internal and external explanations of social movement outcomes” [Giugni, 1999]. For many researchers [Gamson 1975; Clemens 1993], internal factors, particularly organizational aspects, play a significant role in the success of a movement. The combination of solid and weak group connections in organizing structure [Granovetter 1983], the adequately planned framing process [Snow et al., 1986], and the tactics of struggle used during the protest cycle [Tilly 2006], are that internal factors which play the most crucial role in the social movement’s success literature.

In contrast to giving crucial importance to internal/organizational factors, many researchers believe that external factors are the most critical determinants of a movement’s influence and success. Political circumstances [Jenkins, Perrow 1977: 70; Almeida, Stearns 1998; Eisinger 1973; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982] or as Tarrow (1998) calls it - political opportunity is the main external factor that has the most significant impact on the movement’s long-term success). Despite the wide variety of social movement theories, studying the cases we have selected for research within one particular theory/model framework is challenging. Each of the given theories is, in some respects, an ideal type that operates differently in a different space. In post-communist countries, social movements had their peculiarities, making them completely different from the Western development model [Gagy 2015].

However, is it necessary to discuss particular civic activism based on any premeditated model or theory? In the paper, we prefer to gather and analyze data focusing on processes and mechanisms rather than trying to approve pre-selected normative/teleological provisions [Castaneda 2020]. Accordingly, we will try to answer the research question based more on the empirical study of the research examples than on a particular theory.

## **2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

The research is based on qualitative methodology. More specifically, we are using the case study strategy defined by Snow and Trom (2002) as a richly detailed, thick elaboration of the phenomenon. By triangulation of multiple methods, we have analyzed primary and secondary sources. In analyzing the secondary sources, we studied the vast Western literature on social movements and movements developed in Georgia. In addition, we have studied the decisions, statutes, treaties, agreements, or memoranda made at the central and local self-government levels related explicitly to the research issue. At the same time, we requested all the available documentation related to the selected cases from the Tbilisi City Hall and the City Assembly to analyze the communication between governmental circles and activists.

In parallel, information about current movements was mainly disseminated through online media. So we have processed articles, interviews, and announcements published around the issue in the highest-rated online media in Georgia from 2014 to 2019. (total 164 articles, statements, interviews, or information during the period of

movement development). It examined news agencies: Netgazeti, Interpresnews, Civil.ge; For.ge; Online publishing: Liberali, Tabula, et al. While information about quite all events held during the studied movements was mainly spread through the social network, we analyzed the posts, calls, materials, comments, reviews, etc. on various Facebook and Twitter pages by using content analysis. This technique helped trace debates and compared the arguments of the involved sides.

In addition, 25 semi-structured interviews were conducted during the research process to recover the protest cycles fully. 15 women and 12 men aged 23-65 were interviewed. Respondents were selected based on their different involvement in the movements, roles, and attitudes. On the principle of purposefulness, respondents were selected and interviewed from the leaders and active members of each movement, including representatives of various non-governmental organizations, lowers, and members of the opposition political parties, “rank-and-file” activists selected on the snowball principle, and the investor. The anonymity of all respondents in the text is maintained. Respondents were interviewed from January 2020 to June 2020, when none of the movements studied was in the active phase.

At the initial stage of the study, a small set of a priori codes was identified. These were based on media research and included assumptions about movement strategies, communication forms of involved actors, perception of the opposite side, and solidarity among the activists. The inductive codes created for the research were: level of engagement, roles, and responsibilities, methods to protect or produce new order, timeframe, authority, metaphor, assessing others, and self-assessment. By processing and comparing the primary data obtained from interviews, we could fully identify the origins and stages of the studied movements and answer research questions.

### **3. POST-ROSE REVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE EMERGENCE OF URBAN CIVIC ACTIVISM**

Activism that began in Georgia in the late 1980s took the form of a national liberation movement and lasted until the collapse of the Soviet system. Therefore, after gaining independence because of the complex social, economic, and political situation, urban development problems, and generally, “the question of cities was relegated to a side note in mainstream political discourse” [see Pluciński 2018: 655].

While discussing social movements, it is crucial to consider current socio-economic and political factors, as their combination influences the results of the movements [Saeed 2009]. Indeed, for the first time in the history of independent Georgia, the peaceful change of government in 2012 and the replacement of the previous political party in power - United National Movement (UNM) by a new political force, the “Bidzina Ivanishvili - Georgian Dream” (GD) has led to a political power shift in the city’s self-government (the UNM Mayor replacement by a representative of the GD Mayor) as well. The “Defend Vake Park” movement started during the UNM’s rule and continued after GD came to power, while “No to Panorama Tbilisi!” started and completed

during the rule of the GD. Despite radically different political beliefs and platforms, the attitudes of both political forces toward attracting investment in the tourism sector and reorganizing the cities are similar. Therefore, selected cases are studied in the context of these political processes.

In the period of UNM governance, in 2007, Georgia moved from 112th to 37th and, in 2010, to 13th place<sup>1</sup> in terms of doing business. It resulted from radical, far-reaching reforms for trade liberalization and improving the business environment, as well as making the country an attractive place for investors. Accordingly, unprecedentedly has increased the inflow of foreign investment in the country.<sup>2</sup>

Like the previous government for GD, it was also essential to carry out fundamental reforms for “attracting foreign investment,”<sup>3</sup> most of which were planned to be made in tourism - the fastest-growing sector in the country. The increased tourism potential naturally meant making the cities more attractive to potential investors. In 2005, Saakashvili spoke about “the obvious interest of the biggest companies” in Georgia’s tourism potential and the construction of “the world’s largest and most prestigious hotels in Tbilisi.”<sup>4</sup> The given discourse was continued by the elected GD Mayor of Tbilisi, for which one of the main arguments for constructing the Panorama Tbilisi project was the inflow of “half a billion investment, ... which is followed by the development of tourism.”<sup>5</sup> The “New urbanism” [Salet 2012] - achieved as a result of foreign investments, infrastructural transformation, and active tourism development, aimed to transform the urban space from a modern city to a post-industrial city and, as a result, brought about fundamental changes. The increasing degree and cases of mobilization in urban space are usually associated with this type of economic reorganization and urban redevelopment [Feinstein and Feinstein 1985]. Also, in Tbilisi, attempts to carry out such transformation have led to the developing of two civic activism cases we intend to research. In both cases, the reason for starting the movement was the politics to make the city more attractive to tourists. On the opposite side of activism there are always authorities and investors. However, investors are different, as well as their planned investments.

Vake Park, located in the most prestigious part of the city, remains an important recreational function for Tbilisi’s inhabitants. Activism toward defending Vake Park

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<sup>1</sup> Doing Business, Equal Opportunity for all, 2017. [http://www.economy.ge/uploads/ek\\_ciprebshi/reitingebi/reitingebi\\_geo/Doing\\_Business\\_2017\\_-\\_GEO\\_8.12.pdf](http://www.economy.ge/uploads/ek_ciprebshi/reitingebi/reitingebi_geo/Doing_Business_2017_-_GEO_8.12.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> Average annual growth was 9.3 percent during 2004–07. Net foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows reached 16.5 percent of GDP in 2007. See. World Bank Group. 2018. Georgia from reformer to performer, p. 20 <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/496731525097717444/pdf/GEO-SCD-04-24-04272018.pdf>

<sup>3</sup> Interview with Prime minister Giorgi Gakharia given to “Ipress” on December 17, 2020, <https://ipress.ge/new/giorgi-gakharia-pirdapiri-utskhouri-investitsiebis-mozidvis-thvalsazrisith-82-qveqhanas-s-horis-me-8-adgili-davikaveth>.

<sup>4</sup> Annual summarizing speech in Parliamentary spring session by Georgia’s President Mikheil Saakashvili, 2005 <https://www.president.gov.ge/Files/ShowFiles?id=0d2119cd-37c3-4365-b36a-71d7e09ddfe7>.

<sup>5</sup> As stated by Tbilisi Myer, David Narmania in 2015, July 20. <https://www.timer.ge//აზრობ-გამოხატვის-უფლება/>.

(2013) was triggered by the park rehabilitation project, according to which the construction of a 5-storey hotel in the park was envisaged.<sup>6</sup> [Maghaldadze 2016]. In this case, the investor is local “Tiflisi Development.”

Another movement – “No to Panorama Tbilisi!”- was dealing with the city’s historic part. After the public announcement (2014) about the construction of the Panorama Tbilisi project, the organizations working on cultural heritage sites soon stated that this project was contrary to the regulations set by law and the World Heritage Guidelines.<sup>7</sup> However, this case is distinguished from the Vake Park case for two reasons. Firstly, the Panorama Tbilisi project is the largest project ever implemented in Tbilisi, and the planned investment of more than \$ 500 million is unprecedentedly high for the Georgian reality. Secondly, the author and financial implementer of the project idea is the former prime minister, the founder of the “GD,” and an influential political figure, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, according to whom, “if not his whim no investor would agree to invest in this project.”<sup>8</sup>

#### **4. GOVERNMENT STRATEGY: HOW DOES IT WORK?**

The strategy used by the opposing sides involved in the process plays an essential role in the success/failure of any civic activism process. In both cases studied, the civic activist strategy is different, while the action style and strategy of the authorities are more or less similar. Between strategies used by the authorities can be outlined as follows: communication/cooperation. Social movements often emerge because of the private/public sector interdependence/cooperation. Also, protests emerge when there is a lack of dialogue-based communication and information between local governments and the citizens [Mišetić, Ursić 2010]. As it is noticed, the private and public sectors, for various reasons, are driven by common interests. The public sector should care about urban space development as its obligation. In contrast, the city’s development benefits the private sector by increasing profits [see Mišetić, Ursić 2010]. Lacking participatory political culture in newly created democracies is particularly striking, and consequently, the models of relations among the actors mentioned above are different [Gayi 2015]. Often in post-socialist countries, due to the parallel development of democracy and strict economic policies, interest in economic gain overwhelms the idea of perceiving the city as a single public space. “The Right to the City,” activism against the reconstruction of the Flower Square in Zagreb and the construction of a shopping mall in it - is one of the good proofs of the private/public partnership refusal in favor of economic interests [see Mišetić, Ursić 2010]. In Zagreb, due to the lack of dialogue and communication between the citizens and the government, there was no trust in satisfying the city’s inhabitants’ interests during the reconstruction process [Mišetić, Ursić 2010]. The situation is similar in Georgia,

<sup>6</sup> It should be noted that in this same territory from the Soviet period has been located the restaurant “Budapest.”

<sup>7</sup> Inicijativa sajaro sivrcistvis [Initiative for public space] 2016. Legal research. <https://bit.ly/3AKbI-Va>.

<sup>8</sup> Ivanishvili interview with Guria News Agency, 2015, July 28. <https://gurianews.com/?p=730368>.

where the government has an undemocratic, unhealthy attitude toward the city's development processes and is less aware that the city is for everyone. It is a public space [Interview 3, 22, 5]. The lack of willingness of the people holding power to communicate and cooperate with the public and civil activists is evident in the cases selected for our research.

The government never took the initiative regarding public discussions and understanding the problem. Public discussions organized by the government were initiated only when everything had already been decided, what, where, and how to build; they informed us about it like news on TV. No one wanted to talk to us when we asked for a discussion. Once we went and had a picnic inside the town hall, playing badminton, reading books and lying down [Interview 5].

In the rare and often fictitious meetings between the authorities and the activists fighting to defend Vake Park, the communication style of the authorities was less directed towards solidarity and cooperation. The perception that saving Vake Park as the most crucial recreation area for the city is not a demand of one particular group of people, and it is in the interest of Tbilisi citizens - is less. "We need beds in Vake Park, not trees. That was the government's response to the fact that we lack green space in Tbilisi" Even the "simulated meetings" with the city government did not last long "because the elections coincided and the government changed" [Interview 22]. However, changing political situation causes the beginning of cooperation between the government and activists. The government's readiness for communication/cooperation usually occurs when the newly elected city self-government inherits the activism started during the previous city's self-government. In such cases, the strategy of the city government changes - it becomes relatively open for dialogue and cooperation. The coming to power of GD in 2012 made it possible to emerge a "window of opportunity" [Giugni 2009]. Despite the continuation of the protests, the movement organizers and the authorities started cooperating to rectify the situation around the park [Interview 1].

To some extent, it could be said that communication took place in the case of the "Defend Vake Park" movement. The investor directly communicated with both sides. Two primary reasons can explain this. Firstly, as GD's representative became Tbilisi Mayor, he imposed full responsibility on the previous government, stressing the issue of illegal construction in the park<sup>9</sup>. However, the perception that the culprit is not the investor but the state, which allows someone to buy a recreation area and start construction there [Interview 22], was less. Another factor facilitating communication was that for a GD, the investor was seen as a person close to UNM.

Consequently, the GD government stopping the construction in Vake Park could be understood in the context of getting political points. The change of government also led the investor to sit at the negotiating table because – "the government should not

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<sup>9</sup> Tbilisi Mayor David Narmania declares the city's self-government political decision to stop construction in Vake Park. <https://tbilisi.gov.ge/news/2881>.

be opposed. Otherwise, it will stop, destroy, and spoil you” [Interview 8]. At the same time, the investor, whom the new city government no longer supports, communicates with the activists and tries to convince them of the planned construction benefits in Vake Park [Interview 8, 22].

Unlike Vake Park, in the case of the Panorama project, factually, all kinds of communication and cooperation with the government and investor were closed entirely from the very beginning, as the “most powerful person in Georgia’s politics and the investor was the same person.” The only form of communication between the local government and civil activists was the attendance of civic activists in the process of discussing the issue at the City Assembly meeting sessions (with the support of opposition City Assembly members by making so-called passes) and “arranging noisy discussions” [Interview 4].

*Changing Regulations* is a well-trying strategy by the government for a planned construction site. Before the construction of Vake Park, the government changed the legislation and allowed the construction in recreational areas. Also, in the case of Panorama Tbilisi, the government, in an accelerated procedure on 2015 December 30, “made a pre-New Year present to anti-construction activists” [Interview 21] and by granting the project site the status of a “residential zone” instead of a “recreational” one, factually lays the groundwork for construction.

*City governments’* other most common strategies are prolonged time and “doing nothing” [Interview 25]. The lawsuits filed by civil activists the court did not even consider for a long time. Finally, after reviewing them - in the case of Panorama, due to procedural violations did not enter into production, while in the case of Vake Park did not meet the requirements of the plaintiff. The prolonging of time by the authorities was a well-calculated and purposeful action because, as one activist pointed out, “they also have lawyers and know that a loss of legal interest can lead to lawsuit neglect” [Interview 27]. Accordingly, neglecting the rallies and various forms of protest is a well-calculated step by the government. Because “the best way to quell a protest is to do nothing and wait. People do not continuously stand on the street. Because usually, a person wants to go home, to be with family, to work” [Interview 25].

*Creating an informational vacuum* - In obtaining a construction permit for Panorama, the regulations were sent to the members of the City Assembly late or not at all. So “sometimes the members of the City Assembly did not even know what they were going to discuss [Interview 18]. Consequently, virtually all procedural issues were discussed in just a few days without any problems or questions. However, there were cases when, despite the delay of the regulations and the government’s attempt to raise the issue with less noise, the civil activists managed to get information from opposition parties and attend the hearings, as a result of which “there was a lot of noise and clashes” [Interview 15]. Since the activists still managed to get information and were protesting it in the City Council, “the government acted cunningly, and the City Assembly procedurally avoided this responsibility handing it over to the

government which approved it” [Interview 13]. Another manifestation of the attempt to create an information vacuum is the government’s appeal only about the project’s potential benefits, bypassing all negative aspects. Manipulating social issues is one good example of this. In a country where unemployment is one of the main problems, the government actively advocated the Panorama Tbilisi project with the emphasis on “creating 25,000 temporary and permanent jobs” [Interview 14] as well as promising locals “apartments in a new building” [Interview 16].

*Marginalization of protesters.* Sewing NIMBY (Not in My Back Yard)<sup>10</sup> labels for urban transformation protesters is a common fact. Authorities are trying to get activists to wear the NIMBY label while trying to gain public attention and disperse the validity of the label, considering these people to be enemies of the common good [Andretta et al. 2015]. In the cases selected for research, the government tried to portray construction opponents as enemies of development as they “want to stop construction in Georgia. They want to destroy the country; they are pests and do not hide it.”<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, activists must repel these labels, “it is as if someone wants to improve the city, but we are against development. It is not true - we are development supporters [Kevanishvili 2015]. In addition, in portraying activists as enemies of progress and development, one of the most active methods of marginalization is to refer to activists as the main opposition political party – UNM supporters. This strategy is actively used against the “No to Panorama Tbilisi!” movement, as the project and activism against it are planned, started, and developed under the GD government. Activists were baptized as UNM “neurotic politicians’ thoughts” supporters.<sup>12</sup> At the same time, activists were accused of lying. This method is used especially concerning the negative conclusions about Panorama construction by international organizations such as “Save Europe’s Heritage”, “Europa Nostra”, “World’s Monuments Fund”, “Edinburgh World Heritage”, and ecc.<sup>13</sup> The Tbilisi Mayor declared that some forces<sup>14</sup> had misled these international organizations. Governmental manipulation of the issue is also evident in the case of Vake Park when the developer offers the newly arrived city government to cooperate and make concessions. However, given the political game, the government is arranging to “raise the community” (Interview 8) around the construction in Vake Park and use it to discredit the former UNM government.

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<sup>10</sup> Macmillan dictionary. <https://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/nimby>.

<sup>11</sup> Stated Bidzina Ivanishvili, 2019. Tabula, July 17 <https://tabula.ge/ge/news/627922-ivanishvili-aba-nakhet-panoramaze-ra-dgheshi>.

<sup>12</sup> Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili’s statement <https://www.interpressnews.ge/ka/article/455514-giorgi-kvirikashvili-tbilisshi-ketdeba-istoriuli-proekti-romelic-shekmnis-martlac-analogis-armkone-mcvane-sivrces-bizina-ivanishvili-ar-imsaxurebs-imas-rasac-igebs>

<sup>13</sup> International Organizations Are Protesting Panorama Project.” 2015. September 21 <https://tabula.ge/ge/news/578399-saertashoriso-organizatsiebi-panorama-tbilis>.

<sup>14</sup> Tbilisi Mayor David Narmania’s statement <https://www.interpressnews.ge/ka/article/352061-davit-narmania-panorama-tbilis-proektze-arasamtavroebi-xelovnurad-shecdomashi-iqvnen-sheqvanili/>

## 5. INTERNAL FACTORS: REPERTOIRE AND STRATEGY

The protest repertoire is one of the main elements of activism. Unlike the government, the action strategy of the activists has not been uniform and similar, nor has it always been consistent.

In the history of civil activism in independent Georgia, virtually all forms of activism repertoire were mainly built on rallies and various protest gatherings. Similarly, the repertoire used in the case of Vake Park, at the initial stage, was also of a more traditional type - rallies, pickets, setting up tents, as one of the organizers noticed: “We would go to the construction fences, shake them with all our might, and try to break them down” [Interview 31]; However, the initial form of protest has gradually changed and took fully creative form: theatrical performances were staged, exhibitions and various creative types of lessons were held - drawing, the printing of stencils, open lecture-seminars. According to the activists themselves, the transformation of the repertoire was influenced by the successful experience of an entirely positive type of activism repertoire used in the “Save Gudiashvili Square” case.<sup>15</sup>

People were tired and are still tired of this negative and swearing because it does not work, and people know it does not. Because there have been many attempts to achieve things this way, it has never worked. On the contrary, we saw what and how it was in Gudiashvili Square [Interview 5].

So it became activism with a positive repertoire of “enthusiast people who wanted to change” [Interview 10]. It allowed them to express their attitudes and feelings towards the city because, as Castells [1983: 326] notes, “people tend to consider cities, space and urban functions and forms as the mainspring for their feelings.”

In contrast, of the cases mentioned above, the message box of the actions against the Panorama construction was unequivocally negative (it is interesting that the name of the activism itself, unlike another studied case, was built not on the positive- defend/ save something, but on the neglect - no to something). It is true that “the repertoire of collective action will differ in different contexts” [Jacobsson 2016: 7]. It was the same in this case. Although the main forces involved in Panorama’s activism are the same as in the case of Vake Park, the context is entirely different. If in Vake Park “the investor is an ordinary businessman” [interviewer 4], in the case of Panorama Tbilisi, “the enemy was too powerful, the most powerful actor in Georgian politics - Bidzina Ivanishvili.

Moreover, this movement was against his most special interests” [Interview 12]. Accordingly, in contrast to the case discussed, the deviation from positive to negative repertoire occurred because, according to the protest organizers, “with concerts and songs, we could not harm Ivanishvili.” Accordingly, the wholly negative repertoire

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<sup>15</sup> One of the rare exceptions was the movement „Save GudiashviliSquare,” developed in 2009-2015 and directed to protecting the oldest complex of XIX century buildings in the center of old Tbilisi. In addition to the fact that this is the longest and probably the most successful movement in the history of modern Georgia, it is distinguished by its fully positive protest repertoire unknown to the Georgian reality.

of this movement was aimed at the complete political and moral discrediting of the project supporters and authority in general. “It was ordinary bullying with attaching labels such as homeland seller, sold to Ivanishvili, enslaved, and so on” [Interview 6]. *Informing population.* While the number of participants involved in the protest is critical, researchers often emphasize the importance of protesters’ diversity [Wouters, Walgrave 2017]. In any case, properly informing citizens has great importance. In the case of Vake Park, along with the proper strategy, the active involvement of the population in the process was mainly because toward Vake Park, Tbilisi citizens have particular emotional sentiments which, in many cases, date back to childhood [Interview 31, 5]. Additionally, Vake Park, located in one of the most elite areas of Tbilisi, was the only well-equipped park in Tbilisi, which is not distinguished by the abundance of green spaces and large parks.

Consequently, the citizens of Tbilisi had little need to explain the importance of Vake Park. Therefore, the opinion that “Vake Park was protected because it was a Vake Park, public involvement was large, and probably more serious figures were involved in this protest” [Interview 23] does not seem ungrounded. In the case of Panorama, the number of citizens involved in the protest was relatively small. Several factors could cause this.

On the one hand, propaganda by the government to portray the benefits of construction was very active; On the other hand, there was a lack of a clear strategy for raising public awareness and engagement. So, the propaganda of the goodness of construction was active. One of the participants noticed that the government was much more active than “our small education-oriented activities” for the population [Interview 23]. Even the part of the population that would potentially suffer as a result of the project implementation - was not intensively involved in the protest.

On the contrary, as one of the activists pointed out, “authorities promised certain amounts to the population. These people saw huge constructions from the windows of their houses, and nevertheless, they were asking us to protest against the construction” [Interview 4]. At the same time, because of this project implementation, nothing would be destroyed, new facilities would build, significant investments would be made, and jobs would create - played a significant role too. Consequently, in this case, the part of the population for which the re-modeling of the city is a source of benefit and economic prosperity [Andretta et al. 2015] has been overrun.

## **6. CIVIC ACTIVISM: INTRA AND BETWEEN-GROUP CONSTITUTION**

Both cases we have studied are also exciting regarding the intra-group constitution. Many associations and organizations participated in the activism for the protection of Vake Park. However, the single “Guerilla Gardeners” was the initiator and the main organizer of this civic protest. Although, at the local level, the change of city government and the arrival of a new political force led to some intra-group disagreements among the forces involved in the Vake Park movement. According to activists involved

in the protest, activism was alienated from people who, factually, were fighting for political change and not for the sake of saving Vake Park, “they had one goal - to fight the UNA” [Interview 22]. Intra-group confrontation also took place personally, which was explained by the desire to present oneself and gain more visibility and popularity on TV media [Interview 8]. Nevertheless, the unity of the central organizing group of activism was not broken, and the given facts did not affect the overall result.

Generally, the actors involved in social movements and the movements themselves are often neither closely related nor consistently coherent [Castaneda 2020]. It is perhaps most notable in Panorama’s case, which was best illustrated regarding the differences between the groups organizing the protest. The driving force of the process became “Ertad” (together) - the unity of 27 civil society organizations and citizens with different visions, ideological and political beliefs. So one of the disadvantages of this union was its fragmentation and lack of unity.

We thought the Panorama was a topic we could close our eyes to and unite, and we did. This union did not work with other cases - it was created and ended up in Panorama. Because it was the unity of very different associations, gathering people who did not even say “hello” to each other [Interview 7].

On the one hand, active left-wing groups’ appearance at protest meetings with their flags and symbols became the subject of sharp intra-group confrontation. It was unacceptable because “realistic issues were to be resolved in communal politics, and it was more important than the ideological platforms of these people” [Interview 10]. On the other hand, there were activists identified by left-wing groups as neoliberal forces who “everyone knows what they were fighting for – only buildings and landscapes and not surviving ordinary people [Interview 30]. Finally, the method used in the case of “No to Panorama!” - to unite people despite their political and ideological beliefs did not work. So “this union was created and completed in Panorama” [Interview 22].

Although some researchers believe that the involvement of politicians in social activism is an inevitable and positive fact [Andretta et al. 2015], activists’ attitudes towards the involvement of political parties in the protest movement have not been uniform. In studied cases, the involvement of politicians in the protest campaign among ordinary activists was unacceptable. They believed the government could easily use it to discredit the movement and marginalize its members.

We thought that it was unacceptable to cooperate not only with politicians but also with political parties. Because as soon as you collaborate with specific political parties, your motivation is immediately questioned, and you become a person obsessed with the desire to gain power. Also, nobody trusted them. We all remember the past and do not want to associate with these people [Interview 5].

In contrast to this, people who planned and led the activism process, especially in the case of “No to Panorama Tbilisi!” realized that without politicians’ involvement, the movement’s success was impossible

Politicians should not approach us - this opinion is nonsense. Suppose 1000 or even three hundred people are standing on the street. It is a political process, especially if you are protesting something against a billionaire and the most powerful person in the country. A politician is also an ordinary person, and the more people he stands with - the better for him and common business [Interview 6].

Despite these different visions, cooperation between politicians and activists still took place. In the case of “No to Panorama Tbilisi!” civil activists were receiving information about the discussion of the issue in the City Assembly from its opposition political party members. By obtaining the so-called permits, they could attend the gatherings while discussing the issue and had very close coordination. As noted, institutional political actors are ready to aid activists when they benefit from it [Kane 2003; Almeida and Stearns 1998]. Usually, this is a political benefit, as in the case of “No to Panorama Tbilisi!” As one of the members of the opposite political party noticed

We both needed each other, and we both helped each other. You remain a political opponent of society and may not even be listened to. When you are concerned about an issue and are interested in harming the image of the most influential person in Georgian politics, you must ensure that the activists who are more likely to be listened to by citizens - are involved. So they needed to have detailed information [Interview 13].

## **7. COULD IT BE SOMETHING DONE BETTER? – ACTIVIST’S CONCEPTIONS**

There is no uniform attitude among people involved in activism about the appropriateness of the strategy, repertoire, and forms of activism. While in the case of Vake Park, according to activists, the form and ways of protest were more thought out, the case of Panorama was different.

It was more an activist struggle and no long-termed, planned, and strategic struggle. A noise, a scream started. However, usually, governments stifle this shouting. They can marginalize the activists and tell them that they are a representative of that political party, and that is why they are shouting [Interview 6]

Even more, there are different conceptions of whether activist struggle has positive results, and if yes – what? While according to the mayor of Tbilisi, “Vake Park von and nothing will be built on this particular site”<sup>16</sup> The future of any constructions in Vake Park is still vague. On the one hand, according to some activists, “from now on, all authorities will know -if they promise to build something in Vake Park, they will still receive protest” [Interview 5].

On the other hand, some of the organizers are more skeptical - in the case of a change of government, no one knows what the new government will do. Everything will depend on the “goodwill of newly elected city authorities” [Interview 9].

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<sup>16</sup> Nothing will be built in Vake Park– Kakha Kaladze, January 25, 2019, <https://reginfo.ge/politics/item/12145-vakis-parkshi-araperi-ar-ashendeba-%E2%80%93-kaxa-kalawe>

Assessment of the Panorama Tbilisi activism results is also different. Most of the involved actors evaluated it as a failed movement. Moreover, according to one organizer, the authorities razed them to the ground as if they had never existed” [Interview 25]. However, some actors involved, primarily politicians, think it is possible to distinguish several positive outcomes. In addition to attracting media and public attention and unifying citizens with different political views, the most important result was discrediting the government [Interview 21].

Could it be done something differently? Naturally, the actors’ perceptions are also different in this regard. In studied cases, several lawsuits have been filed in court. However, without any results because “the court is when the court is under the control of the authority, you cannot achieve results” [Interview 11]. Nevertheless, according to some activists

This incredulity can only be countered with arguments, which were very difficult to obtain. Some professionals were begging for a lawyer to come and handle these arguments. It is not easy to translate the arguments of art historians into legal arguments. We began doing this too late [interview 13].

While discussing the results of activism, intragroup similarities/differences can be considered an additional determining factor. In the case of the Vake Park movements, the protest was headed by Guerilla Gardeners, within which there was no confrontation and different opinions about the repertoire and tactics of action. At the same time, in the case of Panorama Tbilisi, there was a lack of intergroup consolidation and partnership [Tsuladze et al., 2017]. Even more, “It was not only a gathering of ideologically different people. But these people did not even say” hello” to each other” [Interview 22]. This difference was naturally reflected in the strategy of the movement. While some organizers believed that activism could not be successful without politicians, others had a different opinion.

We thought that it was unacceptable to cooperate with the existing political parties. Because as soon as you start partnering with them, your motivation immediately comes into question. No one trusted them, and nobody wanted to be associated with these people. Only once was there a severe discussion - whether we should let the politicians or not, and this discussion broke up together [Interview 3].

Of course, the controversy over the involvement of politicians is not the only factor determining the results of the Panorama Tbilisi movement. The political situation and the strength/weakness of the investor are essential factors that are identified by all participants involved in the activism process.

Let us imagine that only one organization had done the activism; the result would have been the same. It would happen in all cases, whether one organization would object to it or ten –because the investor was the most influential person in Georgian politics. At the same time, the political situation was beneficial to the government. The Georgian Dream was relatively new to the government, trust was high, and “Ivanishvili charm was then a big factor” [Interview 14].

## **CONCLUSION**

Although both movements we studied developed with the same actors over the same period, their results differ. Based on the analysis of the given movements, we can assume that their results were influenced by both external - independent from the campaign and internal, inter/between-group factors. The analysis of the given cases showed that among the factors that played an essential role in the success of Defend Vake Park one could be outlined: a well-planned action strategy. It was largely conditioned by internal group unity, proper presentation of the problem to the citizens, unequivocally positive repertoire of protest, refusal to involve politicians in the process, and, finally, the emergence of the window of political opportunity. In contrast, Panorama Tbilisi's incoherent, inconsistent, and uniquely disruptive tactics (the result of intra-group differences and disagreements), and ineffective public awareness, played a particular role in the movement's failure.

Favorable political context [Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Almeida and Stearns 1998] is among the most critical factors influencing social movements' results. In our studied cases, the advantages/disadvantages of the political process played a significant role. In the Vake Park case (the partially successful case), the government of the GD has replaced the national government, and the political spectrum of city self-government has also changed. The political process of changing the ruling party had a different impact on the cases studied. As long as the UNM government issued the reconstruction/construction permits in Gudishvili and Vake Park, it was politically advantageous for the new government to meet activists' demands in this area. "The elections were coming; GD representative should have become mayor" [Interview 17]. It would not be easy to discuss the movement's success if this possibility did not appear.

In contrast, in the case of Panorama Tbilisi, the investor was financially and politically influential, and the political context was unfavorable to the movement's success. Finally, as a factor influencing the outcome of the movements, the strengths/weaknesses of investors (however, in social activities theories, less attention is paid to it) could be added. In the case of Vake Park, the investor was not sufficiently strong that it became possible to refuse it. In the case of "No to Panorama Tbilisi!" along with activists' intra- group division and unfavorable political context, the planned unprecedented investment can be considered as one of the main reasons for activism's defeat.

## **Acknowledgment**

This work was supported by the Shota Rustaveli National Science Foundation of Georgia (SRNSFG) [grant number FR-19-124]

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# COMPETITIVENESS OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE

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## **Abstract**

The paper analyses the relative competitiveness of the Slovak Republic and examines in which product groups the country has a comparative advantage compared with the rest of the world. The most commonly used method of calculating the country's comparative advantage is the indicator of revealed comparative advantage. The aim of the paper is to analyse the current comparative advantages of the Slovak Republic through the calculation of the RCA indexes. The application of the Slovak and world-wide export data to RCA index allows us to identify in which sectors Slovakia has got the comparative advantage and is competitive at global level. The analysis of these industries also allows us to identify the threats to the future economic development of Slovakia.

**Key words:** *URCA Index, Revealed Comparative Advantage, Export, Slovakia*

## **INTRODUCTION**

The Slovak Republic is a small country with a very open economy that is dependent on foreign trade. The degree of country's involvement in international trade and cooperation is often the result of the country's impossibility of covering its needs with raw materials and energy resources and there are not enough resources or capacity to meet the domestic demand. By importing the needed goods, a country can use their domestic resources to produce what they are the most suitable for. That allows the economy to deal with the proper allocation and efficient use of scarce resources. Participation in international trade offers the opportunity to specialise in the production of a narrower range of goods and services with lower costs and to benefit from economies of scale even for smaller countries without natural comparative advantages. For companies of any size, this gives the potential to do business with the rest of the world. Trade creates new jobs, contributes to higher wages and better living conditions. The smaller the economy, the higher its openness is assumed.

The extent of a country's involvement in international division of labour and international trade generally depends on the following factors:

- the historical development of the economy;
- the size of the domestic market;
- production possibilities;
- natural assets;
- climatic conditions;
- the geographical location of the country;
- the political situation of the country concerned;
- socio-cultural level of society.

Slovakia's position as a former centrally planned economy has long been conditioned by many historical factors in terms of international trade. The important role was played not only by internal economic and political conditions, but also by fundamental changes in Slovakia's international position. With the accession of the Slovak Republic to the EU, the national market, and along with the integration, the pressure to continuously improve the offered goods have increased, so that they are competitive on the global market. Due to the relatively small internal market and the lack of its own energy raw materials, the Slovak economy has been highly open for a long time. The degree of openness of the Slovak economy has increased in recent decades and reached the highest level of more than 190% in 2018 (see Table 1). Such high openness of the economy means that foreign trade is of key importance for the Slovak economy and creates suitable conditions for high economic growth. On the other hand, there are permanent risks of external (positive and negative) effects on the performance of the Slovak economy.

The territorial orientation of foreign trade is influenced by a number of factors, such as natural conditions, raw materials and energy reserves, lack of domestic capital or the economic and political ambitions of the country. The transformation of the Slovak

economy from centrally planned to market one has been reflected also in foreign trade by changing the territorial structure of trade, with priority being given to a change of orientation from the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance' countries (CMEAS/ COMECON) to advanced world markets, in particular those of Western Europe and the EU countries. Following the establishment of the independent Slovak Republic, the need to focus on the EU markets increased as the existing production capacities had got no longer placement on the markets of the former CMEAS countries. Slovak exporters were increasingly focused on Western markets, but the economy's dependence on raw materials supplies from Russia still persisted.

**Table 1: Slovakia's openness rate as a share of exports and imports of goods and services on GDP**

Time	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
<b>Openness</b>	121,7	120,4	125,1	139,6	147,7	164,6	166,3	162,0	136,2	154,7
Time	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
<b>Openness</b>	169,1	176,3	181,4	178,2	180,9	184,5	188,2	190,9	184,4	170,6

*Source: authors' representation based on Eurostat data (2021)*

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In 1993, the Czech Republic had the largest share of Slovak foreign trade, with which the Slovak economy was linked in the field of supplier-customer relations, and this primacy lasted until 1997. In 1998, the Czech Republic was succeeded by Germany in the first place as a trading partner which still maintains its leading position. Mutual foreign trade is mainly subject to activities of automotive companies and large-scale foreign direct investments. The territorial structure of foreign trade of the Slovak Republic has gradually been transformed and the share of the OECD and the EU countries in both export and import has increased, which was also supported by Slovakia's accession to European integration structures. At present, European coun-

tries account for around 90% of Slovak exports and account for almost 70% of Slovak imports. The V4 countries remain a more important market for Slovakia's exports. Since the 1960s, Slovakia has focused mainly on the export of machinery and metal-working products. Fuels, raw materials and semi-finished products were a key component of imports. The transformation of the Slovak economy into a market economy has largely changed production in many sectors of the economy. The division of Czechoslovakia in 1993 and the inherited structure of the industry characterized by low degree of processing and high energy and material intensity resulted in problems with the initial penetration of Slovak exports into foreign markets. Slovakia had got unused production capacities mainly in the arms industry, which was built for export to the CMEAS countries. Structural changes have mainly affected the mechanical engineering sector, where many products have seen a significant drop in exports and an increase in imports.

In the first half of the 1990s, mainly iron and steel were exported, followed by exports of machinery and equipment, as well as exports of cars, tractors and motorcycles. Since 1995, Slovak exports have gradually started to reduce the weight of iron and steel exports, which can be considered a positive trend in terms of export orientation towards products with higher added value. Motor vehicle exports have seen a strong growth rate. It was the tradition of Slovak arms production and the number of unemployed who still had experience with engineering that were one of the impulses of the establishment of the automotive industry in the Slovak Republic. Exports of machinery and transport equipment increased from 39,5% of total exports in 2002 to 64% in 2020. The growth of motor vehicle exports since 1996, and especially after 2003, has been significant due to foreign investors entering the sector. In the automotive industry, the growth of exports was also accompanied by an increase in imports, in particular imports of parts and accessories for transport equipment. Most components for the Slovak automotive industry are imported from Germany, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Korea, France and Poland. The position of commodities with a higher degree of finalisation on export is gradually strengthening, such as apparatus and equipment for telecommunications, sound and image recording and reproduction and electrical equipment, which is also linked to the entry of foreign investors into this domestic market.

At present, the goods structure of Slovak exports is concentrated on several sectors, namely the production of transport equipment (passenger cars, their parts and accessories), electrical and telecommunication equipment (shafts, bearings, pumps, fans, compressors, boilers, TVs and telephone equipment) and base metals and articles thereof (iron, steel, wires). Developments in these sectors are the main driver of the Slovak economy, but there is a high risk for the economy depending on the development of foreign demand for production of these sectors.

Slovakia imports mainly machinery and electrical equipment (computing, engines, pumps, mobile phones), raw materials (oil, gas, fuel, oils and coal) and transport

equipment (cars and their parts and accessories). The share of machinery and transport equipment in Slovak imports increased from 37.7% in 2002 to 51.5% in 2020 (Table 3) reflecting the high import intensity of this sector. A special chapter of Slovak foreign trade is food and beverages whose negative balance is constantly deepening although they hold a stable share of Slovak exports and imports.

**Table 2: Export of the Slovak Republic by SITC product groups in million ECU/EURO**

Time	2002	2005	2008	2011	2014	2017	2020
<b>Total-all products</b>	15234,1	25632,4	48369,7	57297,3	64913,1	73790,1	75748,8
<b>Food, drinks and tobacco</b>	477,5	1075,4	1625,3	2333,5	2300,4	2477,1	2718,0
<b>Raw materials</b>	471,1	802,9	1299,4	1693,5	1421,7	1435,6	1470,7
<b>Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials</b>	915,0	1511,8	2435,4	3613,8	2903,3	2411,9	1823,8
<b>Chemicals and related products, n.e.s.</b>	1011,7	1474,8	2280,7	2826,2	3136,7	3255,8	3105,2
<b>Other manufactured goods</b>	6210,7	9006,1	14234,6	16533,5	17614,9	19884,2	17989,2
<b>Machinery and transport equipment</b>	6014,6	11315,3	26073,1	30192,6	37360,0	44156,6	48513,1
<b>Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC</b>	133,5	446,1	421,3	104,2	176,0	169,0	128,8

Source: authors' representation based on Eurostat data (2021)

The development of foreign trade and export performance illustrates the long-term import intensity of the Slovak economy and, as a result, emerging trade deficits. The Slovak economy is highly dependent on the import of strategic raw materials, especially oil and gas from Russia. This dependence, together with the unstable development of world prices, has often led to negative balance of payments developments, with the largest negative balances recorded under mineral fuels, lubricants and chemicals. Conversely, the largest and ever-increasing surpluses are under machinery and transport equipment.

As Slovakia is a member of the EU, it is constantly subject to international competition, so it must permanently innovate and modernise. The 2018 Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum [WEF, 2018] highlighted the existing problems of the Slovak Republic that hinder or limit the development of the competitiveness of the Slovak Republic. Based on the Report, the Slovak Republic has an advantage mainly in macroeconomic stability in the form of low inflation rates and low debt ratios compared to other countries. In an environment of globally increasing competition, Slovakia, like other countries and trade groups, faces the challenge of maintaining its position in international trade. It is therefore important to recognise in which sectors and commodities the competitive advantages of the Slovak Republic lie compared to the rest of the world. Their identification and analysis will allow us to define the potential threats arising from current developments, which may threaten the further economic development of the Slovak Republic. OECD [2001] defines competitiveness as „a measure of a country’s advantage or disadvantage in selling its products in international markets “. The competitiveness can be understood as the ability to be present at a market and meet the competition. It represents the success of a certain subject in relation to other subjects, which it meets and competes with at the market. A country’s export competitiveness is usually based on the use of comparative advantages, which mean that a country can produce certain goods more efficiently than other countries. The objective of this article is therefore to analyse the so-called comparative advantages through calculating the RCA indices for individual product groups. The products (sectors) with the highest values of this index represent the main source of economic growth and employment in the Slovak Republic. For this reason, we pay closer attention to them.

**Table 3: Import of the Slovak Republic by SITC product groups in million ECU/EURO**

Time	2002	2005	2008	2011	2014	2017	2020
<b>Total- all products</b>	17516,8	27850,9	50252,6	57601,7	61404,6	72191,9	73871,6
<b>Food, drinks and tobacco</b>	886,2	1607,5	2533,2	3293	3407,1	3930,5	4489,3
<b>Raw materials</b>	650,6	1025,1	1618,6	2248,4	1945,1	2093,9	1899
<b>Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials</b>	2349,7	3668,1	6301,1	8443,7	5959	4879,7	3794,3
<b>Chemicals and related products, n.e.s.</b>	1867,2	2697,6	4279,7	5015,5	5438,1	6432,5	6539,7

<b>Other manufactured goods</b>	5035,4	8084,2	13595,1	15189,2	17325,7	19745,6	18232,6
<b>Machinery and transport equipment</b>	6600,3	10624,9	21761,5	23214,3	27214,1	34853,1	38063,4
<b>Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC</b>	127,3	143,7	163,3	197,6	115,5	256,8	853,5

Source: authors' representation based on Eurostat data (2021)

This paper is divided into three parts. The first part deals with an overview of literature, which focuses on the issue of measuring foreign trade competitiveness through comparative advantages. The second part approximates the methodology and data used in the analysis. The third part presents empirical results and their description.

## 1. LITERATURE REVIEW

Several indicators are used to measure the country's competitive advantages in international trade in various modifications, with indices based on the classic theory of international trade being the most widely used. The classic theories of international trade are based on the principle of comparative advantages, which arise from the determination of relative prices, in particular from the differences in the initial relative prices between countries, which are given by the supply and demand for production factors. There are two basic theories of international trade, which are based on the existence of comparative advantage - Ricardo and Heckscher-Ohlin theory (H-O theory). Ricardo assumed that comparative advantage arises because of differences in technology across countries, while the H-O theory assumes the same technology in the countries. Instead, H-O theory considers the basis of the comparative advantage in differences in costs arising from differences in the prices of production factors. According to this theory, the comparative advantage of the country is based on the relative abundance of production factors (specifically the ratio of factor ownership relatively to the rest of the world or group of countries). However, it is generally known that the measure of comparative advantage and the testing of the H-O theory are problematic, whereas, for example, it is not possible to track the relative prices in the case of autarky. On this basis, Balassa [1965] suggested that there is no need to define all the elements influencing the comparative advantage of the country and the initial relative prices, but it is possible to define comparative advantage as a "revealed" on the basis of the observed current structure of trade. Such comparative advantage derived from observed data is referred to as revealed comparative advantage and, in practice; it is a generally accepted method of analysis of data on trade. This method

as opposed to the Ricardo approach does not analyse the potential competitive advantages but the resulting competitiveness of the country.

The most commonly used tool for analysing data on trade and comparative advantages is the indicator Revealed Comparative Advantage - RCA. Definition and empirical adaptation are being discussed and several alternative ways of measuring the comparative advantage and competitiveness of countries arises. Liesner [1958] was the first, who contributed to the empirical RCA theory and tried to measure the comparative advantage of the Great Britain against the Common market. Balassa [1965] suggested the index (also called Balassa index), which is an advanced form of measurement of the revealed comparative advantage of the country and is generally used in the empirical literature. Weakness of this index is the omission of information about imports. Vollrath [1991] has offered alternative ways to measure the comparative advantage of the country and to prevent double-counting. These alternative methods that have been modified from RCA are relative trade advantage, logarithm of relative export advantage and revealed competitiveness. Greenaway and Milner [1993] suggested an alternative index, which considered the possibility that the country recorded simultaneous export and import within a commodity, or within a certain sector. The benefit of these indexes is the inclusion of both, the supply and demand side. The above indicators suggest that a company in one country compete only with domestic companies within groups of countries (e.g. the EU) and not all firms exporting to that market. That is why Utkulu and Seymen [2004] modified the original index, which measures the proportion of domestic export commodities to its total export in relation to export all over the world on a given market (e.g. the single market of the EU).

The problem of the implementation of these methods of measurement the RCA is that the pattern of trade can be distorted by government intervention in the form of restrictions on imports, export subsidies and other protectionist measures, which may cause misinterpretation of the comparative advantage. Fertò and Hubbard [2003] use the coefficients of nominal assistance estimated by the OECD for the countries and commodities to the filtering effect of the possible deformations. Greenaway and Milner [1993] to remove the distortion caused by the interventions used a price-based measurement of the RCA, called an implicit revealed comparative advantage.

The traditional RCA index provides a static analysis of the comparative advantages, but is unable to explain their transitional changes in time. For the identification of dynamic changes Edwards and Schoer [2002] built a dynamic RCA index, which is used for the analysis of the dynamic market position of competitors on the market, through the disaggregation of the RCA growth to its components. Another frequently used indicator of measuring competitive advantage in international trade is an index of comparative export performance, which is a modified version of the Balassa index and measures the export specialization of a country to a selected group of products. Depending on the alternative version of the indicator used, inconsistent results may

occur. For this reason, careful interpretation of the resulting indices by economic policy makers is necessary. French (2017) applies a widely-used class of quantitative trade models to evaluate the usefulness of measures of revealed comparative advantage and find several common uses of RCA indexes for certain tasks.

Many empirical studies have assessed the competitiveness of foreign trade using the RCA index. The authors focus on either a specific country or some trade area. The studies related to Slovakia state that the Slovak economy has been developing in a similar way to other Central European countries. Vokorokosova, Čarnický (2003) applying the RCA index found that in the early 2000s Slovakia was competitive in relatively higher capital, material and labour intensity production. According to Borbély (2006) new and cohesion EU countries are competitive in middle- and low-quality products. Bobáková, Hečková (2007) find that in Slovakia dominate the price and cost competitiveness. According to Aiginger (1998) Slovakia has got the second largest sector with successful price competition among the transition countries. Zábajník, Borovská (2021) define the key indicators of the competitiveness of the Slovak Republic on the third markets using the basic indicators as export volumes, market share, RCA and export gap. Pavličková (2013) quantifies the competitiveness of Slovak foreign trade and uses the RCA index and the REVELAST approach in order to determine the structure and character of the competitiveness until 2011.

## 2. METHODOLOGY

We decided to analyse the comparative advantages on which Slovakia's exports are based through the Balassa Index of Revealed Comparative Advantages (RCA index), which is generally used to identify foreign trade specialization and sectoral competitiveness. We do not have to consider distortions due to government interventions in international trade, given that the Slovak Republic is part of the EU and does not have its own trade policy. The Balassa index is expressed as follows:

$$\text{RCA index} = (X_{ij}/X_{it}) / (X_{nj}/X_{nt}) \text{ or } (X_{ij}/X_{nj}) / (X_{it}/X_{nt}) \quad (1)$$

where  $X$  represents exports,  $i$  is a country,  $j$  is a commodity (or industry),  $t$  is a group of commodities (or sectors or total exports) and  $n$  is a group of countries (or the world). The RCA index thus measures the share of commodity (industry) exports in the country's total exports relative to the ratio of the commodity's exports to the total exports of the selected group of countries (or worldwide). In other words, it compares a country's share of the world commodity market with that of all commodities. A comparative advantage is considered to be shown if the RCA index is higher than 1, i.e. the commodity's share of the country's exports is higher than its share of world exports. Rather, country is a competitive producer and exporter of that product relative to a country producing and exporting that good at or below the world average. And country with a comparative advantage in product  $j$  is considered to have an export

strength in that product. If the RCA index is lower than 1, the country has a comparative disadvantage in exporting the product (industry).

Moreover, Hinloopen and Marrewijk [2001] classifies the power of comparative advantage as following:

Class a:  $0 < RCA \leq 1$  - no comparative advantage.

Class b:  $1 < RCA \leq 2$  - a weak comparative advantage.

Class c:  $2 < RCA \leq 4$  - a moderate comparative advantage.

Class d:  $4 < RCA$  - a strong comparative advantage.

For the purposes of our analysis, we adjusted the index by calculating the share of exports of a certain product group in the total export of the Slovak Republic against the share of this group of goods in global exports. As a data base, we used the World Trade Organization (WTO) database from which we obtained data on the export performance of the Slovak Republic, as well as the world merchandise export by product group under SITC Revision 3 (aggregates) values for the period from 2002 to 2019. Data for 2020 were not available, moreover, we have avoided to use them due to distortions in trade flows caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

### **3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS**

The application of export data of the Slovak Republic and the world to the RCA index allowed us to identify in which product groups the Slovak Republic has a comparative advantage and is competitive at the global level. However, countries' ability to produce certain goods varies depending on various endogenous and exogenous factors, such as the endowment of production factors, socio-political influences or technological changes. For this reason, we calculated the RCA index for the years 2002 to 2019. It is thus possible to assess which sectors of the Slovak economy strengthen their competitiveness, contribute to export growth and have the potential for further economic development, and which, on the contrary, are declining.

The following table illustrates the results of the RCA indexes for the Slovak Republic in selected years. Data for the whole period are set out in the Annex. Those product groups in which the RCA index acquires a value higher than 1 are sectors in which the Slovak Republic has a revealed comparative advantage over the rest of the world. The higher the value of the index, the greater the comparative advantage of the Slovak Republic.

**Table 4: The RCA indexes for Slovak exports for selected years**

<b>Product group</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>2019</b>
<b>AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS</b>	0,60	0,79	0,58	0,67	0,54	0,47	0,47	0,46
<b>Food</b>	0,48	0,70	0,54	0,67	0,52	0,45	0,44	0,44
<b>FUELS AND MINING PRODUCTS</b>	0,74	0,49	0,34	0,42	0,35	0,37	0,30	0,30
<b>Fuels</b>	0,63	0,43	0,28	0,35	0,29	0,30	0,23	0,23
<b>MANUFACTURES</b>	1,16	1,20	1,34	1,35	1,36	1,33	1,36	1,35
<b>Iron and steel</b>	3,72	2,96	2,06	2,18	2,04	2,16	2,07	1,84
<b>Chemicals</b>	0,65	0,55	0,45	0,46	0,45	0,39	0,38	0,36
<b>Pharmaceuticals</b>	0,27	0,29	0,21	0,23	0,23	0,14	0,16	0,16
<b>Machinery and transport equipment</b>	1,00	1,21	1,62	1,68	1,78	1,72	1,79	1,84
<b>Office and telecom equipment</b>	0,26	0,77	1,74	1,76	1,86	1,51	1,31	1,23
<b>El. data processing and office equipment</b>	0,14	0,70	0,54	0,58	0,86	0,46	0,40	0,48
<b>Telecommunications equipment</b>	0,42	1,20	3,96	4,07	3,88	3,93	3,59	3,03
<b>Integr. circuits and electr. components</b>	0,24	0,27	0,12	0,09	0,10	0,10	0,09	0,07
<b>Transport equipment</b>	1,55	1,59	2,06	2,17	2,43	2,44	2,85	3,07
<b>Automotive products</b>	2,03	2,07	2,83	3,16	3,52	3,43	3,98	4,30
<b>Textiles</b>	1,13	1,00	0,85	0,74	0,66	0,60	0,59	0,56
<b>Clothing</b>	1,40	0,96	0,73	0,80	0,77	0,55	0,61	0,56

Source: authors' calculations based on WTO data (2021)

Based on calculations, Slovakia achieves an RCA index value higher than 1 and thus a revealed comparative advantage over the rest of the world, only under the product group *Manufactures*. If we look at a closer specification, we can see that the RCA index acquires long-term high values in product groups *Automotive Products*, *Telecommunications Equipment* and *Iron and Steel*. In these sectors Slovakia has shown comparative advantages vis-à-vis the rest of the world and has been competitive in these product groups throughout the whole analysed period. On the other side, RCA index values decreased under the groups *Textiles* and *Clothing* over the period considered, which means a loss of global competitive advantage. It was observed that the ongoing competition advantage started to decrease in the analysed period. These traditionally strong sectors of the Slovak economy lost their relevance after the transformation and were downturned. We can see this trend in many developed countries, from where these productions move to areas with a lot of cheap labour, such as India, Bangladesh or China.

The automotive industry is the basic pillar of the Slovak economy and its foreign trade, as confirmed by the highest and increasing values of the RCA index and the strong revealed comparative advantage. In 2019, more than 1,100,000 vehicles were produced in Slovakia, according to the Automotive Industry Association of the Slovak Republic (ZAP SR), and Slovakia is the world leader in the production of cars per capita. The automotive industry's share of the total industry reached 49.5% and the share of exports was 46.6%. The automotive industry directly employs more than 177 000 people and directly and indirectly generates up to 275 000 jobs. One of the impulses for the creation of the strong automotive industry in the Slovak Republic and the growth of its competitiveness were the factor conditions in the form of the tradition of Slovak engineering and arms production and the amount of unemployed skilled labour during the period of transformation, which had experience with engineering. The advantageous geographical position of the Slovak Republic in the middle of Europe positively influenced investors from other countries to invest in Slovakia, because thanks to this localization, the distribution of cars to other countries is easier. Foreign investors have brought in new technologies and built more modern plants than in their home countries, which, together with low labour costs, has formed the basis for competitive production. The first automotive company to build a plant in Bratislava was the German automotive company Volkswagen in 1991, then in 2006 it was followed by PSA Peugeot Citroën in Trnava, KIA Motors in Žilina and in 2018 Jaguar Land Rover opened a plant in Nitra and could benefit from a developed chain of existing suppliers.

As we can see, the automotive industry and related components have a long tradition in Slovak history. The growing share of the automotive industry and downstream industries in Slovakia's foreign trade reflects the competitiveness of these sectors. In addition to historical background, comparative advantages over other countries are based on both internal and external economies of scale. Geographical proximity al-

lows companies to communicate and spread knowledge more easily, leads to higher employee specialisation, cost savings and overall productivity gains. It is beneficial for competing companies if they are located close to each other, which helps them build and use a network of suppliers and customers. This is also applicable to car producers in Slovakia whose production is concentrated in western part of Slovakia (Figure 1). The governments of the Slovak Republic tried to support the development of the automotive industry and supported the inflow of foreign investments in this sector. Through state interventions, financial support, support for upskilling of the workforce, the automotive industry has thus become the most important and competitive sector of the Slovak economy. At the same time, the growth of this sector has supported the development of other downstream sectors. A good example is the production of tyres and other rubber components. Rubber production has been a tradition in Slovakia since 1904, when the first rubber factory Matador in Bratislava was founded, in which technical rubbers or hoses and later tyres for Czechoslovak cars were produced. In 1998, a German investor joined the company and a joint venture was established for the production of Continental Matador truck tyres, which still operates in the chemical and rubber industry of the Slovak Republic.

**Figure 1: Location of car producers in Slovakia**



The second highest values of the RCA index (a moderate comparative advantage) can be seen in a production group Telecommunications Equipment. The strongest sector of Slovak electrical engineering is the production of televisions. The production of televisions, screens, printed circuit boards and other electrotechnical components for TV accounts for almost half of the entire electrical industry in Slovakia. This sector employs more than ten thousand people in Slovakia. After cars, it is the strongest export item. Almost one in five imported TVs in the European Union countries is made by one of the three large companies based in Slovakia. Samsung has been operating in Slovakia since 2002 and in addition to the production of consumer electronics, it also has a distribution centre for Central and Western Europe in Slovakia. It represents almost a third of the entire Slovak electrical engineering industry. Production of Sony TVs started in Slovakia as early as 1996 at the Sony Slovakia plant. Since 2010, the company has been operating under the name Foxconn Slovakia and produces mobile phones, laptops, TVs, digital cameras, game consoles, audio, video

and IT devices and many other products. Universal Media Corporation, operating in Slovakia since 2004, has been sending licensed Blaupunkt and Sharp TVs or cheaper TVs for retail networks such as Tesco and Kaufland to the market. In total, these three companies export to 73 countries around the world. Mainly to Germany (19 % of total exports), Great Britain (13 %) and the Netherlands (11%).

One of the reasons why these multinational concerns opted for production in Slovakia is that there was experience in the production of their own televisions, modern equipment, technology and experienced staff. The production of televisions has been a tradition in Slovakia since 1958. In particular, manufacturers' easier access to European markets following the enlargement of the Union, cheap labour and quality suppliers of plastics and packaging materials contribute to the growth of production of this industry.

The revealed comparative advantage, albeit a smaller and ever decreasing (a weak comparative advantage), is also achieved by Slovakia in the production group Iron and Steel. Historically, steel production has been and will remain one of the main pillars of the development of Slovak industry. In Slovakia, the sector has a share of GDP of more than 6%. The steel industry in Slovakia has a significant share of exports, employment, creating conditions for support of other industries, mainly construction, automotive, engineering or energy. It also has a significant contribution to the application of R&D results in practice, in the field of new materials and new types of steel. The largest steel producer in Slovakia is U. S. Steel Košice. In 2000, the company became the owner of Východoslovenské železiarne (VSŽ), plant which was founded already in 1959. They mainly produced sheets, steel strips and also had extensive engineering production. In the 1980s, VSŽ was the most modern metallurgical plant in Czechoslovakia. At present, the company employs almost 11,000 employees. Steel and sheets are mainly produced. The iron ore used comes mainly from Ukraine and Russia. Slovak iron ore, which was used in the past, is not currently supplied.

However, as we can see from the development of the RCA index, the Slovak comparative advantage in steel production has declined in recent decades. There are several reasons for this. Iron and steel exports from outside the EU have been steadily growing since 2012. In particular, the world is overflowed with record amounts of cheap steel from China, which also causes a reduction in its production in Slovakia. The unit price of imported steel and iron decreased until 2016, when duties were mainly imposed on cheaper Chinese steel, which was also reflected in the increase in the value of the RCA index. Slovakia's problems with metal exports are also related to weaker economic activity and lower demand from its important trading partners.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

The most commonly used method of calculating the comparative advantage of a country is the indicator of the revealed comparative advantage. Through the calculation of the RCA index, we have found that Slovakia has the highest comparative advantages

in the production of *Automotive Products*, *Telecommunications Equipment* and *Iron and Steel*. These findings allow us to identify what these comparative advantages are based on; what risks result from them and what may potentially threaten the future economic development and employment in the Slovak Republic. According to the classic theory of international trade, the reasons for comparative advantages can be mainly differences in labour productivity, endowment of production factors, existence of economies of scale or accumulated knowledge due to the tradition of production in the sector (so called learning by doing).

Slovakia has basically the following competitive advantages, which have an impact on the scope and specialization of its foreign trade:

- strategic location - central location within Europe connects the markets of Eastern and Western Europe;
- industrial tradition - a rich industrial heritage in the automotive, electrotechnical, engineering and wood-processing sectors;
- participation in international institutions and blocs - member of the WTO, OECD, NATO, EU and EMU;
- low labour costs associated with relatively high labour productivity (the average monthly salary is lower than in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary);
- the availability of highly specialised professionals and a skilled workforce;
- low operational costs;
- evolving infrastructure;
- high innovation potential in R&D;
- an attractive investment site with a market economy and high growth potential.

Mainly experience in manufacturing, cheap and skilled labour and investment incentives provided, for example in the form of tax reliefs, have attracted foreign investments to these sectors, which have brought new technologies and thus strengthened their competitiveness. The role of foreign capital is irreplaceable in terms of transformation, streamlining and transition to more sophisticated and competitive production. Foreign investment brings modernization of production and assortment, and also has an impact on growth in performance, skills of the workforce and wages. The subsequent concentration of firms in a relatively small territory made it possible to benefit from external economies of scale in the form of a shared labour market, a network of suppliers or knowledge transfer. All the above factors caused Slovakia's production to concentrate on several sectors producing mainly for exports, what was confirmed by our analysis. Based on the results, we can define the risks of the observed patterns of foreign trade. The high share of foreign trade in the economy and its concentration in several industries has its negatives. Due to the high level of openness and extensive trade flows the Slovak economy is very exposed to external conditions and strongly depends on the economic development of its foreign trade partners. Their economic situation influences Slovakia's performance and export because of its high orientation on luxury goods' production with high elasticity of demand, as auto-

mobiles and electronics. The demand for these products is highly elastic and depends on foreign traders' incomes, which decreased during the crisis. The Slovak Republic has got especially in a case of a favourable world development huge growth potential; however, the negative development in the external environment causing the decrease of the foreign demand negatively influences the economy's performance.

Therefore, the global economic crisis was the main cause of the decline in Slovak foreign trade in 2009.<sup>1</sup> Partly positive is that vehicle exports are diversified, either geographically or by car brand. This means that exports direct to different countries in the world and are not reliant on just one country and a car brand, which mitigates the risks of these negative impacts, but not in the case of a global crisis. However, the long-term development of economic performance cannot depend solely on the development of the revenues of the main trading partners in selected sectors, but must be based primarily on an increase in the added value of export production. Which is also a problem in the automotive industry, as research and development is carried out in the home countries and only assembly operations are carried out in Slovakia. This is also reflected in the high import intensity of production.

Another problem that arises from focusing the economy on manufacturing is that it requires a lot of labour force. In recent years, the automotive and electronics sector in particular has been facing labour shortages and rising labour costs. This is a challenge that almost all industries of the Slovak economy meet. Thus, the growth of labour costs, which were one of the sources of comparative advantages of Slovakia, may threaten its competitive advantages. The insufficient skilled work force and high labour cost is considered to be one of the challenges for Slovakia also according the IMD World Competitiveness Center (2020). Others include stabilising the expenses and return to the balanced budget, strengthening of the digitalisation processes across the sectors, reform of education sector to suit the needs of employers and the need to strengthen the business environment.

Other factors, such as the tendencies towards the 4th industrial revolution and digitalisation threatening employment in manufacturing, the reduction of trade with the UK as a result of Brexit, global restrictions on international trade, as well as the current economic situation, threaten Slovakia's comparative advantages. Slovakia thus faces the key task of supporting investment and innovation, maintaining good economic relations with its main trading partners and promoting the diversification of its production into sectors with higher added value and less sensitive to developments in world trade

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<sup>1</sup> The current COVID-19 crisis has not been as strongly signed up to the decline of the automotive industry as the previous crisis, which was due to the nature of this crisis, when household savings were increasing and this was not reflected in the decline in demand for cars. Rather, the decrease in production was due to a reduction in production supplies on the supply side of the market.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This article was supported by the Grant Agency VEGA, under project no. 1/0664/20 entitled “The competitiveness of the Slovak Republic in the European Union”.

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**ANNEX 1. THE RCA INDEXES FOR SLOVAK EXPORTS (2002-2019)**

<b>Product group</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
<b>AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS</b>	0,60	0,51	0,61	0,79	0,72	0,61	0,58	0,61	0,61
<b>Food</b>	0,48	0,41	0,54	0,70	0,69	0,60	0,54	0,57	0,58
<b>FUELS AND MINING PRODUCTS</b>	0,74	0,59	0,65	0,49	0,49	0,39	0,34	0,36	0,38
<b>Fuels</b>	0,63	0,51	0,58	0,43	0,38	0,32	0,28	0,31	0,30
<b>MANUFACTURES</b>	1,16	1,20	1,18	1,20	1,23	1,27	1,34	1,29	1,30
<b>Iron and steel</b>	3,72	3,35	3,04	2,96	2,66	2,11	2,06	2,18	2,39
<b>Chemicals</b>	0,65	0,48	0,50	0,55	0,53	0,46	0,45	0,38	0,41
<b>Pharmaceuticals</b>	0,27	0,20	0,23	0,29	0,26	0,21	0,21	0,19	0,23
<b>Machinery and transport equipment</b>	1,00	1,22	1,20	1,21	1,33	1,49	1,62	1,63	1,60
<b>Office and telecom equipment</b>	0,26	0,31	0,48	0,77	1,04	1,37	1,74	1,99	1,80
<b>El. data processing and office equipment</b>	0,14	0,29	0,53	0,70	0,52	0,41	0,54	0,43	0,42
<b>Telecommunications equipment</b>	0,42	0,35	0,60	1,20	2,13	3,17	3,96	4,69	4,44
<b>Integr. circuits and el. components</b>	0,24	0,29	0,27	0,27	0,19	0,20	0,12	0,18	0,16
<b>Transport equipment</b>	1,55	2,16	1,88	1,59	1,76	2,02	2,06	1,96	1,99
<b>Automotive products</b>	2,03	2,86	2,46	2,07	2,35	2,71	2,83	2,96	2,86
<b>Textiles</b>	1,13	0,95	1,00	1,00	0,93	0,93	0,85	0,70	0,62
<b>Clothing</b>	1,40	1,05	1,01	0,96	0,78	0,72	0,73	0,68	0,77

<b>Product group</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>2019</b>
<b>AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT</b>	0,67	0,74	0,64	0,54	0,52	0,49	0,47	0,47	0,46
<b>Food</b>	0,67	0,76	0,64	0,52	0,49	0,47	0,45	0,44	0,44
<b>FUELS AND MINING PRODUCTS</b>	0,42	0,40	0,36	0,35	0,40	0,40	0,37	0,30	0,30
<b>Fuels</b>	0,35	0,32	0,32	0,29	0,34	0,35	0,30	0,23	0,23
<b>MANUFACTURES</b>	1,35	1,35	1,38	1,36	1,32	1,31	1,33	1,36	1,35
<b>Iron and steel</b>	2,18	2,19	2,22	2,04	1,97	2,00	2,16	2,07	1,84
<b>Chemicals</b>	0,46	0,40	0,44	0,45	0,43	0,41	0,39	0,38	0,36
<b>Pharmaceuticals</b>	0,23	0,17	0,21	0,23	0,22	0,22	0,14	0,16	0,16
<b>Machinery and transport equipment</b>	1,68	1,75	1,80	1,78	1,72	1,74	1,72	1,79	1,84
<b>Office and telecom equipment</b>	1,76	1,82	1,89	1,86	1,57	1,56	1,51	1,31	1,23
<b>El. data processing and office equipment</b>	0,58	0,63	0,88	0,86	0,64	0,67	0,46	0,40	0,48
<b>Telecommunications equipment</b>	4,07	4,11	4,07	3,88	3,29	3,27	3,93	3,59	3,03
<b>Integr. circuits and el. components</b>	0,09	0,11	0,12	0,10	0,15	0,14	0,10	0,09	0,07
<b>Transport equipment</b>	2,17	2,41	2,48	2,43	2,42	2,47	2,44	2,85	3,07
<b>Automotive products</b>	3,16	3,49	3,62	3,52	3,52	3,53	3,43	3,98	4,30
<b>Textiles</b>	0,74	0,67	0,63	0,66	0,62	0,59	0,60	0,59	0,56
<b>Clothing</b>	0,80	0,77	0,70	0,77	0,66	0,53	0,55	0,61	0,56

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# CORONAVIRUS COVID-19 LIKE A TRIGGER OF SOVEREIGNIZATION

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## **Abstract**

Pandemic of COVID-19 has already become a historical event, aftermath of which revealed the disability of suprapstate institutions and international organizations to take flash decisions in order to save life of an average person. These circumstances determined the aim of the article to unite theoretical and applied researches of interdependence between emergency situations and sovereignization. It has been determined that the common trait of these practices is the decline of democratic freedoms and processes because of life values reappraisal. The article also considers the reasons of reconstruction of neopatrimonialism in post-soviet countries during the Pandemic.

**Key words:** *Sovereignization, Emergency Challenges, Decline of Democracy, Pandemic of COVID-19, Neopatrimonialism, Patron Clientelism*

## **INTRODUCTION**

Pandemic of COVID-19 may with no doubt be regarded as the event that has caused swift transformation of usual social being. In this connection it is possible to agree with the leading historian P. Hennessy who says that contemporary history, which previously was divided into «before» and «after the World War II, now is being transformed into «before» and «after» corona [Kelly 2020].

In March 2020, in his interview to the Spectator S. Žižek presented a new book called «A Left That Dares to Speak Its Name», in which he indicated some features of “after corona” world and stated cardinal changes of belief systems, ideas and values of different social groups, classes and societies – in the demands of World Organization concerning counteraction to coronoviral infection [Nash 2020]. S. Žižek thinks that ideological upheaval becomes apparent in spreading of communist mobilization principles, the end of the era of worship of human freedom and renovation of class struggle.

We can state that these Žižek’s considerations are common with the considerations of general scientific community and state the decline of democracy (as a value) during the pandemic, when the necessity to save people’s lives and implementation of quarantines lead to a partial loss of civil freedoms and rights.

Let’s take note of a series of scholarly papers [Cukierman 2021; Bilgin et.al. 2021] that analyze the various dimensions of increasing authoritarianism in the politics of democracies through: 1) the ability to mobilize resources more efficiently; 2) greater obedience of citizens; 3) unified position of the media; 4) smaller global transportation; 5) the possibility of vaccination of citizens in a centralized manner.

But, to our mind, additional attention should be paid to the factors that conditioned the devaluation of democratic values and degradation of democratic institutions.

It is evident that pandemic of COVID-19 has actualized the consideration of problems connected with interdependence of emergency situations (including extraordinary situations when the whole nation is under the threat and is stipulated by law special legal regime for state institutions’ work) and «sovereignization» as the process of self-determination and subjectivization of political actors. These circumstances determined the article to analyze conceptual evolution of scientific theories and actual situation (pandemic of COVID-19) relative to the interdependence of emergency situations and sovereignization.

### **1. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND HYPOTHESIS**

All mentioned above caused the aim of the article to explain theoretical groundwork concerning interconnections between emergency state, sovereignization and attendant degradation of democratic institutions and devaluations of democratic values.

Our hypothesis is in the assumption that pandemic of COVID, as an emergency state, stipulated for countries’ sovereignization and corresponding decay of democratic freedoms because of the necessity of the fastest decision making in order to

save people's lives. But, as we think, the degree of democracy decay depends on the type of political regime and corresponding political culture.

The aim and hypothesis made use such scientific methods as a systematic one, in which political life is seen as a system – integrated, complicated and self-registering mechanism that constantly interacts with the environment by means of entering and leaving the system and makes it impossible to completely understand the object of investigation and detailed analysis of connections between its elements; a culturological method, which is orientated to reveal dependence of political processes on the level of political culture (in particular the hermeneutic method for examining the innermost political and cultural context of events); a structural and functional method to study politics by means of investigation of behaviour differences of individuals and groups of people rather than political institutions; an anthropological method to study politics conditionality by human nature as a genetic being, that has an invariant set of needs rather than by social factors; a comparative method based on comparison of homotypic political phenomena (systems, parties, etc.) aimed to distinguish general tendencies in the development of political processes; a historical method which demands to investigate political phenomena in their historical consistency taking into consideration historical context.

The connection between emergency situations and sovereignization was specified by C. Shmitt in 1920 in his work «Political theology» [Shmitt 2000]. To his mind the definition of sovereignty by means of «principal restricted power – discontinuity of the existing order's action «stipulates the understanding of state as the institution that proves its superiority over the existing principles of law» [Shmitt 2000: 20, 24-25].

Thus, C. Shmitt compares the main points of sovereignty with the problem of emergency situations, which reveals the nature of state authority because such a decision doesn't correlate with the principles of law and proves that «for law making there is no need in law» [Shmitt 2000: 27]. In this context it would be logical to assert that «the correct definition of state sovereignty is not as the power monopoly or the monopoly of compulsion but as the monopoly of decision making» [Shmitt 2000: 26-27]. In 1921 in his work «Dictatorship. From the Origin of the Modern Concept of Sovereignty to the Proletarian Class Struggle» C. Smitt defines «emergency situation» as the launch of sovereignization in the shape of competence of power concentration and changes in constitutional definitions, which regulate competences, that (in its turn) ruins the whole system of powers sharing [Shmitt 2005: 232].

L. von. Mises in his work «Omnipotent Government: The Rise of Total State and Total War» (1944) broadened the conception of sovereignization as the phased process. The first phase included making of territorial sovereignty to implementate the control over economy on the basis of new peoples hegemony, groups and armies [Mizes 2013: 318, 331]. The second phase was seen as the gaining of subjectivization by suprastate organizations that is the condition for the surviving of democracy [Mizes 2013: 372]. The following phase was connected with the fall of liberal democracy – the concom-

itant of national states sovereignization by means of war, which, according to the definition, is «incompatible with international labour distribution» [Mizes 2013: 319]. The important milestone in the generalization of theoretical groundworks and historical practices of emergency situations implementation is the book (2003) «Homo Sacer. State of Exception» by G.Agamben's [Agamben 2011a]. In this work the transformation of an essence, as a temporary and exclusive measure, into governing technology is seen as the main threat of the present time that changes radically the structure and content of different traditional constitutional forms by means of «confusion of executive and legislative powers' acts».

In Agamben's judgment, the essence of emergency situation notion is in the fact they are legal form of something that can't have it. The specific factor of such a state is confusion of «power of law» and law as the result of isolation. This defines such «a state of law», in which, on one hand, norms are on-stream but aren't used (are out of «force»), on the other hand – the deeds which don't have the significance of law find their «force» during such a state. It is just «the perspective when emergency situation is the threshold beyond which the bounds between democracy and absolutism are obliterated».

On these grounds it is necessary to take into consideration Agamben's comment of 1995 («Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life») explaining the transformation of system's functioning in emergency situation into the norm for the following life [Agamben 2011b: 19]. To his mind, the nature of connection between emergency situation and dominion becomes apparent in the ability of governing stratum to be inside the governing system and out of it at the same time, that means to stop the law and place itself out of rules [Agamben 2011b: 22].

R. Higgs («Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government» (1987)) connected the phenomenon of emergency situation formation with «the effect of flywheel» – mechanism that prevents a wheel move backwards. The effect mentioned above is the case when state sector widens actively in the period of wars and crisis, but when they come to end it narrows but not to its initial level. So, emergency situations create the atmosphere in which government becomes a singular autonomy and grows in discrete steps with appropriate extension of powers. Thus, when test work has been finished, emergence functions in government's powers remain [Higgs 2010: 11].

Sovereignization as the process of gaining subjectivization by a state capable to be responsible for a number of simultaneous but different challenges was studied by P. Mason in his work «Post Capitalism: A Guide to Our Future» [Meison 2019]. To Mason's mind, notional characteristics of modern sovereign state should be the transition from democratic to new decentralized (often secret and alternative) institutions of decision making appearing due to necessity and leading to the change of world elite as the top of hierarchies like in nervous system [Meison 2019: 322-324, 314-318].

N. Moises characterizes sovereignization through the prism of politics fragmentation («The End of Power from Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge isn't What It Used to Be») [Moises 2017]. Basic reasons of changes in political self-determination for political actors the author sees in transformation of governing power as the result of possible revolutions: 1) increasing – as the overcoming of population control means by increasing its quantity, age composition, geographic division, life span, health status; 2) mobility as the end of fidelity to social hierarchies; 3) mentality as creation of new middle class – driving force of actions and behaviour [Moises 2017: 107, 110, 138].

Together all mentioned revolutions caused the phenomenon of «politics dispersion». These motive events lead to the situations when some signs of sovereignty such as armies, control over borders, currency, economics, taxation are left in national states [Moises 2017: 269]. But against a background of «hierarchies levelling» there is a gradual process to form the basis for sovereignization of small groups made of countries which come to an agreement about cooperative activity. Such associations become more effective than the group of dominating states, because the last ones can't determine directions of international cooperation and means for overcoming present and future crisis with the help of public organizations which act on the basis of international agreements [Moises 2017: 257, 258].

Moreover, central power is paralyzed when decentralization conditions the creation of new legal and executive bodies on lower levels, and the power is redistributed from capital and executive institutions to regional and local governments [Moises 2017: 139, 167].

As a result all these tendencies cause not only the «strengthening of hyper-competition» among different political actors with simultaneous recruiting of amateurs to fulfil political activity, but also lead to «gaining of new opportunities by insignificant countries and non-state formations» on the background of decline of «the great players» and multilateral institutions' united attempts [Moises 2017: 180-185, 145].

In our opinion, the idea of the interdependence of emergency situations and sovereignization makes us, first of all, recall the works of one of the followers of G. Agamben – S.D. Krasner. In particular, the works in which he stated the presence of several dimensions of sovereignty (such as inland independence, control over borders and migration, recognition under international law, absence on the territory of churches, political parties and agents of other countries) and its coexistence with acceptance of historical examples intrinsic to the states which under the influence of emergency situations were sovereign in one aspect while at the same time being sovereign in another of these aspects [Krasner 2001: 6-12].

## **2. THE REALITIES OF CONFRONTING THE COVID-19 IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE**

It should be admitted that transformation of political being under the influence of struggle with COVID-19 happened to be more multidimensional than theoretical works. For instance, because of restrictive measures, directed to fight COVID-19, states-members of Council of Europe in March 2020 began to inform the General Secretary of CU about derogation (partial deviation from laws) of some items of European Convention on Human Rights, as it is stipulated by article 15 of the Convention [ZN,UA 2020a].

It was rather demonstrative to give the government of Hungarian prime-minister V.Orban extraordinary powers with no fixed term to fight with the pandemic [News.liga.net. 2020]. As the result the government became able to rule the country with the help of decrees without parliament's appreciation. At the same time, the adopted law stipulates five-year imprisonment for violation of measures against corona and spreading of false information about the crises.

13 countries of EU were concerned about the influence of corona virus restrictions on the supremacy of law and basic human rights [Korrespondent 2020]. The joint statement said that emergency measures ought to be restricted, be propositional and temporary, be under control and esteem principles and duties of international law (especially concerning restrictions on freedom of speech and media).

The struggle with corona virus in Ukraine may be attributed to that trend. Thus, Cabinet of Ministers Resolution N211 (in the version of CMU Resolution from 02.04.2020 N255) implements severe restrictions on stay in public places without respirators or masks; no more than two people are allowed to be in the street (with exception); children under 14 aren't allowed to be in public places without parents, guardians or adult relatives; restrictions on visiting of parks, recreation zone, forests and beaches (with exception); all people older than 60 shouldn't leave places of isolation without permission [Government portal 2020]. The obligatory observation for the term 14 days after returning from abroad is also stipulated. Mentioned above measures were supplemented with the decision forbidding regular and irregular motor-car (except personal cars), railway and air transportation.

As we can see, the scope of restrictions cast doubt on article 29 of the Law of Ukraine «About the defence of population against infectious diseases», according to it quarantine is instituted and annulled by the Cabinet of Ministers, because this applies to guaranteed by the Constitution fundamental rights: right to freedom and personal immunity (article 29); right to movement (article 33); right to freedom of religion (article 35); right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association (article 39); right to business activity (article 42); right to work (article 43); right to strike (article 44) [LAW OF UKRAINE 2020].

This tendency has been confirmed during the third wave of CORONA viral pandemic (autumn, 2021). Thus, in October 2021 the European Court of Human Rights con-

firmed that obligatory vaccination was legit and could be necessary, that doesn't contradict to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Based on this, the Ministry of Health of Ukraine made a decision about the obligatory vaccination for employees of educational establishments and State institutions. It means that unvaccinated employees will be kept out of work for the period of quarantine and they won't be paid for this period, but their place of work will be saved for them. As we can see, these quarantine measures conflict with some Laws of Ukraine. In particular, article 2-1 of the Labour Code of Ukraine forbids discrimination on any criteria in the sphere of work, and article 43 of the Constitution of Ukraine guarantees that citizens are protected from illegal dismissing. Pandemic period in Ukraine certifies the reduction of democratization and infringement of power distribution principles with corresponding enforcement of executive branch. For instance, in 2021 National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, in fact, became an analogue of «soviet politburo» – an additional structure of executive branch, where they have collective discussions of the most resonance events and this is the basis for the President to make decree concerning the solving of these problems. It should be mentioned that such a practice is completely inconsistent with article 107 of the Constitution, according to which National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine is the coordinating body in national security and defence matters under the President of Ukraine and coordinates and control the activity executive power organs in the sphere of national security and defence, and the Head of National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine is the President of Ukraine.

According to P. Wawrzynski such a «revival of soviet manner» in overcoming of aftermath of emergency situation takes place because «function of memory is deep-rooted in political traditions» with the appropriate disdainful attitude to human needs on the background of spreading in media the statements that authoritarian-totalitarian regimes are more effective in crisis overcoming [Wawrzynski 2013: 126].

We think that representation of coronavirus influence on the processes of sovereignty as self-determination and subjectivization of political subjects in an emergency isn't complete without taking into consideration de-globalization processes which are accompanied not only by the returning of influence of local economy but renovation of neo-feudal economic practices of monopolistic space exploitation (physical and virtual) [Scheidel 2020].

And this, in its turn, influences the decline of political means to explore the politic space. This is connected with the fact that «net society is not a horizontal one, it is diametrically opposed» because discussions in the network of political problems doesn't mean the transfer of political activity on the new level. Thus, M. Paskvinelli in his work «Digital neo-feudalism: crisis of network policy and new typology of rent» emphasized that «under the circumstances of communicatory infrastructure (hardware level, protocolary level, level of metadata and social networks) redistribution

of resources under the control of one or another elite group becomes the essence of political process [Paskvinelli 2010].

All mentioned above actualize the thought of S.N. Eisenstadt and L. Roniger as to the ability of clientelism to transform and gain new kinds and forms and continue playing the significant role in political and administrative life, intertwining with efficient institutions and reproducing patrimonial practices in utterly efficient environment [Eisenstadt, Roniger 1984].

It should be mentioned that many scientists think that Ukrainian neopatrimonialism has been inherited from the USSR, and such a conception is based on the recognition of patron-client relations deep-rooted into the basic culture [Eisenstadt 2016: 372]. Among the authors who diagnose the existence of patron-client relations in the Soviet Union are [Eisenstadt&Roniger 1984; Lemarchand 1981; Gellner&Waterbury 1977; Graziano 1983]. The same feature of their works is the recognition of soviet clientelism as a substitute for trust and intercession that appears at the time of modernisation, ruining sacral sanctions of being and informal basis of social affiliation. Such circumstances led to the situation when patron-client relations resembled buying-selling services, and presents and appreciation turned into bribes. But patron-client relations played an important role in the societies that followed the way of modernisation because they combined solidarity and striving to establish pseudo-family relations in resources exchange on the basis of differences in social status. In the conception of the patronclientelism in the USSR they accentuated on the fact that the project of modernization (in historical form of Industrialization) had borrowed and forced character that turned social mechanism into institutional hybrids. Thus, having no «middle class», the ruling stratum became interested in reproduction of status quo rather than in the development, and for that they used administrative apparatus and bureaucratic obstacles to collect the tribute. Political activity gained features of pseudo-ideological personified relations, aspiration for hereditary leadership and reelection of one and the same politician. The reason of this was seen in the lack of equal access to political activity that caused the demand for the help of higher rank officials. All these together led to the transformation of the essence of policy, when politicians got motivation to mainly solve social problems and officials – to make decisions without orienteering on concrete electorate [Bussell 2019]. Patron-client relations in the USSR were described not only as taking posts without professional competence but also as the form of dependent relations, in which socioeconomic factor, together with ideological, cultural, religious and military factors of world outlook formation, was the condition of system survival [Shoemaker&Spanier 1984]. An important milestone in the political science is the work by Sheila Fitzpatrick «Patronage and the Intelligentsia in Stalin's Russia», in which patron-client relations in the USSR were defined as running deep into soviet elite [Fitzpatrick 2014]. Here the role of soviet patron-clientelism was reduced to the compensating for the absence of proper legal system. Soviet clientelism was positioned as relations between senior officials

and principles, where being an influential person gave an average one freedom in political sense and access to shortages – «pull» – in economic sphere.

At the beginning of XXI century western political science started to cover soviet kind of patron-client relations in the context of democratization of post-soviet space and as the reason of democratic institutions and processes simulation. Among the most solid scientific papers is the work «Comparing political corruption and clientelism» [Kawata 2006], that led to the appearance of corresponding scientific course [e.g. Kitschelt&Wilkinson 2007].

On the basis on this recognition, in Ukrainian scientific works of 1990s, soviet political elite was treated as a specific administrative hierarchy (or «nomenklatura») with such characteristic features as total accountability, absence of competition in ruling elite and social feedback [Fesenko 1995].

To our mind, in independent Ukraine neopatrimonialism was recreated in the features of «belonging» based on acquaintance, common membership of senior official's retinue, when promotion the senior official by ruling strata meant career movement of his supporters and secondary role of ideological slogans amid being concentrated on personal interests [Poiarkova 2019]. Under such circumstances patron-client relations were defined as a form of new reality mastering by old means. In the course of time this was supplemented with the tendency to inherit available privileges. Access to privileged education, acquaintances, taking up posts with perspectives of promotion became the channels giving an opportunity to inherit influential positions. With time all these conditioned further ability of post-soviet ruling class to survive during system changes in independent Ukraine.

In other words, one of the essential characteristics of Ukrainian state at the time of COVID pandemic is the disclosure of dependence on influential people, which is supported by different social strata which change their loyalty for certain preferences from budget money sharing. Personification reveals itself in the appearance of institutions, hierarchies and constructions which are based on personalities and gradually deviate from the rules of political competence. This leads to: 1) reduction of moral and intellectual levels in education, science, culture and public communication; 2) imitation of reforms; 3) degradation of deputy body and parties as well as total discredit of judges and law-enforcement bodies. As a result, party patronage became the typical model of relations between authorities (central and local) and business groups, and conversion of political capital into economic one, corruption of political elite, clientelism turned into the most effective means of state government.

The explanation of this fact can be found in Th. Carothers's works (in particular in «The End of the Transition Paradigm») where he gave the definition of hybrid regimes of «grey zone» as those that have features of democratization of political life, including the existence of restricted political space to be and opposition parties and independent civil society, as well as regular elections and democratic institutions [Carothers 2002]. Such regimes are characterized by weak representation of citizens' interests,

low level of political participation, breaking the law by officials, dubious legitimacy of elections, public distrust of state institutions and low institutional effectiveness of the state [Carothers 2002: 49].

Th. Carothers distinguished two phases (two syndromes) in the development of hybrid regimes. The first one is the syndrome of feckless pluralism with its inherent political transparency that makes leaders declare their intentions concerning reforms which are only declarations. Feckless pluralism has some elements of democracy such as elections and rotation of power. But citizens are kept out of the participation and distrust the political elite (as corrupt officials). This phase is characterised by political competition between ingrained parties the essence of which is patronage nets. The following phase is the syndrome of dominant-power politics [Carothers 2002: 52]. It is characterised by domination of one political group – party, family, a single leader – and makes it impossible to change the power in the nearest future. In such a situation the main state funds supply the ruling party. The monopoly of power is supplemented by elections which are like a show. The state is ineffective because of single-party rule, unstable state governing, large-scale corruption and «crony capitalism». Regime of dominant power is presented by constitutionally adopted elements of democracy (democratic constitution, elections of the President, parliament], there is a certain space for opposition, possibility to compete at elections, but one-party political groups (party, family, a single leader) dominate in political system.

To understand such regimes it is necessary to take into account the cyclicity of their functioning occurs as a result of street protest. In such regimes the reason of social disturbances is variation of public mood which changes strategies in elites' behaviour and, consequently, dynamics of the political regime. Loss of support for the ruling regime is possible thanks to: 1) disagreement between the state of economy and political support; 2) discrepancy between social expectations and the level of authoritarianism. For instance, social expectations contradict the increase of repressive measures, tax pressure, payments for housing and communal services and, in general, dismantle of social state. This contradiction makes new risks to aggravate antagonism between: 1) interests of population and elite connected with industrial sector of economy having made during the soviet period; 2) democratization as the elite see it and social expectations.

In other words, under such regimes supporting of authoritarianism or democracy vectors is connected with social expectation concerning one of these models. This process is characterised by two phases, where the first one takes in the period of erosion of values belonged to the previous regime. When the regime is yet a stable, but its support becomes to reduce and political institutions start to be ineffective, opposition looks like a marginal body; all the initiatives belong to the «power» elites keep the loyalty of the regime. The next phase is the split of elites and consolidations around an alternative political project.

Thus, the demand for changes opens for some elites opportunities which are inaccessible under the existing regime. In fact, it is the transition from «outer arbitration» (with attracting of public at large in the frames of public competition) to «inner arbitration» among the elite levels. That supplies consolidation of elites and gradual reduction of public participation in politics. The stampede of some elites to «new demands» strengthens opposition's structures while mobilisation opportunities of the former regime reduce. This provokes instability and crises. After this the new system of political values starts to implement as a system of political reforms.

The pandemic of coronavirus disavow the fact that in Ukraine there is as an authoritarian model of governing, where the President is the main «patron» of political clans, being at the head of the pyramid and uniting around him patronage-clientele systems with the privilege to appoint on responsible posts loyally, without taking into consideration professional skills, that is followed by ineffectiveness of state institutions. The symptom of the present time in Ukraine is the spreading of «vertical blackmail in the form of discrediting evidence» [Radiosvoboda 2021]. As A. Ledeneva sees it, such blackmail is an integral practice of hybrid neo-patrimonial regime [Ledeneva 2006]. This explains why in Ukraine they used state money from the Fund to Fight COVID-19 in other spheres of state governing. For example, in 2020 the amount of money allocated from the Fund to Fight COVID-19 was 78.4 billion hryvnias from 80.9 bln, including the use of 63.7 bln hryvnias of 72 bln from general fund and 2.8 bln hryvnias of 6.4 bln from special fund.

Structure of the biggest money recipients attract attention [gov.ua 2021]. First of all, it is the State Agency of Motor roads which used 25.7 billion hryvnias of 26.2 bn (or 98.3%) to develop and maintain common use and State-Aid roads. Secondly, it's the Ministry of Economic Development, Trade and Agriculture, which used 8.8 billion hryvnias of 10.7 bn or 82.1%. That money was used as unemployment reliefs, as one-time compensations for the united payment of national insurance paid to subjects of economic activity and one-time material aid to subjects of economic activity.

Thirdly, it's the Ministry of Social Policy which used 4 billion hryvnias of 6.8 bn or 59.8% from general fund and 2.8 billion hryvnias of 5.0 bn or 55.5% from special fund. Money mentioned above was paid as insurance payments for temporary disability, payments to families of medical staff died from COVID-19, parental benefit to individual entrepreneurs, one-time material aid to assured people owing to the loss of income because of absolute prohibition of their activity during the quarantine. Fourthly, it's the Ministry of Public Health which used 17.8 billion hryvnias of 20.4 bn from general fund to buy reviving apparatuses, means of self-defense, equipment for admitting areas in hospital regions, to increase salaries of medical staff that treat people suffering from COVID-19, to deliver oxygen to hospitals, etc. But 86.8 % of 1.4 billion hryvnias from special fund weren't used.

Mentioned above tendency is seen in the realization of the program called «Great Motor road Building». In 2020 120 billion hryvnias were spent on road construction.

In 2018 only 40 bn were spent on roads. Thus, in 2018 3,800 km of motor roads were repaired, but in 2020, thanks to the «Great Motor road Building» program they repaired 4,000 km and the general cost of such a maintenance doubled [5.UA 2021]. It is important to mention that this program is positioned as the program of the President of Ukraine, but the mentioned objects were built before and weren't connected with the President, and money appeared thanks to the changes in tax code and budget code, which were adopted several years ago and provided for fiscal revenues from excise-duties on fuels and lubricants into a special fund called «Motor road Fund». Among the reasons of such an increase in the cost of work they call cartel agreement of the largest six companies, which share 67% of motor road budget. Wide spreading was given to the information concerning the fact that European Bank for Reconstruction and Development had included a special issue into the contract for credit extension in the amount of 450 million Euros which demanded the discharge of four clerks, who had financed tender offers, from European projects.

Diagnostically, all these are repeated on a regional level to the advantage of local elites and their partners in regional authorities. This undermines the authority of central bodies, the example of such actions is the refusal to implement quarantine measures in some cities during the crisis moment of the pandemic. Illegal and unconstitutional is the implementation of particular covenants and regime of residence without introduction of defence or emergency situation that can be introduced by a decree of the President and approved by Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine [Druzenko 2020].

The Russian Federation also uses the pandemic and is the subject of the sovereignty of the so-called LPR-DPR. Thus, from 18.03.2020 to 01.05.2020 Russia forbade entry to Ukraine for both self-proclaimed republics [Chervonenko 2020]. From 2020 to 2021 self-declared «republics» have blocked the work of checkpoint on the line of demarcation to deeply separate these arrears from Ukraine under the pretext of COVID-19 spreading [Dw.com 2021]. So, before the pandemic five checkpoints worked in Donbas. Now along the 400 kilometer demarcation line only two checkpoints work – one Lugansk region and one in Donetsk region.

But they allowed entering Russia to those people from LPR-DPR who have Russian passport or who in Ukrainian passport or in the passport of LPR-DPR have the record about residence on the territories beyond Kyiv's control. It is important that with the implementation of «the regime of high readiness to emergency situation» they continue to give the Ukrainians Russian passports [Romanova 2020].

The situation of coronavirus pandemic was used by the RF as a cause for propaganda in LPR-DPR. Internet media under the control of the Russian Federation and with the help of information spam made necessary «information fuss» and frankly propagandistic disinformation about: 1) institutional disability of Ukraine and western countries to take preventive measures, treat and oppose to the pandemic; 2) the situation on the territory under Ukrainian control concerning the number of infections with COVID-19 and the speed of infection spreading; 3) infection state in Military Forces

of Ukraine; 4) information concerning enrichment of officials thanks to the selling of protective masks, etc.

They also tendentiously presented the decision of Ukrainian government to temporarily stop crossing the demarcation line by people registered in the territory under control and want to enter the territory under control through the checkpoints [Donetsk Institute Information 2021].

It is important that on the territory of occupied Donbas the RF breaks not only quarantine restrictions but also article 51 of Geneva Convention, which underlines that «Country-invader must not make people from occupied territories to serve in their armies or subsidiary units. Any pressure or propaganda to the benefit of voluntary draft is forbidden».

For example, in so-called «LPR» such an «order» was published by the leader of «LPR» Leonid Pasichnyk on November 16, 2020. In one of the paragraphs of the «order» it is said that in these «military units» they don't forbid public meetings which were forbidden because of COVID spreading. At the same time «people's militsiya» were charged to control 1.5 meter social distance, wearing protecting masks and gloves among the participants of such meetings.

In so-called «DNR» the same «order» was published by the leader of «DNR» Denis Pushilin on November 21, 2020. In the preamble to the order it is said that «the measures are taken in order to control the presence of servicemen who are in reserve and are assigned to a military unit (assigned to special formations), to staff reserves and mobilization units» [Vostok-SOS 2020].

It is extremely significant that Germany and France show their concern about the restrictions imposed by separatists on the observation mission of OSCE since the 21st of March [Inshe.tv 2020]. Heads of Ministries of Foreign Affairs of both countries accused Russian-orientated separatists in Donbass of prevention to work of OSCE observers under the lee of corona.

The successful attempts of the RF as to the sovereignization of LPR-DPR are proved by the leader of CREON group Fares Kilsie who thinks that this region might become the area for expansion of economic cooperation between the RF and the EU by means of mutual investment into industry [Interfax 2021].

As to the occupied Crimea, the RF used a different practice. Russian FSB Border Administration in the Republic of Crimea limited crossing the border by residents of the annexed Crimea who have local registration and also by residents of Russia because of COVID-19. At the same time residents of the Crimea can enter the peninsula from Ukraine without any limits [RadioSvoboda 2020].

In addition the RF's government has extended the list of territories and land plots that can be in property of «foreigners» and «foreign legal persons» and in fact deprived the Crimean Tartars who in most have the Ukrainian citizenship, of their land [ZN,UA 2020].

## **CONCLUSION**

There is no doubt that pandemic of COVID-19 is the factor which was transformed from medical one into a trigger for the processes of self-determination for political subjects of different levels. First of all, this is connected with the conflict between universal values and emergence actions directed to save lives, which was revealed by the pandemic. Some countries' governments realized that by means of adoption of anti-coronavirus programs, implementation of quarantine, regime of entry, etc., and in such a way they set the superiority of national interests over the decisions and propositions of supranational structures and organizations (e.g. European Union and World Health Organization).

To our mind, it can be established that pandemic of COVID-19 stipulated sovereignization as the renovation of national states' political subjectivization. Implementation of quarantine in European countries not only revealed the restricted ability of EU's institutions to make the fastest decisions for their citizens' sake during the pandemic but also certified borderlines within the EU with the transmission in decision-making to national or even regional level.

So, we can distinguish two dimensions of contemporary sovereignization. For the EU countries it is the decline of European solidarity's basis. For post-soviet countries it is a certain degradation with the trend to the well-established institutional hierarchies, returning of actors, structures and relations of previous time. The analysis of interconnection between the pandemic and sovereignization of Ukraine is not complete without considering the fact that the world pandemic of COVID-19 became not only a medical problem for the Russian Federation and made by it LPR and DPR on the part of Donetsk and Lugansk regions but also a propaganda opportunity and an instrument of information influence on slowing-down of reintegration of Donbas into the united Ukrainian and European space.

The merge point of these practices is the decline of democratic freedoms and procedures as the result of life values reappraisal. Thus, freedoms and rights of average person become crimes, because moving without mask is danger to life. Under the pressure of necessity to save life, civil freedoms are being limited (for example, restriction in movements). So the pandemic plays the role of mutagenic factor because it not only changes the essence of sovereignty as a state and a suprastate formation but also causes degradation of democratic values and institutions amid actualization of neopatrimonial practices of survival.

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# THE NEXUS BETWEEN SOCIAL UNREST AND MIGRANT REMITTANCES: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM GEORGIA

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## **Abstract**

The paper examines the social unrest and migrant remittances relationship for Georgia using monthly time series data covering January 2007– July 2019. The Granger Causality Test was employed in the application of the econometric technique. Frequency domain causality test was also used in order to empower the findings of the study. The empirical findings showed that there is a bidirectional causality between the reported social unrest index (RSUI) and the remittance inflow to Georgia. Besides, frequency domain causality test results indicated that RSUI was the Granger cause of remittance inflow in the medium term (7-10 months), while remittance inflow was the Granger cause of RSUI in the short term (2-6 months). Social unrest comprises protests based on basic economic needs such as food, gas, electricity etc. Therefore, social unrest can be a supportive factor of remittances inflow to Georgia. This is in line with the view that remittances sent by Georgian immigrants to their families in Georgia are used for consumption rather than investments. On the other hand, remittances can be a determinant of social unrest for Georgia because the existence of separatist movements in Abkhazia and former South Ossetia can be interpreted as remittances can be an important source to fund these movements.

**Key words:** *Social Unrest, Remittances, Migration, Georgia, Granger Causality*

## INTRODUCTION

In this age of globalization and interconnectedness, several challenges that were earlier thought to be less probable from the standpoint of international security are now considered as more severe and rigid. The factor of migration might be included among them. It is already a complicated phenomenon. It is mostly collected as a result of many circumstances such as socioeconomic reasons, political unrest, private reasons, and so on [Beraia 2021].

A remittance is money earned by citizens abroad and remitted back to their home country [Mohammed, 2021]. Remittances have the potential to greatly improve the livelihoods of receiving households by stabilizing consumption and enabling investments in human and other capital, particularly in less developed and developing nations. In a nutshell, they encourage economic growth and reduce poverty in the recipient country by promoting economic stability, increasing creditworthiness, and attracting investments [Amuedo-Dorantes 2014]. Remittances have risen in importance as a way of transporting money throughout the world as migrant workers and immigrants repatriate portions of their earnings to their home countries [Bahadir et al. 2018]. When compared to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Official Development Aid (ODA), remittances are one of the less volatile and more consistent sources of foreign exchange revenues for developing nations [Ratha, Sirkeci 2010]. As a result, the amount transferred to developing and less developed nations has been gradually growing. KNOMAD [2021] expects that remittances flows to developing and less developed countries will reach 589 billion US Dollars in 2021.

Despite their obvious economic advantages and widespread appeal, remittances and migration in general have an influence on a wide variety of socioeconomic concerns other than money. These may include their impact on income risks (not than simply levels), income inequality, human capital investments (such as education), gender inequality, birth and mortality rates, ethnic relations, political change, and the environment, among other things. Migration's impact can also vary significantly across these many dimensions of economic and social development [de Haas 2007]. Remittances can mitigate poverty but they can produce new social insecurities at the same time [Warnecke-Berger 2020].

Protests, riots and all kinds of civil disorder are examples of social unrest. Barrett et al. [2020] collected these events for certain countries and formed the Reported Social Unrest Index (RSUI). In creating this index, the authors benefitted from Dow Jones Factiva news aggregator and a bunch of newspapers written in English and wire services in the USA, Canada and UK. The events are compiled on a monthly basis using key words used to report civil disturbances such as protests, riots, large marches and other sorts of unrest. These unrests can be arised from government issues, democratic-reform related issues, religious issues, coups, civil wars, elections, protests based on basic needs such as gas, electricity, education, healthcare or global issues.

Despite the fact that there are several studies in the literature investigating the link between remittances, economic growth, and other macroeconomic factors, [see for example, Pradhan et al. 2008; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009; Barajas 2009; Melkadze 2012; Bayar 2015; Bahadir et al. 2018], there are very few studies dealing with the effect of remittances on social unrest. Using the newly-formed RSUI index for the remittances-social unrest nexus constitutes the original value of our study.

There is a general argument that remittances can be a potential source of funding for insurgent groups and increase social unrest and acts of terrorism [Gunaratna, 2003; Warnecke-Berger 2020; Ari, Bello 2020]. On the other hand, it is argued that remittances reduce the demand for social welfare from the state, and as a result, remittances decrease the motivation to rebel and increase political stability [Regan, Frank 2014; Abbas et al. 2017]. The purpose of this study is to assess the validity of these two perspectives for Georgia. This study seeks to give policy recommendations based on the empirical findings in this setting.

The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the extant literature regarding migrant remittances and social unrest relationship. Section 3 discusses the methodology and the research findings. Finally, section 4 presents the conclusion and policy recommendations

## **1. LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **1.1. Theoretical Literature Review**

A range of factors documented in the literature impact remittance inflows, including inflation, interest rates, currency rates, political and financial risk, economic circumstances, education, and the quantity of migrants. Several ideas have been proposed to explain the differing effects of remittances on the economy based on household welfare or utility functions [Abbas et al. 2017]. Factors like migrants' behaviour patterns, income level, age, education and stay period abroad etc., are important for microeconomic literature [e.g. Lucas, Stark 1985; Poirine, 1997; Docquier, Rapaport 1998; Holst, Schrooten 2006] while factors like income differences between host and home country, inflation rate, exchange rate volatility, political stability, government migration policy are important for macroeconomic literature [e.g. Chami et al. 2003; Amuedo-Dorantes, Pozo 2004; Faini 2006]. The internal conflict is a factor in the country's political stability. Our work may be included in the macroeconomic literature since it investigates the influence of remittances on social unrest.

### **1.2. Empirical Literature Review**

Despite the fact that a vast amount of study has focused on how remittance inflows are connected to economic growth and investment [see, for example, Barajas 2009; Bayar 2015], very little literature has focused on remittances' role against unforeseen events or shocks. Among the studies regarding remittances-social unrest nexus, Re-

gan and Frank [2014] built a model of migrant remittances as a driver for domestic stability during economic downturns. They tested predictions from this model using World Bank remittance data from 1980 to 2005 for 152 countries. Their findings implied that an increase in migrant remittances during a crisis can reduce the chance of a civil war. Using data from 1972 to 2012, Abbas et al. [2017] utilized the GMM approach to evaluate the influence of macroeconomic, financial, and political variables on remittances inflows to Pakistan. They discovered a positive relationship between democracy and remittance inflows to Pakistan. They claimed that the democratic process offers government stability, and that migrants prefer to remit more to their home country when there is more peace and order and less corruption. Batu [2019] provided fresh empirical findings on the influence of remittance flows on the occurrence, commencement, and length of violence in recipient countries. The author developed a micro-based conflict model, which indicated that remittances increase the opportunity cost of participation in conflict. Thus, remittances decrease not only the number of rebels, but also the use of force by the government. Political stability, according to Yoshino et al. [2019] is also inversely related with remittance inflows. That is, the greater the risk of terrorism, war, a lack of social freedom, a lack of democracy, and political volatility, the more probable it is that people will live and work abroad and send a portion of their earnings home to their families. From a completely opposite point of view, Ari and Bello [2020] used yearly time series data from 1990 to 2019 to analyze the influence of remittances on terrorism in the Turkish economy. In the application of the econometric approach, Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) was applied. According to the research, remittances to Turkey had a positive and considerable effect on terrorism. Similarly, Escribà-Folch et al. [2018] opined that remittances promote political dissent in nondemocratic countries by increasing the resources accessible to prospective political opponents. Warnecke-Berger [2020] also asserted that remittances provoke the rescaling of social conflicts in favor of elites in El Salvador during the post-civil war economic restructuring.

Recently, Makhoul and Selmi [2021] have lead an in-depth examination of remittance behavior amid turbulent political events such as Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution. They also applied an elaborated investigation of rescaled range (R/S) analysis and found that remitting behaviour is stable for Tunisian migrants and it does not affect too much from social unrest. They came to the conclusion that remittances benefit both the balance of payments and the households receiving them.

In general, when the existing literature is analyzed, mixed results are produced. While some studies indicate that remittances exacerbate social unrest in less-developed and developing nations, others believe that remittances diminish social unrest and boost welfare. Although the nexus between social unrest and growth is discussed using RSUI in extant literature [see Kollias and Tzeremes, 2022], its relationship with remittances has not been tested through this index. Since remittances are also

a component of economic growth for developing countries, it is useful to examine this relationship. Therefore, this issue is considered worthy of being discussed in a broader perspective.

## 2. METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS

### 2.1. Data and Methodology

The purpose of this study is to look at the link between the social unrest index and remittance inflows from January 2007– to July 2019 in Georgia. Graph 1 displays the distribution of social unrest index and remittance inflow in Georgia for a given period. The Granger causality test between two variables is used in the study. To illustrate causal linkages between time series, the granger causality test is utilized. While the Reported Social Unrest Index (RSI) data used in the study was published by the IMF, the remittance inflow data was obtained from the World Bank Databank. Zurabishvili [2012] argued that the remittances were previously sent through the informal canal via the formal banking system after the “formalization” of the banking sector in Georgia and the host countries in 2006. Therefore, the study based on monthly data covers 2007-2019, and the dataset has 151 observations.

To determine the existence of causality between variables, the nature of the link between remittance inflow and social unrest index was examined. Granger [1980] defines the Granger causality between X and Y as follows: If Y’s probability depends on its history, and X’s history is not equal to Y’s probability-based solely on its history. In a bivariate framework, if the prediction for the second variable improves when lagging variables are taken into account for the first variable, the first variable in the granger sense is said to cause the second variable [Granger 1969].

An empirical model of granger equations is as follows:

$$\text{Remit}_t = \beta_1 \text{Remit}_{t-1} + \dots + \beta_\delta \text{Remit}_{t-\delta} + \theta_1 \text{Unrest}_{t-1} + \dots + \theta_\delta \text{Unrest}_{t-\delta} + \varepsilon_t \quad (1)$$

$$\text{Unrest}_t = \beta_1 \text{Unrest}_{t-1} + \dots + \beta_\delta \text{Unrest}_{t-\delta} + \theta_1 \text{Remit}_{t-1} + \dots + \theta_\delta \text{Remit}_{t-\delta} + \theta_t \quad (2)$$

In the above equations, Remit shows the remittance inflow while Unrest represents reported social unrest index.  $\delta$  indicates the lag length, and the error terms  $\varepsilon_t$  and  $\theta_t$  are assumed to be independent of each other [Granger, 1969, p. 431]. Within the two-variable VAR model, the following assumptions will be tested:

*Hypothesis 1: Remittance inflow is not the granger cause of reported social unrest index*

*Hypothesis 2: Reported social unrest index is not the granger cause of remittance inflow*


## Findings (Result)

Before beginning any econometric study, it is vital to determine if the time series being employed are stationary. Because it is well known that many economic time series include unit roots, an Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test based on the Dickey and Fuller [1979, 1981] test was used. Furthermore, the order of integration of the series utilized in the econometric analysis was enhanced by running both Phillips-Perron [1988] and Zivot-Andrews [1992] unit root tests. The econometric software programs E-views 12 and Stata 16 were used to analyze the data.

## Stationarity Analysis

Figure 1 shows the value of both remittance inflow and social unrest index series of Georgia. When the graph is examined visually, it is noticed that the series may contain deterministic trends. Therefore, this nuance is taken into account when performing unit root testing. In other words, the series is most likely to behave according to a random walk with a drift. The series are examined to see if they have a stochastic trend, sometimes known as a unit root.

**Fig. 1. The value of remittance inflow and social unrest index series of Georgi**



Source: Researchers' compilation

Dickey-Fuller and Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, which are used to detect the presence of a unit root, are the most well-known tests used to determine the stationarity of time series. In addition to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test, the Phillips-Perron [1988] and unit root tests developed by Zivot-Andrews [1992] are used to determine the series order of integration. The breakpoint unit root test developed by Zivot and Andrews [1992] is used to determine the breakpoint of a series. Table 1 summarizes the unit root test findings for the variables' level values.

All unit root tests used in the study have the same hypothesis structure. While the null hypothesis indicates that series has a unit root, the alternative hypothesis suggests that series has not a unit root. For the reported Social Unrest index variable, we may reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at all standard significance levels. The null hypothesis, on the other hand, rejects at 5 per cent significance levels for the

remittance variable. All unit root tests revealed that both time series variables are stationary at the same level. Therefore, the series is used at a level in the analysis.

**Table 1. Unit Root Tests**

	Statistics		Critical Value		
	Social Unrest	Remittance	%10	%5	%1
Augmented Dickey-Fuller	-2.504 (26)	-1.846 (25)	-1.29	-1.66	-2.36
Phillips-Perron	-5.870 (4)	-3.403 (4)	-2.58	-2.89	-3.49
Zivot-Andrews	-6.967 (2)	-5.658 (2)	-4.82	-5.08	-5.57
The numbers in parentheses are the selected lag lengths.					

Source: Computed by the authors using stata 17

### Causality Analysis

The VAR model was created for two variables to analyze Granger causality, and the length of the lag was calculated. The table below demonstrates the appropriate lag lengths based on different information criteria. When selecting the appropriate lag length, the maximum lag length was set at 24.

**Table 2. Appropriate Lag Length**

Lag	LR	FPE	AIC	SC	HQ
0	NA	3.49E+12	34.55778	34.60257	34.57598
1	154.7885	1.07E+12	33.37248	33.50685	33.42707
2	25.36608	9.24E+11	33.22755	<b>33.45150*</b>	33.31854
3	9.391146	9.10E+11	33.21228	33.52582	33.33967
4	1.371007	9.58E+11	33.26366	33.66677	33.42744
5	8.073634	9.52E+11	33.25705	33.74974	33.45722
6	1.503546	1.00E+12	33.30685	33.88913	33.54342
7	3.798028	1.03E+12	33.33593	34.00779	33.6089
8	17.01649	9.42E+11	33.24423	34.00567	33.55359
9	5.369251	9.56E+11	33.25751	34.10852	33.60327
10	2.20064	9.99E+11	33.29974	34.24034	33.68189
11	1.548668	1.05E+12	33.34784	34.37802	33.76639
12	37.70674	7.75E+11	33.04116	34.16092	33.4961
13	79.12454	3.75E+11	32.3129	33.52224	32.80424
14	<b>13.96750*</b>	<b>3.47e+11*</b>	<b>32.23337*</b>	33.53229	<b>32.76111*</b>
LR: Likelihood Ratio Criterion, FPE: Final Prediction Error Criterion AIC: Akaike Information Criterion, SC: Schwarz Information Criterion, HQ: Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion					

Source: Computed by the authors using e-views 12

All information criteria except SC indicate that the appropriate lag length is 14. According to Granger test results in Table 3, both hypotheses “Remittance inflow is not the Granger cause reported social unrest index” and “Reported social unrest index is not the Granger cause remittance inflow” are rejected at a 10 per cent significance level.

**Table 3. Granger Causality Test**

	Obs	F- statistic	Prob
Remittance inflow is not the granger cause of social unrest	137	2.2898	0.008
Social unrest is not the granger cause of remittance inflow		1.7773	0.051

Source: Computed by the authors using e-views 12

We may claim that there is a two-way causation link between the reported social unrest index and remittance inflow.

### **Breitung-Candelon-Granger Causality Test**

In addition to traditional causality tests, we perform a frequency domain causality test to achieve a higher understanding about the relationship between variables. The frequency domain causality test, unlike traditional causality tests, examines causality relationships by allowing a short, medium, and long-term separation of the entire period. As a result, the frequency domain approach provides much better information about casualties' directions and strengths.

The frequency domain causality test was first discussed by Granger [1969] and later developed by Geweke [1982], Hosoya [1991], and Breitung and Candelon [2006], respectively. By placing linear constraints on the autoregressive parameters in a VAR model, Breitung and Candelon [2006] demonstrate how frequency domain causality tests may be calculated, allowing for the testing of informational links at any frequency. The test can be used to find out whether a certain component of the “cause” variable at frequency ( $\omega$ ) is helpful in predicting the component of the “effect” variable at the same frequency one period in advance [Tastan, 2015]. It is simple to implement the frequency domain Granger causality test with the guidance of Breitung and Candelon's [2006] work.


By following Breitung and Candelon's [2006] article, we test two additional hypothesis, which is;

*Hypothesis 3: Remittance inflow is not the Granger cause of reported social unrest index at frequency  $\omega$*

*Hypothesis 4: Reported social unrest index is not the Granger cause of remittance inflow at frequency  $\omega$*

Figure 2 and Figure 3 show Breitung-Candelon frequency domain Granger causality test results. Areas above the red line with a 5% significance level, areas above the green line with a 10% significance level show that the null hypothesis of no causal relationship is rejected.

**Fig. 2. Results of the Breitung-Candelon-Granger Causality Test: Causality from Remittance Inflow to RSUI**



Source: Computed by the authors using Stata 17


Breitung-Candelon test results concerning granger causality from remittance inflow to RSUI is shown in Figure 2. The figure covers all frequencies in the interval  $(0, \pi)$ . The null hypothesis of no Granger causality from remittance inflow to RSUI can be rejected. The test statistics are significant at the 5% level in the range  $\omega \in [2.58- 2.70]$  corresponding to a wavelength between 2.3 and 2.4 months,  $\omega \in [0.94- 1.38]$  corresponding to 4.5 to 6.6 and  $\omega \in [0.01-0.28]$  corresponding to 22.4 months and above. In the light of test results, it can be said that remittance inflow was Granger cause of RSUI in short and long time.

Breitung-Candelon frequency domain causality test related null hypothesis about Granger causality from RSUI to remittance inflow is shown in Figure 3. The test statistics are significant at the 5% level in the range  $\omega \in [0.61- 0.89]$  corresponding to a wavelength between 7 and 10.3 months and  $\omega \in [0.01- 0.25]$  corresponding to 25 months and above. Therefore it can be said that RSUI was Granger cause of remittance inflow for a medium and long term.

As a result, empirical results confirmed that both series have causal effects on one another in the long-term. Furthermore, frequency domain analysis also reveals the timing and the sequence of causal effects [Çevik et al., 2019]. In this case, results indicate that remittance inflow Granger-causal effect on RSUI happens earlier than vice versa. In other words, while remittance inflow was the Granger cause of RSUI

in short term (2-6 months), RSUI was the Granger cause of remittance inflow in the medium term (7-10 months).

**Fig. 3. Results of the Breitung-Candelon-Granger Causality Test: Causality from RSUI to Remittance Inflow**



Source: Computed by the authors using Stata 17

## CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Using monthly data from January 2007– to July 2019, this study evaluates the relationship between social unrest index and remittance inflow in Georgia. To investigate the link between the reported social unrest index and remittance inflow, the Granger causality test was applied. In addition to traditional Granger causality tests, frequency domain causality test was employed to empower the findings of the study. The empirical data revealed that the variables are bidirectionally causative in the long-run. Besides, frequency domain causality test results indicated that RSUI was the Granger cause of remittance inflow in the medium term (7-10 months), while remittance inflow was the Granger cause of RSUI in the short term (2-6 months).

Remittances may be a contributing element to social unrest in Georgia. Indeed, it is clear that the remittances received by Georgia during the Russia-Georgia war in 2008 had an impact. The existence of separatist movements in Abkhazia and former South Ossetia in Georgia can be interpreted as remittances can be an important source to fund these movements. When we analyze Figure 1, we can clearly assert that remittances inflows to Georgia increased before only a few months ago to Russia strain and affected RSUI for a short time. As of January 2009, 6-7 months after the Russia-Georgia war, we see that the trend in remittance inflow had been upwards. These data might confirm the validity of frequency domain causality test findings.

On the other hand, social unrest can be a supportive factor for migrant remittances. Unrest due to economic reasons like unemployment forces family members to immigrate abroad and causes the immigrants to send remittances to their family members staying in Georgia. According to State Commission on Migration Issues Report [2016], a large part of the remittances flowing to Georgia is used to purchase basic consumer goods such as food and clothing and to pay their loan debts. This situation supports the result of our study.

Citizens of Georgia can benefit from visa exemption when entering the Schengen Area of the European Union as of March 28, 2017. As a result, more Georgian citizens can be expected to migrate to Europe to work in the future. The volume of remittances pouring into Georgia might grow. Therefore, there may be a rise in the amount of remittances flowing into Georgia. Therefore remittances flowing to Georgia should be used effectively and converted to investments. This may help preventing conflicts and protests based on basic needs such as gas, electricity, education and healthcare to some extent.

Despite its advantages, it should be noted that remittances can distort the income distribution in Georgia. As seen in Figure 1, while there has been an upward trend in remittances since 2017, an increase is observed in the RSUI index between 2017-2019. The economic and financial crises that may occur in the countries to which the remittances are sent may adversely affect the Georgian economy. This situation may cause social unrest in Georgia.

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# THE OFFICIAL STATE NARRATIVE ON THE BELARUSIAN PROTESTS OF 2020 AND ITS CORRELATIONS TO NON-OFFICIAL UNCREDITED BELARUSIAN MEDIA WITH FOREIGN REPRESENTATIONS

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## **Abstract**

With the beginning of the protests against the presidential election fraud in August 2020, A. Lukashenka and the Belarusian state media attempted to create and promote their interpretation of the nature of the protests, which took place in many cities and towns across Belarus. These protests were the largest, both in terms of sheer size and duration, in the history of independent Belarus. Our critical analysis of the events and the way they were depicted through media channels consists of the following elements: (a) how Belarus' state narrative about the protests developed in August-September 2020, (b) the rhetoric used by the Belarusian state to describe the protests, (c) the protesters, and (d) the use of force against the protesters. Using a short contextualisation, the paper aims to bring and highlight parallel rhetoric of non-accredited Belarusian media with its representations in the Russian and Ukrainian media.

**Key words:** *Belarusian Protests, Belarusian Media, Russian Media, Non-Official Narrative(s)*

## INTRODUCTION

The Belarusian presidential election of 2020 was held in August when A. G. Lukashenko was declared as the winner. According to the official statement from Lidziya Yarmoshyna, the head of the Central Election Commission of the Republic of Belarus (CEC Belarus), he got more than 80 % of the votes over Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and the other opponents [TUT.BY, 14.08.2020]. However, the results of independent exit polls demonstrated the falsification of the election and showed S. H. Tsikhanouskaya was the rightful winner. A series of political imprisonments prior and after the election, followed by violent repressions in Belarusian cities and towns after the official end of the election, stimulated an increase of protest activities that were a public expression of disapproval. The fraud seen during the Belarusian presidential election of 2020 resulted in one of the largest protests in the history of independent Belarus, leading to sanctions against the entourage of A. G. Lukashenko, who was allegedly involved in the falsification of the election results and political repressions [Deutsche Welle, 17.12.2020]. Similar protests also took place after the presidential elections in the 1990s and 2000s, but the size of the 2020 protests exceeded the others. The protesters' dissatisfaction with the official results of the presidential election and unprecedented cruelty from the law enforcement agencies, such as police, Special Purpose Police Detachment (AMAP-bel. *Atrad militsyi asobaha pryznachennia*) and other special forces against protesters and their demonstrations resulted in the emergence of two separate parallel narratives (the "official" state one and "non-official"). In one narrative, Belarusian state media and official state channels attempted to discredit the protests and downplay their scale. In the second narrative, independent 'unaccredited Belarusian journalists'<sup>1</sup> and foreign news media tried to cover the protests and demonstrate the sheer scale and size, and uncover parts and events that were often dismissed by the state media. This analysis emphasises the parallel presence of an official state media narrative that contradicts the unofficial one from independent media.

**Fig. 1. The Belsat video "AMAP throw bombs at people" from 10.8.2020.**



Source: Belsat TV

<sup>1</sup> The 'non-official' Belarusian journalists are the majority of the Belarusian and foreign journalists. They do not work in state media, they either lost their accreditations because of their outputs or did not get it at all because of political reasons. It also includes those journalists who experienced significant obstacles in their work after the Belarusian presidential election of 2020.

## **PUBLISHED AND UNPUBLISHED BOOKS ON THE BELARUSIAN PROTESTS OF 2020**

Although this text is a result of our observations during the summer and autumn of 2020, the first draft was completed and submitted during the end of autumn and winter of 2020-2021 for the *European Journal of Transformation Studies*. After that, numerous books on the past protests were published and others are still being planned to help establish a corpus of scientific and non-scientific sources on the topic.

Two distinguished publications were written on the involvement of women in the protests. One of them was written by Alice Bota, who presented them with her German book *Die Frauen von Belarus: von Revolution, Mut und dem Drang nach Freiheit* [A. Bota, 2021]. Another one by Olga Shparaga is titled *Die Revolution hat ein weibliches Gesicht: Der Fall Belarus*, which Volker Weichsel translated from Russian [O. Shparaga, 2021]. In 2021, Maria Stepanova published her *Brev till en lycklig tid [Pis'ma v schastlivoye vremya]* in Swedish after the translation by Ola Wallin. This publication was based on Svetlana Alexievich's — a Belarusian Nobel Prize laureate — open letter to the Russian intelligentsia titled, “Why are you silent?” that was published on the PEN Center website. Meanwhile, Svetlana Alexievich planned a book on that Belarusian past, where she intended to write about “the human in the mask”, and to reflect on the unanswered questions: “Why were some people hiding protesters, while others were leading the riot of AMAP there? ... Where did these beautiful people who took to the streets come from? How were they formed, who were their parents?” And she plans to include the words of “provocateur G. Azarenok” who is known for his numerous hate speeches, discreditations of protesters and praises for A. G. Lukashenka on the Belarusian state TV. Her goal is to show the provocateurs (propagandists) and what they do to their societies.

Edyta Banaszekiewicz edited the selection of texts by Belarusians in the book *Marsz Białorusi: sierpień-grudzień 2020* in Polish [E. Banaszekiewicz, 2021]. Moreover, the book-essay *The Art of Popular Disobedience* by Dmitry Strotsev, who participated in the protests in Minsk and was detained for 13 days, appeared under “Radio Svaboda” in 2022 [D. Strotsev, 2022]. Different contrasting narration is under the title *Belarus. From the protest to the people's unity* and *The Nazi coup of 2020 in Belarus: Hold on, Batska!* by Ivan Turlay that represents Belarusian pro-government rhetoric [I. Turlay, 2021].

The new corpus of publications about the protests does not cover the complexity of the parallel and contrasting narratives of the tragic events of summer and autumn of 2020. It is still an open question when S. Alexievich's planned book would appear and what the text will look like. In the workings of future researchers, relations to the Belarusian authorities and political views of I. Turlay also deserve a separate interest and analysis as a contextualisation of his books on the recent Belarusian past during the 21st century.

## **METHODOLOGY**

This paper comprises a critical analysis of the 2020 Belarusian protests representation from state and independent non-governmental media of Belarus and other countries to a lesser extent; our observations and content analysis address the development of their parallel narratives. The hypothesis of this paper is that the emerging narratives conflict with each other. To gain a detailed understanding of media representations of the protests and the resulting narratives, we examined state and non-state media rhetoric. The following discourse analysis focuses on the 'official' and 'non-official' narratives and rhetoric on the images of the protests, the protesters, and the violence used against these protestors by law enforcement agencies. The critical analysis covers the protests in August and the beginning of September after the election in 2020. This period was crucial for emerging representations of the protests in Belarus and abroad. In addition, this critical analysis briefly parallels the rhetoric of A. G. Lukashenka, which often is a simplification of the situation, and Belarusian state media with the representations of the protests in Russia and Ukraine and in the unaccredited Belarusian media. We trace the division of the narratives on the available state and non-state materials with their relations to the online sources. Our text does not aim at tracing the whole emerging development and polarisation of all opposing narratives. It requires more extensive complex studies, due to its historical complexity and its significant role in understanding the Belarusian politics and its history in the 21st century.

The materials of our research are composed of the following criteria:

- the state and non-state visual and written materials of Belarusian media that illustrated the Belarusian protests after the presidential election in August 2020
- the news broadcasts from local and foreign television networks that were available online
- materials on the events after the election (9 August 2020) and prior to the visit of the detention centre (SIZA - bel.: *Sledchy izaliatar*) by Lukashenka, when dialogue between the authorities and opposition emerged on a declarative level
- video and written materials from Russian and Ukrainian media outlets, which can be correlated and contrasted with the narratives of the 'official' and 'non-official' Belarusian rhetoric on the protests

The main focuses of the critical analysis are on A. G. Lukashenka's statements and media representation of the protests and protesters after the presidential election of 2020. We contrast them with media reports from non-accredited Belarusian media and proceed further to analyse and compare these reports with the Russian and Ukrainian media. The official analysed Belarusian materials were retrieved from news programmes of the Belarusian Telegraph Agency (BelTA), as found on the Belarusian state television channels and the official websites. As the state media broadcasted and repeated A. G. Lukashenka's words often, his original statements shift

the mainstream state and dominant official interpretations of protests, protesters, violence, and the people who suppress the protests.

In addition, we traced and analysed how this part of Belarusian history in 2020 is covered in the Russian and Ukrainian media, and this is based on the Russian First Channel and Ukrainian NASH TV channel, which take a pro-Russian stance. Their rhetoric contradicts the Belarusian channel, Belsat, which is based in Poland in exile but had numerous journalists, who work in Belarus and maintained streams to keep Belarusian citizens in Belarus and abroad up to date on past and current news. Additionally, Belsat is not officially accredited in Belarus and is recognised as extremist on the official level [BBC, 27.07.2021] as the telegram channel NEXTA due to political reasons and available only online. Similar analytical materials regarding the protests were used from the Russian Rain channel and other Ukrainian media that did not have the same official Russian position. We will further analyse the multi-faceted rhetoric from Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine on the protests captured in the way it was illustrated during August and September 2020. There are three main elements that are analysed and addressed in our paper (1) the protests of 2020, (2) protesters, and (3) the violence used during the protests.

## 1. PROTESTS

The Belarusian authorities were preparing for the demonstrations before and after the presidential election of 2020. At the same time, A. G. Lukashenka frequently drew parallels with the protests in Ukraine in late 2013 and early 2014 in public statements. During the meeting with the head of the Belarusian Committee for State Security (KDB - bel.: *Kamitet dzjarzhaunaj bjaspeki*), on the 1st of June 2020, Lukashenka mentioned that the Maidan (“*maidanchik*”) would not happen in Belarus and that they were aware of “separate wind turbines” (“*otdel’nye vetrodui*”) referring to opposition leaders of Belarus. One of them, Mikola Statkevich, had been arrested a day before [Deutsche Welle, 01.06.2020]. Also, Lukashenka warned all possible protesters about it and called them “*maydanuty*”<sup>2</sup> during that meeting, which appeared in the rhetoric of the Belarusian authorities and their media channels before the protests of 2020 started [BelTA, 01.06.2020]. The derogatory and diminutive epithet was used to describe the parallels with the Ukrainian Maidan in 2013-14 to discredit possible future protests in Belarus. It was not a unique case of attempts to discredit the protestors by the state media and high-level authorities before they started and after.

The strikes were scarcely shown in the state media, and when the strikers were mentioned, they were illustrated in a small size. However, the comments of Lukashenka mentioned that there were about 150 or 200 people when he was at the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant (MZKT - bel.: *Minski zavod kolavykh tsjahachou*) [BelTA, 17.08.2020],

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<sup>2</sup> The nickname with the negative connotation, which Lukashenka expressed as an impromptu or purposely, was for the possible future protesters of Belarus, who are considered as Maidan-obsessed.

unlike the materials on Belsat, TUT.BY, the Rain channel and other online media, which showed higher numbers of people and presented interviews from the strikers. During the strikes at Belarusian factories in mid-August, there was a moment when the workers of the MZKT shouted to A. G. Lukashenka to “go away”, which showed clear evidence of the lack of support for A. G. Lukashenka among the employees of the MZKT [Dozhd, 17.08.2020]. The video of that moment is not on the official website of BelTA, but it was shown on STV briefly, which was cut down by the state journalists [STV, 17.08.2020].

The Russian news programme *Vremia* (Time) on the Russian First Channel used excerpts from Belarusian state channels and quotes from A. G. Lukashenka about the protests. An example of this is the news broadcast from the 16th of August, where they used the quotation of Lukashenka that he restarted the factories and “fed” the hungry people in the 1990s. Moreover, the journalists drew comparisons with other revolutions in post-soviet countries and called them “colourful revolutions”. Thus, claiming that everything is organised by “external forces” (rus. *vneshniie sily*) and the revolution in Belarus was done according to “textbook methodologies of colourful revolutions” (rus. *metodichki tsvietnykh revolutsyi*). The appearance of news about external influences coincides entirely with statements of the Foreign Minister of Russia, Sergei Lavrov, and the Press Secretary for the President of Russia, Dmitry Peskov [Novosti na pervom kanale, 19.08.2020].

The Russian media repeatedly emphasised V. V. Putin’s and S. V. Lavrov’s statements. During his press conference, Lavrov spoke about the events in Belarus as follows, “[We] consider it fundamentally important to let the Belarusian people figure out what is happening on their own and consider the initiative of President Lukashenka to carry out a constitutional reform very promising” [RT na russkom, 02.09.2020]. According to official rhetoric, the reform was initiated by A. G. Lukashenka, but it seems as it was inspired by the Russian constitutional reform, which was implemented after the Russian referendum in June 2020. Also, V. V. Putin spoke of “the unacceptability of any outside interference in the affairs of the republic [of Belarus]” [Official Internet Resources of the President of Russia, 21.08.2020].

With the representation of the protests as an internal affair of Belarus, it was claimed that the foreign countries that recognise S. H. Tsikhanouskaya officially as the president and support protests were interfering in Belarus’ internal affairs. After E. Macron’s call on 17 August to support Belarus’ protests, A. G. Lukashenka, followed by Russian state channels, recalled the yellow vest protests in France and E. Macron’s refusal to cooperate with its protestors [Novosti na pervom kanale, 21.08.2020]. A few Ukrainian media outlets used rhetoric similar to that used by the Russian and Belarusian state channels to represent protests in Belarus. Ukrainian television channels owned by Ukrainian oligarchs promoting pro-Russian narratives of interpretation of the Ukrainian protests of 2013-2014 tried to transfer the narrative they used to describe the Revolution of Dignity to the protests in Belarus in 2020. After

the beginning of the protests, NASH TV channel (the then owner Yevhen Muraev, a former member of the Party of Regions) aired several broadcasts dedicated to Belarusian protests. During this broadcast, the hosts repeatedly supported the idea that A. G. Lukashenka had won the election because it was announced in the CEC. They particularly described the protests as “street democracy” rather than ordinary democracy. Thus, despite the presence of invited speakers who expressed opposition to A. G. Lukashenka such as Valery Tsapkala (who was denied registration as a candidate in the presidential election in Belarus and who was forced to leave the country due to an open criminal case against him), the manner the hosts tended to interview their guests aimed at instilling doubts about the fairness and legitimacy of the protests and the nature of the influence of Western countries over the protests [NASH, 15.08.2020].

The Belarusian and Russian state media, as well as pro-Russian Ukrainian media, actively used comparisons with other revolutions against election fraud and state violence in post-Soviet countries. They justified their emergence by so-called “external forces”, referring to EU and NATO countries. In addition to that, there were attempts to reduce the protests’ scale and show that these would be short-lived. Russia’s position on the protests as an internal affair matter and its emphasis on the non-interference in the conflict is particularly notable.

## **2. PROTESTERS**

After the protests began, A. G. Lukashenka and state media did not address the protests and their participants much, in an attempt to discredit them, pointing out the aggressive actions initiated by protesters. In one of his first statements, A. G. Lukashenka referred to the leaders of the post-election period and demonstrations as “the puppeteers who managed the protests” [BelTA, 10.08.2020]. This information was transmitted by BelTA and other official media. Further, A. G. Lukashenka characterised the protesters as “stoned, drunk and with drugs”, in an attempt to discredit their credibility. On 12 August, he referred to the core of the protesters as “unemployed people and people with a criminal past” [BelTA, 12.08.2020]. Later he stated that “the puppeteers” were “from Poland, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine, and acted as the satellites of the USA” while using the textbook methodology of “colourful revolutions” [BelTA, 16.09.2020]. Lukashenka referred to the united headquarters of the opposition as “sheep that were led by foreign puppeteers.”

One of the Russian propagandists, Evgeny Popov, in a state-sponsored Russian programme “60 minutes”, aired a video of A. G. Lukashenka flying in a personal helicopter with his youngest son, saying about the protesters that “[They] scattered like rats.” The Russian propagandist portrayed the protests as “having reached their peak” and reinforced the Russian position on the Belarusian protests as “Russia does not interfere but is ready to help the fraternal people” [60 minut, 24.08.2020].

High-ranking Russian officials made similar statements. In a speech by Lavrov, he explicitly stated that the opposition was guided by Western partners [Novosti na pervom kanale, 25.08.2020]. The focus on the Russian state channels was on the alleged 'fact' that protesters were paid for their participation in the protests [Novosti na pervom, 19.08.2020]. This Russian rhetoric was similar to the ideas of the Belarusian authorities and their media, while the Russian oppositional channel Rain presented videos of the protests showing their larger scale like the telegram channel NEXTA and Belsat. Independent media broadcasted videos of the large scale of the protests, while also capturing the violence against the protesters by law enforcement agencies, as well as interviews including personal stories of the participants and their leaders. They were also providing analyses on the symbolism of the protests [Dozhd, 10.09.2020]. On the Rain and Belsat channels, the opposition leaders and protesters were portrayed as humane, courageous and resolute, and the channels included numerous their interviews. Also, Rain news demonstrated that the opposition and Belarus did not plan to break off relations with Russia and are not anti-Russian [Dozhd, 10.09.2020]. Also, the Belsat channel counted the number of the protests' days from their news broadcasts.

In the official narrative, protesters were portrayed as having received funds for their activities and controlled by "external forces". In addition, the state taxonomy regarding protesters rendered them as people coming from low social status and with low social responsibility, as opposed to the views presented by the Belsat and Rain channels. The emphases of the two narratives contrasted significantly.

### **3. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND VIOLENCE**

Prior to the election, the Belarusian state media demonstrated how the KDB arrested the provocateurs during the presidential election, who were depicted as the Russian fighters of the Wagner group, which is a Russian paramilitary or private military organisation that use the motto "Our business is death". The story about the Wagner group fighters appeared in the Russian [Dozhd, 29.07.2020] and Ukrainian media as well. Further, after the election, the state news started to circulate an idea that people wanted to storm various administrative buildings, but these allegations which were meant to eliminate provocations against the police were not apparent in the video fragments [ATN: news of Belarus and world, 12.08.2020].

During the first days of the protests, law enforcement agencies dispersed demonstrators and brutally detained them at police stations. The state Belarussian media supported AMAP and other law enforcement agencies from the first days of the protesters rather than protesters themselves.

On 9 September, in the conversation with Russian journalists, Lukashenka denied having offered support to security forces in their brutal interventions against the protesters. Non-denial at the highest level confirms the presence of violence on the Belarusian streets and in the Criminal Detention Centre of the Minsk Executive Com-

mittee's Main Internal Affairs Directorate ("Akrestsina") after the election. However, A. G. Lukashenka and the Belarusian and Russian state media claimed that the protesters were the initiators of violence and had already been convicted many times prior [RT na russkom, 08.09.2020]. This statement completely contradicts the information disseminated by Belsat and other independent Belarusian online media, which, together with their guests, spoke about the peaceful nature of the protests and placed the blame of the violence on the side of authorities. Speaking about violence and AMAP, A. G. Lukashenka stated, "everyone gasped at the disproportional use of force by our riot police, and their alleged beatings of people in 'Akrestina' and on the streets". He completely denied any violent acts of AMAP in the pre-trial detention centres and "Akrestina", and on the streets, without stating that violent offences were done by others, who work there. As for AMAP, Lukashenka affirmed that "They saved the country and thwarted the blitzkrieg" and that "Under these 'white-red-white flags' the blitzkrieg was unsuccessful" [BelTA, 17.09.2020]. In general, comparisons to the Second World War played an essential role in the rhetoric of A. G. Lukashenka and protesters. The strong emphasis on the historical essence of the Second World War in the official Belarusian policy had its outcomes in 'official' and 'non-official' narratives of the protests. The pro-government media categorized the protesters' semiotics - the white-red-white flag and the emblem of *Pahonia* (eng.: pursuit) - as Nazi or fascist to cast a shadow over the opposition's credibility and their protests (this has been already happening from the 1990s). Protesters, on the other hand, called the authorities' methods to disperse the protests as fascist or Stalinist (or compared to the methods of the Soviet People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs - NKVD) sometimes drawing on the same historical parallels.

**Fig. 2. The Belsat video "The Nationwide strike, beginning. 17 August" from 16.8.2020.**



Source: Belsat TV

On 9 August, the Russian journalists were arrested, and on 11 August S. V. Lavrov demanded they should be released. This act played the role of influencing the agenda of Russian news outlets. The news broadcast of 14 August took a different turn from the previous one. Thus, the news acknowledged that Belarusian law enforcement officers used force against protesters. However, the news showed that the detainees had been released and that the Belarusian authorities acknowledged the fact that they had exceeded their authority. From A. G. Lukashenka's interview with Russian journalists, it can be inferred that he knew about their Russian journalists and other detainees who were arrested without trial and were kept in "Akrestina" without food or water for several days. Belsat, NEXTA and other non-state media reported about the abuses that took place there. This information took the form of an official apology from the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus Yuryj Karaeu, which appeared on 13 August [STV, 13.08.2020] and meant only for those who were "simple passers-by" caught in the crossfire.

**Fig. 3. The Belsat video "The Fifteenth day of protests, August 23" from 23.8.2020. The protests in Minsk Near the Museum of the Great Patriotic War with the AMAP on the left.**



Source: Belsat TV

Lukashenka attempted to discredit the violence used against the protesters in an interview with Russian journalists, where he stated that the beatings of women were due to, "some girls painted their bottoms with blue paint, [...] but some really had a blue [beaten] back". He tried to divert the attention from the violence against the Russian journalists and protestors by mentioning about 39 or 40 AMAP members, whose spines were broken [RT na russkom, 08.09.2020]. None of them was mentioned by name, and none of their photos were released in the media. Belsat and TUT.BY, as well as other Belarusian independent unaccredited media, have repeatedly reported information regarding the violence against protesters [Belsat, 10.08.2020; PC "Vyasna", 11.10.2020; TUT.BY, 11.11.2020].

**Fig. 4. The Belsat video “Belarusians: ‘Happy birthday, cockroach!’ ” from 30.8.2020. The protests in Maladzyechna.**



Source: Belsat TV

Many Ukrainian TV channels and state officials highlighted the violence against protesters and compared it with the Ukrainian maidan, such as Ukrainian president, Zelensky did in his speech following Lukashenka’s self-proclaimed inauguration [TSN, 24.09.2020]. In contrast to that, pro-Russian channels in Ukraine often portrayed protesters as offenders who used force against law enforcement agencies. They broadcasted videos depicting AMAP being knocked down by cars or how protesters tried to hit law enforcement officers [NASH, 12.08.2020], while the opposite situation was not shown. They also promoted the message that any deaths that occurred during the protests were strictly accidental [NASH, 15.08.2020].

The Belarusian and Russian state media and some of the pro-Russian Ukrainian media outlets did not acknowledge the scale of the violence used against the protesters and tried to discredit all attempts to acknowledge their existence. The only exception is their reporting of this violence in relation to the arrests of Russian journalists.

## CONCLUSION

In Belarus, the state policy and official orientations, and the words of A. G. Lukashenka, created commonality in the representations of the protests in the news, which formed the central ‘official’ narrative. Meanwhile, a parallel ‘non-official’ narrative emerged from unaccredited journalists and media in Belarus. Before and after the presidential election, the words of A. G. Lukashenka in the state media were often reinforced with a negative connotation toward the protests, protesters, and leaders of the opposition. A. G. Lukashenka’s official speeches, together with the interpretations and nuances added by the Belarusian state media, dominated the main official state narrative on the Belarusian protests from the summer of 2020. The state media’s written and visual materials were presented to a different extent in the state-funded Russian media and were conflicting with the information transpiring from the unoffi-

cial media outlets in Belarus. The Russian state media's broadcasts and their official line of interpretation on the Belarusian protests were very similar to those of the Belarusian authorities. Russian media helped shape the Belarusian narrative as the interviews sustained with Russian journalists enlightened some of the aspects of the protests, which can be found in the materials of BelTA. Due to various journalists' investigative work, both Belarusian and foreign, two different informational spaces were developed regarding the Belarusian protests, and these two spaces did not converge, due to their opposite approach.

Comparisons with the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries' revolutions were used in the rhetoric of the official narrative. The protest and the protesters were represented as being guided by "external forces" and receiving foreign funds for their protests. Any support for the protests in Belarus by EU countries was seen as evidence that these countries were trying to interfere in the internal affairs of Belarus. In addition, they did not acknowledge the violence against the protesters at the official state level. Official statements by high-ranking Belarusian officials and media coverage of events on Belarusian state channels attempted to reduce the protests' scale and discredit the protesters. In contrast, unaccredited Belarusian media and some Russian and Ukrainian media widely broadcasted the protests' scale, law enforcement agencies' violence, and interviews with protestors and opposition leaders.

The development of the state narrative on the protests in 2020 did not only occur in the months before and after the elections. Some of the above-mentioned rhetoric was present during the presidential election campaigns of the 1990s and 2000s, such as claiming the opposition was 'fascist'. On the other side, Russian state propaganda had a considerable influence, following the patterns of which the Belarusian authorities' official narrative on the protests was formed and developed. In the future research on the history of independent Belarus, and broader Eastern Europe, the interconnections of common and conflicting narratives should be covered and analysed in detail as this part of knowledge relevant for understanding the present and recent past, and it includes similar and distinguished patterns in the history of other post-Soviet countries.

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# POWER OF LEADERSHIP MOTIVATION IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY

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## **Abstract**

Leadership and Motivation are key factors associated with success and failure of any organization. In accordance with Herzberg's two-factor theory, the motivation influences the managers while adopting a leadership style. This study examines the impact of Leadership Motivation on Organizational Performance with mediating effect of Leadership styles. This research focuses on motivation of leaders, their leadership style and its impact on organizational performance and developing the concept of mediating role of Leadership Styles as a banking sector nowadays is in the race of facing challenges in order to become competitive and also to improve the performance. The descriptive statistics and Mediation model 4 of Hayes [2013] PROCESS macro regression-based approach was used to analyze the data. The findings suggested that both aspects of Motivation, i.e. intrinsic as well as extrinsic motivation, have a positive and significant effect on organization performance. The leadership style acts as a strong mediator between motivation and organizational performance. The study has provided good construction towards literature regarding the Leadership Motivation for improving organizational performance.

**Key words:** *Leadership Motivation, Autocratic Leadership Style, Democratic Leadership Style, Laissez-Faire Leadership Style, Organizational Performance*

## INTRODUCTION

Leadership is basically a continuous process of influencing by an individual or a group of people to their team for making efforts towards the accomplishment of a specified goal of an organization [Chua et al., 2018]. Leadership has played a vital role in development of communities, culture and nations throughout the period of early world to modern history. Al Khajeh [2018] stated that leadership is an inspirational tool for others to make efforts in achieving a goal by following a vision. Michael [2010] stated that success of any organization depends upon the effective leadership. All organizations want to be successful in this highly competitive global era and hence to overcome the challenges and to compete in this environment every organization must create a strong bonding between employees and give them direction toward task attainment [Yang et al., 2018]. Organizations are facing multiple challenges in this current competitive environment and making out strategies for improvement in operational performance and fulfillment of a desired goal [Jaramilo et al., 2005]. An organization relies on availability of resources, i.e. human, finance and information, effective leadership style, formulation of policies and its implementation to achieve objectives and goals [Khan et al., 2014]. The organizations which are working in an efficient way considered human capital as a major asset in order to attain a goal [Yang et al., 2018]. Thus, leadership plays a vital role in making continuous improvement in order to run in efficient and effective way in this competitive environment [Buble et al., 2014].

It is expressed that the most important component of any organization is its employees so it is essential to stimulate and encourage them for task completion [Ochola, 2018]. Most of the organizations now realize the importance of having motivated employees because it empowers them to perform better in the long-term and helps toward the growth of organizations [Evans and Thomas, 2013]. Motivation is the core element of organizational performance. Motivation is an influential tool which stimulates behavior toward a goal [Yang et al., 2018]. Buble et al. [2014] observed that there is a positive relationship between motivation and a leader because highly motivated team depends upon the most motivated leaders. For making leadership effective, a leader must adopt the style of leadership according to the motivational needs of the team [Maslow, 1954]. Furthermore, the success of any organization relies on the appropriate style of a leader which is adopting according to the motivational requirements of the followers [Buble et al., 2014].

Many researches have been done on leadership and motivation, but some of them have put attention on motivation of managers and their leadership styles and its impact on organizational performance [Buble et al., 2014]. It has been observed that there is a huge variety of studies that emphasize on leadership effectiveness, while exploration on leadership motivation remains lagging behind [Deep Sharm et al., 2019]. This research focuses on motivation of leaders and their leadership style and its impact on organizational performance and developing the concept of mediating

role of Leadership Styles between Leadership Motivation and Organizational Performance.

### **Problem of originality/Value**

It has been revealed that motivation at work place depends upon both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (Gagné et al., 2010). Siddiqui and Rida (2019) concluded from his study that intrinsic as well as extrinsic motivation positively affect the employee performance. Al Khajeh (2018) stated that leadership styles have significant, both positive and negative effect on organizational performance. Deep Sharm et al (2019) systematically reviewed 119 articles related to the leadership and organization and stated that there is extensive literature on leadership but research on leadership is lagging behind and they further suggested to examine the effect of leadership motivation on organizational performance. Therefore, there is a sheer need to study the impact of leadership motivation on organizational performance with the mediating role of leadership styles.

## **1. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT**

### **1.1. Motivation and Leadership**

Human capital's behavior is one of the significant factors in the success of any organization in any type of organization and it does not matter that it is of public or private market [Madanchian and Taherdoost, 2017]. Motivation of a worker depends largely on the style of a leader as it varies from company to company [Fiaz et al., 2017]. The most important function of management is to motivate employees [Gamage, 2018]. Leadership is considered as blood for organization life and its significance cannot be ignored in this current era [Ali, 2019].

Bhatti et al. [2012] stated that democratic leadership can even work with a small team and is very careful for the participation of all team members in decision making to increase their motivational level. Bouckenoghe et al. [2015] stated that efficiency and effectiveness of the style of a leader depends upon the situation in which he or she adopted a specific style. So, when a leader wants to increase a production level he or she preferred the autocratic leadership but in case of maintaining a good relationship among team members and improving performance they follow the democratic leadership [Asrar-ul-Haq and Kuchinke, 2016]. Alghazo and Al-Anazi [2016] stated that the supervisors who adopted the Autocratic leadership, i.e. taking decisions according to their own skills and experience, may be helpful in the emergency situation when there is no time for a group discussion. While those managers who are highly concerned about their team proficiency and level of motivation and want to value their opinions, adopted the democratic leadership style as their style of leadership. This highly affects the motivation of employees because workers are considered an important part in taking final decision. Whereas Laissez-Faire leader assumed that

his team is highly motivated and skilled and delegates his authority for decision making as he authorizes his team for their own success.

R. Singh, [2016] stated that intrinsic motivation is the performing of any function for his/her inner satisfaction rather than for external rewards. It is the doing of any action for the intrinsic pleasure of the task. Intrinsic motivation plays an important role in sustaining long term and positive aspects on performance of employees as these variables are a fundamental factor for psychological development of a human [Yusoff et al., 2013]. Extrinsic stimuli encourage the efficiency of the worker by good working environment, fair management policies, job satisfaction and positive peer ties [Emeka et al., 2015]. Employees that are happy with their job are highly motivated and perform efficiently than [Shaikh et al., 2018]. As Extrinsic motivation is related with external stimuli that are gained by bonuses after completing the task rather than inner satisfaction from a job [R. Singh, 2016]. When management ignore the provision of external factors to employees then there are chances of frustration from a job among workers [Yusoff et al., 2013].

Buble et al. [2014] highlighted the importance of intrinsic motivation that leads the behavior of an individual to attain the high performance of the organization. Srivastava and Barmola [2011] stated that extrinsic motivation plays a vital role in boosting the productivity of employees. Therefore, in view of discussed literature, we hypothesize that:

**Hypothesis 1[a]:** *There is a significant relationship between Intrinsic motivation of manager and leadership styles.*

**Hypothesis 1[b]:** *There is a significant relationship between Extrinsic motivation of manager and leadership styles.*

## **1.2 Leadership and Organizational Performance**

Ali [2019] stated that styles of leadership have a significant impact on the organizational performance. Leadership is one of the most significant predictors of the organizational performance how company works effectively in this competitive world by providing a healthy environment to its employees thus need of effective leadership is utmost important than ever.

Dele et al. [2015] declared that an appropriate style of a leader enhances the development and growth of a firm. Iqbal et al. [2015] observed that the autocratic model of leadership produced the effective results even in a short span of a time. Chua et al. [2018] stated that autocratic leadership is valuable in “emergency situation” and “in case of homogenous work force is involved” or in case of intellectual leadership then there is a good interaction with his team. Whereas, Democratic Leadership is one of the most productive style of leadership which involves employees in decision making and in result produce more output, promotes team working and improves the position of the organization [Akpapere et al., 2019]. This approach of leadership encourages the employees to use their skills toward creativity for achieving the goal of the

organization [Anderson et al, 1991]. Chua et al. [2018] considered the Laissez-Faire style of leadership as permissive leadership built on the premise that team members are motivated, inspired, skillful and accountable in achieving the goal of the firm. In view of preceding discussion, we hypothesize the:

**Hypothesis 2:** *Leadership style has a significant effect on the organizational performance.*

### 1.3. Motivation and Organizational Performance

Shaikh et al. [2018] declared that motivation is an important tool for enhancing the efficiency of workers and keep staying in organization for a long period of time. Sabri et al. [2019] stated that there is direct association between motivation of employees and organizational performance as worker willingness and enthusiasm improves the quality of their performance. Kalhoro et al. [2017] decided that banks should keep a balance between inner and exterior reward to enhance the quality of work.

Herzberg [1959] described two sets of components for determining the employees' attitude and performance levels known as Motivation and Hygiene Factors. Motivational factors are also known as Intrinsic Factors which will boost the satisfaction of employees; while Hygiene Factors are also known as Extrinsic Factors which prevent the disappointment of any employees [Yusoff et al., 2013]. Buble et al. [2014] highlighted the importance of intrinsic motivation is that it led the behavior of individual to attain the high performance of the organization. According to Shaikh et al. [2018] extrinsic incentives played a significant role in enhancing the employees performance both in private and public sectors like good financial rewards and strong working relations. Therefore, we hypothesize that:

**Hypothesis 3[a]:** *There is a significant relationship between Intrinsic motivation of manager and organizational performance.*

**Hypothesis 3 [b]:** *There is a significant relationship between Extrinsic motivation of manager and organizational performance.*

### 1.4. Mediation of Leadership Styles between Leadership Motivation and Organizational Performance

Christian [2018] stated that performance of any employee is affected by two main factors which are leadership style and motivation. Steers and Mowday [2004] concluded that motivation of human resource is the driving force to achieve the goal of any organization. So, the leadership style of a manager plays a vital role in the employees willingness to improve, boost and mitigate the behavior of employees for better results [Gamage, 2018]. It is an intrinsic force that arouses and pushes a man to fulfill the assigned task and to meet their unmet needs [Siddiqui and Rida, 2019]. Leadership plays an important role in achievement of success of any organization and can have a multiple consequences for a broad variety of results like human motivation [Lam and O'Higgins, 2012]. Bowditch and Buono, 1997 stated that success of any

organization is in the hands of motivated employees that as motivation is essential element to increase the productivity of the firm. That's why one of the most important managerial function is employee motivation Crispen et al. [2013] stated that each style of leadership effects the employee's motivation but participative, delegating and directive leadership were considered highly effective leadership styles to increase the performance of organization. Therefore, in the view of earlier discussed literature we hypothesize that:


**Hypothesis 4[a]:** *Leadership Intrinsic Motivation has a significant effect on organizational performance with the mediating role of leadership styles.*

**Hypothesis 4[b]:** *Leadership Extrinsic Motivation has a significant effect on organizational performance with the mediating role of leadership styles.*

## 2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This conceptual model shows that Leadership Motivation is the Independent Variable. It consists of two dimensions, i.e. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation. Leadership style is the mediating variable, which consists of three basic styles, which are Autocratic, Democratic and Laissez-Faire Leadership Styles. Organizational Performance is the Dependent Variable. This model has been formulated on the studies of Bubble et al. [2014] and Al Khajeh [2018].

**Figure 1. Conceptual Framework**



Source: Bubble et al., 2014 and Al Khajeh, 2018]

### 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Research methodology has been divided into three parts, i.e. population and sampling, measurement scales and research techniques.

#### 3.1. Population and Sampling

This study focuses on the managerial staff of commercial banks. Multistage sampling technique was used to evaluate the sample size for this study. At first stage, commercial banks are selected according to the KPMG report 2019. KPMG [Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler] is a multiple professional service network. KPMG report 2019 presents the performance of total 26 commercial banks of Pakistan. Out of which 20 banks are operating in Abbottabad, District, which is the second stage of sampling process. And then found there are 76 total sub branches of these banks in District Abbottabad. Total 230 middle managers are working in these 76 branches. Random sampling technique has been used because our population is known, and it give each unit of population equal chance to be selected as a sample. The sample size has been selected according to Krejcie and Morgan [1970] table which was 144 at final stage which is given in Appendix-A.

#### 3.2. Measurement Scales

The questionnaire is consisted on 5-point Likert scale given in Appendix-B. The detail of measuring instruments i.e. number of items and their references are given in Table 1.

**Table 1. Measurement Scale**

Variables	No. of items	Reference/Scale
Motivation	6	Gagné et al. [2010]
Leadership styles	9	Ojokuku et al. [2012]
Organizational Performance	7	Delaney & Huselid, [1996].

#### 3.3. Research Technique

To analyze the hypotheses Descriptive Statistics and Mediation model 4 of Hayes [2013] PROCESS macro regression-based approach has been used by using SPSS package.

## 4. DATA ANALYSIS

**Table 2. Descriptive Statistics**

	<b>N</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Deviation</b>
Organizational Performance	144	2.14	5.00	3.96	.57
Democratic Leadership	144	1.67	5.00	4.00	.63
Autocratic Leadership	144	2.00	5.00	3.78	.71
Laissez-Faire Leadership	144	1.67	5.00	3.87	.67
Intrinsic Motivation	144	2.00	5.00	3.90	.65
Extrinsic Motivation	144	2.00	5.00	4.01	.57

### 4.1. Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics are used to calculate the mean and standard deviation of those variables, which are used in this study. Mean with a response of 3 show the show the positive response from the respondent and the response below than 3 shows the disagreeableness from the respondent toward the questions of the questionnaire. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the variables.

### 4.2. Reliability of Research Instrument

Reliability analysis is used to check the consistency and reliability of the questionnaire that is measuring by the construct by Cronbach's alpha. A scale is considered reliable when the alpha value is more than 0.60 [Santos, 1999]. The reliability of the independent variable i.e. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation is 0.893 and 0.781 respectively. The reliability of Leadership styles is 0.725, 0.849 and 0.762. While the reliability of Organizational Performance is 0.762 which is acceptable.

### 4.3. Hypotheses Testing

To analyze the hypotheses Mediation model 4 of Hayes [2013] PROCESS macro regression-based approach has been used by using SPSS package. It consists of four parts, i.e. path 'a', path 'b', path 'c' and path 'c'. Path 'a' defines the impact of the independent variable on the mediating variable. Path b shows the effect of mediating variable on the dependent variable. Path c' defines the direct effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable while path c defines the total indirect and direct effect on the dependent variable, i.e.  $c = ab + c$ .

**Table 3: Direct Relationship**

<b>Paths</b>	<b><math>\beta</math>- Value</b>	<b>Std. Dev</b>	<b>T- value</b>	<b>P- value</b>	<b>LLC I</b>	<b>ULC I</b>
<b><u>a. Effect of Motivation on Leadership styles</u></b>						
<b>Intrinsic Motive → Autocratic Leadership style</b>	.4649	.0830	5.600	.0000	.300	.629
<b>Intrinsic Motive → Democratic Leadership style</b>	.6504	.0593	10.96	.0000	.533	.767
<b>Intrinsic Motive → Laisses-Faire Leadership style</b>	.4699	.0770	6.100	.0000	.317	.622
<b>Extrinsic Motive → Autocratic Leadership style</b>	.6382	.0901	7.083	.0000	.460	.816
<b>Extrinsic Motive → Democratic Leadership style</b>	.4991	.0820	6.086	.0000	.337	.661
<b>Extrinsic Motive → Laisses-Faire Leadership style</b>	.4451	.0916	4.860	.0000	.264	.626
<b><u>b. Effect of Leadership styles on Organizational Performance</u></b>						
<b>Autocratic Leadership style → Organizational Performance</b>	.1468	.0458	3.203	.0017	.056	.237
<b>Democratic Leadership style → Organizational Performance</b>	.4082	.0656	6.222	.0000	.278	.537
<b>Laisses-Faire Leadership style → Organizational Performance</b>	.1628	.0504	3.233	.0015	.063	.262
<b><u>c. Effect of Motivation on Organizational Performance</u></b>						
<b>Intrinsic Motive → Organizational Performance</b>	.1566	.0658	2.379	.0187	.026	.286
<b>Extrinsic Motive → Organizational Performance</b>	.2017	.0648	3.111	.0023	.073	.329

**4.3.1. Path a**

Table 3 shows the result of three paths, which are Effect of Motivation on Leadership styles, Effect of Motivation on Organizational Performance and Effect of Leadership styles on Organizational Performance. These three paths represent the direct relationship between dependent and independent variable. The first one is the Effect

of Motivation on Leadership styles. There are two types of motivation i.e. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation. Intrinsic Motivation model represents the value of Autocratic Leadership Style  $\beta = 0.46$ ,  $t [142] = 5.60$  and  $p=0.000$ , model of Democratic Leadership Style  $\beta = 0.65$ ,  $t [142] = 10.9$  and  $p=0.0000$  and model of Laissez Faire Leadership  $\beta = 0.47$ ,  $t [142] = 6.10$  and  $p=0.0000$ , which means that intrinsic motivation significantly effects the leadership styles while the extrinsic motivation model shows that Autocratic Leadership Style  $\beta = 0.63$ ,  $t [142] = 7.08$  and  $p=0.000$ , model of Democratic Leadership Style  $\beta = 0.49$ ,  $t [142] = 6.08$  and  $p=0.0000$  and model of Laissez-Faire Leadership  $\beta = 0.44$ ,  $t [142] = 4.8$  and  $p=0.0000$  shows, that extrinsic motivation of a manager significantly effects the leadership styles.

**4.3.2. Path b**

Path b represents the direct effect of Leadership Styles on Organizational Performance. This model predicts that the  $\beta$  coefficient of Autocratic Leadership style is 0.146 and  $p=0.0017$ , Democratic Leadership  $\beta=0.40$  and  $p=0.0000$  and Laissez-Faire Leadership is  $\beta =0.16$  and  $p=0.0015$  that Leadership styles significantly affect the organizational performance respectively.

**4.3.3. Path c'**

Path c' defines the direct effect of independent variable on dependent variable. Intrinsic Motivation  $\beta=.15$  and  $p=0.0187$  and the Extrinsic motivation  $\beta=.20$ ,  $p= 0.000$  that there is a significant relationship between Motivation and organizational performance.

**Table 4. Path Coefficients for Indirect Relationship**

Path	Effect	Boot SE	Boot LLCI	Boot ULCI
<b>Intrinsic Motivation → Autocratic Leadership Style → Organizational Performance</b>	.0682	.0317	.3021	.5175
<b>Intrinsic Motivation → Democratic Leadership Style → Organizational Performance</b>	.2655	.0512	.1643	.3612
<b>Intrinsic Motivation → Laissez-Faire Leadership Style → Organizational Performance</b>	.0765	.0341	.0185	.1516
<b>Extrinsic Motivation → Autocratic Leadership Style → Organizational Performance</b>	.0726	.0361	.0127	.1565
<b>Extrinsic Motivation → Democratic Leadership Style → Organizational Performance</b>	.2250	.0590	.1226	.3533
<b>Extrinsic Motivation → Laissez-Faire Leadership Style → Organizational Performance</b>	.0697	.0338	.0073	.1375

Table 4 represents the combine effect of motivation and leadership styles on the Organizational Performance. that there are six specific indirect effect which are Intrinsic Motivation→Autocratic Leadership Style→Organizational Performance, Intrinsic Motivation→Democratic Leadership Style→Organizational Performance, Intrinsic Motivation→Laissez-Faire Leadership Style→Organizational Performance, Extrinsic Motivation→Autocratic Leadership Style→Organizational Performance, Extrinsic Motivation→Democratic Leadership Style→Organizational Performance and Extrinsic Motivation→Laissez-Faire Leadership Style→Organizational Performance which together constitute total indirect effect. The result is statistically significant, as its boot confidence interval does not include a zero value. Preacher and Hayes [2004] stated that if the confidence interval does not include zero, then the indirect effect is significant, and mediation exists.

## 5. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

The basic purpose of the current research is to examine the mediation of leadership style in between Leadership Motivation and Organizational Performance. Model 4 of Hayes [2013] Process macro regression-based approach has been followed. Path a' shows that there is a significant relationship between Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Motivation of manager and Leadership style. Crispen et al. [2013] stated that motivation influences all leadership styles. Hence, Intrinsic as well as extrinsic motivation is essential for achievement of organizational goals [Siddiqui and Rida, 2019]. Path b and c' represents the direct effect of Motivation and Leadership Styles on Organizational Performance has been discussed. Findings show that there is strong and positive correlation between leadership style and organizational performance. Akparep et al. [2019] reported that leadership styles have a significant effect on performance of organization. Table 3 shows that Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation significantly affect the organizational performance directly. Buble et al. [2014] highlighted the importance of intrinsic motivation is that it led the behavior of an individual to attain the high performance of the organization. Individuals who are extrinsically motivated will increase the performance of the organization as they believe they will receive desirable outcomes [Putra et al., 2017]. Changar et al [2021] concluded that using appropriate leadership styles in the financial sector of UK could improve the organizational productivity and performance. Mbah et al. [2018] stated that leadership style is significant toward employee motivation and performance which would improve organizational productivity in the banking sector of UK.

Path c shows that leadership motivation significantly affects the organizational performance with the mediating role of leadership styles. Table 4 shows that there is no zero lies in upper and lower bound of confidence interval. Therefore, Preacher and Hayes [2004] stated that, if the confidence interval does not include zero, there is a mediation exists.

## **6. CONTRIBUTIONS**

Research has been extensively studied on the impact of leadership and its styles as well as motivational effect upon organizational performance. Nowadays, banking sector is in the race of facing challenges to become competitive and to improve the performance. Leadership and Motivation together are strong predictors of organizational performance but, in the literature, there are fewer studies that have captured attention on leadership motivation. Therefore, the purpose of current study is to explore the motivation of leaders by examining the association between motivation of leaders and organizational performances with mediating role of leadership styles. This research has emphasized the impact of leadership motivation on organizational performance. The analysis found out that there is a high correlation between two dimensions of Motivation, three basic Styles of Leadership and Organizational Performance. The mediating role of Leadership has been studied between Motivation and Organizational Performance.

The reliability of variable was tested by using Cronbach's Alpha reliability coefficient. Descriptive statistics and Mediation model 4 of Hayes (2013) PROCESS macro regression-based approach used to test and analyze the hypotheses. SPSS version 25 software package was used to run these tests. All hypotheses have been accepted.

## **7. RECOMMENDATIONS**

This research has explored the strong impact of leadership motivation on organizational performance in the commercial banking sector. Government sectors should focus on leadership motivation to improve the performance of the other organization. Organization should make a balance between intrinsic and extrinsic rewards as both dimensions of motivation play a significant role in the achievement of the organization. As there is no "one size fits all" style of leadership, so it is suggested that management should try to use many methods and techniques according to the demand of the situation to encourage staff to work harder to attain the goals of the organization. Top Management should make positive measures to develop and establish efficient communication network between three management groups, i.e. upper, middle and lower and their employees. Therefore, every individual knows how to improve effectively the performance of the organization. The management must recognize the employee's motivation as its primary objective because the performance, efficiency and achievement of the company depend upon how early they show their commitment to the task. The organization should strive to ensure organizational balance in between both organization's needs and workforce that describes a watertight integration.

## **8. LIMITATIONS**

Due to limitation of resources, this research has been focused on the Commercial Banks of Pakistan only. All respondents were from the same service field. It will be conducted in different sectors with a big sample size. The respondents of this

research were only middle level managers of the commercial banking sector. The research will be conducted at international level by involving high level and low level of management to widen the scope of Leadership Motivation. This research has used the quantitative approach and can be carried out using qualitative methods to enhance the scope of the research. This analysis can be conducted over a wide range of demographics to explore the effects of Leadership Motivation to predict the Organizational Performance.

## 9. FUTURE DIRECTIONS

These findings are less generalizable or standardized due a limited sample size of middle level of managers of the commercial banks of Abbottabad. Future researches may include government and other private institutes and conduct a comparative analysis. Moreover, we suggest that the moderating and mediating influences of leadership styles and innovative work attitude should be studied.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I want to thank my supervisor for his support in my studies and research, for his patience, motivation, enthusiasm and immense knowledge.

I would like to thank my beloved family, especially my father Syed Sajid Hussian, mother Imrana Sajid and my husband Syed Abbas Haider for their support at every stage.

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**APPENDIX-A** KREJCIE AND MORGAN [1970] TABLE FOR CALCULATING SAMPLE SIZE

N	S	N	S	N	S	N	S	N	S
10	10	100	80	280	162	800	260	2800	338
15	14	110	86	290	165	850	265	3000	341
20	19	120	92	300	169	900	269	3500	346
25	24	130	97	320	175	950	274	4000	351
30	28	140	103	340	181	1000	278	4500	354
35	32	150	108	360	186	1100	285	5000	357
40	36	160	113	380	191	1200	291	6000	361
45	40	170	118	400	196	1300	297	7000	364
50	44	180	123	420	201	1400	302	8000	367
55	48	190	127	440	205	1500	306	9000	368
60	52	200	132	460	210	1600	310	10000	370
65	56	210	136	480	214	1700	313	15000	375
70	59	220	140	500	217	1800	317	20000	377
75	63	230	144	550	226	1900	320	30000	379
80	66	240	148	600	234	2000	322	40000	380
85	70	250	152	650	242	2200	327	50000	381
90	73	260	155	700	248	2400	331	75000	382
95	76	270	159	750	254	2600	335	100000	384

**APPENDIX-B**

**Research Questionnaire**

**Part 1:**

Male	Female
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**Demographic Information**

Age\_\_\_\_\_ Qualification \_\_\_\_\_ Designation\_\_\_\_\_

Total work Experience\_\_\_\_\_ Work Experience in current Organization \_\_\_\_\_

Gender

**Part 2:****Leadership Motivation**

<b>S.No</b>	<b>Items</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree 1</b>	<b>Disagree 2</b>	<b>Neutral 3</b>	<b>Agree 4</b>	<b>Strongly Agree 5</b>
<b>1</b>	I am motivated in this job because I enjoy this work very much.					
<b>2</b>	I am motivated in this job because I have fun doing my job.					
<b>3</b>	I am motivated in this job for the moments of pleasure that this job brings me.					
<b>4</b>	I am motivated in this job because this job pays me for a certain standard of living.					
<b>5</b>	I am motivated because this job allows me to make a lot of money.					
<b>6</b>	I do this job for the pay-check.					

**Leadership styles**

<b>S.No</b>	<b>Items</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree 1</b>	<b>Disagree 2</b>	<b>Neutral 3</b>	<b>Agree 4</b>	<b>Strongly Agree 5</b>
1	I am motivated in this job because I enjoy this work very much.					
2	I am motivated in this job because I have fun doing my job.					
3	I am motivated in this job for the moments of pleasure that this job brings me.					
4	I am motivated in this job because this job pays me for a certain standard of living.					
5	I am motivated because this job allows me to make a lot of money.					
6	I do this job for the pay-check.					

**Leadership styles**

S.No	Items	Never 1	Once in a while 2	Occa- sionally 3	Fairly Often 4	Always 5
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**Autocratic Leadership style**

1	My supervisor hands over instruction without any comment from me.					
2	My supervisor uses threats and fear-based approach to achieve conformance.					
3	Communication flow is entirely downward.					

**Democratic Leadership styles**

S.No	Items	Never 1	Once in a while 2	Occa- sionally 3	Fairly Often 4	Always 5
4	My supervisor always consults me before making any decision.					
5	My supervisor makes me proud of being a member of the department.					
6	To work with my supervisor makes me feel good.					

**Laissez-Faire Leadership style**

7	I am content to let others continue working in the same ways always.					
8	Whatever others want to do is OK with me.					
9	I ask no more of others than what is absolutely essential.					

**Organizational Performance**

How would you compare the organization's performance over the past 3 years to that of other organization same kind of work?

S.No	Items	Much worse 1	Some- what worse 2	Stayed the same 3	Some What Better 4	Much Better 5
1	I found the Quality of products, services, or programs is good.					
2	I found that Development of new products, services, or programs is satisfactory.					

3	The ability to attract essential employees is acceptable.					
4	The ability to retain essential employees is acceptable.					
5	The satisfaction of customers or clients is improved.					
6	The relations between management and other employees are well built.					
7	The relations among employees in general are well built.					

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# ADAMA BARROW'S PRESIDENCY IN THE GAMBIA. RECAPITULATION OF FIVE YEARS OF THE NEW RULE

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## **Abstract**

The Gambia, the smallest state in continental Africa, has been undergoing a through transformation since the beginning of 2017. This is the outcome of a change in many years' rule, initially of President Dawda Jawara (24 years) and then Yahya Jammeh (22 years), and the take-over of power by Adama Barrow.

The incumbent president, who has been holding the position for five years, bearing in mind numerous problems resulting from the heritage of his predecessors, among others abuse of power, ignorance for the constitutional rules, failure to observe the rule of law and violation of human rights, has set a goal for himself and his associates to prepare a strategy for the repair and development of the state, which could guarantee that the Republic of The Gambia transforms into a state with democratic foundations, ensuring safety and prosperity to all its citizens. It is obvious that such a short time to implement the new policy cannot produce spectacular successes, yet the purpose of the paper is to present an assessment of the first five years of Barrow's presidency. It is an attempt at answering questions as to which of the assumed goals show any progress and which still remain in the sphere of the new president's unre-alised aspirations.

In the text below, the author primarily uses three research methods. The task of the institutional and legal method is to analyse the functioning of the political institutions in The Gambia (reasonability of the adopted strategies, verification of the functions of state institutions with respect to the citizens; assessment of the effects of adopted premises; analysis of impact of quality of the state institutions on the efficient or inefficient functioning of the state). The system method is used to analyse a group of elements, i.e., the political system in the state, the relations of such elements (authorities, offices, parties, etc.) and their reciprocal impact, as well as impact on the environment and behaviour (level of residents' life, observance of human rights, degree of civil society). In turn, the method of statistical analysis is used to compare the statistical data prepared regularly by international institutions that assess the level of a state's correct operation.

**Key words:** *President, Presidency, Law-Abidingness, Democracy, Human Rights, Development, Progress, Republic of The Gambia, Security*

## **INTRODUCTION**

After forty-six years of dictatorship in The Gambia under two presidents (Dawda Jawara, 1970–1994, and Yahya Jammeh, 1994–2016), an opportunity emerged on 19.01.2017 for improvement of the condition of the smallest state of continental Africa. Adama Barrow, the new president of the country, received 43.29% of the vote and defeated the autocratic incumbent Yahya Jammeh (who won 39.64% of the vote) and was sworn in at the embassy of The Gambia in Dakar. Barrow declared that he would hold office for three years (with the constitutional term of office of 5 years) as provisional president of the state. Being aware of numerous problems resulting from the inheritance of his predecessor, Barrow put forward an innovative strategy of the state's development aimed to curb the abuse of power, combat ignorance of constitutional principles, rectify the failure to observe the rule of law and prevent the violation of human rights [A. Jeng 2021]. He tasked himself and his associates with preparation of a strategy of repair and development of the state which would guarantee that the Republic of The Gambia transitions into a modern state, relying on democratic foundations, ensuring safety and prosperity to all its residents [L. Attanasio 2020]. After five years from the acceptance of office, it is hard to expect the situation in the country to radically improve, yet it is definitely clear whether the 'policy of changes' pursued by the new president is taking the country in the right direction and has brought at least minimum progress. Such assessment is all the more necessary as the new head of the country will most probably hold power in The Gambia for the ensuing five years, as on 04.12.2021 Barrow once again won the presidential elections, winning 53% of the vote and leaving his main rival, Ousainou Darbou, far behind with only 27.7% of the votes cast [A. Omasanjuwa 2022].

Such outcome of the presidential election may testify to the fact that Barrow – as president and head of the government – managed to convince over half of the country's population of his strategy, of the reforms that were introduced and the promises that he made, among others with respect to the introduction of a system of health insurance, the restoration of full civil freedom, plans to build transportation infrastructure, and to improve relations with the international community.

Unfortunately, when analysing the situation of African states and bearing in mind frequent tampering with election results, the percentage of support for the country's president is by itself not an accurate measure of the effectiveness of his governance or the actual political transformation and economic progress in the state. International think tanks that prepare rankings assessing the situation of the majority of countries in the world and verifying them on an ongoing basis every year may be of help in this respect.

## **FUND FOR PEACE, FRAGILE STATES INDEX**

The starting point for estimating the profit and loss account of the new executive's rule in the course of the last five years are the data from a report published year by

year by Fund For Peace, an independent research organisation. In the Fragile States Index report, published since 2005, it analyses the degree of stability and the possibility of operation of a state through a framework of twelve indices (social, economic, political and military).

It follows from the recent report, published last year, that between 2017, i.e., the year when Barrow became president, and 2021, a more or less clear improvement is noticeable in the situation of eleven out of twelve analysed categories. This greatly improved the country's grade in the rankings (by over 7.5 points) and moved it from the 37th position to the 56th place (a higher position entails fewer problems, in line with the analysis of 178 countries around of the world). Although The Gambia is still assigned to the 'High Warning' category, in 2017 the country's total score amounted to 89.4 points, which gave it the penultimate position (before Egypt), just above classification to an even worse group identified as 'Alert'; in 2021, with the score at 80.5 points, it is still in the same group, yet Turkey, with a result better by a mere 0.8%, is in another, better category, namely 'Elevated Warning' [M. Sanchez, N. Fiertz 2022]. According to the analyses of Fund for Peace, over the last five years, the category where regress was observed is in the degree of demographic pressure, where the adverse movement was assessed at only one-tenth of one point (0.1). Aggravation of the problem is not surprising, as – first of all – it reflects the current tendencies in many states, especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa (the average birth rate in this area of the continent is 24%), and secondly it attests to the high birth rate in The Gambia, where in the 1960s the population was just a half-million; by the 1990s, the country's population had doubled, while in the last three decades it has grown to almost 2.5 million (2,490,896 in 2022). It is estimated that if this birth rate persists, in 2040 the number of residents in this country will exceed 4 million, which raises a question about to the degree to which this growth will become a problem for the economy of The Gambia [D. Batterman, S. Cockey, A.E. Deleersnyder, ... 2021].

The greatest improvement in the country may be noted in the category of the observance of human rights and rule of law, because a change of 1.3 points (on a scale from 1 to 10) was recorded. A progress of 0.9 points is noticeable in as many as three categories defined as group grievance, uneven development and state legitimacy. The situation in the public services and external intervention in the state's affairs improved by 0.6 points, by 0.7 points with respect to the criterion of human flight and brain drain, by 0.5 points in the refugees internally and displaced persons indicators, and by 0.3% points in the context of the operation of the security apparatus and in economic decline, while the factionalised elites index improved by only 0.1% [D. Batterman, S. Cockey, A.E. Deleersnyder, ... 2021].

Summing up, it is clearly noticeable that in the aspect of civil liberties, social satisfaction and the rule of law, the situation in The Gambia has been gradually improving over the course of the last five years.

## **DEMOCRACY INDEX**

Wishing to analyse the process of state democratisation, as declared and promised by Adama Barrow, it is worth relying on another research unit that is of use in assessing a state's condition, namely the Economist Intelligence Unit which is part of the organisation that publishes the weekly magazine *The Economist*. Since 2006, the magazine has published an annual report, the so-called Democracy Index, where the level of democracy in 167 countries around the world is analysed and countries are categorised into one of four types of regime: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes.

It also follows from the analysis of this organisation that even though The Gambia is still classified as a hybrid regime, the situation there is gradually improving [C. J. Edie, 2000]. This is reflected in the ranking of 2021, where The Gambia moved up by as many as 12 slots, from the 113th position in 2017 to the 101st position in 2021, and recorded an overall improvement by almost half a point (0.46 on a scale from 1 to 10). The individual components of the analysis allow for concluding that the quality of civil freedoms in the country grew by 1.18 points, the degree of political participation by 1.11 points, and the quality of functioning of the government by 0.36, while for the last four years the political culture in the country has remained on the same level at 5.63 points, while the quality of the election process and political pluralism dropped by almost half a point (0.48).<sup>1</sup>

Improvement of the rule of law in the country has been confirmed by the report of Fabian Salvioli, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, who, with a view to examining progress in repairing the effects of mass violations and abuses committed during the Yahya Jammeh regime, paid an official visit to The Gambia in November 2019. The human rights expert, for the sake of an in-depth analysis of the situation, met with government officials, representatives of legislative authorities, judges, security forces, the national human rights institution, representatives of civil society, groups of victims, scientists and representatives of the international community. The expert concluded that the new administration of the state introduced a number of remedial measures already in the first 100 days of Barrow's administration, along with the so-called best practice and later, with the support of international community, has consistently initiated domestic processes aimed at addressing past abuses, which may be exemplified by establishment of the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission [L. Salvioli 2019].

## **CORRUPTIONS PERCEPTION INDEX**

Another litmus test for the rule of law in a country is the Corruptions Perception Index. This is a report that is prepared on a yearly basis by Transparency International – an international, independent, non-governmental organisation that expos-

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<sup>1</sup> [https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2021/#mktoForm\\_anchor](https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2021/#mktoForm_anchor) (22.12.2022)

es, investigates, and fights corrupt practices in the public sphere. The Corruptions Perceptions Index studies rely on sixteen different analyses and assessments from eleven institutions (World Bank, World Economic Forum, African Development Bank, Economist Intelligence Unit, Freedom House, Global Insight, Bertelsmann Foundation, International Institute for Management Development, Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, The PRS Group, and World Justice Project).

Furthermore, they also take into account surveys – evaluations from businessmen and assessments of study results carried out by groups of analysts. Following the report published in 2021, the improvement of the situation in The Gambia is indisputable. The data presented in the report at the end of 2017, i.e., the year when the corrupt Yahya Jammeh made way for the presidency of Adama Barrow, showed that The Gambia was 130th out of 180 analysed states, with a score of 30 points [C. Pring, J. Vrushi, 2019]. Four years later, in 2021, it had moved to the 102nd position (28 positions higher), with 37 points. Given the fact that the average result for the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa is 32 out of 100 points, it may be noted that The Gambia does not stand out in positive terms, yet improvement in the ranking by as many as 28 points confirms progress in this aspect as well [M. Bak, 2021].

### **BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG'S TRANSFORMATION INDEX**

Another measure of the political and economic situation in countries around the world is Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index. It is a measure of the stage of development and management of the processes of political and economic transformation in developing countries and in countries undergoing positive changes around the world. Since 2006, the BTI report has been published every two years by Bertelsmann Stiftung. Its last edition was in 2020 and covered 129 countries. The index measures and compares the quality of government actions. The ranking, based on independently recorded data, analyses successes and failures on the path to constitutional democracy and market economy and reports on the social and political support of the citizens. To this end, the 'Status Index' is calculated based on the general level of development in reference to the features of geography and market economy and the 'Management Index' pertaining to political management by the decision-makers. In line with the report published by Bertelsmann Stiftung in 2020, which covers a period from 1 January 2017 to 31 January 2019 [H. Hartmann, 2020], the situation in The Gambia, in the context of its positive transformation, is greatly diversified. Considerable improvement is noted with respect to the freedom of speech in the media. During Jammeh's presidency, the media landscape did not present an extensive range of opinions. The single state-owned television station, radio stations and private press were regularly threatened (even with the use of physical violence). The new president allowed the media to proliferate; what is more, diverse political and social views are now presented by various new privately-owned television and radio stations

and publication houses. On the other hand, funding their operation is a different issue [D. Sanga 2022, M. Stańczyk - Minkiewicz 2015].

Furthermore, the new government clearly sets apart the executive, the legislative and the court system, which was not the case at all during Jammeh's presidency, because the National Assembly was dominated by the governing party, Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC), while judges were intimidated and forced to issue rulings influenced by the elites [Adbul Jalilu Ateku, 2020].

At the present moment, the National Assembly is more diversified with respect to party representation. The new government is also attempting to make the system of justice more professional. The executive authority respects the independence of the courts and does not interfere in their decisions, as was the case during the previous president's rule. According to the BIT report, the democratisation of institutions has been clearly visible since 2017; they have been performing their tasks more adequately as assessed by proponents as well as opponents of the new government, who also highlight growing trust in state institutions, i.e., the presidency, police, army and National Assembly. Civil participation is also visible [S. Doner, 2020].

## **WORLD BANK**

According to the economic overview, as part of a programme monitored by the employees of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), The Gambia achieved highly satisfactory results between 2017 and 2019. Quick and considerable reduction of the budget deficit and redemption of debt on the part of major multi-lateral and bilateral creditors allowed the country to get out of debt and economic crisis. This also paved the way for a comprehensive credit instrument approved by the management board of the IMF on 23 March 2020. The fiscal deficit in the country was reduced from 6.2% of the GDP in 2018 to 2.6% of the GDP in 2019.

In line with the report prepared on the basis of data from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the International Peace Institute and the World Economic Outlook, during only the first three years of Barrow's presidency (2017–2019), the GDP per capita grew from USD 1,489.5 to USD 1,624.5 (a rise of approx. USD 140), while the GDP of The Gambia rose from 4.6% to 6.6%; the inflation dropped from 8.0% to 6.5%, while on account of the fact that the country takes actions aimed at improvement of the investment climate and facilitation of trade, foreign BIZ investments grew from 0.4% of GDP to 1.8% of GDP. The Gambia also enjoys a good position in the region as far as import and export procedures are concerned. Nevertheless, the level of unemployment in the country has remained unchanged.

In the first years of Barrow's presidency, the bank system also noted progress in the area of high-risk loans, as according to the indices, a drop from 5.9% to 4.7% was recorded in 2018.

Overall, the level of social security in The Gambia remains low. Pension benefits are available only sporadically and exclusively to a small group of people (i.e., those

who worked for governmental or nationally significant private institutions for over ten years). The situation concerning disability benefits, compensation or other social services (on account of damage to health, unemployment or family leave) is even direr: they are not available at all or are available to a small portion of the population. According to analysts, progress is noted in the context of access to water, which is currently guaranteed to 90% of Gambians. Unfortunately, the level of medical care is still a problem, especially in rural areas in the upper part of the country, which is inhabited by over 230,000 people. There is only one hospital in the region and several smaller paramedic centres – all extremely under-financed with a huge shortage of pharmaceuticals, personnel, beds, etc. [N.M.B. Sanyang, 2021].

### **COUNTRY INDICATORS FOR FOREIGN POLICY (CIFP)**

To allow for the implementation of accurate and effective international projects to improve the situation in dysfunctional and unstable states, a team from Carleton's Country Indicators for Foreign Policy project initiated extensive cooperation with the Canadian government to implement three basic objectives. The priority for the team of this academic and governmental project was to prepare efficient tools used to monitor, evaluate and forecast the situation of failed and fragile states. Furthermore, an important element was analysis of the measures implemented in the states and used to guarantee progress in the aspect of security and economic growth. An equally important task was working out a methodology for the evaluation of performance of an individual state. This was primarily meant to categorise the states with respect to the areas of greatest problems and risks and the necessary activities that need to be implemented in relation to this, as well as to highlight the areas of comparative strength – the stability of the state, which may form the foundation for international efforts for purposes of development. Eventually, the research team of the project engaged in theoretical and statistical research regarding the nature of the relationship between state fragility and selected key variables. In the researchers' opinion, this is significant for an accurate analysis of the problem on account of the fact that the history of a state's conflicts has significant impact on its internal problems, along with ethnic, economic, and ecological divisions, etc.

In line with the global ranking of instability prepared by the CIFP in 2020 pertaining to 2019, out of fifty most fragile states around the world, The Gambia took a weak 21st place with a score of 6.33 points. In turn, it follows from a detailed analysis verifying the data between 2017 and 2019 that among the twenty most problematic and fragile states in the world in 2017, The Gambia was in 17th place with 6.72 points (while the worst, Southern Sudan, was in first place with a score of 7.85). A year later, the situation had worsened, and The Gambia took 13th place, yet with a marginally lower result at 6.63 points; however, by 2019 The Gambia had disappeared from the infamous twenty and was not included in this ranking on account of the considerable improvement of the situation in the state [D. Carment, K. Muñoz, Y. Samy, 2020].

In 2019, it was not included in the group of 20 most authoritarian states of the globe or states with the highest index of violations of the rule of law. However, it still occupied the second position with 7.38 points (first place: São Tomé and Príncipe) in the ranking of the so-called capacity (to guarantee resources for the residents: energy, health care, education, etc.). In this case, it is ahead of such countries as Somalia, Chad and Eritrea [D. Carment, K. K. Muñoz, Y. Samy, 2020].

These international analyses of research teams outside of the African continent offer an insight into the current situation in The Gambia, yet it seems that it is also important to take account of the assessments of African organisations on this issue. Here, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance is the first to come to mind.

### **IBRAHIM INDEX OF AFRICAN GOVERNANCE**

The purpose of this organisation set up in 2007 is to explore the quality of governments in African countries. Analysis of over 100 indices verified by over 30 independent African and global institutions offers a reliable and comprehensive basis for compilation of a report pertaining to the quality of governance in African countries. In the report, the analysts attach special significance to the scale of delivery of public services to citizens, institutions and the private sector. Furthermore, the index helps determine the methods and the efficiency of governance, defines the quality of goods guaranteed to citizens and the exercise of political, economic and social functions with respect to them.

In 2020, the Ibrahim Index foundation analysed the performance of fifty-four African countries over the last ten years, i.e., from 2010 to 2019 inclusive. To this end, the foundation's research team compiled 237 variables measuring the management concept according to forty different sources. They were verified in order to develop seventy-nine indicators, which are ordered according to four basic categories: security and rule of law, political participation and human rights, sustainable economic development, and social development as well as sixteen sub-categories that comprise the overall management result. Accounting for all the data compiled from these sources, i.e., 372 various management parameters in total, an assessment was made of the situation in each of fifty-four countries over the decade in question.

The results of the analysis are divided into three main types: result, rank and trend. When studying the data, all the types were taken into account, because every type of result offers context for the remaining ones. For example, by looking only at the rank or the result without accounting for the trends and the important trajectories that the selected countries are following may be overlooked.<sup>2</sup> It is also necessary to

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<sup>2</sup> For example in the IAG 2020 ranking, the Republic of South Africa is in the top ten of states with the highest score in 2019 (6th place) with a result of 65.8 (out of 100). Yet in the last ten years, this is also the eighth most degraded state on the continent with respect to the overall management, which dropped by -0.9 in this period. In the same way in which the trends should be taken into account when looking at the results and rankings, it is important to take into account the result and the rank when looking at the trends. For example, Somalia recorded seventh improvement with respect to size in the last ten years (+5.7) and eighth improvement with respect to size in the last five years (+2.6) with respect to the overall governance, but still occupies the bottom of the ranking table, in 54th place.

take into account classifications of trends that examine the trajectory of a state or a group in any measure in the course of the last five years (2015–2019) in the context of its trajectory in the course of the last ten years (2010–2019), because they may help identify the early signs of direction and speed of a trajectory of a state or a group of states.

It follows from the report that in comparison to the other fifty-three states, The Gambia is developing the most rapidly, which may prove that the policy of Adama Barrow is heading in the right direction. Nevertheless, in the overall ranking it currently is in 16th place with 55.9 points out of 100 and is behind the following countries: Mauritius, Cape Verde, Seychelles, Tunisia, Botswana, Republic of South Africa, Namibia, Ghana, Senegal, Morocco, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Benin, Kenya and Algeria. However, in the last ten or – more precisely, five – years, it progressed 9.2 points, which puts it in the lead with respect to the pace and the efficiency of change [N. Delapalme, C. Rocca, D.F. Fernández, ...2020].

Furthermore, in the context of social participation, civic participation and citizen equality, The Gambia gained an even better position – 12th – in the ranking, with a score of 57.1 and a growth of almost 19.5 points in the analysed decade; in the last five years, 2.5 more points were added to the score, for a total of 21.9 points. The situation is similar in the context of gender equality; The Gambia is in 19th place, but with a score of 57 points it is in 4th place after São Tomé and Príncipe, Zambia and Gabon on account of the rate of improvement. With respect to security, protection of the state's residents, governance and justice, the country also outperformed other states, progressing by 14.2 points (by 19.6 points within the last five years) with a total score of 58.0 points and 16th place in the rankings. As far as the fight against corruption is concerned, it is the sixth country – with a score of 50 out of 54 points – that is dealing effectively with the problem. In the same report, it follows from the analysis pertaining to the bases of economic potential that The Gambia – in 14th place on the list – has 57 points and 4.7 points of growth. With respect to infrastructural development, it occupies the 18th place, and the same applies to the quality of public administration – the 18th position (7th with respect to the rate of changes), and with respect to business environment, it is in 16th place (categorised as bouncing back). Unfortunately, the studies are not equally satisfactory in the context of development – namely, the improvement of living conditions – because in this case, between 2010 and 2015 (administration of Y. Jammeh), The Gambia was in 27th place in the middle of the ranking with a score of 51.4 points and a negative tendency, i.e., a drop by -1.8 points, which put it in the group of states categorised as slowly deteriorating. Luckily, in the next five years (2015–2020: the four years of the Barrow administration), the situation started to systematically improve and the country was categorised as improving (bouncing back). The same refers to the quality of health care, where the problem is even greater because The Gambia is in 37th

place out of 54 countries, and in terms of the level of health care-social support it is in 19th place [N. Delapalme, C. Rocca, D.F. Fernández, ... 2020]

The situation is slightly better in the case of education, while as the fourth country with the fastest-improving index it holds the 18th position in the ranking (even though the rate is still insufficient, because according to the Literacy Rate Report of the UNESCO – the World Bank Statistical Institute– in 2021 the literacy tuition in the country was at 50.80% and in 2017 at 50.78%, i.e., without statistically significant change).<sup>3</sup>

Furthermore, in the context of sustainable development, The Gambia is almost dead last: it is in 44th place and is defined as a slowly deteriorating state. Hence, it follows from the studies published in the report that the chances for the progress of a state are not always compatible with opportunities to improve the citizens' situation.

### **HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX**

This state of affairs is also corroborated by the Human Development Index (HDI) report, which proves that the systemic (institutional) progress of a state does not go hand in hand with improvements in the living standards of its citizens. Unfortunately, in this respect progress in The Gambia is not so spectacular. The Human Development Index is a report on social development prepared on a yearly basis by the UN as part of the United Nations Programme for Development; it analyses the quality of life of a country's citizens with respect to life expectancy, level of health, access to education and standard of life measured according to the GDP *per capita*.

In the report from 2021, The Gambia was evaluated negatively: among 189 states, it placed 174th with a score of 0.500; in 2017, its score was 0.480, which put it lower still, in 173rd place. As far as concerns life expectancy over the last three years, the average life expectancy of the residents grew by two years, from 61 to 63, which obviously is a cause for optimism, given the country's population increase, yet it is still unsatisfactory as compared to neighbouring Senegal, where the expectancy is almost 69 years [P. Conceição, 2022].

The expected years of education grew by half a year from 9.3 to 9.9, while the actual dimension of education improved by only two months, from 3.7 to 3.9. With respect to the wealth of the citizenry, according to the GDP per capita, personal income grew by only 150 dollars a year, which is definitely an outcome of unemployment where progress was very slight, even though it was one of the primary goals of the Barrow administration according to promises made during the first campaign in 2016 and reiterated a number of times in 2021 [P. Conceição, 2022].

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<sup>3</sup> UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS). UIS.Stat Bulk Data Download Service. Accessed October 24, 2022. [apiportal.uis.unesco.org/bdds](https://apiportal.uis.unesco.org/bdds), <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS> <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/literacy-rate-by-country>, (13.12.2022).

## CONCLUSION

In spite of the fact that – as mentioned at the beginning – when fighting for the second term of office, Adama Barrow managed to acquire 53% of the vote, yet in the opinion of many Gambians, the country still suffers from economic stagnation in many respects. Some residents feel disappointed with Barrow's policy, claiming that they hoped for faster and multi-dimensional changes.

Without doubt, the plans for the country's rapid economic progress were also hindered by the pandemic. Although The Gambia experienced no major problems with Covid because the scale of infections in the country was very low as compared to other countries on the continent the fact that the global COVID-19 pandemic has had serious socio-economic consequences for almost every country in the world, especially for developing ones such as The Gambia, one may expect that the speed of beneficial changes in the country will be greatly slowed and, in some cases conditions may even revert to the time before Barrow's presidency. This is visible, for example, in the case of the inflow of cash from other regions of the world. Since the outbreak of the pandemic, The Gambia – with its strong dependence on tourism – has experienced a significant slump in the number of tourists, especially from the key markets in Europe, as well as disruptions in trade and an overall drop in the prices of goods. All of this exacerbates the already bad quality of the residents' life, the poor access to the labour market and low wages and salaries; as mentioned before, the residents cannot count on social assistance on the part of the state, because there is practically no social welfare system.

However, Barrow's government took some steps to protect life and livelihood. As part of the response to the COVID-19 crisis, the World Bank guaranteed a support package with a value of USD 10 million, while the IMF supported the country with a quick loan with a value of USD 21.2 million. Furthermore, the IMF granted the Gambia debt service relief under the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust with a value of USD 2.9 million. The European Union disbursed USD 9.7 million for budget support subsidies, while a draft of social registry prepared by the World Bank received additional USD 6 million. The Gambia's government also applied for postponement of the debt servicing as part of the G20 initiative, which could guarantee – from the creditors supporting this initiative – from USD 2.19 million to almost USD 6.68 million, if multi-lateral and private creditors support the initiative.<sup>4</sup>

In line with the analysed reports, in the context of the rule of law, freedom of media, social trust and observance of human rights, the situation in the country is gradually – and in some cases even spectacularly – improving. Unfortunately, this is not reflected in a clear improvement in the quality of life for the people of The Gambia. The promises made by Barrow in 2016 – when he was running for president – did not come to fruition to the degree that he predicted, but it must be admitted that there were also adverse circumstances in the form of COVID-19. The beginning of the

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<sup>4</sup> <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/gambia/overview> (11.11.2022).

second term is the time of further consequences of the pandemic, coupled with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, which has also been felt across the African continent (for example, limited food supplies, especially grain, from Ukraine and the Russian Federation, as well as downsized international investment). All of this hinders the president and his associates. Meanwhile, the second term of office will end in just three years and time will come for Barrow to account for a decade of his actions over against the promises he made.

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**UKRAINE IN THE FACE OF RUSSIAN  
AGGRESSION**

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# **SPECIALIZED MILITARY JOURNALISM IN THE SYSTEM OF MASS COMMUNICATION DURING THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR (2014-2022): COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF WORLD AND UKRAINIAN MASS MEDIA**

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## **Abstract**

The article gives an analysis of world military publications and militarized journalism in comparison with the Ukrainian comparables in historical retrospective view and in the context of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which is still ongoing. Special attention is paid to international military-focused media standards and specific military (mainly print) mass media: *Stars and Stripes*, *Milli təhlükəsizlik və hərbi elm-lər*, *Narodna Armiia*, *Narodna Armiia (People's Army)*, *Army Inform*, *Officer of Ukraine*, *on occasion – The Washington Post*, *The New York Times* and others. In the process of research, it was found out that military journalism has almost completely transformed into universal journalism. And for some reason, specialized printed editions of military focus have closed down in recent years. And if in Ukraine it is associated with the denationalization of the mass media, then abroad, it is most likely connected with the processes of digitalization and the separation of journalism from ideologies and state policies. As a result, the remaining military mass media are also changing their format, approaching global brands such as *The Washington Post*, *The New York Times*, *Le Mond*. However, this does not prevent them from putting information and analytics about Russia's war against Ukraine in the foreground and highlighting key points as reality and the principle of objectivity require. And although the Ukrainian mass media in this regard are far from ideal, their ideological bias should be attributed to the war, an organically inherent ritual model of communication and still a close connection with the socialist past. Since military journalism is currently working in extreme conditions, it is difficult to draw comprehensive conclusions, but it is already clear that specialized military media are relevant and promising for scientific research.

**Key words:** *Military Mass Media, War, Ukraine, the US, Eurasia, Propaganda, Standard*

## INTRODUCTION

The full-scale invasion of Russia into Ukraine on February 24, 2022 stimulated scientific studies in the realm of specialized (military) mass media activity. Until now, we have believed that such journalism was not necessary, because in the period of armed conflicts, every publication and its employees involuntarily become military, since it is impossible not to write about the war, even about completely civilian problems. This issue was also covered in the international monograph published before the full-scale war, “The role of technology in the socio-economic development of the post-quarantine world”, that came out two years ago in Katowice [Kosiuk 2020]. Frankly speaking, our opinion has not changed until now, but the prepositional assumption requires additional confirmation. And now we will not once again analyze the leading mass media of Ukraine and the world (perhaps only in some cases), but we will turn to the specialized media and monitor whether they exist, how they work, whether they changed at the beginning of the war between Russia and Ukraine and the most important focus is how they differ from ordinary ones. For the research, we will use content analysis as a way of obtaining information from search engines, comparison and analogy to compare different mass media, modelling (to determine types of communication) and chronological analysis to determine the history of development and the process of mass media transformations, etc.

In Ukraine, the question “How to revive military journalism?” appeared back in December 2014, when the number of media professionals killed at the beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian war broke all anti-records. The discussion, in which theoreticians and practitioners took part, arose on the pages of the popular edition *Den* (Day) [Ghryvinskyj 2014]. Then the diverging views were expressed by the experts: some believed that military journalism and specialized media were necessary and their representatives should study and practically improve and take the oath at military universities, others thought that during the war all journalism is transformed into military and any universal journalist should be able to work in the zone of armed conflicts. We agree with the latter opinion and as a theoretical basis we will use the work of authoritative foreign authors on reporting and news production, who do not single out military journalism. For instance, Mitchell Stephens [Stivens 2008], offers the following list of topics in the approbation chapter “Reporting the News” such as “Tragedies” (officials, witnesses, doctors), “Crime” (the police, courts), “Politics” (meetings, speeches, press conferences, campaigns, polls, investigations, protests, economy, sanctions).

International legislation will also be an important basis for our research. The rights and duties of journalists in war zones are defined by IHL (International Humanitarian Law), the norms of which are recognized by most countries of the world. IHL main documents are the Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 (the Law of the Hague), the Geneva Conventions on protection of war victims (1949) and Additional Protocols to them (1977) (the Law of Geneva) and United Nations General As-

sembly Resolutions. In particular, the Law of the Hague determines the norms for the use of weapons and aspects of protection of all those who are in the front-line zone and directly in hot spots, but they are not military personnel (civilians, prisoners, wounded, etc.). Thus, the Hague law defines the means and methods of warfare and the use of weapons, and the Geneva law defines the standards of protection of those who accidentally find themselves in the conflict zone. Collectively, humanitarian law is used by the International Committee of the Red Cross, which combined both laws into one document [Buromenjskyj 2016].

Rule 34 of International Humanitarian Law states that “Civilian journalists engaged in professional missions in areas of armed conflict must be respected and protected as long as they are not taking a direct part in hostilities.” [Rudjuk 2004]. The direct rights of journalists are fixed in Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907), Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949) and in Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts.

There have always been two categories of media professionals: military media soldiers who are permanently accredited to armed conflict zones and independent media workers sent by specific mass media, which have the legal right to send journalists “to places of armed conflicts, to the location of terrorist acts and the elimination of dangerous criminal groups” [Rudjuk 2004]. Both categories are civilians who are under the protection of the Geneva Convention and the relevant provisions of Additional Protocol I (1977).

The specified legislative norms separately refer to the duties of military journalists and war reporters, it is stated that not all and not any information can be recorded and disclosed, in particular plans of special units, which constitute the secret of investigations; the number of weapons and equipment, places of dislocation, statements, reports, acts of terrorist organizations; propaganda texts; own analytics, etc. First of all, the published materials must contain a specific, genre-driven list of facts and opinions that are not classified as “secret” (due to military secrecy). Particular attention should be paid to the identification of experts who give comments and the names of witnesses and victims should be clearly written, because their condition is monitored by relatives and friends. In general, the triad (experts, witnesses, victims) should be balanced: opposition experts, several witnesses who observed the phenomenon from different angles, victims who can speak unemotionally and have a more or less aesthetic appearance. This is especially important in reports (however, you cannot “expose” the faces of the participants if it threatens someone’s life).

The greatest attention should be paid to the officiality of the sources. And even the most respected expert sources should be checked: you have to take into account the opinions of opponents and direct participants of the events. If necessary, use refutations and additions. This is not a sign of poor quality or deficiencies – information circulates quickly, becomes more expressive and needs to be clarified. In critical

cases, one should rely on self-censorship and remember that a journalist is obliged to remain neutral, even if they are not indifferent to what is happening. In the news it is not allowed to give the floor to the leaders of terrorists to voice slogans about infringement of the territorial integrity, preaching the ideology of violence and military aggression. There may be exceptions in the situations when the speakership is given to the head of an enemy country. And that only in order to confirm undeniable facts and identify war criminals. By the way, the entirely patriotic positions of all the participants in the journalistic material also arouse fair suspicions. In order to clearly balance arguments and facts and solve the problem, it is better to conduct a live talk show, and write materials based on its results (not forgetting the format of the genre in which we put them). However, there will always be complaints against journalists, as they are in professional opposition to everyone.

Only a journalist who has the trust of the editorial office, the support of his colleagues, the resources for self-defence and confidence in their own safety can act in a qualified and unbiased manner. The mass media that sent a journalist are held responsible for violations of international standards.

Moral and ethical norms and rules of behaviour function separately; they do not seem to be strictly regulated (although they are fixed in codes of ethics [Lytvyn 2008]) and are a matter of conscience and self-censorship. In the context of violations of ethical norms, the names of journalists are often mentioned, e.g. Kevin Carter, who, while recording the war, between helping the victims and “great shots” chose the latter. Even after receiving the highest awards, such media persons bear a heavy moral responsibility. They cannot endure it and take their own lives.

To analyze and compare military publications, we will use the following criteria: content, readership, internal policy, authorship and mass media structure; design quality, frequency, volume, circulation, etc. [Ghurjjeva 2006]. Observance of professional norms, coverage of important topics, reflection and actualization of key problems and search for their solutions are considered as markers of quality journalism. And although special-purpose publications concentrate on their own topics, this fact does not deprive them of the need to adhere to domestic and international standards.

## **1. FOREIGN MILITARY PUBLICATIONS. EXPERIENCE OF EURASIA AND THE USA**

There are not so many specialized military mass media in the world, unless they are, of course, classified (according to the terms of their own Charter). In Europe, for example, we do not find such links on the official websites of the ministries of defence. However, as we have witnessed time and again, important information of a military nature immediately appears in all the world's leading mass media, which have their own correspondents in the hot spots of the planet or have access to world news agencies. In this regard, Asia is no different from Europe (we found newspaper *Azərbaycan Ordusu* and magazines *Hərbi Bilik* [Azərbaycan 2022], *Milli təhlükəsizlik və hərbi elmlər* only at the website of Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan in the tabbed section “Military

Press” (other sites are either closed to third parties, such as the Ministries of Defence of Tajikistan and Turkey, or do not contain links to mass media), however, these mass media also ceased to exist in 2018, 2019, and 2020. The remarkable thing is that it happened before the beginning of the Second Karabakh War. As of August 16, 2022 the website of the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan does not even contain a mention of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Instead, there are many reports about shelling of the state border by Armenia, training in Turkey, visits to Iraq, etc. Since there are no printed editions in Europe and Asia, and websites are rather promotional mass media, because all organizations, institutions, and informal communities have them now, we turn to the publication of the US Ministry of Defence *Stars and Stripes* [Stars and 2022], which has been issued since 1861 and has a special status: it is designed for contingents of the Armed Forces of the United States of America stationed abroad. In this way, we seem to unite Eurasia and the USA into informational integrity.

It is immediately obvious that the mass media is quite independent as for its military status: the issue of freedom of speech was implicitly discussed here even during the First World War. Contributors to *Stars and Stripes* are civilian and military staff of the US government and special correspondents, who work in Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Spain, Great Britain, the Middle East and actually in Washington. Offices were temporarily opened in Guam, Paris, Honolulu, Brussels, Vienna, Casablanca, Belfast and other cities (we did not find information about dislocations on the territory of Ukraine). Journalists accompany the armed forces during wars, military exercises, peacekeeping missions on land and at sea. Until the early 90s, the publication was a paper edition, and then a website appeared. Until the present day, several original issues of *Stars and Stripes* have been preserved, which were published as facsimile reproductions by the AEF publishing association back in 1920 (these are pages of issues published during the First World War). Rarities can be viewed in the funds of Ohio State Libraries.

The newspaper periodically wins in various nominations; in particular, during the Second World War it repeatedly received the Pulitzer Prize (for cartoons by editorial cartoonist Bill Mauldin and publications by Mark Watson, Russell Jones, Nan Robertson, etc.). Among the newspaper staff periodically were journalists Andy Rooney and Steve Kroft; poet and songwriter Shel Silverstein; comic book artist Tom Sutton; writers Gustav Hasford and Ralph G. Martin; painter and cartoonist Paul Fontaine; television news correspondent Tony Zappone; cartoonist Vernon Grant, Hollywood photographer Phil Stern, Allen Morrison and others.

It is difficult to call this publication independent, because the military media have always been censored, so to speak, by their very nature. However, the level of objectivity here mostly depends not on the status, but on the professionalism and steel-like hardness of a journalist. In particular, when in 2008 the Pentagon banned *Stars and Stripes* from covering the reactions of troops stationed abroad to the US presidential election, their own correspondents in the Middle East and Europe ignored this decision and were held responsible.

Regular readers of *Stars and Stripes* are considered to be American military personnel and their families (mostly those who are outside the country). In fact, a wider au-

dience is interested in the publication, as it does not differ from global brand media in terms of content and competes successfully, making materials publicly available and free of charge (which in itself is already a rarity for well-promoted mass media). Over time, the newspaper acquired a special status. Now it is a member of Defence Media Activity (DMA), which, in its turn, is a part of PR Office at the United States Department of Defence. As a result, *Stars and Stripes* works in three directions: European, Pacific, Middle Eastern. Depending on the localization, the materials may be different and may not coincide in the analytical dimension. As a rule, weekend issues are produced for Europe and Pacific Region on Friday, and issues for Middle East are from Friday to Sunday.

The semantics of the newspaper name was outlined in 1987, when the U.S. Congress adopted “Stars and Stripes forever” as the official National March. The thought-out media concept is complemented by a logo made in the form of interweaving of two national flags and a brand red and blue font (8 pages of the publication are in colour, the rest are in black and white) with exclusively own, not network or ordered, images (real-time and archive), as an exception, there are photos from official sources.

*Stars and Stripes* also hides some (obviously the most resonant) materials and offers to purchase them for a separate fee, however, unlike other mass media, as an option, it presents an absolutely free monthly access to the digital space. This way you can get exclusive access to innovative digital features, multimedia publications and photos. The readership also gets free access to the website and mobile app (with reports on military events, coverage of veterans’ issues, archival photos of the day and access to protected information from planetary US bases) for monthly or annual subscriptions. The electronic version can be gifted to friends and community members. So far as it is always unique information that is constantly updated, even in social networks the newspaper has more than a million branded stable readers.

The monthly subscription in 2020 was 3.99 USD. The annual one is 39.99 USD. A two-year subscription saves \$10. You can use the demo for \$0.99 or \$39.99 for four weeks. The digital version provides unlimited access to independent content. The subscription also includes access to the mobile application with more readable fonts and a more convenient interface. The application supports both Apple and Android devices. The package of services is complemented by a free email distribution of news, weekly exclusives, internal analytics, and information about veterans, military stories and news from Europe. It is only necessary to choose one of the newsletters to consume relevant information. The editors do not offer to send the full electronic version of the publication, obviously due to its large volume, but you can find it on the official website in the tab ePaper.

Key headings: “War”, “United States”, “Nation”, “World”, “Ranking” (Sport), “Comics”, “Crosswords”, “Faces”, “Opinions”, “Currency rate” and “Weather”. Each material is authorized immediately after the title (according to the established pattern of scien-

tific publications). We are going to analyze separate issues of *Stars and Stripes* (till February, 2022 and during the full-scale Russian invasion into Ukraine).

The issue from November 12, 2020 opens with a photo of a mother and child undergoing a PCR test. In this way, the publication focuses attention on the main problem of 2020 – the COVID-19 pandemic. The three most important, in the editor's opinion, materials about the events in Iraq (a personal story of a warrior), military faces of show business and sport are presented above. Readers' attention is immediately drawn to the rhyming slogan "However you read us, wherever you need us" and faces of authors who you can be in touch with. Advertising of world brands also catches the eye (in the analyzed issue it is "Honda").

As military communication is specific and takes place according to a ritual pattern [Kosjuk 2012], newspaper interviews are more like essays with inserts of expert comments. Informative journalism is realized according to the established news format in the form of notes and correspondence about the White House, opening of the Army Museum on Veterans' Day, Trump's arrival there, etc. There are also provocative and secular sketches such as "Female hit a 74-year-old woman with a sandwich". In a separate rubric-appendix *Stars and Stripes* is conducting a survey among members of deployed teams about the best local entertainment, services, facilities and destinations on and off military bases. The result of survey "Best of the Pacific" becomes a kind of guide for those interested. The sixteenth page presents humorous comics, crosswords and cryptograms (with answers to the previous ones). Next to them there are banners with the QR-code from which a Smartphone usually invites us to the publication's official website.

Separate materials from the archive (1.2 million historical tomes) are also permanently highlighted, mainly from the period of the world wars and from the hot spots of the planet in Europe, Northern Ireland, the Mediterranean Sea, separately – in Africa and others.

Today, the newspaper is published five times a week and consists of 40-64 pages. With the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Russia into Ukraine, the emphasis spontaneously shifted to our state... For example, on August 14, 2022 the flagship publication was "On the Kherson front lines, little sign of a Ukrainian offensive". It is about the importance for the Armed Forces of Ukraine to retake Kherson, however, it is clear that this is unacceptable for the Russians, so the publication honestly reports that the situation is dead-end and it is unlikely that victory on the southern front should be expected in the near future [Morris 2022]. The cover story seems to be "overgrown" with other materials, forming the central nave. Satellite publications discuss the demand for the supply of additional weapons for the war in Ukraine, report on the dangerous situation in Energodar at the nuclear plant, outline the level of China-Taiwan confrontation and emphasize the shaky stability of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. As a consequence, the most essential information gets into the epicentre. And, what is important, it is covered critically and impartially.

In order to be non-biased, let's look at the content of the website dated a month ago (July 14, 2022). At that time, the material "Air Defence" became central. It stated that NATO would deploy missile defences along the eastern edges of the Alliance to strengthen defence to protect against any potential threats that could arise from a full-scale Russian invasion into Ukraine. Then, for this purpose, the leaders of US, France, Germany and others even visited a number of Border States and monitored the situation.

To see the general picture of the fullness of materials about Ukraine, we will apply content analysis by keyword (we only select the publications that are a month old). On July 14, 2022 by link "Ukraine" we see materials about the blockade of Kalinin-grad by the Baltic citizens, the visit of the head of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin to Iran and talks with President Ebrahim Raisi on the sidelines of the summit of the Caspian States in Ashgabat. Among other things, it is noted that Iran is increasing uranium enrichment, suppressing dissent and deepening ties with Russia, thereby challenging the United States and Europe. The material for July 13, 2022 shows how a Russian opposition politician and municipal deputy of the Krasnoselsky District Ilya Yashin is standing in a cage in the courtroom at the Basmanny District Court of Moscow. They write that the system imprisoned the oppositionist for criticizing its armed forces. It is also noted that Yashin is one of the very few well-known oppositionists who did not leave Russia, despite the unprecedented pressure of the authorities on dissidents. As you can see, under the name "Ukraine" the site publishes materials about Russia, fitting them in the context of the war with Ukraine. And this means that our state still loses in terms of its self-worth for America. Information about Ukraine becomes relevant and consumed only in tandem with Russia and the full-scale war. Therefore, the publication does not create false propaganda tricks and shows the situation as it is.

We can state that the most popular military mass media is not much different from other world media that work according to the principle of universality. *The Washington Post* is even ahead of *Stars and Stripes* in some respects: it opened a bureau for military issues in Ukraine in May 2022. In July *The New York Times* did it too. Of course, it should be taken into account that journalists from *Stars and Stripes* are, probably, secretly and constantly in the war zone. In order to see a clearer picture of the daily content connected with information about the war in Ukraine in all three publications, let's try to compare the issues of the three newspapers as of August 18, 2022 (we will analyze headings of articles, announcements and leads).

*The Washington Post* [The Washington 2022] reports, that "In Ukraine, a Russian mercenary group steps out of shadows. Wagner's infamous group is recruiting. Killers are only welcome". There are also discussions about the situation in Kharkiv, the UN discussion of the nuclear threat due to provocations at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, new strategies of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the occupied Crimea.

*The New York Times* [The New York 2022] announces the UN discussions of grain exports and nuclear safety, continuation of reburials of numerous victims in Bucha, indignation of Turkey and Russia about the fact that one of the sleepy Greek resorts becomes a US weapons centre.

*Stars and Stripes* [Stars and 2022] points out, “On Thursday, April 28, 2022 Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is going to receive his Turkish colleague and the head of the UN for negotiations regarding the implementation of the agreement on the restoration of grain exports from Ukraine, the unstable situation at the Russian-occupied nuclear power plant and diplomatic efforts aimed at ending the war”. Further, it is reported that Russia is deploying hypersonic missiles in its Baltic exclave; Ukrainians are fleeing the bleak life in Russian-occupied Kherson; Trevor Reed, a former prisoner in Russia, calls on President Joe Biden and US Congress to classify the Russian Federation as a state-sponsor of terrorism.

So, all three newspapers singled out the most important topics: discussions at the UN on nuclear safety and grain transportation and added some more actualities using their own sources and authorship. However, *Stars and Stripes* gets the top prize in the specialized field if only because the other information in it also concerns military problems in Afghanistan, the DPRK, South Korea, Somalia, etc. The newspaper also covers civilian topics, but it focuses on its own specialization, therefore, in our deep conviction, it is an example of the highest quality military mass media that does not violate either the Statute or international legislation.

## **2. SPECIALIZED MILITARY JOURNALISM IN UKRAINE**

Until recently, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine was also directly involved in the implementation of state defence policy. And it was in charge of the functioning of military publications such as *Narodna Armiiia* (People’s Army), *Viisko Ukrainy* (Army of Ukraine) and others. However, reforms took place four years ago, as a result of which specialized mass media were reduced to a digital minimum. How it happened, why and whether it was necessary, we will try to find out.

On December 29, 2018, an announcement appeared on the website of the Central Printed Body of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine *Narodna Armiiia* that this issue was the last. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine enacted the Law of Ukraine “On Reforming State and Communal Printed Media” [Burmaghin 2017], by closing all military-related paper publications (which were subject to denationalization). This is how the almost century-long history of the printed military press came to a sad end. However, the field, and everything that happened in the zone of the ATO (Anti-terrorist Operation), later the OOS (Joint Forces Operation), still required specialized coverage of the events about the recapture, stabilization and revival of the occupied territories of Donbas and Crimea. In order to save the situation, the Ministry of Defence initiated changes and additions to the media legislation. However, it was not possible to save the traditional mass media and the journalists were scattered and went who where,

mainly to the newly created Internet resource *Army Inform*, which should be discussed separately. In the meantime, following the chronology of events, we are going to consider the concept of the oldest military edition of Ukraine.

Like *Stars and Stripes*, *Narodna Armiiia* (People's Army) (transformation of "Lenin's Flag") is very old: it was created during the Second World War as an official body of the Kyiv Military District [Vitajemo 2017]. During the occupation, the editorial office was periodically moved from the capital to Chernihiv. However, the newspaper did not become a popular brand of the USSR, as, for example, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, although, compared to other mass media, it quite boldly covered not only internal military events, situations in the hot spots of the planet, but also liquidation of natural disasters, extinguishing fires, above all – in Chernobyl (one thousand five hundred articles), the collapse of the Soviet empire, democratic changes during Perestroika, etc. Since October 11, 1991, the media was the Central Printing Body of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (the editors of which always took a military oath).

Since the newspaper was intended for military personnel, their entourage and all interested parties, its columns recently featured issues of social protection for soldiers and their families, training of personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and security forces, military history and culture, key aspects of military and patriotic education, reforms in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, etc. Journalists of the *Narodna Armiiia* occasionally worked in Liberia, Lebanon, Kuwait, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, etc. In this way, the media performed a wide range of general and special functions: informative, communicative, cognitive, propagandistic, educational, promotional, value-oriented, entertaining, social, organizational, etc. Despite the narrow specialization, *Narodna Armiiia* as well as *Stars and Stripes*, covered and tried to professionally analyze all the most important events in Ukraine and the world. What is important is that a separate branch was functioning on the territory of temporarily occupied Donbas; it was a publishing office that produced a field "pocket" version of the mass media for soldiers on the front lines [U zoni 2016].

Artistic customization should also be considered quite effective: each issue contained a wide variety of materials (mostly analytical): stories, reviews, articles, interviews, reports, news selections, even investigative journalism. All posts were accompanied by high-quality images of own production and the brand olive-black colour palette, as well as high-quality fonts and perfect layout. The lack of diffusion of genres is especially impressive, which implies a formal mastery of the presentation and the accuracy of information "inputs".

It is impossible to find the archive. We managed to open the issue for April 28, 2016 [Narodna 2016]. The central advertisement of the front page presents a publication about the orientation of the Ukrainian army to European and American standards. Next to it there are a few more announcements of materials: about the evacuation of the population the day after the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, positive attitude of the Ukrainians towards NATO, events in the Stanytsia of Luhanska,

an artilleryman who returned from the ATO to paint icons in the church, a comedy show in Ternopil that collects funds for the ATO and congratulations on Happy Easter. We scroll down the pages in search of something more interesting than the announcements. Here is an extensive review on page ten (“From tape recorders “Maiak” to mortars, machine guns, sniper rifles”) about conversion of the plant “Maiak”. The material is informative both in the technological aspect and in the prognostic aspect (on the eve of a full-scale invasion, which was probably suspended by the pandemic). The spread is complemented by related information that more than forty drones have been transferred to the combat zone and a chronicle of Russian aggression. As we can see, there is no analysis, sensations, and, accordingly, balance on the pages of *Narodna Armiiia*. That is the nature of militarized communication. However, the premonition of a great war is present. Perhaps the official closure of the resource is due to that fact.

Since Army Inform has become a kind of continuation of the cancelled print media, let’s consider the content of this site as of August 10, 2022. The red sign reads: “168th day of defence of Ukraine continues”. Above the sign there is a link to *Armiya FM* radio. Under it there is a shift to TELEGRAM. Next there is a selection of news in which the topics of the discussion are support for Ukraine during the visit of the US president to Latvia, the trial and punishment of former law enforcement officers who filmed the location of the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on video, an announcement of state awards, the demand to ban the crossing of European borders for citizens of the Russian Federation (quote by Dmytro Kuleba), voicing distrust of Russia, which consistently violates agreements (quoting Mykhailo Podoliak), the call of the USA and the EU to stop Russian military operations around Ukraine’s nuclear facilities, information about the conviction of the DPR members to 15 years in prison, demining the liberated territories of Ukraine with the help of eVorog chatbot, the call of the G7 Foreign Minister to the Russian Federation to urgently return control of the ZNPP to Ukraine, reports that the Armed Forces destroyed a bridge in the area of the Kakhovskaya HPP, a statement that Danish instructors will train our military in Great Britain, the detention of an enemy agent who was directing fire at Bakhmut, information about the fact that the launch issue OPEN VOLUNTEER SCHOOL took place in Kharkiv, confirmation of the transfer of American protective equipment for dogs to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, video of live broadcasts from the war zone. To see more, click on the additional link. Under the news there is a heading “This day in history”. Next, the site focuses on individual regions (“War#Kharkiv\_Tribunal”). The most popular news are “ejected” and scrolled in the central niche. Under which we see a scoreboard with official information about enemy losses and sports news of the Armed Forces. Then analytics is presented, “In the border regions with Ukraine, Russia forcibly transports reservists to “military training””, “The only thing that didn’t hit our position was a tactical nuclear shell”, “ The Grammar of War: How Inverted Commas Hurt Ukraine”, “Trials of Ukrainian prisoners of war are an attempt to de-

moralize Ukrainians and sow discord”, “”Rusotourists” should live only in the “Rusky mir””. Next is the column of current honours “Heroes of unconquered Ukraine”. Below it there are “Russian fakes”. Below there are video materials. Then is “Chronicle of the defence of Ukraine”. Blogging and expertise are on the side. Then there are reports, messages from the regions, psychological information, the publication’s own products, presentation of new equipment (“Weapons and equipment”), economic rubric, sketch stories of warriors, information blocks “The world supports Ukraine”, “National resistance”, “Bubble greatness of the RusArmy”, “The Ukrainian people are invincible”. On the side there are sections “Ukrainian Humour”, “LIFESTORY”, “Pantheon of heroes”, “Ordinary fasciZm”, “ZSU Sergeant”, “Social security during the war”. So, the site is quite full, but you can see with the unaided eye that it lacks balance and impartiality – each material is presented in a propaganda style.

In addition to the *Narodna Armia* and its digital modifications, military publications of Ukraine include the Information Agency of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine “ArmiaINFORM”, “Military television of Ukraine” (Central TV and Radio Studio of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine), radio “Armia FM” (Central Teleradio Studio of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine), TV and Radio Studio “Bryz”, as well as scientific, educational and youth magazines *Science and Defence*, *Dignity and Law* (National Academy of National Guard of Ukraine), Modern information technologies in the field of security and defence (Kharkiv Air Force University named after Ivan Kozhedub, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine), *Collection of scientific papers of the centre of military and strategic research*, *National University of Defence of Ukraine named after Ivan Cherniakhovskiyi* (National University of Defence of Ukraine named after Ivan Cherniakhovskiyi) etc. These mass media are included in the list of scientific and specialized publications of Ukraine. We will focus special attention on the mass media of military universities, because their content should show what the Armed Forces of Ukraine are preparing for in the near future and what is a priority for the army.

The press organ of the National Academy of Land Forces named after Hetman Petro Sahaidachny *Officer of Ukraine* was created twelve years ago (2010). Editor in Chief is Ihor Makhno, the circulation is 500 copies. Since the publication is educational, it focuses on the problems of combat training in the conditions of the training ground, sports and cultural components of the formation of a future officer, military history of Ukraine (in particular, biographies of warlords, especially the patron of academy Petro Konashevych- Sahaidachny). The media is youthfully bright, fashionable and attractive. Anyone can become a contributor.

Let’s consider impartially, without choosing specially, issue seven (from January 27, 2017). Obviously, the warning that “the opinion of the editorial board does not always coincide with the opinion of the authors” should be considered a calling card of freedom of speech and independence of this mass media, however, to maintain “the format” “the editors reserve the right to use materials, edit and shorten them as they see fit”. Gray and blue colour range prevails, but insets and titles of some pub-

lications are presented in crimson and burgundy tones. Of course, it would be more presentable if all titles and leads were printed the same, because the multicolour on the pages of serious military media creates a chaotic effect and eliminates a part of the potential readership.

The analyzed issue of *Officer of Ukraine* has 18 sections. On the cover is a portrait of Lieutenant Mykyta Yarovyi, who, according to Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 581/2016, was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Ukraine and awarded the Order of the Gold Star. Below is more detailed information about this extraordinary event and a presentation of Yarovyi's entry into the Pantheon of Heroes of Ukraine.

"Our Pride" captures a post by an anonymous reader about the first days of the attack on Donbas in 2014. The question arises – why is everything so veiled? Most likely, because at that time Russia was still playing a "closed game" and there was no 100% evidence of its direct strategic presence at the level of diplomacy. However, the author quite frankly talks about the initial clashes of a separate battalion with separatists and Russian mercenaries, the establishment of roadblocks in Svativ District of Luhansk Region, snipers, prisoners of war and the deceased near Druzheliubovka and Rubizhne.

The publication "Awarded by the President" is repeated twice and to some extent duplicates the cover, but on a slightly different level: here is information about the lifetime awarding of the Order for Courage (3rd grade) to Oleh Tkachuk, a local third-year student at the National Academy of Land Forces named after Hetman Petro Sahaidachny. The message is accompanied by a photo report.

Another interesting topic is "International cooperation". There are promising materials by topic "Ukrainian experience for the armies of Asian countries" and "Joint work will contribute to bringing the Armed Forces of Ukraine closer to NATO standards". It turns out that such information was always up to date, and did not become relevant only after the full-scale invasion of Russia into Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The value of the materials is enhanced by colour photos.

The largest section (4 pages) is "From the ATO zone". In it there are essays by Ihor Parbuskyi ("The destination point is war") and by Oksana Voitko ("The war changed his life"). The materials are emotionally intense, entirely in the style of art journalism. Analytical and informative genres would be inappropriate here, because it is about "visualization" of the zone of military operations, which is prohibited to show too realistically at the level of legislation.

The educational vector of the publication is confirmed by the rubrics "The floor to the graduates", "Department and learning process", "DAP is the citadel of wisdom", "Academic and teaching staff", in which six alumni first talk about the advantages and disadvantages of employment and the difficulties of professional adaptation, and later the teachers share their own experience and present the university. In order to visualize the materials as much as possible, but not to turn them into advertising, the authors prefer photo illustrations of essay topics. The only interview (also pre-

sented more like an essay) meticulously explains “why a future officer should know physics” [Oficer 2017].

There are separate blocks of materials that offer to reflect on “what we mean by the word “Sobornost”” [Mosejchenok 2017] and those as “Historical truth” which are built in the form of debatable essayistic reflections, designed for the future. “Memory Eternal!” and “Heroes do not die”, for obvious reasons, do not give special grounds for creative approaches; however, these blocks of information contain many eloquent photographs. On the last page there is a flash mob advertisement: students of the Academy support the fighters of the Joint Forces Operation.

Under the heading “Officially” the floor is given to: the President of Ukraine – Supreme Commander of Armed Forces of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyi (he emphasizes the free choice of Ukrainians regarding European and Euro-Atlantic integration), Minister of Defence of Ukraine Andrii Taran (he points out that European partners highly appreciate the achievements of our country in the defence reform), Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Colonel-General Ruslan Khomchak (he notes that, despite the successes of the reforms of the Armed Forces, there are problems related to legislation, separation of powers, etc., but the process continues), Commander of ZSU Land Forces Colonel-General Oleksandr Syrskyi (he says that “the transition of the military administration to the NATO structure is one of the important elements of the large-scale changes that are being implemented in the army today”). The citations are accompanied by high-quality passport-type portraits. The column “Military education” informs that the meeting of the leadership of the military education system of Ukraine was held in the “context of Ukraine’s movement towards NATO and the implementation of our standards to those in force in the member states of the Alliance”. The last issue (December, 2021) is completely promotional. It might be a tribute to the time. To make sure, let’s turn the pages relative to the civilian issues and the first already shooting war ones. The archive contains materials only from 2014. The first issue is educational: it introduces interesting personalities, achievements of the academy, reforms of specialized education, etc. Only the column entitled “2014 is the year of combatants on the territory of other states” is intriguing here, it is the article “Wars end and leave not only memories” in which an interview with the head of the Lviv regional organization of veterans of Afghanistan is presented. Although the expectations of some intrigue are not confirmed, because M. Maherovskyi monotonously tells about the sequence of the introduction and withdrawal of Soviet troops to the territory of Afghanistan in the early 1980s and current measures to commemorate and celebrate anniversaries [Oficijno 2021]. Similar material is periodically repeated. For example, in the first and second issues of 2019 in the article “Afghanistan of the 1980s. We’ll never forget...” The interview here is more sensational. It tells about the battle in the Maravar Gorge on April 21, 1985. Former fighters, by the way, recollect how “dushmany (mujahideen) killed the wounded with axes, and then mocked the dead, putting out their eyes” and “how dead comrades were taken out on infantry

fighting vehicles, pouring them with diesel fuel to get rid of the smell and insects [Mosejchenok 2014]”.

The war really and tangibly enters the pages of the magazine from issue №6 in 2014 in the form of six obituaries (“Eternal memory to Academy graduates who died during the Anti-terrorist operation in the East of the country” [Mosejchenok 2019]. Apparently, the readers reacted painfully to the material, so no more such information appeared – only messages about feats and awards. However, in the seventh issue we can already see a publication entitled “Freshmen from the ATO zone”) [Vichna pamjatj 2014]. In fact, it is not about sending students untested by fire to the front (as it is implied), but about soldiers from the war zone who entered the Academy (probably without exams) to improve their skills.

During the seven years of the war *Officer of Ukraine* is analogous to *Uriadovy Courier* (literary Governmental Courier) in some way: the current presidents and their environment are steadily in the epicentre of attention, as well as award decrees, sketches with airbrushed reality from the war zones. However, it is possible to find analytics among propaganda materials. So, already in the seventh issue of 2014, we see actual considerations on the topic “The resuscitation of Novorosiya as a manifestation of the Kremlin’s imperial syndrome” [Mosejchenok Pershokursnyky 2014]. And although issue 9 does not tell a single word about the Ilovaisk trap (it should have been mentioned about), however, it presents critical reflections on the consequences of Russification (“How to cut the Gordian knot of ethnopolitical conflict”) [Voljvych 2014]. Issue 1 of 2015 contains a lengthy article about the heroes of Kruty (apparently, it is a “worthy” substitute for information about DNA identification and reburial of a critically large number of victims at the end of the summer of 2014). Issues 9 and 10 of 2020 record a forward-looking material about “Changes in the constitution of Russia – consequences for Ukraine and the world” [Rudjuk 2014], which shows how the “good neighbour” is preparing for a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, leaving the “eternal” President Putin in office, allowing the use of nuclear weapons and critically limiting the rights of the indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation. By the way, the publication also contains photo information about the numerous protests of Russians who went to individual pickets with the following posters “No amendments to the Constitution”, “We do not need the expired President”, “Whether you vote or not, you will still get a new Constitution” etc. So, at the end of 2020, a critical tension is felt in the relations between Russia and Ukraine, as well as between Russia and the East and Europe and America.

## CONCLUSIONS

We see that military publications, as well as military journalism, do not exist in their pure form today, because mass communication focuses on current events, which can be of various topics (including military). Accordingly, time-tested mass media are being modified into electronic ones or are closed. Regarding the American media *Stars and Stripes*, which produces news from combat zones for military deployments of a planetary scale, of course, it is, in no way, inferior to global brands, but not due to specialization, but precisely because of the fact that it promptly responds to current problems and attracts talented journalists to cooperation.

The situation in Ukraine is specific. Its oldest military mass media are closely related to the socialist past and the history and ideology of the USSR, which negatively affects their transformation processes, since the transmission (Soviet) model of communication is almost superimposed on the ritual (totalitarian) model, according to which military communication takes place organically. While American and European military mass media are being modified into universal ones (because journalism at the turn of the 20th-21st centuries finally separated from states and ideologies and became self-sufficient), the Ukrainian ones continue to exist according to established patterns and either turn into propagandistic ones or close down (similar processes are also observed in the post-Soviet states of the East, for example in Azerbaijan).

In our opinion, instead of reviving propaganda pocket media for frontline soldiers and their entourage, it is better to improve all-Ukrainian brands such as *Den* (Day), *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia* (Mirror Weekly) and others: introduce large military sections in each of the publications and fill them with objective events and serious analytics. Then there will be no need to call military personnel on the front line to get fresh information („bypassing” the official one), and the soldiers themselves will not laugh at the primitive mass media that are distributed to them as advertising, but will become active participants in discussions on comprehensive topics. This will also benefit the popular mass media, which will be more serious about working in war conditions and will once again more carefully review international standards and domestic legislation. Actually, in the field of militarized information space, there are so many questions that still remain open and stimulate scientific discussions. But to put the things right, it is obvious that we should wait for the end of the war.

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**COLLABORATIVE PLATFORMS  
AS ALTERNATIVE PLAYERS  
OF GLOBAL POLITICS:  
UKRAINE DEFENSE CONTACT GROUP  
AND KYIV SECURITY COMPACT 2022**

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**Abstract**

In the article, the author considers the possibility of new global actors in the context of rethinking security architecture. Using G. Grevi's interolarity approach and the "thousand plateaus" concept by J. Deleuze and F. Guattari, the researcher forms a theoretical basis for the categories of the collaborative window and collaborative platform. The author offers her vision of the external and internal structure of the collaborative platform as a transnational interactive place for joint actions. Applying the case study, the researcher considers the Ukraine Defense Contact Group as a kind of prototype of a collaborative platform, while the Kyiv Security Compact is the legal basis of a collective security institution.

**Key words:** *Collaborative Platform, Security, Collaboration, Rammstein*

## INTRODUCTION

The power redistribution in world politics, along with the deepening of interdependence between political players, is becoming one of the key dimensions of the current rethinking of global institutional design. In the book “The Interpolar World: A New Scenario”, G. Grevi [Grevi 2009] argues that the outlined changes are often separate issues, while it is worth focusing on the interaction of these two trends. T. Renard [Renard 2009] supports the opinion that within the framework of modern international politics, interdependence between states is not limited exclusively to the economic sphere, producing peculiar functional and systemic nodes. The scientist calls this phenomenon “multi-multilateralism” [Renard 2009: 35], which is characterized, firstly, by an increasing the membership of states in duplicative organizations; secondly, by deepening relations between countries thanks to their participation in cross-sectoral forums; and, third, by crossing the activities of official institutions, such as the UN, and informal forums like the G20. Indeed, a lot of national governments are facing an unprecedented combination of economic, energy, and environmental crises, with none of them able to successfully meet these challenges alone.

While top-level diplomacy is assumed to be able to perform important tasks of building confidence, setting the agenda, and linking bilateralism and minilateralism to the broader model of multilateralism, the very emergence of new players in global governance such as collaborative platforms can be seen in the context of an alternative or even replacing traditional multilateral practices. This aspect is a particularly significant issue since the emergence of alternative interactive platforms is related to the inability of existing multi-subject organizations to solve today’s crises. Therefore, the collaborative format provoked by these trends deserves close analytical attention. The collaborative platform is a hybrid of S. Huntington’s model of uni-multipolarity and G. Grevi’s interolarity. S. Huntington once defined unipolarity as a “configuration consisting of a power game between a superpower and some great ones, when important international decisions are made jointly, but the superpower has the right to “veto” [Huntington 1999: 36]. While recognizing US dominance, he ignored the influence of non-state actors and the pervasive interdependence that significantly affects the choice of policy options. In turn, G. Grevi characterizes interolarity as “multipolarity in the era of interdependence” [Grevi 2009: 5], which contributed to the interpolar configuration in the context of the security and prosperity dilemma.

Taking into account the above-mentioned models, the collaborative platform presents the category of uni-interolarity as a set of situational anti-crisis nodes - collaborative windows, the appearance of which became possible due to the problem actualization in a certain governance sector. Orientation to the solution of the acute issue for numerous global actors serves as the foundation for the collaborative platforms’ emergence aimed at the temporary fixation of multi-subject interaction until the appropriate crisis resolution. Such a transnational structure is characterized by the interdependence of involved stakeholders, several dominant players with appropriate

resources, and the consensus principle, the viability of which is motivated by the urgency of making optimal decisions. Solving a problematic issue may lead to the dissolution of the created interactive joint action platform as a separate entity, but also requires post-problem monitoring of shared results to stabilize the situation through multilateral agreements. Thus, a collaborative platform can act as a kind of autonomous entity in solving some fundamental issues, such as security (terrorism and nuclear proliferation), economy (global recession), or ecology (climate change), trying on the leading role to mobilize powerful players based on the smart specialization approach, flexible nature and quick adaptation to changing circumstances.

In the first chapters of the article, the author presents her vision of the collaborative format through familiarity with the categories “collaborative window” and “collaborative platform”, appealing to the concept of “thousand plateaus” by J. Deleuze and F. Guattari. Next, the successive stages of a common platform creation are described, by building models of the external and internal space of the collaborative platform. The author devotes the last chapter to the Rammstein collective security platform analysis and the September Kyiv Security Compact as prototypes of a potential collaborative platform. The article ends with conclusions and an outline of future research vectors.

## **1. THEORETICAL BASIS: A COLLABORATIVE PLATFORM AS AN IMPLEMENTATION OF A “THOUSAND PLATEAU” CONCEPT**

The idea of the collaborative subject’s emergence correlates with the concept of the rhizome by J. Deleuze and F. Guattari, presented in the book “Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Book 2” (1980). The rhizome, not having a clearly defined subject and object, consists of a set of linear dimensions. Its heterogeneous nature allows any point to join another segment, corresponding to the touch points of interactive collaborative platforms. J. Kingdon once suggested that the evolution of the global governance structure “occurs not so much due to mutation or the sudden appearance of a completely new form, but to the recombination of already familiar elements” [Kingdon 1995: 131].

As to the researchers [Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 18], the rhizome consists of so-called “plateaus” - sub-sets representing regions of intensities, each element of which constantly modifies its distance to other elements according to the next articulations: 1) content and 2) form of connections. The content articulation selects or removes from the streams metastable molecular units (substances), on which it imposes a statistical order of connections and sequences, while the form articulation establishes functional, compact, stable structures, constructing molar composites where they are simultaneously actualized. So, we are talking about the problematic and procedural components, serving as the internal environment basis of the collaborative structure (more on that below).

Synthesizing the concepts of J. Kingdon and D. Lobster [Kingdon 1995; Lobster 1997], I propose to resort to the collaborative window category as sub-sets of rhizomes, i.e. plateaus. Let us suppose that four relatively independent streams pass through the global governance system, namely: problem actualization, procedural, structural, and political response streams. A problem flow involves a departure from a state perceived as stable or one that satisfies a specific segment of the global community. The stability of the state begins to fluctuate due to a crisis or a violation of discrete systematic indicators.

The procedural flow embodies the players' suggestions for quick and constructive problem-solving. The policy response stream embraces the national sentiment measurement, and interest group influence, as administrative and legislative aspects. The structural flow consists of behavioral patterns that demonstrate an increased willingness to consider the potential impact of joint decisions on the macro-spheres of the global political arena. Accordingly, the problem and procedural stream synthesis (content articulation) lead to the emergence of specifically behavioral patterns set in the form of agreed conventions or action algorithms (form articulation). Although the content articulation does not lack systematic interactions, the clear agenda actualizes the relevant attempts at resolution. Instead, at the level of form articulation, "phenomena of centering, unification, totalization of actions, integration, hierarchization, or goal-setting occur" [Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 31]. As we can see, each of the two articulations establishes a binary relationship between its corresponding segments.

Convergence of outlined flows leads to the temporal collaborative windows opening, which provides an opportunity to combine options for solving problems between interested parties. That is, if the flows coincide in space and time, there is an opportunity to consider the actual problem, develop innovative solutions and implement them. In addition to the merging of streams, the collaboration window opening involves the trigger activation, external to the intersecting streams, in the form of a certain triggering event (for example, economic crisis, war, pandemic) or the activity of a so-called "political entrepreneur" [Ansell & Gash 2018: 8] (public statement, signing a contract, etc.), which it will continue to perform relational activities not only between members of the platform but also between different sectors and levels.

According to J. Deleuze and F. Guattari, the "rhizome connects subsets along two lines: (1) segmentary and (2) deterritorialization" [Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 42]. Segmentation allows for stratification of the rhizome plateau per established criteria, such as the unification of goals or final results, by which its unity can be both destroyed and restored. That is if the involved participants of the platform reach a consensus on the risks and losses distribution, the collaborative platform keeps existing. In some cases, objective or monetized allocation measures may be involved, such as access to a particular resource among stakeholders or the geographic dispersion assessment of shared reserves. Fairness can also be measured by the ratio of par-

ticipants' investment to the margin obtained. Regardless of objective indicators, it is significant to assess perceptions of fairness as beneficiaries' vision of the equal costs and benefits distribution associated with joint actions.

On the contrary, deterritorialization performs the opposite function, representing a channel of the rhizome "slippage", for example, the players' use of resources in a full/limited amount or their (non-)observance of norms of transparency or accountability. Potential determinants of deterritorialization also include the collaboration scale (the rate at which crossover occurs between the problem, the choice, and the decision-maker) and the energy burdens (time, expertise, budgets, etc.) available to stakeholders for solving specific problems during the period concerning the agreed political course.

Sub-sets along the deterritorialization line can change their nature, connecting with other plateaus and transforming according to their thresholds, which we understand as the initial parameters of participants joining the collaboration. If the a priori parameters of involvement in the collaborative process do not correspond to the further stages of scaling up cooperation, the actors could either leave the game or adjust their initial coordinates at the expense of additional resources or the existing strengths transformation. The third option involves revising the initial tasks and, accordingly, the final results towards reducing/increasing the parties' claims. For example, if a collaborative change agent is unable to attract more resources compared to other players, the percentage of potential gain should be proportionally reduced and vice versa.

The J. Deleuze's and F. Guattari's opinion, the "rhizoma avoids any orientation towards a point of culmination" [Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 18] or a final external goal, leaving room for potential transformation. We are talking about creating a model for solving the political global crisis under conditions of turbulence and uncertainty, which dictate qualitatively different rhythmicity of reforming, either because of the problem urgency or because of its scale and subsequent consequences. Considering "the incompatibility of the genetic axis idea as a deep structure" [Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 9], the rhizome reflects the situational and purposeful nature of the alternative forums and players of the modern global order. National governments are under constant pressure to manage change rather than balance. Pressure factors include technology, growing needs of citizens, limited budgets, financial crises, natural disasters, military conflicts, and pandemics. The political potential in such an environment should be based not only on general opportunities but also contain some forecasting, sometimes imposing reforms in conditions of time shortage or strong opposition.

It is worth noting that the collaborative window appearance is not necessarily accompanied by a successful partnership. The presence of a cooperation structure does not guarantee long-term interaction, since the time and spatial conditions that opened the collaborative window, and, therefore, the management structures based on them, are often not able to adapt to the collaboration dynamics itself. This means the need

for institutional fixation of the collaborative window with more stable “interaction grids” like a collaborative platform.

## **2. METHODOLOGICAL ASPECT: COLLABORATIVE PLATFORM AS A SITUATIONAL GLOBAL PLAYER**

A collaborative window opens up a space for future interaction, while a collaborative platform captures the formation of trusting relationships between stakeholders and localizes them within a single interactive structure. Organizational approach theorists understand collaborative platforms as “structures or programs with special competencies and resources to create a common foundation for ongoing joint projects” [Thomas et al. 2014: 199]. According to C. Ciborra, the essence of the platform concept is to create “a stable structure for ensuring a more flexible management regime” [Ciborra 1996: 103] that adapts over time to new opportunities or changing conditions. A systematized view of the structure and world examples of collaborative platforms was offered by C. Ansell and A. Gash. Specifically, they labelled the platform as “a distinctive institutional framework for promoting multiple collaborations or for facilitating the adaptation of many collaborative projects over time” [Ansell & Gash 2018: 7]. Accordingly, collaborative platforms could play the role of an adaptive management player, forming or reorganizing projects with additional resources or problems. Consequently, platforms create a space to facilitate stakeholder interaction through information exchange and resources, producing standardized technological interfaces or communication forums.

At the same time, the platform may act as a strategic (for example, within the chosen political course) or tactical (for example, steps regarding a specific project or evaluation of information reasons) subject. In our case, we consider the collaborative platform as a situational needed-partnership format with the bureaucratic component minimization (documentation, approval of the charter, etc.) and a maximum focus on deeds.

The map of the rhizome, according to J. Deleuze and F. Guattari, has “multiple entrances and exits” [Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 9], with the leadership phenomena or expansion due to new projects, allowing us to reconstruct the initial nature of the rhizome gradually. The subjugation of the multiplicity principle involves the crossing of unified interactive platforms (collaborative platforms) and drawing up a kind of consistency plan (planomenon) based on reasonable specialization. The latter constructs continuums of the cooperation intensity between the players involved, creating the potential for continuity of political action within different forms and substances.

Each collaborative platform undergoes modification means the external environment deterritorialization and the internal structure “reterritorialization” [Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 41]. Through the external environment, we understand the material constituent component of providing certain forms of external support from players who are not directly involved in the collaborative cycle, but whose interests are affect-

ed resulting from the collaborating participants' decisions. In the case of the Russian-Ukrainian war 2022, we are talking about the support of the oil embargo by the EU countries or the provision of weapons/humanitarian aid. That is, in the broadest sense, external support varies from financial aid and training to weapons, asylum, or transit permission. But being used in the format of "imitation aid", the material constituent component aims at justifying the lack of activity on the part of some participants.

Except for the external and internal components, we have transition states in the form of associated variables and epistrates. The associated forces oppose the external environment, producing energy sources that could be transformed into "composites" [Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 40] (reactions of additionally involved stakeholders). By associated variables, we understand the relational component offers an explanation tool regarding who can be a potential internal or external stakeholder during a specific crisis, and how and to whom the relevant authority should be delegated. Specification helps distinguish key actors from supporting forces.


Associated variables provide an impetus for "the epistrata" [Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 42] constitution intending to form new centers on the periphery of political actions. For example, in the case of a military conflict, they may include "auxiliary armed groups" [Rauta 2019: 11] being not part of regular forces but are directly embedded in the combat structure, acting with or alongside regular forces. Epistrates also include "written agreements signed by official representatives of at least two independent states with a promise to help a partner in the event of a military conflict, remain neutral or refrain from a military conflict with each other, and consult/cooperate in the event of international threats" [Leeds et al. 2002: 238]. Thus, during the annexation of Crimea in 2014, pro-Russian activists who participated in anti-Ukrainian protests, blocking roads and other measures aimed at seizing the peninsula could be considered epistrates. The auxiliary forces mobilization was carried out by such groups as "Night Wolves", led by D. Sinichkin [Salem 2014], with the involvement of the Afghan war veterans and self-defense units.

In author's opinion, epistrates may also include "affiliated forces" [Rauta 2019: 14] such as militias unofficially form part of regular forces and fight for and on behalf of states that wish to change the strategic outcome of a conflict while remaining external to it. Affiliated forces have a symbiotic, formal but legally dubious relationship with a client state that acts as an invisible hand. They record the rise of aggressive non-state actors, for whom the battlefield opens up opportunities for profit maximization, especially for mercenaries, shadowy private military, and security companies. Let us pay attention to the so-called "surrogate forces" - pro-government groups or militias, "used in the internal struggle between the government and the armed opposition" [Hughes & Tripodi 2009: 44]. Surrogates differ from the other categories mentioned above because they build relationships, not with external sponsor states that want to change the conflict outcome, but with internal government circles. For ex-

ample, in 2014, in response to Russian aggression against Ukraine, volunteer paramilitary groups were formed and funded through the Volunteer Council, a civilian group within the Ministry of Defense [Weiss 2015]. The Ukrainian Volunteer Army, the Aidar Battalion, the Azov and Donbas Battalions, the Right Sector, Dnipro-1, and the Organization of Ukrainian Citizens are some of the most famous. Studies show that there were 40 to 50 such groups [Aliev 2016]. The fact of including them in the official structures of the armed forces emphasizes their importance during serious combat operations.


Accordingly, each environment of the collaborative platform vibrates, representing a block of space-time constituted by the periodic repetition of components and leading to its coding. At the same time, any interaction code is permanently transcoded or transformed. Transcoding “allows one environment to act as a foundation for another or, on the contrary, to be built on top of another interactive platform, to disperse, or to be constituted within its boundaries” [Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 249]. That is, environments constantly communicate with each other, which allows us to talk about the intraconsistency when collaborative platforms force different points of order to resonate together - power centers (geographic, military, economic, etc.) - to achieve the set goals. The model for creating a collaborative platform is presented in graph 1.

**Graph 1. A collaborative platform model**



*Source: Proposed by the author*

Therefore, the collaborative platform emerges under the collaborative window impulse as a simultaneous crossing of flows and external triggers, activating the dynamics of the latter. The collaborative window vectors create a system context that influences the future platform components. In turn, the driving forces of the platform feedback on the initial system context, cause the collaborative window to oscillate. The collaborative platform itself is represented by a dotted line and consists of two key elements: dynamics and actions, determining its performance (graph 2).

**Graph 2. The internal environment model of the collaborative platform**

Source: Proposed by the author

The internal environment of the collaborative platform contains a procedural component, explaining the methods of the material component usage and the actual cooperation dynamics. One of the scenarios involves the complex chains of responsibility between players of direct interaction, or “through third parties as observers” [Borghard 2014: 29]. The second way is to give an external mediator part of the national powers to resolve the crisis issue. The procedural component also provides an opportunity to follow the dynamics of the involved players. For example, Qatar’s support for the Dawn faction in the Libyan civil war included coordination with Turkey and Sudan as a mediator [Wehrey 2014]. As such, the procedural part adds specificity by integrating the material constitutive aspect into a series of interactions between the parties.

Let us turn to the internal components of the platform. The category “dynamics” refers to organizational moments, the analysis of which should provide answers to the following questions: 1) is it even possible to form a shared room for action? 2) who exactly should be involved in a quick and optimal crisis resolution; 3) what should be the agreed problem vision as the general rules of the game; 4) what benefits can be offered to players in exchange for their resources; 5) which management model is better to choose: self-organization or appointment of a project group; 6) what should be the mechanism for coordinated results’ monitoring. At this stage, the maximum number of scenarios with multiple alternatives are prescribed for understanding both the players’ interests in collaborative project participation and the feasibility of an interactive platform launching. The dynamics category, in our opinion, may consist of the following elements (table 1):

**Table 1. Characteristics of the internal collaborative platform components**

Name of the element	Characteristic
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Antecedent:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Formation of the agenda</li> <li>• Identification of key stakeholders</li> <li>• General vision of the problem</li> <li>• Appointment-if necessary-of joint actions coordinator</li> </ul>	<p>Seeking consensus among stakeholders in controversial moments. Integration of stakeholders in the discussion, with the potential benefits and risks identification, both for the participants and for the platform itself. Attracting a critical mass of participants to avoid the liquidity trap.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Planning:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Basic rules and goals of cooperation</li> <li>• Exchange and search for information</li> <li>• Appointment of expert groups</li> <li>• Development of alternative solutions</li> </ul>	<p>Determination of collaborative general principles is necessary to resolve potential conflict situations. Goals should be specific and measurable to improve subsequent monitoring of results. A coordinated algorithm of actions is important to prevent unsystematic waste of resources.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Implementation:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Formalization of relations</li> <li>• Assignment of roles to each of the stakeholders</li> <li>• Allocation of resources</li> </ul>	<p>The formalization of relations between participants involves formal (legal) and informal (trust) components. Ensure even distribution of tasks and roles among the key actors of the platform to create a sense of mutual responsibility and accountability. Regarding funding, we expect voluntary contributions to show a positive correlation with the staff employed within the respective budget category. However, if the share of voluntary contributions increases cumulatively, the platform will be under more pressure, so it should look for alternative employment models such as freelance or temporary staff.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Monitoring:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development of a strategy for evaluating the achieved results</li> <li>• Appointment of coordinators</li> <li>• Consideration of prospects for the platform preservation</li> </ul>	<p>Determination of accurate basic indicators of key parameters before project implementation. Creation of a monitoring program to identify successful elements of collaboration and those that require correction. Development of a multi-level platform post-effects support program.</p>

Source: Proposed by the author

After agreeing on the “dynamic” components and receiving positive answers, it is worth moving to the next category of “actions”. All internal components of the collaborative platform, namely: dynamics and actions - are in constant fluctuation, which significantly complicates the consensus, but ensures maximum adaptation to changing conditions. The actions category already focuses on specific joint procedures between the involved players, for example, 1) an algorithm for agenda determining (personnel responsible for collecting and systematizing information from participants,

prioritizing issues, etc.); 2) appointment of an expert group, the functions of which may include analytical, consulting duties or establishing relations between the participants during the negotiations; 3) legal registration of the agreements reached; 4) list of sanctions in case of non-fulfillment the obligations undertaken by the platform participant; 5) indicators of success or failure of a joint initiative; 6) sources and volume of funding or involvement of other resources (informational, personnel, technical) for the agreed solutions implementation, etc. It should be taken into account that over time, shared steps and experiences can be integrated into the platform as a cyclical element, which will create a threat to the platform's flexible nature due to, for example, treating it as a closed network, therefore, refusing to attract new powerful players. Accordingly, the developed procedures should be adjusted depending on the fluctuations of the system context.

One of the characteristic properties of collaborative platforms is modularity coordinates actions between interested parties and "at the same time reduces the degree of managerial control" [Ansell & Gash 2018: 11]. To some extent, the platform's management strives to be ecological by developing an institutional cooperation structure and appearing as an indirect consequence of joint activities. Uniform design rules, standardized collaboration interfaces, and communication protocols contribute to such consistency.

Brackets indicate the feedback of the platform with the collaborative window in the form of effects/post-effects of its functioning. The performance of the collective initiative can be related to both joint actions and results. For example, the common steps taken for the agreed platform goal are direct results of the cooperation dynamics. That is if, at the input, we talk about the predominant influence of the system context, then at the output, we pay attention to the transitional or final effects, which, in turn, generate adaptive responses (post-effects) resulting from joint actions. This chain of collective actions/effects/post-effects presents three critical levels of performance:

I. Joint actions. A collaborative platform presents a tool to stimulate actions or results that "could not be achieved by any of the participants alone" [Huxham 2003: 403]. In this context, we tend to view the joint activity as transitory or "secondary outcomes" [Thomas & Koontz 2011: 771]. Depending on the context, the platform's goals, and the relationships between the participants, joint actions may include, for example, informing participants about potential risks and benefits, adopting new regulations or memorandums of cooperation, distributing external resources among the involved players, mobilizing personnel, joint decisions monitoring, etc.

II. Effects. Effects are changes in an existing or projected state viewed as undesirable or needed to be correct. The latter may indicate an improvement in the state's position in the case of its participation in collaboration, industrial funds modernization, rearmament of allies, creation of joint regional energy networks, etc. They can be physical, environmental, social, economic, and/or political, and short- or long-term in duration.

III. Post-effects/adaptation. Shared governance is often encouraged through the ability to transform the context of a complex situation. Indeed, one of the most important consequences of collaboration can be changing the problem vector and facilitating adaptation to external circumstances. This potential for transformative change represents the basis of an adaptive response to the results of joint actions. L. Thomas claims that the success of collaborative platforms depends on so-called “architectural levers” which mean “creating an impact disproportionately greater than the initial prerequisites” [Thomas 2014: 206]. Thus, the platform creates a multiplicative effect by developing common assets, designs, and standards that can be combined, thereby facilitating the coordination and management of joint efforts. In his research, J. Borys also notes the strategic importance of “social multiplier effects (for example, due to the involvement of stakeholders in various formats of dialogue and partnership or effective communication channels) and the combination of multiple interventions” [Borys et al. 2012: 312]. In this context, the post-effects identify the number of potential stakeholders willing to join the platform in the future, the number of requests from national or international actors to help solve a similar problem, and the platform’s sustainability level by itself.

By the resilience of the platform’s results, we understand both the reliability and the stability of the adaptive collaborative responses against the background of the changing external context. So, sustainability means the ability to demonstrate and maintain effects over time. For example, if the platform’s purpose is to strengthen the European security bloc, then the desired results should be systemic enough to cause sustainable shifts in behavior, resources, and other strategic factors of the mentioned industry. Therefore, the key indicator of stability is the duration during which adaptive responses to system failures are maintained over a certain time.

Accordingly, for a comprehensive assessment of the collaborative platform performance, it is necessary to take into account three levels (actions, effects, post-effects/adaptation), creating an analytical space of chief vectors for the assessment of joint efforts. Most measurements focus on obtaining evidence from multiple sources, which may require data triangulation methodologies usage to test interpretations. Some indicators are measured by reports, websites, media, and social networks, while other indicators focus on data collected from interviews, focus groups, and field observations. However, researchers should further focus on developing appropriate measurement tools and data collection procedures applied to platform participants and observers. Moreover, close attention should be paid to the categorization of intermediate and final results. The inconsistent use of indicators, motivated by the strategic positioning of the parties or the concept ambiguity, may undermine the effectiveness of joint management systems.

### 3. CASE STUDIES: UKRAINE DEFENSE CONTACT GROUP AND THE SECURITY TREATY 2022

Collaborative platforms have already been recognized as a successful problem-solving strategy in issues such as humanitarian aid, agricultural innovation, regional economics, and sustainable development [Ansell & Gash 2018; Bentrup 2001]. Occupying a special niche within the management system, platforms are aimed at facilitating and regulating collective relations between the maximum number of stakeholders. Similar to the multi-stakeholder market platform Uber, the collaborative platform could play the role of a kind of “meta-space” in politics, bringing together all interested parties in a joint effort to find a solution to a local or global problem.

As a prototype of a modeled collaborative platform, one may consider current attempts to revive the security architecture through the initiative of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group at the US Air Force base “Rammstein”, as well as the Kyiv Security Compact as the legal basis of a collective platform for preventive protection.

**Rammstein format.** Since the initiative’s launch in April, there have been five meetings of representatives of more than 50 countries regarding assistance to Ukraine in countering Russian aggression. Each gathering envisaged strengthening the Ukrainian army’s position by providing modern weapons, and technical assistance, as holding joint training. On whole, the armed forces of Ukraine received a military package from the United States worth \$675 million (HARM anti-radar missiles, 105-mm light howitzers, GMLRS shells for HIMARS, armored HMMWVs, anti-tank systems, and other equipment) [Military media 08.11.2022], as well as significant assistance from the UK, Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, and Germany. Military aid is provided by most EU countries, except for Austria and Hungary. Each meeting on a shared platform records a change in the rhetoric of key stakeholders: from “stop Russia” to “allow Ukraine to win.” In this context, it is worth paying attention to the ratio of lobbyists and the total number of interested parties to measure the homogeneity level of the collaborative platform’s transnational composition. At the same time, we should not forget about the “devil’s shift” phenomenon [Sabatier et al. 1987] with its harmful consequences both for subjects and political processes as a whole. Not the last role is played by the public opinion influence and the stable position of the participants, who consistently emphasize the protection of Ukraine’s interests. This factor, in particular, affected Germany, which became more active in fulfilling the stated promises.

It is also worth paying attention to one more indicator like the participant’s strength within the collaborative platform no less important when making joint decisions. P. Bonacich once claimed that the “subject’s influence directly depends on the degree of its connection with other political players” [Bonacich 1987: 1172] and the impact of the latter’s contacts. I.e. a participant weigh if he or she is connected to influential actors with strong and close ties. The scientist used the parameter  $\beta$  to represent weak and strong contacts [Bonacich 1987: 1174]. If  $\beta$  is negative, the participant’s in-

fluence depends on his/her contacts with dependent or autonomous subjects. When  $\beta$  is positive, the degree of influence increases in case of expanding contacts with independent actors. In this context, previous connections between the participants in other security platforms such as NATO or regional security forums could have a significant matter.

The number of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group is increasing due to the involvement of other players, in particular Arab countries, India and Israel, actualizing the question about the initiative's effectiveness itself. An important point of further negotiations is operational interoperability in terms of reducing the time of weapons deliveries, requiring rapid coordination of action algorithms. According to the experts' observations [Sabatier et al. 1987], the maximum effect of joint management could be achieved by setting a limit of participants at 5-6 subjects. Scaling the platform is inefficient because players may either ignore critical network issues or spend a lot of time trying to coordinate among themselves. A structural solution to this problem is the centralization of network management actions using the figure of a network broker as a nodal contact between platform participants. Today, such a role is played by Lloyd Austin, who monitors the vector of the collective arena activities.

The item concerning applying sanctions to countries that either take the position of a passive observer (the latest statement by the Bulgarian defense minister regarding the refusal to transfer heavy weapons to Ukraine) or help Russia to circumvent sanctions remains controversial. Rethinking the security format and creating constructive alternatives requires specifying the mechanisms of political influence on systematic violators, which in this way level the ways of achieving the agreed goals and negate the very fact of the platform's creation.

The prolonging of Rammstein's initiative could be a transnational platform of security guarantors for Ukraine based on the **Kyiv Security Compact** from September 13, 2022, proposed by the President's office. In particular, the document reflects an attempt to outline a group of Ukraine's partners and ways of further countering Russian aggression on a global scale. If we consider it from the perspective of the collaborative platform concept, then the creation of such an interactive collective security platform should take into account the following nuances.

Based on the smart specialization principle and the limited resource base of the partner countries, it is worth dividing the group of security guarantors by key areas of activity, according to the strength of their potential, the amount of aid already provided, interest in further cooperation, geographical location, and activity in cooperation with Russia. For example, if we proceed from the urgency of receiving help in the event of military aggression within the first 72 hours, a rational step is to check the logistical possibilities and contact the closest countries in terms of space, while simultaneously informing other - more distant - guarantors of security.

It is also worth focusing attention on the opponents of countries that actively support Russian aggression against Ukraine. Israel is a case in point in this context. For quite

a long time, Israel tried to balance Kyiv and the Kremlin, which was determined by the peculiarities of regional politics. However, Iran's delivery of Shahid-type drones (1,750 units) radically changed the situation. On October 21, a missile strike destroyed a site with components and equipment for the assembly of Iranian drones near the Dimas military airfield in Syria. After Iran transferred a batch of drones and surface-to-surface ballistic missiles to Russia, Israel provided Ukraine with intelligence on targeting Iranian UAVs and announced the transfer of an air threat alert system and modern anti-drone weapons. Analysts predict that "with the strengthening of cooperation between Moscow and Tehran, the military-strategic partnership between Kyiv and Jerusalem will only strengthen" [Kramer 2022].

The above principle of P. Bonacich can be applied to the group of Visegrad countries. The governments of Poland and Hungary have certain contradictions due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, as evidenced by the words of Jarosław Kaczyński, head of the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party, regarding V. Orban's "sad" and "disappointing" position [Rankin 2022]. Radically opposing views on ensuring regional security among the allies can lead to aggravation of relations between the partners and even call into question the future existence of the alliance in its current composition. In particular, the President of Slovakia, Z. Čaputová, at a press conference on the energy crisis and regional security, also pointed out the inconsistency of the V4 position regarding military aid to Ukraine. Taking into account the "ideological closeness" [Rankin 2022] of the ruling parties of Poland and Hungary, as well as the EU's financial leverage, one can hope for a change in the scales of Hungarian attitudes specifically towards Ukraine.

Thus, different actors possess different aid potentials, from the supply of arms and humanitarian aid to diplomatic social capital. One of the important requirements in attempts to jointly solve problem situations is the ability of political actors to accurately assess the partners' goals and resources. Such a calculation makes it possible to determine the expenditure of resources necessary to ensure a reasonable probability of success, as well as the positive effects for the participants, which should justify the investment of the corresponding internal reserves. Therefore, it would be advisable to consider the option of a peculiar distribution of security guarantors by vectors, based on their strengths. The authors of the Kyiv Security Compact rightly distinguish between guarantees of military and non-military nature, such as support for sanctions, confiscation of property and funds of the aggressor, seizure of assets of individual citizens or organizations on the sanctioned list, financial assistance for the restoration of destroyed infrastructure, accommodation of refugees, etc.

The number of participants in each narrowly profiled group should not exceed 7-10 partners. The more participants involved, the more time and resources the trust-building process takes. The broader and more abstract its formulation of the shared vision of the situation, the more time is on the final results agreeing and criteria for their monitoring. It is also worth prescribing sanctions against countries that do not fulfill

their obligations (joint levers of economic, political, reputational, or other influence). The security platform of the new format will not make sense if its existence is reduced exclusively to statements, bypassing deeds.

It would be appropriate to develop indicators of the joint success, for example, the national armed forces modernization, the creation of transnational defense forces, the strengthening of the security sense among the citizens of the countries participating in the collaborative platform, the formation of observers for the targeted use of weapons, etc.

At the same time, it is worth noting that maintaining a high adaptable level of a collaborative platform, especially the requirements of legitimacy and efficiency, without a stable formal structure, seems a difficult task. It is possible to create a simultaneously stable and flexible management structure. However, it requires frequent reassessment of structural mechanisms and procedures in the light of new developments, as well as readiness to make the necessary adjustments to the initial management format. For example, as needs and expectations change, platform participants join or leave the network, so the governance format must adapt accordingly since it is the actors who directly participate in decision-making. In any case, there is a recognized need for a temporary formalized structure sustained over a defined period.

Hence, a collaborative platform represents an institutional adaptation designed to maintain the individual equilibrium of actors in changing conditions, demands, or opportunities. How well the organizations involved in it manage to adapt to integrated management and at the same time remain autonomous enough to carry out their tasks is a central problem of collaborative institutions. The longer the period of the collaborative platform's existence, the closer the interaction between the same subjects, which contributes to the cooperation prolongation. Stable networks mean that participants can develop long-term relationships with at least a narrow (selected) circle of actors to understand their strengths and weaknesses, for maximizing the results of the joint initiative. Such flexibility will allow the collaborative network to respond quickly to the changing needs and requirements of interested parties. In essence, platforms should focus on ensuring the so-called hidden stability due to symmetry in the resources and results distribution.

## **CONCLUSION**

The format of global management is gradually acquiring a multidimensional nature, when constructive problem-solving involves the activity of key participants at different levels (world, national, regional, local), in different policy areas (water, energy, regional development, research, etc.) and various communication channels (informational, motivational, receptive, etc.). Therefore, the collaborative principle of interaction matters in identifying an algorithm of actions under the condition of more open interfaces between interested parties.

Let us take a closer look at the “uni-interpolar idea” [Tella 2015] from the given context. Being a meta-network consisting of situational anti-crisis nodes (collaborative windows), it is assumed that a temporary fixation of multi-subject interaction until the appropriate crisis resolution. Solving the problematic issue leads to the dissolution of the interactive platform as a separate actor, but requires post-problem monitoring of joint results through multilateral agreements. However, the flexibility of collaborative windows and platforms aims to quickly adapt both goals and methods of crisis resolution, depending on changing circumstances. Accordingly, the ultimate external goal also changes along with the prediction of resource base utilization of the players involved.

The proposed model of collaborative platforms can be applied to a wide range of cooperation policies, since many of the indicated components are present in solving issues of health care, crime, transport, etc. Along with positive effects, it is worth remembering some problems that accompany cross-border cooperation, namely: influence distribution, territoriality, contradictions in norms and procedures, the establishment of horizontal and vertical communication, imbalance of forces, the autonomy of involved structures, uniform accountability standards, and monitoring planned results. This article represents an attempt to model collaborative platforms and acknowledges the need for further study of this issue. The proposed model correlates with the input-output system of key players and the measurement of functionally useful effects, but it needs the embeddedness of political and social processes within collective institutional structures. Researchers should focus on the impact of collaborative platforms vis-à-vis national governments, traditional international institutions, and private players who may both support such initiatives and see alternative competitors as a threat. The very appearance of such interactive platforms can be used for a global smart specialization strategy in light of political processes.

It is worth noting that most academic works on collaborative governance tend to focus on macro-issues, but not all explore micro-issues such as the leadership required for industry interfaces or cross-cultural processes. Therefore, research into microelements of collaborative platforms that stimulate the prolongation of collaboration between stakeholders would be a valuable contribution. In this context, it would be good to emphasize the platform’s institutional dynamics for identifying and solving the stated problems.

Criteria for the accountability of platform participants regarding the implementation of approved tasks and the use of allocated capital require further development. After all, in the case of limiting the platform’s role exclusively to the functions of aggregating the subjects’ interests, the creation of a collaborative institution is pointless. Establishing cooperation standards and cyclical interactions could lead to the basic collaborative modules that can be connected to solve a similar problem situation.

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# DYNAMICS OF AGGRESSIVE DISCOURSE ON UKRAINE AND THE WEST IN THE RUSSIAN PRO-GOVERNMENT MEDIA IN 2000-2022

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## **Abstract**

The aim of this research is a build of a tool that helps to detect latent meanings of Russian propaganda messages. For this purpose, a new approach to building time-aware sentence embeddings was created, using the logic of the word2vec word embeddings model. An array of articles (754,372) from more than 50 Russian news websites for the years 2000–2022 was analyzed. In the dynamics of aggressive discourse towards the West and Ukraine, the key year is 2014 - the year of the beginning of the aggression against Ukraine. But at the same time, Russian propaganda positions it as a struggle for influence with the West, and this perfectly demonstrates the synchronicity of anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian propaganda.

**Key words:** *Propaganda, Sentence Embedding, BERT, Content Analysis, Cluster Analysis*

## **INTRODUCTION**

### **Personal experience**

Recently, a Belarusian friend of mine, who visited Berlin over the weekend, told me a story from the Berlin metro with admiration and surprise. He met two Ukrainian men there. They spoke loudly to each other in pure Ukrainian. But at the same time, their attention was focused on the phone, where they were watching a recording of the program of Vladimir Solovyov, one of the most famous and popular Russian presenters. They watched it for so long that my friend had to ask them to turn it off. He can't stand Russian TV presenters.

A friend rightly assumed that Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians were hardly Solovyov's audience. He told me this story because he wanted to understand why these men did it. However, this did not surprise me because there are people in Ukraine who watch the Russian state media to understand the Russian state's intentions toward Ukraine. Calls for military intervention in Ukraine have long been heard on Russian television, but these calls have now been implemented. When the first reports of an increase in Russia's military presence near Ukraine's borders appeared, some of my friends rushed to watch Russian TV to understand the seriousness of their intentions, expecting that the reasons for the invasion would be legalized there. That is why Ukrainians now understand more than anyone else in the world the importance of content analysis, a method of sociology that owes its emergence to another great war.

### **Need for better technologies in social science**

The war in Ukraine is called the first online war. Modern communication technologies make it possible to observe military operations almost in real-time. The world learned about Russia's plans for the attack thanks to high-quality satellite images. It has become possible due to the development of technology. If propaganda is part of military preparations, why not use the latest technology to analyze it?

*It is the question we asked ourselves before starting this study. We'll just try to create an analog of the MAXAR satellite for content analysis.*

**Fig. 1. MAXAR satellite shows Russian military build-up (late 2021)****Motivation**

Russia's aggression against Ukraine was previously accompanied by informational preparation to justify the need for military action. The demands of the Russian Federation made before the war also contained provisions on NATO, so part of the preparatory aggressive discourse also concerned Western countries. As this is not Russia's first aggressive campaign, it is essential to look at how aggressive speech has developed throughout Putin's rule since 2000. 2000 is also the year of the emergence of the sites of the largest online media, which are now considered pro-government in Russia - RIA Novosti (known for its article "What do we need to do with Ukraine?") and Komsomolskaya Pravda.

Materials from these publications are helpful information on developing the pro-government discourse on Ukraine and the West. We decided to find out what the dynamics of this discourse were. In particular, we were interested in how this discourse changed synchronously with the beginning of Russia's aggressive actions in 2014 and 2022. It is also important how the dynamics of aggressive discourse about Ukraine differ from the dynamics of aggressive discourse about the West.

Also, it is important to have the ability to analyse a vast amount of texts because of the Russian "Firehose of Falsehood" propaganda model [Paul and Matthews 2017]. The key feature of this model is the huge amount and intensity of propaganda sources and messages (so many that it is impossible to verify their veracity and understand the main message).

Therefore, we need to have a tool to detect the latent meanings of Russian propaganda messages (in general), so the aim of this study is an approach that helps to detect such latent senses of Russian propaganda messages.

## **1. METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH**

The topic of our research is the study of aggressive discourse on Ukraine and the west in the Russian pro-government media in 2000-2022, although tracking the dynamics with traditional content analysis is an unrealistic task. We need to track semantic dynamics, so we turn to the method of sentence embedding - such a task is difficult in itself. Therefore, the methodology of our research contains two parallel tasks at once - the conceptualization of Russian propaganda messages and the build of a tool for its detection.

### **1.1. Russian propaganda as a subject of study**

The topic of Russian propaganda is not new in scientific studies, so there is no need to justify the subject of research. Researchers focus on such an aggressive practice of Russian propaganda as the open use of social media and media outlets in foreign languages, not only Russian, to destabilize other states and societies from within.

For example, Ch. Wagnsson and C. Barzanje exposed the discursive (harmful) ability of strategic narratives of Russian propaganda using the example of the Russian state-sponsored broadcasting company Sputnik's strategic narrative about Sweden from 2014 to 2018 [Wagnsson, Barzanje 2021]. In France, the Russian-founded media RT and Sputnik are also considered partial or misleading. An example is the Yellow Vests movement, whose members have been accused of being manipulated by Russia and its media. The grouping of those spreading content from international Russian media is based on data collected on Twitter during the first months of the Yellow Vest movement [Gérard, Marotte, Salamatian 2020].

An important case is RT Arabic (formerly Russia Today), which creates a strategic narrative of Russia's participation in the war in Syria, effectively legitimizing its presence. D. Dajani, M. Gillespie and Rh. Crilley attempted to conceptualize "how state-sponsored strategic narratives operate in practice and can be mobilized as a of soft power resource". A qualitative analysis of social media (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube) shows that RT Arabic creates an image of Syria as a non-sovereign, dysfunctional state (a false state or fake country), vulnerable to invasion by foreign forces competing for power and control in the region, Russia is as "portrayed as coming to the aid of Syrians and Syria, as a benign presence promoting the establishment of good governance and skillfully managing the complex diplomatic relations surrounding the conflict" [Dajani, Gillespie, Crilley 2021]. RT Arabic skillfully uses the narrative strategies of "exposure" and "concealment", while in the case of Sputnik the authors presented three antagonistic narrative strategies of "suppression," "destruction," and "direction" [Wagnsson, Barzanje 2021].

O. Denkovski and D. Trilling consider the Russian state to be the most innovative in creating false and misleading information (content from RT and Sputnik) and spreading it on social media and news websites to promote alternative socio-political

realities. Researchers successfully use computational text analysis to study online disinformation on the example of Serbia [Denkovski, Trilling 2022].

Russian propaganda is aimed at both external and internal audiences. Distorting social and political reality for Russians for decades, the Chekist state legitimizes itself and its illegitimate actions both in domestic politics and in foreign policy. Many narratives are more significant for maintaining the stability of the Russian political course, in particular regarding the annexation of the territories of other states [Golovchenko 2020]. The Chekists of the Russian Federation do not simply ignore public opinion (the leader considers the consideration of citizens' opinion to be a weakness of the politics of Western countries) they shape it through the controlled mass media.

The study of Russian propaganda has a number of other interesting conclusions.

Through television, social networks, or websites, Russian propaganda forms narrative strategies depending on the socio-political context and target audience, however, according to S. Radnitz, it succeeds worst (have minimal effects) on those aimed at audience support for conspiracy theories [Radnitz 2022].

S. Alzahrani and others researchers showed that "influence campaigns, in which a state actor or organizations under its control attempt to shift public opinion by framing information to support a narrative that facilitate their goals," precede active action. Researchers studied pro-Russian news media in Ukraine and found "significant framing shifts exceeding a smaller peak of 2010, in November 2013, and sharply spiking and trending again in December 2013, three-four months ahead of Crimea's annexation by the Russian Federation" [Alzahrani et al. 2018].

Recent year Russian propaganda is often the subject of studies, especially after annexation of Crimea in 2014. Such interest on the topic we can explain through unusual way of waging war that got the name as "a hybrid war". Propaganda in Russian government media was an essential part of this strategy. Given the Russian-Ukrainian war, not crisis or conflict, and its implications for the world [Audinet, 2018], the number of publications focusing on Russian media influence actors and the narratives they deploy will increase.

In different studies authors considered various sides of Russian propaganda that resulted in a big variety of the methods applied for this task. I detected the following aspects and features that are inherent for such papers:

- studies on networks of pro-Russian trolls and bots in social media. In such papers scholars analysed in the most cases links between different profiles, and tried to detect some networks, communities most often in Twitter (because of an open API that allows downloading a lot of data from this network). Therefore the main methods of such studies are graph analysis-like community detection approaches (Clauset–Newman–Moore community detection algorithm);
- studies of Russian trolls and bots comments below publications in the West media. In these studies authors tried to detect propaganda stamps and similarity between comments and Russian narratives. In these papers authors rely on text

mining methods that allow to detect linguistic “fingerprints” on Russian bots comments [Helmus et al. 2018];

- studies of the narratives of Russian state media. In these studies researchers rely in the most cases on traditional content analysis strategies trying to detect propaganda-specific categories in the texts and summarise it. Our research belongs to this part of Russian-propaganda studies.

## **1.2. Analysis of changes in the meaning of words**

Language is a changing social product. The meaning of the same words may change over time. For example, the English word “apple” is now primarily associated with the company of the same name, although previously, people used the word only to denote fruit [Yao et al. 2018].

Vector representation of words can quantitatively demonstrate how the meaning of words changes. It is because it represents words to find out their position in the semantic space relative to other words. For example, in the case of the word mentioned above, “apple,” the vector representation based on nineteenth-century texts showed its closeness to words related to fruits, trees, and plants. At the same time, the vector representation made on modern texts has placed this word in space next to the words associated with computers, information technology, and corporations. These shifts in the space of meanings are interesting for analysis because they illustrate how, historically, the perception of a particular concept has changed. It is also possible to investigate how the meaning of a concept varies depending on the group context.

Currently, several techniques use word embeddings to analyze the evolution of meanings [Kozłowski et al. 2018]. The easiest way would be to train different vector representations for each period and compare the positions of each word. But the problem is that in each corpus, there are differences in dictionaries (not all words occur in different periods), and the vector representation is calculated purely relative to other words. Hence, it is not the specific coordinates of the word in n-dimensional space but their distance from the coordinates. In other words (simply put, the coordinate systems in different vector representations can differ significantly). Therefore, it is necessary to bring separate vector representations of words to one coordinate system so that we can correctly compare them.

In Dynamic Vector Representations of Words, Bamler and Mandt analyze the evolution of the meaning of words over 150 years from the Google Book Archive using their version of Dynamic Word Embeddings of Words, which is an extension of Mikolov’s original skip-gram. This extension is to add to the model a latent time series, which on the one hand, trains a model that would take into account changes in vector meanings of words in space, and on the other hand, implements it by learning just one vector representation instead of a set of models for different periods [Bamler and Mandt 2017].

Zhang, in his dissertation “Dynamic word embeddings for news analysis.” Zhang solved the problem of the dynamics of vector representations differently. His algorithm was to train individual vector representations for each period and their subsequent rotation to minimize differences in the coordinates of the same words. He used this approach to analyze the dynamics of the words “Trump” and “Croatia” in the media during 2018 [Zhang 2019].

Yao, Song, Ding, Rao, and Xiong in Dynamic Vector Word Representations for Evolving Semantic Research proposed a version of dynamic word embedding that was also based on rotating spaces to superimpose different vector representations over time. They analyzed nearly 100,000 articles from the New York Times between 1990 and 2016. Their main focus in the analysis was finding equivalent words in the past [Yao et al. 2018].

Di Carlo, Bianchi, and Palmonari, in their article Training Temporal Word Embedding with a Compass, presented an alternative method of training word embeddings that could show semantic dynamics. The main idea of this approach is to train word embedding in two stages. In the first stage, they have trained the general vector representation for texts for all years that they planned to study. Then they train vector representations for periods, which researchers plan to compare. It is necessary to create a space against which changes in values over the years will be measured (the authors call this vector representation a “compass”). However, the values in space for words are calculated relative to their meanings in the “compass.” This effect is achieved because each vector representation of words for the period learns not from the beginning but from its values in the vector representation-compass (these values are initialized before learning each new vector representation, which speeds up the model learning process). All the above models are based on the word2vec architecture [Carlo et al. 2019].

Similar studies have already been conducted on the TWEC<sup>1</sup> model [Angelov 2020]. In particular, there was a successful attempt to find out how associations with the police in the Ukrainian mass media have changed over the last 20 years [Kyrychenko 2021], and to study of mediatization of politicians [Salnikova, Kyrychenko 2021]. Therefore, we know the possibilities and limitations of these methods. The critical limit is that many meanings, especially complex ones, are conveyed in whole sentences/texts. Therefore, it would be essential to make coding of entire sentences/texts. It is beneficial to record the dynamics of these embeddings. TVEC allows it, but at the level of words.

### **1.3. Data**

We use an array of articles from the more than 50 Russian news websites for 2000- to 2022 to conduct the study. The total volume of analyzed news pieces is 754,372.

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<sup>1</sup> See implementation here: <https://github.com/valedica/twec>

These are all Russian newspapers, but without so-called “liberal” media like Meduza, tvrain. Some sites have not been fully downloaded due to DDOS attacks on them and blocking.

Below is a table of the top resources from which we take most articles for our analysis.

**Table 1: Top-10 news websites by amount of articles**

Media	Count
kp.ru	215 731
fedpress.ru	104 417
lenta.ru	92 851
ria.ru	47 099
gazeta.ru	44 570
newsru.com	42 714
life.ru	39 735
vedomosti.ru	37 319
kommersant.ru	30 688
rbc.ru	27 574

Articles were collected using the newspaper package<sup>2</sup> in the Python software environment.

## 2. RESEARCH MODEL

As you have read above, we need to have a good text encoding method to compare many news pieces. Word embeddings are good, but we need an alternative to compare complete sentences.

### 2.1. Model to encode complex concepts

In recent years the field of NLP has developed intensively, primarily due to the emergence of the architecture of the model of deep learning Bert [Devlin et al. 2018].

This architecture is characterized by learning to embed the entire input text. It makes it possible to use this model to encode sentences and compare them. However, this requires a correct modification of the model. The classic version of Bert focuses on the tasks of guessing and classifying texts. Embeddings, which the model trains, also focus on this task. However, this architecture is also suitable for paraphrase detection.

For this task, the *SentenceBert*<sup>3</sup> architecture was created.

We take **Sentence Bert’s deep learning model** as the basis of our research method [Reimers and Gurevych 2019]. This model is used for paraphrase detection [Reimers and Gurevych 2020]. To train such a model, you need to prepare a dataset with pairs

<sup>2</sup> See here mode: <https://newspaper.readthedocs.io/en/latest/>. The code is authored by one of the co-authors of the article, who will also publish his code in the future.

<sup>3</sup> See documentation and code here: <https://www.sbert.net/>

of sentences and labels (0 or 1), indicating whether the two sentences are the same content.

In our case, we want way more:

- we need to understand the similarity of narratives;
- we need to have links between time and narratives;
- we need to train the model to understand the time relations.

We could use the principle of the TWEC model mentioned above. However, it requires the training of a separate model for each period and one general model. We planned to analyze a huge volume of texts. We also went to get daily details. In this case, we would have to train about 8,000 individual models and then compare them. So we came up with an elegant solution through one model. The key to this solution is the proper preparation of the dataset.

Ideally, we would need to have a large array of marked pairs of things from the Russian media, indicating whether they are similar in content or not. We did not have the resources to do so.

To prepare the dataset, we took the idea that is the basis of **the model of vector representation of words word2vec**. Its training is based on analyzing the proximity of the location of words in a sentence. If the words are close, the model considers them close in meaning. If far - then far [Mikolov et al. 2013]. We decided to label it as zero sentences taken from different pieces. For sentences from one article, we labeled more than 0. Still, not more than one depends on the proximity of sentences in the text (calculated by formula  $1/(\text{the number of other sentences between these two sentences in the text} + 1)$ ).

To evenly present the whole period in the sample, we randomly took five articles from each day and made pairs of them for all sentences. Then we took five new random articles for each day and took one random sentence from them. We randomly chose a different sentence from another text for each sentence. We gave such pairs a score of 0. We have done it to show for models other content in the sentences (although purely by chance, the pair may be similar, the model focuses on generalization, this is not a problem).

It was also essential to create the date embeddings for these texts. Therefore, we also enriched the dataset with data-sentence pairs (if this sentence was in the text for the relevant date, then put a mark of 1, if not - 0) and date-date pairs (we placed marks on the principle of  $1/(\text{difference in the days between dates})$ ). We again took five articles for each day and created a pair of sentences for them from the day the article was published.


It is also important for the model to understand that there are connections between dates. To do this, we have created 10,000 pairs of random dates between 2000 and 2022. Soon they were assigned as follows:

$$\frac{\log(2)}{\log(2 + |day_x - day_y|)}$$

Thus the dataset contained 567,840 pairs of text-text, date-text, and date-date. It allowed us to train a model that could reveal substantive similarities and relate them to the temporal context.

This dataset allowed us to train the embedding model, which can then return a 768-dimensional vector of values for each input of text or date. This vector indicates the position of the text or date in the semantic space of the Russian propaganda media. Using these vectors, we can measure the cosine similarity<sup>4</sup> between texts and dates and thus say which semantic narratives in the Russian media are close and for which dates they are more characteristic.

**Fig. 3. Modified SentenceBert**




## 2.2. Challenges

This approach allows for solving many methodological problems related to studying the dynamics of discourse and the possibility of using vector representations for text analysis. The main advantage is that this methodology allows you to quickly and automatically analyze an extensive array of data without manual coding. It is also important that, unlike word embedding models (word2vec already mentioned above), this model makes a vector not for each word individually but for an entire sentence or text. That is, we can use such a **model to encode complex concepts** that are described in a whole sentence. Adding pairs of dates to an array of data also allows

<sup>4</sup> Cosine similarity =  $S_G(A, B) := \cos(\theta) = \frac{A \cdot B}{\|A\| \|B\|} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n A_i B_i}{\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n A_i^2} \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n B_i^2}}$


us to identify the proximity of concepts to a specific time, which is the primary tool for determining discourse dynamics.

**Fig. 4. Denazification in texts (counts). It seems denazification is a new term**



The disadvantage of this approach is that it captures specific changes or fluctuations worse and is highly dependent on the amount of training data. Because of this, the boundaries between the concepts are “blurred”. The specificity of the method leads to the fact that similar concepts are recognized, which often appear side by side in one text. Therefore, it is not surprising that the model will not fundamentally distinguish between the concept of “denazification of Ukraine” and “non-admission of Ukraine to NATO” if they are mentioned simultaneously - from the model’s point of view, it is one concept.

**Fig. 5. Denazification in texts (embedding). That shows denazification has existed in Russian media always (but in other linguistic form)**




### 3. RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Our analysis is based on a study of a set of propaganda statements. We obtained the embedding for each of them, which we compare with the embedding of each day between 2000 and 2022. But for the convenience of analysis, we first conducted a cluster analysis of these statements. It needs to be clarified so that we have an idea of the topics the propaganda raises simultaneously.

#### 3.1. Hierarchical clustering on topics

We performed a simple hierarchical clustering analysis using the Ward’s method. In the dendrogram below, we have identified six main topics we analyze below.

**Fig. 6. Hierarchical Clustering of propaganda topics**



The presence of topics in one cluster means that the cosine similarity of their vectors from the SentenceBert model is more similar than to other topics. Not every cluster was easy to interpret because, in general, all propaganda statements have a relatively high level of similarity.

**Table 2: Cluster description**

Cluster	Topic
Aggressive Ukraine and West	NATO is arming Ukraine; The West is arming Ukraine with weapons; The West wants to weaken Russia; Ukraine wants to attack Russia; Ukraine wants to attack Donbas
Crisis of the world order	NATO has deceived Russia; Nazism is flourishing in Ukraine; The West is rotting
Distortion of history	Lenin created Ukraine; Donbas has been bombed for 8 years; Ukrainians are a fraternal people; We can repeat
Justification of military actions	NATO is a danger to Russia; NATO is interested in new conflicts and wars; Ukraine needs to be denazified; Russia has a strong army; There must be a peaceful solution of the conflict in Donbas; Russia needs to use nuclear weapons; Ukraine is dangerous for Russia; We need to protect Donbas; Russia must and to protect the world from Nazism
Narratives against the central government	Kyiv authorities do not listen to their people; Ukrainians are waiting for liberation; Ukrainians do not want to join NATO; Most Ukrainians want to Russia; Donbas is independent

Ukraine is a fake country	Ukraine is part of the Russian world; Ukraine is part of Russia; Ukraine is a puppet of the United States; Ukraine is too militarized; Ukraine is an unfriendly country for Russia; Russians are a peaceful nation
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We provide below an explanation of cluster names.

### 3.2. Keypoints before you go to analysis

Following the trained model, we made embeddings for several narrative phrases typical of Russian propaganda about Ukraine and NATO and examined their dynamics. To do this, we measured its cosine distance with the year vector for each phrase and mapped values on the graphs.

But for a good understanding of the trends that will be evident from the graphs, we have recorded critical historical dates that may be related to our findings.

**Table 3: Important dates**


Years	Event
2004-2005	the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the defeat of the pro-Russian presidential candidate, the victory of the pro-European
2008	active attempts by Ukraine to obtain an action plan for NATO membership, Russia's war against Georgia
2010-2013	pro-Russian president in Ukraine
2013-2014	pro-European revolution of dignity in Ukraine, the establishment of a pro-Western government in the country
2014-2022	Russian hybrid invasion of Ukraine, annexation of Crimea, the war in the Donbas
2019	presidential elections in Ukraine, the new president's efforts to restore diplomatic efforts to achieve peace in the Donbas
2021-...	preparation and the further full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine

These dates will further help us understand the peaks in the graphs.

### 3.3. Justification of military actions

From a practical point of view, this group of theses interested us the most from the very beginning. The preface states that Ukraine is most interested in this.

This cluster includes allegations of Russia's threat from other states, the strength of its army, and the need to protect something.

**Fig. 7. Justification of military actions**

We estimated that the peaks of these allegations fell during the three years in which Russia carried out aggressive actions - 2008, 2014, and 2022. The decline in the intensity of these narratives is due to the pro-Russian president of Ukraine and Russia's expectations of the positive consequences of the Ukrainian presidential election in 2019.


The most exciting thing is that these events coincide with the negative connotations against NATO. However, Russia has never been at war with NATO.

Russia's desire to fight Nazism coincides somewhat less. For example, the peak of denazification fell during both pro-Western revolutions in Ukraine.

If we talk about current events, the most noticeable feature of the new conflict is that in 2014 there were more narratives about the threat of Donbas from Ukraine, while from 2020, the idea of the threat to Russia (from Ukraine and NATO) is developing more actively. At the same time, threats to use nuclear weapons are also more pronounced. It is not surprising, given the scale of the 2022 war. However, it is crucial to understand that according to this analysis, Ukraine began to threaten Russia in 2020. Other propaganda narratives grew in 2021. The information campaign preceded the start of hostilities and did not accompany them *ex post facto*.

### 3.4. Aggressive Ukraine and West

This group of narratives is quite similar to the first. However, it places a key emphasis on the threats and hostility of Ukraine and the West. And here, the last growth was also observed in 2021, long before the full-scale invasion of the Russian army on the territory of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. So, the information field about aggressive 'neighbors' was prepared in advance.

**Fig. 8. Aggressive Ukraine and West**

The main difference between these narratives is that they are at the same level of intensity in 2021-2022 as in 2014-2015.

In both cases - justification of military actions, the attitude of Ukraine and the West - Russia acts as in the case of Syria, portraying a favorable image of Russia as defenders or victims, and threatening and aggressive images of Ukraine, the West and NATO.

### 3.5. Crisis of the world order

Ironically, Russian media has not strongly developed the topic of the decline of the West since 2005.


**Fig. 9. Crisis of the world order**

Therefore, the conclusions of S. Radnitz about the minimal influence of Russian propaganda, aimed at the support of the population of post-Soviet countries for narratives in the context of conspiracy theories [Radnitz 2022], are also confirmed within the framework of this study. He believed that the rejection of such narratives depends on the support of the government by the population as well. So we can already assume that the propaganda directed against the Ukrainian authorities was also not particularly successful. This is true (see 3.8).

### 3.6. Distortion of history

This group of statements contains references to history. Three of them are references to the shared history of Russia and Ukraine, mostly related to the Soviet Union. Mostly these are myths that Russia is actively trying to spread.

**Fig. 10. Distortion of history**




They were not used more action before the start of hostilities, although they were widely present throughout the study period in most cases.

### 3.7. Ukraine is a fake country

This group of these includes statements about Ukraine as an object and not a subject of international politics. Moreover, this contains ideas on the dependence on the United States and the thesis that Ukraine is part of the Russian world.

**Fig. 11. Ukraine is a fake country**




The most significant emphasis before the war of 2022 was on Ukraine's hostility to Russia. Other theses experienced the most significant peak in 2014-2015.

It is known that the main Chekist of Russia publicly declared the fakeness of Ukraine as a state; in 2000, the World Bank report used the phrase "state capture" in relation to Ukraine [Hellman et al. 2000]. Society's reaction to the merger of power and business was the alienation of society from the state [Salnikova 2014]. Hence, obviously, there are constant narratives of Russian propaganda about the non-acceptance of their power by Ukrainians and the fakeness of state institutions. Russia's mistake is that it considered such a situation in Ukraine to be static, but it turned out to be dynamic: since 2000, the situation in Ukraine has gradually changed. Revolutions in Ukraine are not about Ukrainians not accepting their state institutions; it is about the desire to change.

### 3.8. Narratives against the central government

These narratives include allegations of anti-people power in Ukraine. This power makes ordinary citizens either want to secede into a separate state or wait for Russian power to come because they do not support the government's pro-Western course.

**Fig. 12. Narratives against the central government**



Interestingly, this group of theses has the most pronounced peaks in 2004-2005. Then the first pro-Western president seized power in Ukraine. At the same time, the thesis about the separation of the eastern regions of Ukraine was loudly raised for the first time. There was no military campaign after that. However, the pro-Russian forces in Ukraine became powerful. They took revenge in the 2006 parliamentary elections. After that, the power in Ukraine, according to Russian media, became more popular.


### 3.9. General trends of narratives

Our analysis shows that most narratives have similar dynamics. The key to this dynamic is 2014, in which the intensity of anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric increased sharply. It confirms our hypothesis about the synchronicity of this rhetoric in the Russian propaganda media. At the same time, we cannot say that the rhetoric was much ahead of the start of hostilities.

Until 2014, there was no significant increase in anti-NATO narratives in the Russian media. Since 2014, the dynamics of such narratives have constantly been growing, which we can interpret as Russia's informational preparation for a confrontation with the bloc.

Anti-Ukrainian narratives first intensified in 2004-2005, during the Orange Revolution. But then, this strengthening was not as substantial as in 2014. Paradoxically, in 2014-2015 there was a peak in the narrative about "brotherly peoples." After this period it continued to decline. It is also noteworthy that the strengthening of anti-Ukrainian narratives also took place in 2020, which we can see as the beginning of preparations for a new round of aggression against Ukraine.

**Fig. 13. General trends**



## CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES

This paper aims to build a system that allows us to analyse huge amounts of media content (more than 1 million news pieces) without reading it. This article presents the way for the automated content analysis of media through sentence embeddings (in other words, we build latent representations of the main statements in the texts). We use that to detect changes in aggressive Russian discourse against Ukraine and the West. In order to do that, we created a new approach to building time-aware sentence embeddings using the logic of the word2vec word embeddings model (We use cooccurrences of statements in one text as the sign of the similarity of meaning). The model is based on SentenceBert transformer neural network architecture. Our modification of this model is able to encode text statements to 768-dimensional numeric vectors (latent representation), estimate the similarity of different statements, and the propriety of the statement for a specific time point. We use latent representation also to make cluster analysis to detect the main narratives in Russian-state media. In general, it allows us to speed up the content analysis of news and conduct such a significant comparative study. The main conclusions are that in the dynamics of aggressive discourse towards the West and Ukraine, the key year is 2014 - the year of the beginning of the aggression against Ukraine. But at the same time, Russian propaganda positions it as a struggle for influence with the West, and this perfectly demonstrates the synchronicity of anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian propaganda.

Russian propaganda positions it as a struggle for influence with the West, which perfectly demonstrates the synchronicity of anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian propaganda. To test the hypothesis of the precedence of informational preparation for aggression, we need to gather a larger array of data that would allow us to make a daily dynamics of narratives. Aggregating data for up to a year does not allow it to do so (only if this training has taken years). We plan to improve this analysis in future publications.

However, this analysis shows the great potential of using neural networks in sociology. We were able to find an effective solution to identify the dynamics of narratives by rethinking the model of deep learning used for another non-sociological task. However, we need to continue this work.

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# BALANCING POLICY OF THE ARAB STATES OF THE PERSIAN GULF IN THE FACE OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE

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## **Abstract**

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the determinants of the balancing policy of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf in relation to the war in Ukraine and the political and economic consequences of this policy. The main hypothesis holds that the foreign policy of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf toward the war in Ukraine is primarily a function of their relations with the USA and Russia and their own political/economic interests/gains (primarily the enhancing of their own power position in the international arena). Three research questions were posed to verify this hypothesis: 1) Why are the Arab states of the Persian Gulf pursuing a balancing policy in relation to the war in Ukraine? 2) How do US-Arab and Russian-Arab relations translate into the foreign policy strategy of the oil monarchies toward the war in Ukraine? 3) How will the balancing policies of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf affect their relations with the USA and Russia? The paper makes a reference to the theory of neorealism, thanks to which selected determinants of the policy of balancing/non-involvement in the war in Ukraine were indicated.

**Key words:** *War in Ukraine, Middle East, Persian Gulf, Arab States, Russia, USA*

## **INTRODUCTION**

There are a number of relationships between war and foreign policy. According to the theory of realism, international relations are dominated by conflicts of interest, which are most often resolved by war [Morgenthau 1965; Morgenthau 1985]. War, therefore, is an instrument of foreign policy (“War is the continuation of policy with other means,” Carl von Clausewitz [Clausewitz 2010]), with states pursuing imperial interests at the expense of other states and by imposing their conditions on them. Recourse to war is also a result of the balance of power in the international arena or the position occupied by a state in the international system [Vasques, Elman 2002]. Countries that are striving for dominance must have advanced military capabilities and technologies that will allow them to engage in warfare. Last but not least, once a war breaks out, it is an important determinant of foreign policy that influences other countries, pushing them to behave in certain ways: to support, to oppose or to remain neutral/not engage with, the warring parties.

However, in recent years, the Arab States of the Persian Gulf/the Member States of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, which include Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, have been waging/engaging in proxy wars far more frequently than in traditional wars. They were and still remain a form of competition for dominance in the Middle East (e.g. proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, or between the UAE and Qatar in Libya). This is confirmed by Stephen Walt, a representative of the school of neorealism, who emphasizes that Middle Eastern states are rational actors who compete for power in a hostile and anarchic environment, which is in a state of the permanent threat of war/upheaval/revolution [Walt 1987]. However, despite the continued operation of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf in an unstable environment, they have not chosen to become directly involved in the hostilities in Ukraine. The Arab states have taken neither the side of Russia nor the side of Ukraine (USA), perceiving this conflict as a struggle between two different visions of the world (democratic-liberal supported by Ukraine, and represented by the USA and the EU, and undemocratic and anti-liberal, represented by Russia, but also by such countries as Iran and China), for which they do not intend to suffer financial or material, let alone human losses.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the determinants of the balancing policy of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf in relation to the war in Ukraine and the political and economic consequences of this policy.

The hypothesis holds that the foreign policy of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf toward the war in Ukraine is primarily a function of their relations with the USA and Russia and their own political/economic interests/gains (primarily the enhancing of their own power position in the international arena).

To verify the above-mentioned hypothesis, the author posed three research questions:

1. Why are the Arab states of the Persian Gulf pursuing a balancing policy in relation to the war in Ukraine?
2. How do US-Arab and Russian-Arab relations translate into the foreign policy strategy of the oil monarchies toward the war in Ukraine?
3. How will the balancing policies of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf affect their relations with the USA and Russia?

The paper makes a reference to Stephen Waltz's neo-realist concept of balance of threat and the policy of balancing, which in turn is derived from the realist concept of balance of power. These concepts have proven useful in explaining the motives behind the behavior and perceptions of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf of the war in Ukraine.

### **THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE OIL MONARCHIES TOWARDS THE SUPERPOWERS BEFORE THE WAR IN UKRAINE**

The oil monarchies of the Persian Gulf have for many years been seen as traditional allies of the USA in the Middle East. However, the war in Ukraine that started in 2022 became a catalyst in Arab-American relations and made Arab leaders realize that building an alliance based solely on one superpower is a mistake. The Persian Gulf still remains a zone of American influence, but a process of change has been underway for many years that includes China and Russia in the emerging new subregional order (*in statu nascendi*).

During Barack Obama (2009-2017) and Joe Biden (2021- ) presidencies a very clear desire to limit direct American engagement in the Middle East region has been noticeable. This is due to, among other things, the shift in the focus of geopolitical competition for hegemony in the world to East Asia ("Pivot to East Asia") [Goldberg 2022]. The list of America's "failures" in its relations with the countries of the Middle East that Arab leaders have pointed to is long: the abandonment of US allies (including Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia) during the Arab Spring, the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, the withdrawal of support (especially in the form of arms sales) for Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen, the negotiation of a nuclear deal with Iran, the failure to respond to Bashar al-Assad's use of chemical weapons in Syria, attempts to make Saudi Arabia an international pariah for its involvement in the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul, and much more. The war in Ukraine has moved to the top of the US foreign policy agenda and "relegated" the Middle East to a distant position. Although the American administration convinced Arab states that the Middle East region is among US foreign policy priorities, in the opinion of Arab leaders, these assertions did not correspond with American declarations [Yahya 2022]. Such an Arab perception has led to a rise in anti-American sentiment in the Middle East but was also a signal that the oil monarchies either needed to be more self-reliant in terms of security or needed to find other allies. Russia and

China have decided to take advantage of the US withdrawal in the Middle East and the growing disillusionment of Arab leaders with US foreign policy; the two countries have become open to new initiatives and cooperation with the wealthy Arab states of the Persian Gulf.

The reduction of the US presence in the Middle East has been exploited by Russia. Moscow has concluded numerous trade agreements with GCC countries (UAE), oil supply agreements (Saudi Arabia), technical and military agreements (Qatar), and agreements within OPEC+, and established a formula for trilateral consultations on Syria [Frolovskiy 2018: 83-94]. As part of the Russian-Saudi cooperation, the Kingdom Holding Company (KHC) owned by prince Alwaleed bin Talal invested USD 500 million in Russian energy companies Gazprom and Lukoil both before and during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, when sanctions were already imposed on Russia. Unfortunately, such actions make it more challenging for the West to isolate Russia and weaken European and US pressure on the aggressor. Moreover, any economic cooperation between Arab states and Russia could negatively affect the West's relations with the oil monarchies of the Persian Gulf.

The war in Ukraine also fosters closer cooperation between Arab states and China, united by their opposition to US hegemony and their desire to change the dominant liberal-democratic order. The war is an opportunity for China to draw the Arab states of the Persian Gulf away from the orbit of US influence. The balancing policy of the Arab states is an approach that may appeal to China. Arab leaders do not directly challenge the hegemony of the USA, but through the expansion of international contacts, closer economic cooperation, and making symbolic gestures in opposition to US actions (or lack thereof) in the region, they are showing their dissatisfaction with the state of Arab-US relations. At the same time, the government in Beijing asserts that foreign interventions and "external patriarchy" are the source of conflict and civil unrest in the Middle East [Mohseni-Cheraghlou, Vafei 2022: 5-34].

Arab-Chinese relations have also been developing in recent years. China remains the main importer of Saudi oil (38%) and the amount of trade between GCC countries and China in 2020 was USD 160 billion [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2021]. Xi Jinping's talks with Arab leaders in recent months have concerned, among other things, the inclusion of the Belt and Road Initiative in the Arab economic diversification programs referred to as VISION 2030. Lastly, when Nancy Pelosi, US Speaker of the House of Representatives, visited Taiwan on August 2, 2022, the UAE described it as "provocative" and emphasized its support for the One China policy [Omar 2022]. The government in Beijing is also slowly escalating military cooperation with countries of the subregion. Examples of this cooperation are the sale of military unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to the United Arab Emirates and the agreement to launch a Chinese military drone production facility in Saudi Arabia.

China is also monitoring shipping lanes that are of critical importance to security in the Persian Gulf region, being aware of threats to Saudi oil shipments. To this end, in 2019, together with Iran and Russia, China conducted maritime operations exercise in the Gulf of Oman in an attempt to protect regional shipping lanes [Israsena-Pichitkanjanakul 2022: 74-97]. However, as it was emphasized before, the USA still remains the main external guarantor of the security of Arab states, as evidenced by the US military bases located in the subregion and the numerous military cooperation agreements between the USA and the GCC member states.

### **THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE OIL MONARCHIES TOWARDS THE SUPERPOWERS AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE**

The war in Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, has reminded the world, particularly the West, that hard power remains an important foreign policy instrument, especially for authoritarian states. This is one of the main tenets of realism, which emphasizes the importance of strength and power in relations between states. Although the role of hard power in the world diminished with the end of the Cold War, it has always been one of the main foreign policy instruments for the Persian Gulf states.

Given the state of Arab-American relations before the outbreak of the war and the improvement in their countries' relations with Russia and China, Arab leaders have decided to pursue a policy of balancing between the USA and Russia. One of the main factors that have determined the choice of such a policy is the perception of the international environment by the oil monarchies, as well as the distribution of power in the international arena: the increasing dehegemonization of the USA and the growing role and importance of Russia in the Middle East and China in the world. It is hard not to notice that Arab leaders have seen the winds of change blowing in the international order, until now based on democratic and liberal principles with the dominant position of the USA. An opportunity has surfaced to offset this order due to the rise in the position and importance of authoritarian states in the world. The balancing policy of the GCC member states is a part of this global trend. The process of adaptation to the changing international situation is also one of the determinants of each country's foreign policy.

Consequently, the oil monarchies of the Persian Gulf do not reject the Russian narrative (or American narrative presented by John Mearsheimer [Mearsheimer 2014: 74-89]<sup>1</sup>) that Russia's national security has been threatened as a result of Ukraine being dragged into the orbit of Western influence and the attempt to build a Western (NATO) bastion in Ukraine on the border with Russia. Saudi Arabia is facing a similar

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<sup>1</sup> According to offensive realist representative John Mearsheimer "...the United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis. The taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia's orbit and integrate it into the West", J. Mearsheimer, Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin, Foreign Affairs, vol. 93, no. 5 (Sep.-Oct. 2014), pp. 77-89.

situation in its war with Yemen, where the authorities in Riyadh seek to secure their country's borders and border areas from shelling by the Houthis and terrorist organizations. The situation is viewed the same way by Russia, which wants to secure its border areas: a zone that would be free of Western, particularly NATO, influence in Ukraine.

On the other hand, the oil monarchies have not responded to US President Joe Biden's call to freeze oil prices/increase oil production and exports to global markets to address the energy crisis and inflation caused by the cutoff of oil and gas supplies from Russia to Europe. The Arab states have not decided to cooperate with the USA because they acknowledged that the ultimate political profits and benefits resulting from this cooperation are not favorable to them/their relations with Russia. Moreover, Arab leaders decided not to follow all of Washington's orders [Miller 2022]. If the oil states had complied with the request of the USA, they could have weakened the impact of Russia's economic blackmail against Europe and strengthened the US and European position in the war in Ukraine. That is why the Arab states decided to decline the American appeal, thus gaining not only influence on the prices in the fuel markets but also more revenue from oil sales, so urgently needed after the pandemic that limited this revenue: the less oil supplied to the market, the higher its price. Perhaps if President Biden had decided to lift the blockade on the sale of American offensive weapons to the Saudi coalition in the Yemen Civil War, the talks about increasing oil production would have had a different outcome (transaction policy). Such a reaction by the Arab states indicates an increase in their independence from the USA and their attempts to strengthen their bargaining position with Washington (e.g. concerning enhanced security guarantees, including in the nuclear talks with Iran and a reduction in its support for its proxies in the region, permission to sell offensive weapons to Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the war in Yemen, recognizing the Houthis as a terrorist organization, etc.).

However, the Arab leaders are concerned about Iran's support for Russia in the war in Ukraine. Iran has supplied Russia with medium-range missiles and combat drones. Moreover, instructors from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have been identified in Russian-occupied Crimea, where they supported Russia in operating Iranian equipment in the territory of Ukraine [Hardie 2022]. Iran has extensive experience in countering international sanctions, which could prove useful to Russia in the face of the sanctions regime imposed on it. The situation shows that the two countries, which are under sanctions, can cooperate on at least weapons and money transfers. For instance, Russia may use shell companies to hide the real sources of money, which would allow it to bypass the international financial sanctions imposed against it. This dissuades Iran from returning to the 2015 nuclear agreement, which has two consequences. On the one hand, it means the further isolation of Iran by the West, which is a severe economic blow to Tehran and clearly weakens its relations with the oil monarchies. On the other hand, it could lead to Iran's greater involve-

ment in proxy wars in the region, for example, in Yemen, Iraq, or Syria, and could potentially result in a more significant threat to the security of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. How do Russian-Iranian relations (Iran is Saudi Arabia's arch-enemy) affect Arab foreign policy toward the war in Ukraine?

As mentioned before, Arab states will engage in the war in Ukraine if it brings them concrete benefits. Saudi Arabia has taken part in mediation with Russia (10 prisoners of war captured by Russian soldiers in Ukraine were released) and has also provided USD 400 million in humanitarian aid to Ukraine. For Saudi Arabia, involvement in the war in Ukraine and being the country that can tip the scale in that war is a chance to emerge from international isolation after Riyadh was accused by the USA in 2018 of involvement in the murder of a Saudi journalist working for The Washington Post and other media. However, it seems that the oil states perceive the energy crisis as an opportunity to increase their revenues from oil/natural gas sales in their own budgets after many of them signed agreements to supply the raw materials to European/EU countries (including Germany – ZEA [Kerr 2022] and Qatar [Wintour 2022], France – ZEA [Irish 2022], and Poland – Saudi Arabia [Aramco 2022]).

Without explicitly taking sides in the war in Ukraine, the Arab states chose a strategy of balancing between the superpowers (the USA and Russia) while retaining the right to negotiate and talk with each of them. Moreover, the oil monarchies do not want to weaken Russia by supporting the USA and, conversely, do not want to weaken the USA by supporting Russia. They have ties with each of the great powers, which were once strong in the case of the USA but became weakened in recent years, or, in Russia's case, were quite weak but became stronger as a result of the Russian Federation's return to the Middle East (mainly through its involvement in the war in Syria). The table below illustrates the selected actions taken by the Arab states of the Persian Gulf in relation to the USA and Russia during the war in Ukraine. Russia is satisfied that the traditional allies of the USA have not supported the military efforts of the USA/Ukraine. A frequently repeated question is whether the policy of non-involvement of Arab states in military operations in Ukraine results from reluctance and a decrease in trust in the USA, and thus a desire to support Russia, or whether these states are "using" Russia to signal their dissatisfaction with the state of Arab-American relations? Qatar and Kuwait are those member states of the GCC that most boldly spoke out against Russia's aggression and disapproved of the attack on Ukraine at the UN. The UAE, as a member of the UN Security Council, refrained from supporting the resolution drafted by the USA which condemned the Russian invasion, explaining that supporting either side in the conflict would only lead to increased violence. A few days later, however, the country supported the UN resolution calling for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine.

The USA can either abandon its allies in the Persian Gulf, thus pushing them into the arms of Russia and China, or it can offer/implement at least some of the demands that the oil monarchies have made with regard to the war in Yemen or the American

policy toward Iran. This is certainly not the first, nor the last, crisis in the Arab-American relations.

**Table 1. Selected actions of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf towards the USA/Ukraine and Russia during the war in Ukraine in 2022**

Pro-American actions	Pro-Russian actions
Lack of military support for the Russian armed forces	Lack of military support for the Ukrainian armed forces
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and UAE supported the UN resolution calling for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine (March 2, 2022)	The UAE abstained from voting in favor of the draft United Nations Security Council resolution condemning Russian aggression in Ukraine by the UAE (February 25 and 27, 2022)
Qatar and Kuwait called for a diplomatic solution that would recognize Ukraine's territorial integrity	Lack of consent to Joe Biden's request to increase oil production (cooperation with Russia in the framework of OPEC+) Failure to join the sanctions imposed by the EU and the USA against Russia
A vote in favor of the UN resolution condemning the so-called referenda and calling for the return of the Ukrainian territories annexed by Russia (October 12, 2022)	The opposition of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf to the UN resolution suspending Russia from the Human Rights Council (April 7, 2022)
Humanitarian aid provided by the Arab states of the Persian Gulf to Ukraine	The Kingdom Holding Company (KHC) owned by Prince Alwaleed bin Talal invested USD 500 million in Russian energy companies Gazprom and Lukoil despite the sanctions imposed on Russia
Qatar provided a platform to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the annual Doha Forum	Phone calls by the Saudi Arabia and UAE leaders to Vladimir Putin and refusal to hold a telephone call with Joe Biden
Mediation of Saudi Arabia with Russia over the release of (US/British) prisoners	
Conclusion of gas and oil contracts with European/EU countries	

Source: prepared by the author

## THE BALANCING POLICY IN THE THEORY OF REALISM

There are many theories and approaches to studying the foreign policies of states. One of the theories of international relations that is particularly useful in explaining political and international processes in the Middle East is (neo)realism.

Realism assumes that states are in a state of perpetual danger because of the conflicting interests and rivalries in the international arena that force states to constantly seek security and survive in an anarchic environment. States achieve security and seek survival by maximizing their power and pursuing their own selfish interests. When establishing spheres of influence, superpowers use all necessary means (including military force) to prevent other states from entering the orbit of another superpower (as in the case of the war in Ukraine). Also, according to the theory of realism, international relations are an arena of clashes between great powers (e.g. USA and Russia) and, therefore, it is in the interest of some states to weaken others, e.g. in a country that is defending itself against an invader and is supported by another power [Goodin 2010: 132-133].

The above assumptions are reflected in the war in Ukraine. Russia has recognized that Ukraine was moving away from its sphere of influence and encroachment into the orbit of Western influence. Since diplomatic efforts, as well as interference in Ukraine's internal affairs, had not yielded the desired results, Russia launched an invasion aimed at preventing the NATO enlargement into the East and from drawing Ukraine into its orbit. When Ukraine successfully resisted Russian's first offensive, the West provided support to the government in Kiev and prevented Russia's quick victory.

The outcome is a situation similar to the Cold War: two great powers wage a war in the territory of a third country, supporting or engaging directly in warfare. In order to understand the roles and place of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf in this war, one would have to answer the following questions: What exactly is the balancing policy? In what situations do states opt for it and what are the consequences, both for the states pursue this policy and its recipients?

The concept of balancing comes from the realist balance of power theory, which assumes that hegemony is unattainable in a multipolar system (Arab states recognize the existence of a multipolar system, with an important role of Russia and China in the world), because hegemony is perceived by other states as a threat (in recent years, the support of leaders of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf for US dominance in the region has declined), leading them to balance its potential, influence, and power [Levy 2004:37]. Balancing involves supporting/taking actions that a particular state or group of states take in order to equalize the odds (Russia and China) against more powerful states (USA). Balancing mainly concerns states (Arab states) that seek to survive and ensure/enhance their security in order to constrain the most powerful and rising state that can prove a potential threat [Waltz 2008: 137]. In the case of the oil monarchies, the balancing policy is related to the increase of anti-American sentiment in the Persian Gulf and a decline in the confidence in the USA as a guarantor of their security (war in Yemen, talks with Iran). This refers to the principle of reciprocity: you have not helped us in "our" conflicts so we will not help you in "your" war either. The balancing policy of the Arab states is supported by Russia and China,

which are interested in reducing US involvement in the Middle East and establishing their own spheres of influence. The balancing policy pursued by the oil monarchies is therefore the result of the development of their relations with Russia and China, which are important poles of power and authority in the international arena.

Although the power of the state plays a vital role in the balancing policy, it is not the only factor. Balancing is also a response to a threat and, in line with the above exemplification of the balancing policy, it concerns the oil monarchies' declining sense of security in the face of a reduced US presence in the Middle East. In an effort to demonstrate the decline in their security and the increase in the potential threats to the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, I will apply elements of Stephen Walt's balance of threat concept. According to this concept, with the rising threats and to protect their security and interests, states form alliances and either balance (by allying against a common enemy) or join (bandwagon) other states (e.g. an aggressor). Balancing and bandwagoning are, therefore, a state's foreign policy strategies, whose choice depends on the factors that affect the level of threat posed by a state. Walt identifies four criteria states use to evaluate the threat a state poses: 1) its aggregate strength or power (size, population, latent power, and economic capabilities); 2) its geographic proximity; 3) its offensive capabilities; and 4) its offensive or hostile intentions. For most states, a balance of power in which there is no hegemony of one country is the most favorable arrangement in relations. Walt's concept will be used primarily to show the motives behind the Arab states' decision to balance between the USA and Russia during the war in Ukraine [Walt 1987].

Therefore, states analyze the above factors and decide to balance or bandwagon. Since the USA has abundant resources (population, industrial and military potential, and technological capabilities), Arab states can see this as an opportunity or a threat. Because the US policy toward the Middle East has not met their expectations in recent years and recognizing the increasing dehegemonization of the USA in the world, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf have decided not to support the vision of liberal-democratic order that the USA is fighting for in Ukraine.

For the Arab states, the war in Ukraine is primarily a European conflict because it is far from their borders [The Ukraine Crisis and the Gulf: A Saudi Perspective 2022]. It is not a direct threat to the oil monarchies' security; therefore, their interest in participating in the war is limited. Arab leaders indicate that a similar stance was taken by Western countries toward the wars in Syria or Yemen, where the refugees were seen as a serious challenge to Europe and the USA failed to respond to Bashar al-Assad's use of chemical weapons despite earlier declarations. In addition, the biggest security challenge for the Arab states of the Gulf is posed by the nearest countries, such as Iran. President Joe Biden's policy toward Iran (an attempt to rejoin the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA), as well as the military incidents that have occurred in Saudi Arabia or the UAE after attacks by Iran or the Houthi, have proven that the USA does not fully guarantee the security of its allies.

Further tenets of the concept of balance of threat are offensive capabilities and offensive intentions. Russia is not showing aggressive intentions toward the states of the Persian Gulf. On the contrary, Arab-Russian relations have been developing in recent years as part of Russia's resurgence in the Middle East, if only through its involvement in the wars in Syria or Libya. Therefore, the Arab states chose not to explicitly support the American-led coalition. The mere fact of aggression was not a decisive argument for the oil monarchies to oppose Russia. On the contrary, John Mearsheimer's argument about the threat posed by NATO's proximity to Russia's borders is quite understandable to such countries as Saudi Arabia, which faces a similar threat on its southern borders with Yemen. Perhaps a more real threat could be cooperation between Iran and Russia in the Middle East, which, given Tehran's support for the Russian military operation, is a possible scenario, but for now it is not a decisive argument for the oil monarchies to join Russia's opponents.

These arguments convinced the Arab states of the Gulf to choose a policy of balancing between Russia and the USA in the war in Ukraine. For many decades, the oil monarchies were the USA's traditional allies in the region. However, given the sequence of the decisions and actions of the USA in the Middle East in recent years, the continuing dehegemonization of the USA, the change in the dominant liberal-democratic order in the world, and, most importantly, the involvement of Russia and China in the events taking place in the region, the choice of a pragmatic/transactional foreign policy by the oil monarchies appears warranted

## **SUMMARY**

The above analysis of the foreign policy of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf confirms the hypothesis that the choice of political strategy towards the USA and Russia in the context of the war in Ukraine is a function of the oil monarchies' relations with these two powers, but also the result of their pursuit of their own interests rather than the expectations of either power. Three research questions were posed to verify the hypothesis: 1) Why are the Arab states of the Persian Gulf pursuing a balancing policy in relation to the war in Ukraine? 2) How do US-Arab and Russian-Arab relations translate into the foreign policy strategy of the oil monarchies toward the war in Ukraine? 3) How will the balancing policies of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf affect their relations with the USA and Russia?

In answering the first question, one should consider the critical argument, i.e. the state of the Arab-American, Arab-Russian, and Arab-Chinese relations. Realizing the changes that are unfolding in the international order, the Arab states do not yet want to sever their relations with the USA, which is the main guarantor of their security, but at the same time they already want to build another alliance with China (for now, an economic one) and Russia. In order to reconcile the conflicting interests of the superpowers, the oil monarchies are trying to find a balance between them. The unequivocal support for the USA by the oil monarchies would weaken the GCC mem-

ber states' relations with China and Russia. China is a strategic economic partner in the context of both buying/selling oil and other commodities and supporting the implementation of the GCC member states' economic diversification program (VISION 2030), e.g. participation in the Belt and Road initiative. Russia, on the other hand, being politically and militarily involved in the Middle East, provides the Arab states of the Gulf an alternative to the USA, thus strengthening their bargaining position in possible negotiations with America. The Arab states of the Persian Gulf no longer rely solely on the USA due to their expanded cooperation with China and Russia.

The second question was: How do US-Arab and Russian-Arab relations translate into the foreign policy strategy of the oil monarchies toward the war in Ukraine? In answering this question, one would have to take into consideration the improvement in the relations of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf with Russia with the simultaneous deterioration of their relations with the USA and the gradual reduction of the involvement of the American superpower in the Middle East. Arab leaders have made statements about the changing international order, with a gradual dehegemonization of the USA and a rise in the position and importance of China, with which these countries are strengthening their relations, especially economical ones. In this situation, the Arab states did not choose to support the USA in the war in Ukraine in an outright way because the USA did not support (or supported insufficiently) their involvement in the war in Yemen or against Iran.

However, the protracted war in Ukraine will lead Russia to focus its attention on military operations more than on the Middle East/Persian Gulf region. Since the war is absorbing a large part of Russia's military resources, some Russian groups and weapons have already been redeployed from Syria. As a result, Russia may be incapable of sending more resources to the Middle East and thus helping its Middle Eastern partners (e.g. Syria) [Katz 2022]. This argument also supports the balancing policy, as still no one knows how the war in Ukraine will affect Russia's and America's power projection in the Middle East. The policy of balancing adopted by the Arab states of the Persian Gulf towards the USA in the war in Ukraine and the restraint in the choice of/support for a side in the conflict show that American-Arab relations are undergoing a transformation. While the USA was reducing its presence in the Middle East, Russia and China were expanding their spheres of influence.

The third question is how the balancing policies of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf will affect their relations with the USA and Russia Concerning further developments in the context of the war in Ukraine. It can already be seen that the lack of clear support of the oil monarchies for the USA/Ukraine will reduce the confidence of Washington in the Arab autocrats. Symptoms of limited confidence were evident even before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine when a deal for the UAE to buy more than fifty American F-35 fighter jets was suspended in December 2021 amid fears of leakage of US military technology to China, which maintains good relations with the government in Abu Dhabi [Rumley 2022]. On the other hand, the USA will continue

to play the role of a guarantor of the security of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, which, due to the halted of the nuclear negotiations between the West and Iran, could lead to an increase in Iran's military involvement in the region. For several years, the USA has been shifting the weight of its involvement from the Middle East to Asia, where China remains the main challenge; therefore, it is not surprising to see declining US involvement in the former region.

The Arab-Russian relations are based on common political, economic, and security interests. In the context of the war in Ukraine, many experts emphasize the consolidation of authoritarian regimes in the face of America's attempt to maintain its hegemony. Because of Russia's growing importance in the region (Syria, Libya, Iran, Algeria, and Lebanon) and the world, Arab states will be keen to maintain good relations with authorities in Moscow. Russia, however, will not play the role of a security guarantor for the oil monarchies (e.g. due to its inferior military technologies compared to those of the USA), but is more likely to be taken advantage of for short-term opportunistic "deals," acting as a bargaining chip for these countries in their relations with the USA. What unites Russia and the member states of the GCC in the long run is their shared vision of a regional order that has no place for pluralism, human rights, or democracy, and favors a strong dynastic rule instead.

The war in Ukraine has once again highlighted the strategic importance of the oil monarchies to the global energy sector and the major powers. In the short term, it still does not seem that China and Russia will dominate the Middle East's regional order, but certainly the foreign policy of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf is a signal to the USA that if they do not treat them as partners, the USA's traditional allies will cease to support American interests in the Middle East and globally in the long term.

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**CRIME AGAINST MEMORY OR CULTURAL GENOCIDE?  
ON THE DESTRUCTION  
OF THE CULTURAL HERITAGE OF UKRAINE  
DURING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION  
IN THE XXI CENTURY**

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## **Abstract**

The relevance of the article is seen in the fact that it is one of the first attempts of systematic scientific research and analysis of the current state of cultural heritage objects of Ukraine which were destroyed or partially destroyed during the Russian aggression against Ukraine, starting from February 24, 2022. There were determined losses, caused by the looting of cultural and art institutions by the occupation forces, and world practices, the experience of various scenarios of reconstruction of cultural objects as well as the measures of European partners aimed at preserving and rebuilding the cultural heritage of Ukraine were analysed. The research methodology is represented by a set of general scientific philosophical methods, including theoretical and empirical levels of cognition, special historical methods of scientific cognition, principles of historicism, scientificity, systematicity, and complexity.

**Key words:** *Military Aggression, “Cultural Genocide”, Cultural Heritage, UNESCO*

## **INTRODUCTION**

The historical and cultural heritage plays an important role in preserving the past, forming the historical memory and national consciousness of the people. The discovery of world-famous cultures and ancient civilizations i.e., the Trypillian culture, ancient cities, monuments of Slavic culture, and the unique heritage of Kyivan Rus is connected with the territory of Ukraine. It is in the architectural monuments and outstanding ensembles of the past that the cultural characteristics of the Ukrainian people, and their attitude to the formation of the urban and rural environments were embodied.

The cultural heritage of Ukraine comprises more than 500 museums (art museums, history museums, local history museums, memorials, reserves, fortresses, castles, parks), 65 historical and cultural reserves, about 15,000 preserved landmarks of urban planning and architectural monuments, almost 170,000 site monuments, including seven UNESCO World Heritage sites (one of them, Chersonesus or Chersonese Taurica, is located on the temporarily occupied territory of the Crimean Peninsula) [Bilash K. 2022b]. Immovable shrines are kept in the open air, and other pieces of historical monuments and the material and spiritual culture of the nation are kept in the museums of Ukraine. The unique national culture of the Ukrainian people is an integral part of the world culture.

On June 30, 2022, as reported by the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy, Ukraine received the European Union Award in the field of cultural heritage (European Heritage Awards/Europa Nostra Awards), which was established by the European Commission in 2002. St. Andrew’s Church in Kyiv was announced to be the winner in the category “Protection of cultural heritage and its adaptive reuse”. “This complex and well-documented restoration has returned to the people of Ukraine a monument that has a significant cultural and spiritual value,” the Ministry says [Ukraina zdo-

la premii. 2022]. In addition to that, the project Holiday of Vyshyvanka was awarded a prize in the category Involvement of citizens and raising awareness.

But military operations severely disrupt the usual way of life and change the general idea of normality. However, even the war has its own rules which regulate the acceptance of surrender, the rights of prisoners of war, and other aspects. Among everything, the rules of war prescribe preserving cultural property. This prescription is enshrined in the Hague Convention of 1954, which, in particular, prohibits the destruction of religious and cultural institutions and historical monuments. The completely destroyed cities of Ukraine during the military aggression of 2022 leave no room for doubt that the Ukrainian cultural heritage is being deliberately and systematically destroyed.

Since the beginning of Russian aggression on the territory of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, monuments of cultural heritage have suffered from invaders' vandalism and are constantly under threat of destruction. Barbaric shelling and bombardment by the Russian military completely destroyed or damaged many museums, churches, theatres, libraries, and other cultural institutions. Among such objects there belong priceless exhibits, ancient monuments, sculptures, world-class paintings and rare books. The destruction of cultural heritage leads to much more serious consequences than the destruction of the monuments themselves: the history, identity, memory, dignity, and future of the nation fall under attack.

Therefore, the coverage of demonstrative examples of vandalism, destruction, and extermination of the historical and cultural heritage of the Ukrainian people by the Russian occupiers and the analysis of the development of scenarios for post-war reconstruction and preservation of cultural monuments are extremely important and relevant in this article. In addition, it is important to determine the place and role of international organizations, one of whose priority tasks is the protection and preservation of cultural monuments and their help to Ukraine in this domain. After all, today the preservation of historical and cultural heritage is a serious problem for the whole world. Sights of nature, historical and cultural monuments, and property of Ukraine contribute significantly to the cultural diversity of the world and support the balanced development of the country and human civilization as a whole, which determines the responsibility of the state to preserve its heritage for its transfer to the future generations.

It is hard to say what part of our culture we will lose in this war; it depends on its duration and further strategy of the Russian Federation. But it also depends on the efforts of Ukraine aimed at its preservation and protection.

It is clear that today there are no special studies devoted to the problems of preserving the cultural heritage of Ukraine under conditions of military aggression in 2022. In general works on studies of historical monuments and properties and cultural heritage, these issues have not become the subject of a thorough and comprehensive analysis, meanwhile being covered superficially by the authors in research and stud-

ies on local history. Therefore, the main sources of the research were the databases of the Official websites of UNESCO World Heritage, the Ukrainian State Institute of Cultural Heritage, the websites of the President of Ukraine, the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine, the National Institute for Strategic Studies. The particular interest is represented by the modern articles of foreign and domestic origin considering the destruction of cultural heritage as an act of genocide against the nation. In addition to that, the opinions and comments of modern influential politicians and scientists commenting in the media are considered to matter and are taken into consideration, when this topic is started being researched and analyzed.

### **1. CULTURAL GENOCIDE. CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY**

Culture is the genetic code of a nation which becomes the basis for determining national identity and forming national guidelines of world perception. The destruction of such a code actually destroys the foundations of national identification, and the awareness of belonging to a given nation, and, therefore, actually destroys the nation itself. A nation cannot exist without a culture, because it is united by the social memory of society and a complex of spiritual and cultural values and orientations in world perception. Instead, culture, in its turn, can exist only in a “national form”, because the nation is “a specified self-portrait of humanity and at the same time a historical personality (since it has individual features, like a person), embodies the historical experience, and, most importantly, those requirements of the time, era, historical perspective, which allow us to imagine the valuable content of culture” [Krymskyi S.B. 2003: 58].

Recently, in the scientific community there appeared and is spread the opinion that the destruction of cultural heritage is perceived not only as a violation of human rights, which is subject to the jurisdiction of international criminal law, being a crime against humanity and a war crime, but also is interpreted as an act of genocide, which gives rise to new names cultural genocide, ethnocide.

The problem of cultural genocide was raised in 1944 by the Polish lawyer, human rights defender, author, and developer of the concept of genocide, Raphael Lemkin, in his most famous work, “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress” [Lemkin R. 1944]. As we can see, the topic of genocide has not lost its relevance nowadays. After the Second World War, R. Lemkin’s term “genocide” received an international legal status and was interpreted as a concept defining the most serious crimes against humanity. The researcher singled out eight types of genocide: political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious, and moral; each of them is aimed at destroying a certain aspect of the existence of the human community [Lemkin R. 1944]. According to R. Lemkin, the main types of genocide were physical, biological, and cultural. They must be considered in unity, without separating cultural genocide from physical and biological.

Cultural genocide involves not only the physical destruction of representatives of any race or ethnicity, but also the undermining and destruction of its religious, cultural-historical and spiritual foundations. R. Lemkin interpreted cultural genocide as the destruction of the unique culture of a certain human community, its language, and religious peculiarities. Each nation is an integral part of the world community and contributes to the world's cultural heritage. The destruction of a nation, as noted by R. Lemkin, leads to the loss of its future contribution to world culture development. Among the signs that determine the further development of civilization are "respect and appreciation of national characteristics and qualities contributed to world culture by various nations" [Lemkin R. 1944].

R. Lemkin's contribution to the study of genocide, the creation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide, and his international legal activity are difficult to be underestimated. It was R. Lemkin who called a genocide the crimes of Soviet authorities against the Ukrainian people. In Ukrainian genocide, R. Lemkin sees four components, in particular as follows: "destruction of the Ukrainian intelligentsia – the brain or mind of the nation; liquidation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church – the "soul of Ukraine"; Holodomor of the Ukrainian peasantry - the custodian of the Ukrainian culture, language, traditions, etc.; forced populating of Ukraine with non-ethnic elements for a radical change in the composition of the population" [Serbyn R. 2009].

Thus, R. Lemkin raised a problem that provoked true interest among many researchers from different countries, who tried to analyse the essence of this term and illustrate examples of cultural genocide. Thus, the professor of culture, theologian George E. Tinker in his work "Missionary Conquest: The Gospel and Native American Cultural Genocide" (1993) defines cultural genocide as "the effective destruction of a people by systematically or systemically (intentionally or unintentionally in order to achieve other goals) destroying, eroding or undermining the integrity of the culture and system of values that defines a people and gives them life" [Tinker G.E.1993].

Professor David L. Nersessian, a well-known researcher in the field of public international law, criminal international law and genocide, understands cultural genocide as a specific form of destruction, elimination of the unique cultural attributes of a certain group, an attack on culture (when perpetrated to destroy the unique cultural attributes of the group itself, attacks on culture qualify as the specific form of destruction known as cultural genocide) [Nersessian D. 2019]. The researcher comes to the conclusion that, despite some progress, significant gaps remain in solving this problem. Therefore, the international community should continue to develop mechanisms for the prevention of crimes of cultural genocide.

The publication of the leaders of the Minerva Centre for Human Rights at Tel Aviv University, Leora Bilsky and Rachel Klagsbrun, "The Return of Cultural Genocide?" is devoted to the issue of cultural genocide [Bilsky L., Klagsbrun R. 2018]. In this article, the researchers try to answer the following questions: how did it happen that

the concept of “cultural genocide” disappeared from the Genocide Convention? What has caused the almost complete inversion of the original meaning of genocide, the move away from a holistic concept of genocide to a concept that is limited only to the physical and biological aspects of genocide? How was the cultural essence of genocide separated from the international crime of genocide and then reduced to attacks on “cultural values” or “cultural heritage” protected by international humanitarian law and the law on the protection of indigenous peoples? What happened to the original understanding that placed the cultural group at the centre and considered genocide as a collective, multi-aspect crime requiring a structural response to eradicate it? [Bilsky L., Klagsbrun R. 2018]. The value of this study is in the fact that the authors consider the concept of cultural genocide through the lens of law, politics, and history.

Rasa Davidaviciute’s study considers the destruction of cultural heritage as a process that leads to cultural assimilation, and loss of cultural identity. These actions are considered potentially components of cultural genocide, as opposed to genocide itself. The addition of “genocide” can be interpreted as a rhetorical move that emphasizes the seriousness of the harm of cultural destruction and loss [Davidaviciute R. 2021]. The destruction of cultural heritage is also called cultural genocide by the American professor, author and expert on international relations, a special adviser to the UN Secretary-General on responsibility for protection in 2008 through 2012, Edward Luck. He claims that threats to the world’s cultural heritage have become increasingly insolent in recent years. The destruction of cultural heritage becomes a blatant challenge to the established international order. However, until recently, dealing with the problems of the destruction of cultural monuments was considered a second or third-level policy priority. However, the analysis of the impact of such destruction requires the development of a conceptual framework for the implementation of the task of cultural heritage protection, which will provide a legal, scientific, and theoretical basis for achieving an international consensus on a more vigorous political response to threats to public order. Such a theoretical and legal framework can be of great importance for the prospects of development in smart and timely practical actions that will be an adequate and appropriate response to destruction at the local, national, regional, and global levels [Luck E.C. 2020].

However, the review of cultural genocide mostly uses examples of infringement on cultural achievements in Asian and African countries, in particular Syria, Afghanistan, Mali, Nigeria, and in colonial countries. Nowadays, we can observe cultural genocide more and more often in Europe. A vivid example can be the siege and shelling of Dubrovnik (the territory of the Old Town was included in the list of UNESCO World Heritage Sites in 1979) during the war in former Yugoslavia.

Among modern Ukrainian studies, Maria Dotsenko’s publication, dedicated to the peculiarities of the use of the term cultural genocide in the Ukrainian information network space is worth noting. The work is tracing the history of the use of the term

cultural genocide, determining the peculiarities of its use in the correct sense, and analyses cases of manipulation and substitution of concepts [Dotsenko M. 2020].

Manifestations of cultural genocide are referred to as follows: the forced transfer of children from one human group to another; forced relocation and deportation of persons representing cultural communities; ban on the use of the national language in private communication and in the education system; ban on the publications in the languages of one or another group; the systematic destruction of monuments of material culture and architecture of historical, religious and general cultural significance; destruction of objects used for religious worship; violation of human rights, so-called “re-education”, creation of mass detention camps, filtration camps.

In scientific literature, along with the term cultural genocide, the term ethnocide is used. This is a policy of destroying the national identity, and the self-awareness of the people, as a rule, it is carried out with the help of the policy of assimilation, therefore, in terms of content, this term is close to the term “assimilation”. Peoples who have been subjected to the policy of ethnocide usually lose their historical memory, national identity, self-awareness, language, culture, and religion, are assimilated or experience subjugation and oppression by the ruling nation.

International organizations have joined to the development of the definition of this term, in particular, the working group on indigenous peoples of UNESCO defines ethnocide as “any action which has the aim or effect of depriving an ethnic group of its integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities, any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights, any propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination directed against indigenous peoples”. Forms of ethnocide include the destruction of national and cultural monuments, archival institutions, and libraries; banning the use of national languages or introducing restrictions; “rewriting” of national history, changing the historical names of settlements, localities, etc [Holovko V.V. 2005].

Today, together with the Russian military invasion of the territory of Ukraine, its cultural heritage massive destruction is being executed. The destruction of monuments of the culture of the Ukrainian people leads to the loss of cultural artifacts that emphasize the national uniqueness and peculiarity of Ukrainians, the uniqueness and originality of national culture. There is no doubt that human deaths and economic losses are perceived more painfully today than the damage caused by the destruction of cultural heritage. However, the loss of cultural heritage has a lasting effect. In its totality, it can result in the loss of national identity, and later of the nation itself.

So, the history of the Ukrainian people knows many examples of both cultural genocide and ethnocide. As for Ukrainian history, these concepts complement each other and overlap each other. It is hard to believe that in the 21st century we are once again witnessing the cultural genocide of the Ukrainian people.

## **2. CULTURE IN THE GUN SIGHT. HOW THE ENEMY DESTROYS OBJECTS OF THE HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL HERITAGE OF UKRAINE**

One of the main tasks during the period of military aggression is the protection and preservation of the unique cultural heritage of our country. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization – UNESCO, which was created after the Second World War, has priority tasks for the protection of cultural monuments in the world. The Hague Convention was the first international agreement devoted exclusively to the protection of cultural properties in the event of an armed conflict. The legal norms of the Convention and its Protocols provide for preparation for the protection of these objects in peacetime, respect for them during military operations, a ban on the removal of cultural values from the occupied territory, and their immediate return after the end of military actions, as well as taking measures to criminal prosecution in case of violation of these norms. The prohibition of hostile acts against historical monuments and works of art is also contained in the Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 [Kolodka I. 2022].

Following the invasion of Ukrainian lands by Russian troops, UNESCO announced that it was working to mark the country's key historical sites with the emblem of the Hague Convention of 1954, an internationally recognized symbol of the protection of cultural heritage during armed conflict. The organization will also work with directors of Ukrainian museums to coordinate collections' preservation efforts. It is also planned to perform monitoring of damage to cultural objects using satellite imagery. Director General of UNESCO, Audrey Azoulay, called to "protect Ukrainian cultural heritage, which bears witness to the country's rich history, and includes its seven World Heritage sites – notably located in Lviv and Kyiv; the cities of Odesa and Kharkiv, members of the UNESCO Creative Cities Network; its national archives, some of which are put in the UNESCO Memory of the World Register; and its sites commemorating the tragedy of the Holocaust" [Iglesias Kuntz L., Mallard T. 2022].

On April 21, 2022, the Decree of the President of Ukraine "Issues of the National Council for the Recovery of Ukraine from the Consequences of the War" No. 266/2022 entered into force, which established the dedicated Council as a consultative and advisory body under the President of Ukraine, which main task is to develop a plan of measures for post-war recovery and development of Ukraine, which, in particular, will provide for the restoration and preservation of cultural heritage sites [Ukaz prezidenta Ukrainy №266/2022. 2022].

In order to better record Russia's cultural crimes against our state, the Ministry of Culture created a website, and the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation developed a special map to show these losses. Online archives will be useful both for the possible reconstruction of destroyed objects and as pieces of evidence of war crimes; a special site already contains information about more than a hundred destroyed or damaged cultural monuments of Ukraine [Mapa kulturnykh vtrat. 2022].

The world community has witnessed not only the disregard of international norms and UNESCO conventions in the context of the preservation of cultural heritage objects and art collections but also violations of all possible laws and customs of war, which is a large-scale war crime that will have to be held responsible for.

As of July 1, 2022, the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine recorded 407 crimes against the cultural heritage of Ukraine in the territory of 13 Oblasts of Ukraine, as reported by the Minister of Culture and Information Policy Oleksandr Tkachenko. It is known that the biggest damage to the objects of cultural heritage and infrastructure in the field of culture was recorded in Kharkiv Oblast – 97 episodes, 93 crimes were documented in Donetsk Oblast, 62 of them in Mariupol, another 76 episodes were recorded in Kyiv Oblast [MKIP prodovzhuie fiksuvaty voieni zlochyny rosiian proty kulturnoi spadshchyny Ukrainy. 2022].

At the time of this study, 101 objects of valuable historical buildings were damaged, but religious buildings were the ones most affected, the occupiers destroyed or damaged 145 religious buildings, 51 of which are registered as monuments of history, architecture, and urban planning or valuable historical buildings [Landsberh T., Korolova N. 2022].

In particular, three wooden churches of the 19th century were destroyed. The Church of the Nativity of the Virgin (Vyazzka village, Zhytomyr Oblast), which is an architectural monument of national importance, protection number 108, was destroyed on March 7, 2022. The church was built in 1862 with wood on a stone foundation. The church should have turned 160 years old this year [Biryukova I. 2022]. (Picture 1).

**Picture 1. The Church of the Nativity of the Virgin (Vyazzka village, Zhytomyr Oblast)**



*Biryukova, I., (2022), Rosiia nyshchyt nashi pravoslavni khramy, – UPT's Moskovskoho patriarkhatu. [Russia is destroying our Orthodox churches, UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate]. [online]. [2022-08-05]. Available at: <https://vechirniy.kyiv.ua/news/62357/>*

The second is St. George's Church in the village of Zavorichi, Kyiv Oblast. The single-domed wooden church of St. George was built in 1873 according to a typical proj-

ect. During 1998-2012, it was restored. On March 7, 2022, the church was destroyed by an artillery strike by the Russian occupants. The ignition was caused by a direct hit of a projectile into the dome of the church [Biryukova I. 2022]. (Picture 2).


**Picture 2. The St. George's Church in the village of Zavorichi, Kyiv Oblast**



Source: Biryukova, I., (2022), *Rosii nyschyt nashi pravoslavni khramy, – UPTs Moskovskoho patriarkhatu. [Russia is destroying our Orthodox churches, UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate]. [online]. [2022-08-05]. Available at: <https://vechirniy.kyiv.ua/news/62357/>*

The third church is the Ascension of the Lord Church, which since March 25, 2022, is a lost monument of Ukrainian wooden architecture of the second half of the 19th century situated in the village of Lukyanivka, Brovary district, Kyiv Oblast [Biryukova I. 2022]. (Picture 3).


**Picture 3. The Ascension of the Lord Church in the village of Lukyanivka, Brovary district**



Source: Biryukova, I., (2022), *Rosii nyschyt nashi pravoslavni khramy, – UPTs Moskovskoho patriarkhatu. [Russia is destroying our Orthodox churches, UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate]. [online]. [2022-08-05]. Available at: <https://vechirniy.kyiv.ua/news/62357/>*

As a result of shelling and hostilities in ancient Chernihiv, the ensemble of the Trinity-Saint Elijah's Monastery and Yeletskyi Dormition Monastery were damaged, the Church of St. Theodosius was half-destroyed, and the Resurrection, Catherine, and St. Kazan churches were damaged. The Ascension Church in Lukashivka, Chernihiv Oblast, where the occupying forces had set up a headquarters, ammunition, and fuel depot, was significantly damaged. As a result of shelling and fire, the walls and roof were damaged, and windows were broken [Mykhailova O. 2022a]. (Picture 4).

**Picture 4. The Ascension Church in Lukashivka, Chernihiv Oblast**



*Source: Mykhailova, O., (2022), Kulturna spadshchyna Ukrainy, yaku zruinuvaly ta znyshchily okupanty v perebihu rosiisko-ukrainskoi viiny. [Cultural heritage of Ukraine, which was destroyed and ruined by occupants during the Russo-Ukrainian war]. [online]. [2022-08-05]. Available at: <https://niss.gov.ua/news/komentari-ekspertiv/kulturna-spadshchyna-ukrayiny-yaku-zruynuvaly-ta-znyshchily-okupanty-v>*

Airstrikes and shelling destroyed the Holy Dormition Sviatohirsk Lavra, which was located on the territory of the Sviatohirskyi State Historical and Architectural Reserve. There are 25 architectural monuments on the territory of the reserve, among them there is the main temple of the monastery – the Holy Dormition Cathedral. In the complex of caves, there is the Nicholas Church, refectory, Oleksiyiv Church, and also the Nikolaev Church which is built into the rock. The invaders bombed the St. George hermitage with a targeted strike. Before the full-scale invasion of Russian troops, the Lavra was a centre of religious pilgrimage and tourism [On average two per day. 2022]. (Picture 5).

Museums, which had been creating their collections for decades, faced the threat of destruction during the period of Russian aggression. Currently, museum staff is taking the necessary measures to ensure the safety and preservation of their collections during hostilities. However, the first weeks of the war, unfortunately, turned out to be fatal for many museum collections in Ukraine [Kozlova K. 2022]. The Ivankiv Museum of History and Local History in the Kyiv Oblast was burned to the ground by a Russian rocket fire. The museum housed works of folk art, in particular, paintings

by Maria Priymachenko and textile works by Hanna Veres. Local residents managed to save part of the paintings by Maria Priymachenko and other exhibits out of the burning building [Chaiko O. 2022]. (Picture 6).

**Picture 5. The St. George hermitage of the Holy Dormition Sviatohirsk Lavra**



Source: On average two per day: Russia's war against Ukraine damaged and ruined at least 59 spiritual sites in at least 8 regions of Ukraine, 2022. [online]. [2022-08-05]. Available at: <https://dessa.gov.ua/on-average-two-per-day/>

**Picture 6. The Ivankiv Museum of History and Local History in the Kyiv Oblast**




Source: Chaiko, O., (2022), *Ryzykuvaly zhyttiam, shchob vriatuvaty ukrainsku spadshchynu vid rosiian! Yak utsilily kartyny Marii Pryimachenko v Ivankovi. [They risked their lives to save Ukrainian heritage from Russians! How Maria Priymachenko's paintings survived in Ivankiv].* [online]. [2022-08-05]. Available at: <https://vikna.tv/video/ukrajina/prymachenko/>

On the night of May 7, 2022, a rocket hit the National Museum of Hryhoriy Skovoroda, located in the village of Skovorodinivka of Zolochiv District, in the Kharkiv Oblast. The fire spread all over the entire premises of the museum. The museum exposition

included editions of Skovoroda's works, literature about him, books by ancient, medieval, and modern philosophers and poets who studied Skovoroda, ethnographic objects, paintings, and graphic works related to Skovoroda, as well as some personal clothes and belongings of the philosopher.

The manor in Skovorodynivka was built in the 18th century and is considered a historical building. Ukrainian philosopher Hryhoriy Skovoroda spent there last years of his life, and he is buried there. On the eve of the war, restoration works of the manor were completed. In December 2022, the museum was to celebrate the 300th anniversary of the birth of the outstanding philosopher [Hrynko O. 2022]. (Picture 7).

**Picture 7. the National Museum of Hryhoriy Skovoroda in the village of Skovorodiniivka of Zolochiv District, in the Kharkiv Oblast**



Source: Hrynko, O., (2022), *Na Kharkivshchyni rosiyani znyshchylu muzei Hryhoriia Skovorody. [Russians destroyed Hryhoriy Skovoroda museum in Kharkiv region]. [online]. [2022-08-05]. Available at: [https://zaxid.net/na\\_harkivshhyni\\_rosiyani\\_znishhili\\_muzei\\_imeni\\_grigoriya\\_skovorodi\\_n1542340](https://zaxid.net/na_harkivshhyni_rosiyani_znishhili_muzei_imeni_grigoriya_skovorodi_n1542340)*

On April 19, 2022, the Museum of Local History in Mariupol was almost completely destroyed by bombing and fire. Many exhibits were partially or completely burned. It is known that Russian troops took more than 2,000 exhibits from three Mariupol museums (in particular, paintings by Arkhip Kuindzhi and Ivan Aivazovsky) to Donetsk. Among the priceless works exported are the originals of three paintings by A. Kuindzhi "Red Sunset", "Autumn", "Elbrus", the original painting by I. Aivazovsky "Near the shores of the Caucasus", two original paintings by Mykola Dubovsky – "Sea" and "Night on the Baltic Sea", the original by Grigory Kalmykov "A. Kuindzhi", bust of A. Kuindzhi by sculptor Volodymyr Beklemishev, three unique icons: Jesus Christ Almighty, Madonna with the Child, and Ivan the Baptist [Okupanty vyvezly vsi tsinni eksponaty. 2022].

The list of destroyed and damaged museums of national importance comprises as follows: museum-reserve of Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky in Chernihiv, the regional art museum named after Hryhoriy Galagan, Kharkiv art museum and Museum of Nature of Kharkiv University, historical and architectural museum-reserve "Sadyba of

Popov” in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Military History Museum in Chernihiv, National Museum-Reserve “Battle for Kyiv of 1943” in Kyiv Oblast, “Star Wormwood” museum in Chornobyl [Mykhailova O. 2022a].

The objects of the national importance of the museum and exhibition centre “Trostyansky”, located on the territory of the manor of Leopold Koenig, were destroyed. During the shelling, the facades and the premises of the museum being the monuments of 19th century urban planning were damaged. An unknown quantity of small museums at various institutions, including schools, were also destroyed.

The war caused great damage to the monuments of urban architecture and palace-park ensembles of the cities of Ukraine. One of the oldest theatres of the Left Bank Ukraine – the Regional Academic Drama Theatre in the great cultural centre of the Donetsk Oblast – the city of Mariupol, was destroyed. The theatre was built in 1956-1960 according to the project of architects Oleksiy Krylov and Oleh Malysenko. The main facade of the architectural object was built out of the Crimean Inkerman grey stone, it had a gallery with four columns, which were crowned by the capitals of the composite order with a sculptural group [Kozlova K. 2022]. On March 16, 2022, the occupants dropped a 5-ton bomb on this theatre, where at that time about a thousand people were hiding in the basements. The theatre was destroyed, but the basements, fortunately, survived (Picture 8).

**Picture 8. The Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast**



Source: Kozlova, K., (2022), *The Great Russian Destruction: Ukrainian Architectural Landmarks Damaged by the War*. [online]. [2022-08-05]. Available at: <https://birdinflight.com/architectura-2/20220317-great-russian-destruction.html>

The shelling of Chernihiv partially destroyed an architectural monument of the end of the 19th century, the building of the former Vasyl Tarnovsky Museum of Ukrainian Antiquities, which lately housed the regional children’s library. This is one of the oldest, richest and most well-known museums in Ukraine. His collection includes almost 230,000 exhibits of material and spiritual culture [Kozlova K. 2022]. (Picture 9).

**Picture 9. The Vasyl Tarnovsky Museum of Ukrainian Antiquities**



Source: Kozlova, K., (2022), *The Great Russian Destruction: Ukrainian Architectural Landmarks Damaged by the War.* [online]. [2022-08-05]. Available at: <https://birdinflight.com/architectura-2/20220317-great-russian-destruction.html>

In Sumy, as a result of a rocket attack, the ancient buildings of the beginning of the 20th century suffered a significant damage in the manor of the former artillery school, where the Cadet Corps named after Ivan Kharitonenko is now located. The buildings of the Corps are witnesses of the era and preserve the historical memory of Sumy residents: their walls were home to generations of cadets (Picture 10).

**Picture 10. The Cadet Corps named after Ivan Kharitonenko**



Source: Kozlova, K., (2022), *The Great Russian Destruction: Ukrainian Architectural Landmarks Damaged by the War.* [online]. [2022-08-05]. Available at: <https://birdinflight.com/architectura-2/20220317-great-russian-destruction.html>

The rocket strike and the subsequent fire partially destroyed the facades, roof, windows, and interiors of the monument of architecture and urban planning, the building of the former People's Labour Commissariat of 1925, which houses the Faculty of Economics of the Kharkiv National University named after V.N. Karazin (Picture 11). On March 8, 2022, it became known that during the shelling of Kharkiv, the legendary Slovo house, which was built on the outskirts of Kharkiv in the late 1920s by a cooperative of writers, was damaged. The name is related to the shape of the build-

ing, from the height it resembles the letter “C”. In the early 1930s, there were settled Ukrainian artists, who later became representatives of the Shot Renaissance, among them were Mykola Khvylovy, Ivan Bagryany, and Mykhailo Yalovy.

**Picture 11. The former People’s Labour Commissariat**



*Source: Kozlova, K., (2022), The Great Russian Destruction: Ukrainian Architectural Landmarks Damaged by the War. [online]. [2022-08-05]. Available at: <https://birdinflight.com/architectura-2/20220317-great-russian-destruction.html>*

Historical and architectural losses are the most visible. They are difficult not to notice, easy to record, and convenient to use as an argument in discussions. Svobody Maidan, a unique historical object of urban development in Kharkiv, was bombed. Two shells fell near the building of the Kharkiv Regional State Administration. Maidan Svobody is the central square of the city of Kharkiv, it is the sixth largest square in Europe and the twelfth largest in the world. The architecture of modern Kharkiv is eclectic, combining buildings of the 19th century, monuments of constructivism, cooperative houses, and new buildings. During the Second World War, the city was almost completely destroyed, so most of the existing architectural solutions were created after the 1950s.

According to the Map of Cultural Losses of the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation, the damage by enemy missiles was brought to the architectural monument of the beginning of the 19th century, Vorontsovsky Palace in Odesa, a unique object of cultural heritage and historical monument in the style of classicism and Empire. Due to the threat of destruction as a result of military aggression, Odesa can be included in the UNESCO heritage. The historical city area has 196 monuments of cultural heritage, 30 of which are of national importance. If Odesa is added to the World Heritage list, UNESCO will be able to provide protection guarantees to cultural monuments and protect the historical centre of the city from hostilities [Odesu mozhut vnesty do spadshchyny UNESCO. 2022].

Among the objects of cultural heritage that suffered from Russian aggression and need to be restored, the monuments and memorials, as well as burial places of Ukraine, should be noted. At the time of the research, the Ministry of Culture and Information

Policy accounted for about 45 memorial monuments in honour of historical personalities and events of the 19th - early 21st centuries, as well as other valuable historical buildings [MKIP prodovzhuie fiksuvaty voieni zlochyny. 2022].

In the Donetsk Oblast, monuments to Metropolitan Ignatius and Volodymyr Korolenko in Mariupol, as well as a monument to Afghan soldiers, were damaged. Vasyl Slipak's memorial was destroyed near the village of Luhanske. In the Kyiv Oblast, a mass grave with a Monument to the Dead in the Second World War in Bucha, a monument to Taras Shevchenko, and a statue of Archangel Michael in Borodyanka, as well as Monuments to the Dead in the Second World War and soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were damaged [Mykhailova O. 2022b]. (Picture 12).

**Picture 12. The monument to Taras Shevchenko, and the statue of Archangel Michael in Borodyanka**



Source: Mykhailova, O., (2022), *Pamiatnyky Ukrainy, zruinovani ta poshkodzeni okupantamy u perebihu rosiisko-ukrainskoi viiny*. [Monuments of Ukraine, destroyed and damaged by occupants during the Russo-Ukrainian war]. [online]. [2022-08-05]. Available at: <https://niss.gov.ua/en/node/4446>

The memorial Stella to the participants of the anti-terrorist operation in Energodar, the monument to the 183rd tank brigade in the Sumy Oblast, the memorial Stella in honour of Vyacheslav Chornovol in the Kherson Oblast, and the memorial at the Yatsevo cemetery in Chernihiv were damaged.

During the Russian strike to the Kyiv TV tower on March 1, 2022, the Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial Centre, which was under construction at the time, was damaged. The building of the Centre's Museum and the monument of the 19th century, the former office of the adjacent cemetery, were damaged. A part of the tombstones of the 19th century was destroyed by the explosion and fire at the historical Jewish cemetery in Glukhiv, Sumy Oblast. The Glukhiv Jewish cemetery is the largest preserved cemetery in the region, which survived the Second World War. Jews who were victims of the pogrom of 1918 are buried on the territory of the cemetery. The fraternal burial is the grave of Tzaddiks Menachem-Nohim-David Geselev and Israel-Dov-Ber Nokhi-

mov Shumiatskyi. For the entire Jewish people, it is not only a historical monument, but also a special symbol of world significance [Tyshchenko K. 2022].

In the Kharkiv Oblast, Ataka Memorial, dedicated to the Dead in the Second World War, is known to be damaged. Damage to the Kharkiv Memorial to the Victims of Totalitarianism was discovered, where the remnants of rockets were stuck and some plaques with the names of the dead were broken. The Memorial to the Victims of Nazism in the Drobytskyi Yar tract and the Slava Memorial were also damaged by Russian shelling.

Due to the actions of Russian invaders, the unique military-historical object “Rock” in the city of Korosten in the Zhytomyr Oblast was damaged. The fortification of the site in the 1930s also included local natural objects of granite caves. At the same time, these caves represent more interest as ancient Drevlians settled in them. Accordingly, the cultural layer of the hillfort of the ancient city of Iskorosten of the 9th-11th centuries was damaged.

Cruise missiles hit the heart of the Cossackdom and the cradle of statehood, the protected part of the island of Khortytsia in Zaporizhzhya, restored within the framework of the “Great Restoration” program. The history of Khortytsia goes back to prehistoric times, about 100,000 years ago, which lasts until now. “Khortytsia” is one of the first historical and cultural reserves to have high status as a national reserve [Naslidky rankovoho obstrilu Zaporizhzhia. 2022].

During the hostilities, unique episodes of neglecting the unique historical objects of Ukraine and the world were also recorded. This is how it is known about the mining by the Russian military of the territory near the Stone Tomb, a unique monument of geology and archaeology of world importance, located in the Zaporizhzhya Oblast near Melitopol. The Stone Tomb Monument is a cult complex, the only place in Eastern Europe where rock paintings from the Late Paleolithic to the Middle Ages have been preserved. The hill has about 3,000 slabs, under which there are 65 grottoes and caves richly covered with petroglyphs [Chernychko A. 2022].

The Stone Tomb hill itself is a unique natural object. This is a remnant of the Sarmatian Sea sandstone of the Tertiary period. Under the influence of time, glaciers, water, and wind, the slabs of the hill acquired amazing outlines. One can see the prints of plants and molluscs of the Sarmatian Sea on many of them (Picture 13).

As a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the local history museum of Melitopol, where ancient Scythian gold was stored, was damaged and seized. The collection of the state museum includes more than 45,000 items and consists of archaeological, numismatic, ethnographic, artistic, geological, paleontological, botanical, zoological, and entomological collections. The real decoration of the museum is the graphic and pictorial works of the artist of world importance, who was born in the city of Melitopol, Oleksandr Tishler. But particular importance has the unique collection of Scythian gold of the 4th century BC, obtained as a result of excavations of the Melitopol mound: 275 golden pieces of Scythian, Sarmatian, and Hunnic origin, which were

hidden by the local history museum management after the beginning of the Russian invasion, are currently under a threat of theft [Nazvano kil'kist zruinovanykh muzeiv ta pamiatnykiv v Ukraini cherez viinu. 2022].

**Picture 13. The Stone Tomb hill**



*Source: Naslidky rankovoho obstrilu Zaporizhzhia: vluchyly u zapovidnu chastynu Khortytsi. [Consequences of the morning shelling of Zaporizhzhia: the protected part of Khortytsia was hit], (2022). [online]. [2022-08-05]. Available at: <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-rosiyska-raketa-khortytsya/31846716.html>*

In the temporarily occupied territory of the Kherson Oblast, Russian troops are equipping fire positions and, thus, are destroying archaeological monuments, Scythian mounds, located along the roads, which are an important part of the cultural landscape of the Kherson Oblast. Local scientists claim that at least 100 burial mounds were marked on maps of the 19th century in Kherson. In fact, they are believed to be three times more, and only five of them have been investigated and 15 more are in the register [Na Khersonshchyni rosiiski viiskovi znyschuiut kurhany. 2022].

Archaeological monuments are an important and integral part of Ukrainian cultural heritage. As a result of hostilities, archaeological sites suffer irreparable losses. The situation is worsened by the fact that after the destruction of the cultural layer due to shelling and bombing, archaeological monuments become more accessible for looting by treasure hunters-marauders, who, even in times of war, continue to encroach on the national cultural heritage.

The destruction and damage to the monuments of production and technology history, which are an important part of the historical and cultural heritage of Ukraine and are widely represented in all regions of the country, are recorded. In particular, the historical excursion retro tram of the Saltivsky depot, which made its last voyage on February 14, 2022, then performing transportation of passengers as a part of the St. Valentine's Day celebration, did not survive. Retro tramcar MTV-82 was restored in 2006 for the tram's 100th anniversary [Kladovyshche tramvaiv. 2022]. The administrative building and the workshop for maintenance and repair of trams were also damaged.

The Museum of Retro Computers in Mariupol, which contained more than 500 pieces of computing equipment from 1950s to the early 2000s, including 120 computing devices, computers, and consoles, was completely destroyed by the Russian bombing [Vijna bezzhalna do pamiati. 2022].

The monuments of production and technology history are of great interest not only in a cognitive sense but also in a purely practical sense. They are a valuable source of information about the development of the country's production, they characterize various periods and aspects of technical progress.

On February 27, 2022, during the heavy fights at the Antonov airport in Gostomel, the world's largest record-breaking cargo aircraft An-225 "Mriya" was destroyed. The plane has a maximum take-off weight of 381 tons, and it was also the largest plane in the world that took off more than once. In 2004, the International Aeronautical Federation put An-225 into the Guinness Book of Records for its 240 records [Feshchuk V. 2022].

"By destroying our cultural heritage, Russia is trying to erase the national identity of the Ukrainian people. The aggressor's troops violate Articles 4 and 5 of the Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. According to Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, such actions of the aggressor are deemed a war crime", stated Ombudsman L. Denisova [Lohvina T. 2022].

The Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine continues to work on recording the destruction of cultural heritage objects, which will later become pieces of evidence for international proceedings. Consultations and negotiations with international partners and professional public organizations on the issues of cultural heritage protection and loss documentation continue. Therefore, the preservation of cultural heritage in times of war is a challenge that requires a consolidation of the efforts of various parties, both the state and civil society, as well as professional communities, in order to be overcome.

### **3. THE HELP OF THE CIVILIZED WORLD IN THE RECONSTRUCTION AND PRESERVATION OF THE CULTURAL HERITAGE OF UKRAINE**

It is a very right time, when it is necessary to understand how it is possible to rebuild the state, by deliberately choosing the best direction of action and creating a specific plan in advance, so that, it can be implemented as fast as possible after the victory. The ways of recovery of countries in the post-war period were different, whereas priorities were determined by the needs and characteristics of specific cities. Currently, when forming a plan for the reconstruction of Ukraine, it is important to consider the economic, geopolitical, social, and cultural peculiarities of the state and the requirements of modern urban planning. Therefore, today, an up-to-date European experience is a vivid example to Ukraine of how to solve the problem of preserving

its historical and cultural heritage. European partners are actively involved in this matter.

With the support of the Ministry of Culture of Latvia and the Riga Technical University, a group of specialists led by Bruno Deslandes visited Ukraine. Together with their colleagues from Ukraine, they carried out 3D scanning of two monuments of cultural heritage in Chernihiv, damaged as a result of Russian shelling, as well as two monuments of sacred architecture in the Lviv Oblast and in Kyiv. The materials obtained will be used in the future during the development of restoration programs. It should be noted that Latvia has 20 years of experience in the field of documenting emergency situations and diagnosing the condition of cultural heritage objects during armed conflicts. The Government of Latvia provided similar technical assistance to Iraq in 2005-2006 [Lototska N. 2022].

In Poland, on the initiative of Polish museum workers, at the beginning of March 2022, the Committee for Assistance to Museums of Ukraine was established, which united 55 members, well-known museum workers, and cultural figures. This public initiative is headed by Jan Oldakowski, the director of one of the most modern museums in Poland, the Warsaw Uprising Museum. Among the goals that Polish museum workers have set for themselves, there are not only helping Ukrainian colleagues in securing museum collections, digitizing and inventorying collections but also collecting information about the looting and destruction of Ukrainian cultural values by occupants. First of all, materials were sent from Poland to Ukraine to protect museum collections from possible damage during shelling and bombing. Providing the necessary assistance to Ukrainian museum workers would be impossible without the support of Polish sponsors and foreign partners of the Committee. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Swiss Foundation for Art, Culture and History, the National Library of Estonia, the European Parliament, the University Museum in Bergen, and many others joined this noble initiative. The Polish Ministry of Culture and National Heritage provides logistic support for the activities of the Committee [Kramar R. 2022]. The Committee for Assistance to Museums of Ukraine will continue to help secure museum collections, especially in small museums, as requested by Ukrainian partners. Even now, the members of the Committee state they will help their Ukrainian colleagues to rethink and modernize museum exhibits. Both Polish and Ukrainian museologists agree that the war forces us to think about the museum's mission and modern ways of its implementation.

The new direction of the Committee's activity became the collection of funds for the post-war reconstruction of destroyed or damaged Ukrainian museums. As the Polish museum workers emphasized in their statement, the struggle to preserve the cultural and national heritage of Ukraine is a joint struggle of Ukrainians and Poles.

Finland's museums have also united to help Ukraine. The organizer of the association was Elina Anttila, director of the National Museum of Finland. Museum workers collect packaging materials for Ukrainian colleagues and pay special attention to

recorders being used to control temperature and humidity. This will help Ukrainian institutions to monitor the storage conditions of collections in storage premises [Bilash K. 2022b].

Many international grants for the protection of Ukrainian culture have also appeared. The most ambitious is probably the proposal of the International Alliance for the Protection of Cultural Heritage in Conflict Zones (ALIPH Foundation), based in Switzerland: it allocated USD 2 million for micro-grants to support small museums in Kyiv and the eastern part of Ukraine [Bilash K. 2022b].

More than ten Ukrainian museums have already received money from this fund for conducting inventory, purchasing protective equipment, and strengthening security. Dozens of similar foreign proposals can be found on the website of the Network of European Museum Organizations, which has become an aggregator of various initiatives. Here you can find a place for the temporary storage of a museum collection, an offer of temporary employment, a grant from a charitable foundation, or a foreign residence.

The Ministry of Culture of the Czech Republic allocated more than EUR 80,000 to help Ukrainian museums and offered the capacities of Czech conservation and restoration workshops and premises where things can be stored [Bilash K. 2022a].

Ukrainian restorers consider valuable the experience of their colleagues from Croatia as they survived the war and have the practice of saving cultural treasures under conditions of armed conflict. The restorers held online meetings and shared experiences, from working with large-scale architectural monuments to preserving works on paper and wood worth protecting in times of war.

In March 2022, the state minister for Culture and Media Claudia Roth, together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany, created a network of institutions whose activities were aimed at the protection of cultural values in Ukraine and involved the collection, coordination, and distribution worldwide of the information about threats to Ukrainian culture, as well as about the need for help and proposals for its provision mainly from Germany. The central body of the network was the German National Committee of the International Council of Museums (ICOM) [Landsberh T., Korolova N. 2022].

Among the organizations cooperating with the network for the protection of Ukrainian cultural values, created in Germany, there are many cultural institutions, including the German National Library, the Prussian Cultural Heritage Fund, the Federal Archives, and the German Commission for UNESCO. Various interest clubs and professional associations, such as the Association of German Art Historians, also offer their help. The planned activities are coordinated between the national committees that are part of ICOM, including the Ukrainian National Committee, at virtual meetings. Cultural institutions that are part of the network, created by the government of Germany, also help Ukraine with the examination of cultural values. The German

Archaeological Institute, for example, uses satellite imagery to assess damage to cultural sites and help document this data [Landsberh T., Korolova N. 2022].

The Warsaw City Council created the project “House of Reconstruction of Ukraine”, which will help preserve cultural monuments, as well as rebuild Ukrainian cities destroyed as a result of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation. The project will involve the exchange of information between Polish and Ukrainian cities, collection of materials for the protection of monuments, creation of a fund for the reconstruction of Ukraine together with the UNESCO World Heritage Cities Organization, and work on a plan for the reconstruction of Ukrainian heritage with specialists in various fields. As already mentioned above, the Warsaw office of restorers has already started cooperation with Ukraine. Currently, Polish specialists help Ukraine in the preparation of documents for the inclusion of the historical centres of Odesa, Chernihiv, and two places in Kharkiv, in particular, Freedom Square and the Derzhprom skyscraper, onto the UNESCO World Heritage List [Popovych A. 2022a].

As stated by the Minister of Culture and Information Policy Oleksandr Tkachenko, the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM) will provide financial support for assessing the scale of post-war reconstruction of Ukrainian cultural heritage. In addition to that, according to him, the following actions will be taken training on first aid to cultural heritage in emergency situations and during military conflicts; consultations on conservation and restoration of materials. The next step should be the preparation of a Memorandum between the Heritage Emergency Response Initiative, ICCROM, and the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy on the creation of a joint Ukraine-ICCROM group to save Ukrainian heritage [Popovych A. 2022b].

On June 29, 2022, at the Lviv National Opera, the ministers of culture of the Eastern and Central Europe countries signed a declaration on aid to the culture of Ukraine during the war. The ministers of culture stated that the countries they represent, Poland, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania, support Ukrainian culture and will jointly resist and fight against Russian propaganda.

According to the Minister of Culture of Poland, Piotr Glinski, four projects are currently being implemented in Poland to help Ukrainian institutions, which are currently located in his country. In particular, Poland finances the work of three symphony orchestras that are preparing for a world tour [Lozynska O. 2022].

Christie’s auction house will hold a series of auctions in support of humanitarian initiatives in Ukraine and projects dealing with the preservation of the country’s cultural heritage. So, it is planned to hold three charity auctions, within the framework of which the organizers hope to raise at least USD 1 million. All proceeds will be divided into equal shares between three organizations involved in humanitarian aid and preservation of the cultural heritage of Ukraine – the World Monuments Fund (WMF), Doctors without Borders (MSF), and the CORE fund, created by actor Sean

Penn. In particular, the works of modern Ukrainian artists will be exhibited at the charity auction [Pavlysh O. 2022].

Volunteers created the international project “Save Ukrainian Cultural Heritage Online” (SUCHO), which aims to archive online cultural values – the content of various sites dedicated to culture. More than 1,000 programmers, archiving specialists and ordinary volunteers joined the project, which within a month had archived more than 2,600 sites of Ukrainian museums, libraries, virtual tours, and photo documents from the open access resources. Information has been kept in the form of backup copies, the volume of which already exceeds 10 terabytes. Copies will be stored in the cloud storage of the Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard University and the University of Alberta, even in case the Ukrainian servers are physically destroyed or become the object of hacker attacks [Broyer R., Korolova N., Saakov V. 2022].

In his turn, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced that an analogue of the Marshall Plan for the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine would be developed. “There was also an agreement to show the people of Ukraine now that no matter what happens, when a free, sovereign, independent Ukraine is defended and restored, we will rebuild everything and we will have a Marshall Plan to restore Ukraine”, the British Prime Minister said [Prokaieva A. 2022].

In conclusion, it is worth reminding that within the framework of the recovery program of Ukraine, which was developed by the government of Ukraine, the involvement of partner states in the reconstruction of Ukraine continues. So far, statements about their readiness to participate in post-war reconstruction have been made by the Italian government, which promised to restore the Drama Theatre in Mariupol destroyed by the Russian invaders; Greece is ready to rebuild the maternity hospital in Mariupol; Denmark can “take over” the reconstruction of the city Mykolaiv. In addition, Germany agreed to help in the restoration of cultural monuments in Chernihiv, destroyed by the Russian invaders, Sweden – in Kyiv, and France – in Ukraine as a whole. Japan allocated USD13.64 million to international organizations for the restoration of the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts affected by hostilities, in particular for the infrastructure of the region; Poland proposes a plan to rebuild Ukraine for EUR 100 billion from the EU budget; Ukraine will receive EUR 300 million in soft loans from the French Development Agency [Shutkevych O. 2022]. However, the statements should be followed by actions or at least the development of road maps with clear public steps that could be implemented after the Victory.

Therefore, under conditions of war, cultural heritage cannot withstand any competition in comparison with the value of human life. The debate about the appropriateness of evacuation and measures to increase the chances of preserving monuments becomes more acute the closer to the epicentres of hostilities. These preventive measures are expensive, require time and resources and all this is at the same time necessary for other things with higher priority in the conditions of war. These factors

significantly reduce the chances of preserving the monuments, so the question of their future will be more relevant the closer we are to post-war reconstruction.

Western countries will help rebuild Ukraine after the war. For this, a new Marshall Plan is being developed, similar to the one that helped Europe to recover after World War II. Currently, the plan to help Ukraine is being actively discussed in key international institutions. European partners are also ready to support Ukraine on the cultural front. In particular, during the visit to Ukraine of the ministers of culture of Lithuania and Poland, the parties agreed on the creation of a national platform for the management of cultural heritage in Ukraine.

So, for the time being, it is not possible to even roughly calculate how many architectural monuments and cultural institutions Ukraine has lost during this period of the war. Shelling continues, human resources for calculations are not enough, and checking the reliability of already available information is difficult.

## **CONCLUSION**

The term cultural genocide has recently become widely used in scientific literature. This concept is used in the context of international criminal and public law, as well as in scientific research on history, ethnology, cultural studies, and philosophy. Cultural genocide means the systematic, purposeful destruction of unique cultural monuments and linguistic, religious, and ethnic peculiarities of a certain people. The method of this policy is the destruction of national identity, self-awareness, and unique characteristics of material and spiritual culture. Cultural genocide is inextricably linked with other forms of genocide, including physical and biological. Cultural genocide against a certain people leads to the inevitable and irreparable impoverishment of world culture, being a crime not only against a specific people or state, not only a violation of the international order but also a crime against humanity, a violation of fundamental universal principles and values.

As of July 1, 2022, due to Russian aggression against Ukraine, 407 objects of cultural heritage were damaged or partially destroyed. Particularly affected were religious buildings, some of which are monuments of history, architecture and urban planning of national and local importance, unique museums and libraries, monuments and memorials of Ukraine. Most crimes against cultural heritage were committed in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Luhansk, Sumy, Kherson, and Mykolaiv Oblasts. The level of support of European countries for saving the cultural heritage of Ukraine allows us to talk about the scale comparable to the allies' campaign to preserve European monuments during the Second World War. European partners actively offer interesting projects for the reconstruction of lost buildings. After all, the Russian method of conducting a war, from which the northern, eastern, and southern regions of Ukraine suffered the most, deprived the world of the unique architecture of Kharkiv and Chernihiv, due to which Ukrainian museums stand empty and are surrounded

by the barbed wire – this is a crime not only against our country but also against all humanity, which can rightly be called cultural genocide.

An urgent task is the renewal of broad state programs to create up-to-date registers and databases of cultural values of Ukraine being lost as a result of military actions. Ukrainian legislation needs to be improved, in particular, regarding the possibility of initiating relevant criminal cases on the fact of losses of cultural values of Ukraine under conditions where such losses occurred during wartimes due to the illegal removal or destruction of cultural monuments. The issue of creating special programs based on various practices and world experiences in the reconstruction of cultural heritage sites is important. The development of a mechanism for examination and restoration of damaged buildings of historical and architectural heritage or buildings of religious significance, including restoration through major repairs, reconstruction, and restoration, deserves attention.

Self-awareness and a sense of dignity that derive from cultural identity are essential components of today's realities for Ukrainian society. The cultural self-identification of the nation is one of the dominant value orientations of its life.

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# THE RUSSIAN WAR AGAINST UKRAINE AND REMAKE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE: DYNAMICS AND PROSPECTS

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## **Abstract**

In the first decade of the 21st century, Russia once again brought the Primacy of Power in the bosom of the Liberal Order established in 1991. As a result of the 5-day aggressive war against Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the principles based on the 1975 Helsinki Act on the inviolability of borders, non-use of force, and protection of sovereignty in Europe actually lost their relevance. What about the European security system that was established in 1991 has collapsed after the full-scale military invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February 2022. Post-Cold War European peace-keeping Organizations, (ie OSCE and Council of Europe) international law mechanisms (1975, Final Act of Helsinki, 1991 Charter of New Europe, etc.) and the European soft deterrence strategy actually were unable to prevent and deter aggressive revisionist politics of Kremlin regarding neighboring countries (usually called “Near Abroad” by Kremlin). As a result, the European region and its security architecture faced an acute crisis the analogue of which has not been seen since the end of the Cold War and which is periodically exacerbated by nuclear threats both the high risks of using tactical nuclear weapons and potential missile strikes on Ukraine’s nuclear power plants which are situated in the area of battles. No matter how the outcome of the war in Ukraine ends, it has fundamentally changed the European region already, especially the geopolitical picture of the Black Sea basin, the balance of power, and the strategic culture of the acting powers, which would be a determining factor of regional security developments for the next decades. The present article discusses the peculiarities of the formation of the European security system after the end of the Cold War. Specific attention is paid to the actual issue dealing with the dilemma of which security system was important for future Europe

‘OSCE First’ or “NATO First Strategy”? The weaknesses of the European security architecture and its underlying causes became the basis of the biggest military-political crisis in Europe. An important aim of the paper is to present the dynamics of military and political events in the region based on the analysis of current events, as well as by observing the interests of global and regional actors acting in the region and their policies, to determine in a theoretical aspect what kind of international order emerging in the Euro-Atlantic area, how transformative will be the Ukrainian war, what kind of changes brought it in the current European order and what kind of consequences are expected for future. In the final section, the article presents possible scenarios of European security transformations

**Key words:** *Key Words: European Security, Russian Aggressive Revisionism, War in Ukraine, Black Sea, New Lines of Confrontation in the Euro-Atlantic Region, the Transformation of European Security Architecture*

### **Methodology**

The systematic method (structural and functional aspects) was used in the preparation of the research, which allowed us to study the foreign policy of European states. Using the comparative-historical method, we analysed the change in the nature of relations between subjects. The method of situational analysis, which we used in the assessment of individual situations. Also, the common scientific method gave rise to the possibility of analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, concretisation, and abstraction.

### **RETROSPECT OF FAILED ATTEMPTS TO CREATE AN INCLUSIVE OSCE-BASED EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE**

The formation of the present European security system starts from the adoption of the 1975 Final Act of Helsinki, which for the first time since the beginning of the Cold War appeared mutual trust and a common vision between the Western and Eastern European countries and the USSR about European security and cooperation. By the Helsinki Act, basic principles, norms, and rules of future European security were determined which were recognized by both parties. However, rapidly changing strategic environment and new confrontation phases (i.e., Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, Euro-Missile Crisis, and escalation in the Middle East) new approaches for European security, its principles and norms remained only on paper until the end of the 1980s, and the situation in both global and European politics did not change fundamentally. The new foreign policy strategy of the Soviet leader Mikheil Gorbachev (New Thinking”) created the prospect of ending the Cold War without military conflict. The format of the Conference on Security and Cooperation (SCSE) in Europe was recognised as the most effective mechanism for the successful completion of the process. According to the 1987 Washington Agreement, both the US and the Soviet Union agreed to reduce the arsenal of medium and long range nuclear missile arsenal, in 1991 both the NATO and Warsaw Block European countries signed an agreement on reduction of conventional arms, successfully completed the reunification of Germany, changing Communist regimes, and gaining sovereignty in the eastern European Coun-

tries, which actually was a result of Gorbachev's so-called "Policy of Non-Interference" which the Kremlin adopted at the end phase of the Cold War.

During the end days of the Cold War, by European politicians and academicians from both sides of the Iron Curtain, the CSCE also seemed the natural framework in the continued search for a peaceful order in Europe. Gorbachev saw the CSCE as an instrument to materialize his vision of a 'Common European Home' in which both Cold War alliances would be dissolved, Russia would 'return to Europe' and the CSCE would become the focal point for European cooperation (Rey, 2004) (Crump, 2019, Vol. 43, No. 2). In his famous Ten Point Plan for German reunification, announced on November 1989, FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl emphasised in his eighth point that the CSCE process should remain the "part of the heart of the pan-European architecture" (Christian Nünlist, Juhana Aunesluoma, Benno Zogg, 2017, p. 13). West German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher perceived the CSCE as a way to transcend the Cold War divide (Crump, 2019, Vol. 43, No. 2). To honour the Western partnership with Moscow, Genscher was even ready to dissolve NATO and the Warsaw Pact, echoing Gorbachev. His various promises vis-à-vis Gorbachev and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, in early 1990 to transform the CSCE into the dominant security alliance in Europe were meant sincerely. (Christian Nünlist, Juhana Aunesluoma, Benno Zogg, 2017, p. 13). The French president, Francois Mitterrand, also imagined the possibility of a new security system in Europe, overcoming the Cold War divide and making Europe emancipation possible. On 31 December 1989, he offered Central and Eastern Europeans a 'Confederation for Europe' under French auspices as an alternative to eventually joining the EC. Mitterrand's project intended to include the Soviet Union but exclude the US. (Christian Nünlist, Juhana Aunesluoma, Benno Zogg, 2017, p. 14). According to the French position, Cold war intuitions such as NATO must be replaced with European Security structures. Later, in 1994 the German and Dutch foreign ministers, Klaus Kinkel and Pieter Kooijmans, even developed the "OSCE First" initiative in order to prioritise the OSCE in decision-making on European Security. (Crump, 2019, Vol. 43, No. 2). At the first time during the uncertainty caused by the turbulent revolutionary transition years of 1989-1990, the 'Eastern Block' countries welcomed CSCE/OSCE as the structural design of a new European architecture to fill the security vacuum in the Central and East European region to avoid regional tensions and border security since Soviet troops were living, German unification was fulfilling, and Self-Identification of nations was emerging.

According to western researchers (Mary Sarotte, Christian Nünlist, Juhana Aunesluoma, Benno Zogg), the US and the FRG used the rhetoric of strengthening the CSCE and pan-European security mostly to balance their 'NATO First' strategy, to soften Soviet (and initially also British and French) resistance against a reunified Germany. In public speeches and in meetings with their Soviet counterparts in 1990, US leaders promised that European security would become more integrative and more coop-

erative – and NATO less important (Christian Nünlist, Juhana Aunesluoma, Benno Zogg, 2017) (Sarotte, 2010). Thus, Gorbachev was assured in 1990 that the West would limit NATO's influence and instead strengthen the pan-European CSCE.

However, at the end of 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed and the Eurasian geopolitical landscape drastically changed. New sovereign states appeared on the political map of the world, with their own national interests, quest of security, and specific foreign policy aspirations. The new realities significantly changed the agenda for forming European security. Moreover, after the collapse of the USSR, Russia found itself in a deep economic and political crisis. Therefore, the initiative to institutionalise the European security system was on the side of the West, but the successful fulfilment of this task was a great challenge for the Euro-Atlantic community because the new security system of the post-bipolar Europe, which would include European countries, Russia, and its post-Soviet and post-Socialist countries, had to be established by forming the institutions and norms which would be acceptable to all parties, especially for Russia because Kremlin had historical incompatibility and mistrust with Cold War institutions such as NATO. Furthermore, the conditionality of Gorbachev's and then Yeltsin's compromise policy at the end of the cold war was not to expand NATO and EU to the Eastward. But it should be noted that the agreement on the enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic structures to the East was not part of any treaty or document signed at the end years of the Cold War by the parties: the US, Soviet Union, and EU. Actually, it was a tripartite 'Gentlemen Deal' and one of the so-called '9 guarantees' given by the US Secretary of State James Baker to the leadership of the Soviet Union ("not one inch eastwards") during the meeting on 9 February 1990 (NSC, 2017).

Consequently, in both, the West and Russia CSCE, which was a common European platform of cooperation established by all European countries (including Franco's Spain), were identified as an important basement to build a new, post-cold war European Security system. On 21 November 1990, at the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Paris, Western and Eastern European States and the Soviet Union signed the Charter of "New Europe" which shared the principles of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 in matters of security. In the following years, Russia actively participated in the process of creating instruments, mechanisms, and institutions to ensure the effectiveness of the newly shaped security architecture of Europe. In the context of the OSCE, European states with Russia have formulated various so-called confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs). In November 1990 they established a Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation as Regards Unusual Military Activities that is part of the procedures for their implementation and verification (quoted in Clingendael Institute, 2004, p. 12). The aim of the CSBM is to enhance security by reducing the risks of surprise attacks, improving transparency and openness as far as military affairs are concerned, and eliminating the possibility of misunderstandings or miscalculations. In 1992 the OSCE created, as its security component, a Fo-

rum for Security Cooperation (FSC). In March 1995 OSCE adopted Stability Pact for Europe and reaffirms the importance of understanding, trust, and friendly relations between European countries (Clingendael Institute, 2004, p. 12). Russia also was a part of the so-called Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation with Regard to Emergency Situations of OSCE (1989 Vienna Mechanism, 1991 Berlin Mechanism, 1991 Valletta Mechanism, Mechanisms for Risk Reduction and etc.) (OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, 2004, p. 6).

Much more than other international organisations, the OSCE can be seen as a kind of process by which member states are more or less permanently engaged in consultations (quoted in Clingendael Institute, 2004, p. 14). Such consultations and discussions are stipulated in OSCE documents for the purpose of implementation and verification of the various commitments that member states have accepted in the military and human dimension spheres and some other issue areas. These consultations and the information they generate are supposed to. This content downloaded from All use subject to have a preventive effect, as they enable states to put pressure on governments that do not respect their commitments and thus are likely to contribute towards the eruption of conflict.

One of the general procedures that the OSCE has at its disposal for the prevention of conflict is the, otherwise known as the Berlin Mechanism (Clingendael Institute, 2004, p. 14). The Berlin Mechanism, which was adopted in June 1991 at the Berlin meeting of the CSCE Council Ministers of Foreign Affairs, outlines measures that can be applied in the case of serious emergency situations that may arise from a violation of one of the Principles of the Helsinki Final Act or as the result of major disruptions endangering peace, security, or stability. For the peaceful settlement of disputes, the use of negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration was advocated, the so-called Valletta Procedures. It was the first formal CSCE procedure for the peaceful settlement of disputes (OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, 2004, p. 6). In the OSCE Summit held in Istanbul (Turkey) on 18-19 November 1999, Russia made a significant commitment to pull out its military bases from post-soviet countries (especially Georgia and Moldova), which remained there since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The withdrawal of Russian military bases was the last important achievement in the framework of creating a stable basement for security in Europe and for strengthening the sovereignty of newly independent European countries.

Despite the progress mentioned above, the OSCE failed to become the main source of the European security order due to the following complex circumstances and factors. At first, the United States was less enthusiastic about trying to create alternative security institutions in Europe to counterbalance NATO. Military and political elites in Washington believed that only norms, principles and institutions without huge military and economic resources would not be able to contain Russia or deal with other threats. A more powerful and strong alliance such as NATO was needed in a rapidly changing world to ensure the security of Europe. When the first conference

began on the outskirts of Helsinki in November 1972, the Americans showed little interest. American president Richard Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, were more interested in superpower détente with the Soviet Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev than in the kind of multilateral, Pan-European détente that seemed to be fostered by the CSCE. The US attitude towards CSCE/OSCE has not changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union when the new post-Bipolar world order was established. (Crump, 2019, Vol. 43, No. 2). ‘NATO-first strategy was one of the Bush administration’s important political agendas during the cold war end days. At the meeting with Helmut Kohl in Camp David (USA) on 24 February 1990 Bush underlined the priority of NATO over the CSCE. For Bush, ‘CSCE cannot replace NATO as the core of the West’s deterrence strategy in Europe and as the fundamental justification for US troops in Europe’, concluding that “if that happens, we will have a real problem.’ In July 1990, Bush’s advisors emphasised in internal discussions in Washington, D.C., that strengthening the CSCE at the expense of NATO was out of the question. However, the future shape and role of NATO and how it would coordinate with the EC/EU and organisations, such as the CSCE/OSCE, remained unclear until well into the first half of the 1990s, in the absence of credible military threats in Europe. (Christian Nünlist, Juhana Aunesluoma, Benno Zogg, 2017, p. 18). In his speech to the CSCE session in 1994, US president Bill Clinton called for a greater role for the security organisation, but also described NATO as ‘the bedrock of security in Europe.’ He said the alliance’s decision to expand, perhaps as early as 1996, will improve security for all of Europe, members and nonmembers alike (Norman Kempster, Dean E. Murphy, 1994). Besides the fact that NATO remained one of the strongest pillars of European security, western European countries especially Germany was able to achieve to maintain and develop a decades-long special economic, and trade relationship with Russia, exclusively in the Energy Supply field. After the end of the Cold War, EU countries became energy dependent on Russia for decades, and in the European energy supply system they created an order that sounds like ‘Keep the Americans out, Russians in, and the Europeans above’.

The second important factor was the creation of the European Union as a political unit in 1992 and the formation of a common foreign and security policy within it significantly reduced the OSCE institutionally, as the main focus on the issue of European security was finally shifted to the EU and NATO.

The third, the inability of the OSCE and European security in general in the Yugoslav wars and post-Soviet conflicts convinced the post-socialist and post-communist countries of Eastern Europe (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) that in the matter of protecting their security and deterring Russia in the future, the OSCE and other security or peace-keeping structures cannot be effective mechanisms. Leaning on historical experiences, there was a feeling among the post-Communist countries that in case of Russian aggression, only norms, values, and principles would not be able to deter Moscow and protect their independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity

because, as historical experience shows, Moscow does not respect any norms or principles established by the civilised world. Furthermore, all post-communist countries had (and still have) the expectation that after overcoming economic and political crises, the Russian federation would “come back again” as a revisionist power and pose a significant challenge to their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Furthermore, the Euro-Atlantic community was well aware of the Kremlin’s destructive policy on the territorial integrity of newly independent neighboring states. There was clear evidence that ethnoterritorial conflicts in the South Caucasus region (Abkhazia and Samachablo in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan-Armenia) and in Moldova were inspired and escalated by the Kremlin. In 1991 when Moscow provoked the separatist movement of Russian minorities in the Pridnestrovian region, supported and weaponised their militants against Chisinau, other states having Russian minorities. Since Vladimir Putin became President and started to advance a policy of the so-called “Russian World” that mainly means to promote Russian culture as soft power to enhance its influence over neighboring countries. Moreover, the Kremlin announced that it would defend the rights of ethnic Russians or citizens of Russia, regardless of whether they are permanently or temporarily residing. Since 2000, the military doctrine of Russia contains provisions that declare ‘discrimination and the suppression of the rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states’ (Federation, 2000). Using Russian minorities as a tool to violate the territorial integrity of neighbouring countries significantly threatened the Baltic states, as Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia have a large Russian ethnic minority, each in solid numbers Latvia 24%, Estonia 25%, and Lithuania 5% (Coolican, 2021). After the Moldova case, these Russian minorities became a source of concern, especially in Estonia and Latvia. The Baltic states feared that Russia could influence and weaponise them against the perspective governments or intervene militarily in those countries. That is why immediately after gaining independence, they focused their efforts on alliance membership, deepening their partnership with the United States, and integration into the European Union, and to achieve these goals, they periodically increased the pressure on their Western partners.

And finally, the Western triumphant society, the winner of the Cold War, was less eager to create an effective security system with Russia based on OSCE because, despite the constructive position shown in the final stage of the Cold War by the USSR, there was historical mistrust towards the Kremlin among the Western political elites. Furthermore, some high-rank delegates in Paris perceived the CSCE summit primarily as a reward for Gorbachev’s acceptance of the reunification of Germany, rather than an attempt to rebuild the European security architecture in such a way that it would include Russia (Crump, 2019, Vol. 43, No. 2). Later, suspicions of the West were justified when Russia provoked and supported separatist movements and ethno-territorial conflicts in the neighbouring countries. The West was convinced that identifying NATO and the European Union as the main instruments of the European

security system was the right decision. Moreover, strengthening and supporting its enlargement to the East was also the pragmatic choice of the Euro-Atlantic community. Shifting strategic aims of the Euro-Atlantic Community regarding the European Security architecture instantly became clear to the Kremlin. The Russian political elites were finally convinced that Western society was placing more emphasis on the North Atlantic Alliance, the growth of the European dimension in it, and the further development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU in the matter of developing the European security architecture.

Thus, in the late 1980s, the suddenly emerging prospect of ending the acute confrontation between the West and the East could not become the basis for creating an effective security system in Europe in the 1990s. This was stipulated due to several objective factors.

1. Western political elites believed that M. Gorbachev's progressive visions and strategies for European and world peace in general ("New Vision", Common European Family, etc.) were not so much well-minded and well-organised strategies, but they were forced by the economic and political crisis occurring at the beginning of 1980s. In fact, internal problems (corruption and economic stagnation), the Arms Race, unlimited aid from economically weak allies, and the war in Afghanistan had a negative impact on the development of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin was also well aware that sooner or later the USSR would run out of strategic resources. Especially those economic and military resources which had vital importance in maintaining influence on Eastern Europe. Moreover, there were no positive forecasts for the preservation of the unity of the USSR itself. That's why Moscow was considered by the Western alliance as a defeated party in the cold war ("We prevailed and they did not. We cannot let the Soviets snatch victory from the jaws of defeat" – Bush to Kohl at the meeting in Kamp David, 24 February 1990. (Svetlana Savranskaya & Tom Blanton, 2021)), while the Kremlin believed that it took unprecedented compromising steps to finally ease the 44-year extremely tense conflict and establish world peace, which was not appreciated at all; While there existed various interpretations of winners and losers of the Cold War, it means that there still existed basis of confrontation and fragmentation as well, which will involve actors of the Euro-Atlantic area under increasing risks of new confrontation (**Bazhunaishvili Lasha, Gorgiladze Irakli, 2020**).
2. Gorbachev's foreign policy strategy and policy visions did not reflect the position of the Russian political elite and military establishment generally. Therefore, there was a reasonable suspicion that in the event of his departure from power or in case of his overthrow, as well as after the stabilisation of the economic and political situation in Russia, the situation would radically change and Russia would be on the the return on traditional revisionist and expansionist policy line again. The risks of radicalisation of the Kremlin's policy were high even during Gorbachev's rule. Conservative Communists, military elites, the KGB and repre-

representatives of other intelligence services severely criticised the foreign policy decisions of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. In August 1991 hardliners of the Soviet Union's Communist party unsuccessfully tried to overthrow Gorbachev's regime by coup d'état (so-called GKCHP).

3. Western countries were sceptical about the possibility of democratisation of Russia, as well as the basis of Kremlin's foreign policy on liberal values in the future. Thus, in addition to the fact that in 1990 by the main western powers the Soviet Union was promised an inclusive and cooperative future European Security Order, western countries under the US leadership had decided to rely on and perpetuate "Cold War security institutions" rather than experiment with a new pan-European and inclusive security organisation CSCE/OSCE, including the Soviet Union (Sarotte, 2010). Accordingly, from the very beginning, European Security in the 1990s was centred on exclusive NATO/EU (Christian Nünlist, Juhana Aunesluoma, Benno Zogg, 2017), it was meant that Russia's place in European Security was determined "with" not "in". At the end of the 1990s, new confrontation phase between Russia and the West started growing. It was progressing toward escalation at a slow pace, but dynamically. The ground for a new confrontation between the West and Russia has been prepared again. The confrontation was slowly but dynamically progressing towards escalation.

### **RUSSIA'S SECURITY POLICY: FROM 'COLD PEACE' TO HARD POWER**

In the 1990s, both NATO and the European Union underwent significant transformation. The component of political cooperation in both structures has increased. At their summit in London in July 1990, NATO leaders promised to transform the alliance from a military pact into a political organisation. In 1992, the Maastricht Agreement on the creation of the European Union entered into force, which laid the foundation for deepening the political integration of European countries. The policy of creating a European defense and security system was activated, which was primarily lobbied by France and Germany. Traditional competition between European and Atlantic security systems has been renewed. In 1992 Germany and France presented an initiative to create a common European military unit called EuroCorps. The European Union issued the Petersberg Declaration, which defined those missions that could be entrusted to the Western European Union (WEU) and that EuroCorps would also undertake. In 1996 NATO ministers agreed that the WEU would take responsibility for the creation of a European Security and Defence Identity. (McCormick, 2016). In December 2003, the EU council adopted the European Security Strategy, which declared that the EU is a global actor and should therefore be ready to take responsibility for global security issues as well (EU, 2009). But Central and Eastern European countries had less confidence regarding the European Security institutions and politics which mainly were orchestrated by Germany and France. That is why in the field of security, the main orientation of the former Warsaw Block countries was made to deepen the partnership with the United States and to join the North Atlantic Alliance.

They actively implemented all necessary reforms, harmonised standards with NATO standards, and insistently demanded membership of the Alliance.

The making of fundamental emphasis on NATO/EU in the field of continental security by the Euro-Atlantic Community did not go unnoticed by the Kremlin. Moreover, Russians made several conclusions:

1. With the participation of Russia, the common European security system based on the OSCE actually did not take place.
2. The European Security Architecture was not inclusive as promised. During the construction of the new European security system, Western partners unilaterally acted, and Russia's role and functions were not clearly defined. Finally, Russia found itself not integrated with the West. Meanwhile, the West still expecting compromises regarding strategic issues, especially NATO enlargement to the East, which was an important part of the "NATO First Strategy"
3. In the context of global or regional threats (terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, especially in the west Balkans), the Euro-Atlantic community actually acted unilaterally without Russia, which put the Kremlin in an off-side position.

Besides the fact that Yeltsin's Russia was preoccupied with economic and domestic political problems, Moscow reacted strongly regarding the NATO enlargement strategy. In December 1994, during a speech at the European Security and Cooperation Conference in Budapest, Boris Yeltsin made a harsh statement against western partners, which is known as a 'Cold Peace' speech. "History demonstrates that it is a dangerous illusion to suppose that the destinies of continents and of the world community, in general, can somehow be managed from one single capital. (Sciolino, 1994). The domineering U.S. was 'trying to split [the] continent again' through NATO expansion... (Svetlana Savranskaya & Tom Blanton, 2021) "Russia also expects its security to be taken into account," Yeltsin said. "We are concerned about the changes that are taking place in NATO. What is this going to mean for Russia? NATO was created during the Cold War. Why sow seeds of mistrust? After all, we are no longer enemies; we are all partners now - stated B. Yeltsin (Norman Kempster, Dean E. Murphy, 1994). After "Yeltsin's blow-up" in Budapest President of the United States Bill Clinton carried out several diplomatic attempts to calm down Boris Yeltsin and ensure that NATO enlargement is not a threat, but rather a process of creating more secure and integrated Europe and the world in general. "NATO expansion is not Anti-Russian; It is not intended to be exclusive of Russia and there is no imminent timetable (Memorandum of Conversation between Clinton and Yeltsin, 1994). In the letter sent from the White House to the Kremlin on 16 December 1994 President Bill Clinton stated that "the most important strategic aim of the US is to help to construct a unified, stable and peaceful Europe in the next century in which Russia, the United States and countries of Europe can fully participate. This process, which will take years to complete, must include strengthened CSCE/OSCE." (Letter from Clinton to Yeltsin,

1994). Clinton also stated that Russia must be part of several Western economic and political institutions including the World Trade Organisation, the Paris Club, and the G – 7. “Our common aim should be to achieve a full integration between Russia and the West – including strengthened links with NATO – with no new divisions in Europe” – stated Clinton in his letter (Letter From Clinton to Yeltsin, 1994). Therefore, Clinton promised and guaranteed Russia’s integration into global and regional institutions instead of NATO’s enlargement to the East. Moreover, on 27 May 1997, at the NATO Summit in Paris, France, NATO, and Russia signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security. Based on this agreement, in 2002, the NATO-Russia council was created, one of the important consultative institutions in the Euro – Atlantic regional Security structure.

Meanwhile, in the 1990s the US, NATO, and the EU became transformative powers for ex – Communist countries, assisting and financially supporting their reforms, economic development (mainly transition to market economics), and democratisation. In this process, international economic and financial institutions were involved. Consequently, great progress has been achieved in the field of stabilisation, transformation, democratization, and development of post-communist countries. In 1990 former Warsaw Block Countries Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary became NATO member states and continue their integration policy with the EU.

The appearance of the Euro-Atlantic institutions in central and Eastern Europe as a transformative power in a strategically important area for Moscow (the so-called ‘Near Abroad’), the democratization of Post-Communist European countries and their transition from post-Soviet-type countries into western-aligned democratic states was perceived as a threat to the Kremlin for the several reasons:

1. the democratization and implementation of western-style reforms put an end to those social and political institutions that Russia used as tools of influence over the “former allies”;
2. Russia did not play any economic or political role in the transformation process of eastern European countries and once again became offside from the important process that took place in neighboring regions; and
3. the presence of an economically advanced and democratically developed countries in Russia’s neighborhood posed a threat to the autocracy emerging in Russia, because this circumstance created a feeling among the Russian citizens that if development and democratization could be achieved in countries with limited economic capacity or poor natural resources, or in politically unstable states, why could it not be achieved in Russia, which is rich in resources and political experience!

The angry tone of Yeltsin’s speech on European security was continued by his successor Vladimir Putin, a former KGB high-rank employee with conservative views on Russia’s role in global politics. After Putin became Prime Minister and then was elected as president of Russia, he became a strong leader and collected all the power

in his hands, establishing strong control over Russia's strategic economic resources. In addition to hardliners coming to power, several important factors contributed to the activation of Russia's critical and often contradictory policy toward European security. At first, the Enlargement process of the North Atlantic Alliance to the East (granting membership to Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) and at the same time carried out by NATO Humanitarian Intervention in the Western Balkans (especially, against Serbian authorities and military units that committed genocide and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo) in order to enforce peace in the region unilaterally from Russia, in fact, bypassing the UN and the OSCE, convinced Moscow that Russia was not considered an equal actor in the European security system by the West, and often "its interests were ignored" (Kramer, 2017, p. 43). As a result, Russia's attitude towards the OSCE and the European security system orchestrated by the West starts to shift from confidence to suspicions. Consequently, in the eyes of Moscow, the legitimacy of the OSCE, the degree of its recognition, and its prestige decreased significantly. Unilaterally taking responsibility for European security by the Euro-Atlantic structures in Kremlin was also identified as a threat. Second, since the end of the 1990s, the price of oil has started to increase. In 2000, a barrel of oil rose from 18 to 28 dollars and in subsequent years to 100 dollars. Subsequently, Russia's economic growth and political influence at global and regional levels increased significantly. The Russian hardliners under Putin's leadership returned their 'sense of pride'. And finally, after 9/11 NATO The strengthening of euro-atlantic institutions and becoming the main component of European security has turned into an irreversible process. Furthermore, for Western countries, the first place on the list of global threats was taken by terrorism and the second place was occupied by the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. What about Russia, it became a tertiary challenge for the West which was unacceptable for Moscow. As Russian researcher Yulia Shevtsova argues, the worst scenario for Russia, whether in global or regional politics, is not a confrontation with the United States, but Washington ignoring or neglecting Russia as a Global Power. Despite the asymmetry of the military and economic resources at their disposal, Russia's confrontation with the United States, the primacy of Russian threats in the agenda of the West, and the dialogue with Russia on various strategic issues (arms control, European Security, WMD, Terrorism etc.) represent a kind of guarantee for Russia to maintain its "superpower" status. This status has been the spine of the Russian system of personalised power, the means to legitimize political leadership, and the instrument to distract the attention from their domestic woes (Shevtsova, 2021). In 2005 Vladimir Putin publicly stated that "the collapse of the Soviet Union was the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the century and "For the Russian people, it has become a real drama" (Putin M. t., 2005). In the following years, Russia under Putin's presidency began to ignore and then criticise the values and principles of the liberal international order, also refused to honestly follow the

norms and rules of OSCE-based security, and returned to the power (actually, which he never betrayed).

The Russian hardliners who were inspired by the idea of ‘Russia is Back’ started realizing aggressive revisionist policy under Putin’s leadership to return back its positions which were during Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Subsequently, regarding European security issues, Russia has formed more contradictory positions than compatible ones. The change of the post-Soviet regimes as a result of colour revolutions in Georgia in 2003 and in Ukraine in 2004, their democratic transitions, reforms, and their west-orientated foreign policy course made the Kremlin even more aggressive towards the West. In the following years, Russia’s policy became even more offensive. Especially, Moscow had a negative attitude regarding the NATO enlargement to the Black Sea (in 2007 Bulgaria and Romania became members of the Alliance) possibility of deployment of American Anti-Missile systems in Central European countries, and active negotiations for granting MAP to Georgia and Ukraine. As President George W. Bush recalled in his memoirs, Russia and its leader “became more aggressive in the international arena and more locked in domestic political issues...” (Kramer, 2017, p. 64). In his famous 2007 angry speech at the Munich security conference President of Russia, Vladimir Putin blamed the West (generally the US and NATO) that after the cold war they proposed a unipolar world order “which did not take place either”. He also reminded the Western public that the “universal, indivisible character of security is expressed as the basic principle that “security for one is security for all” (MSC, 2007). Citing this word, Vladimir Putin underlined that Russia was beyond the European Security Architecture and it was a national threat to Russia. Munich’s speech can be perceived as a turning point in the relations between the West and Russia. In response to Putin’s accusations, Western leaders choose a passive position, even though they did not make a response statement.

Putin’s hard words against the US/NATO/EU soon transformed into aggressive actions to unilaterally acquire an effective tool to deter NATO integration in post-Soviet countries Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. In August 2008 Russia invaded Georgia using provocative actions of separatists against peaceful inhabitants and Georgian military units patrolling along the administrative border. In the next year, 2009, Russia continued its aggressive politics toward its neighbours. Moscow permanently violated the “Five Point Agreement” and instead of pulling military personnel from the occupied territories of Georgia it was increased to 8000 soldiers, Samachablo region was declared the independent state of South Ossetia by Moscow and started widening the borders of the separatist region threatening strategic communications (the highway runs from west to East and vice versa and even the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline) and territorial integrity of Georgia as well. “If we had faltered in 2008, the geopolitical arrangement would be different now and the number of countries in respect of which attempts were made to artificially drag them into the North Atlantic Alliance, would have probably been there [in NATO] now,” stated Dmitry Medvedev in

2011. Medvedev emphasised that August 8 was for us almost what 9/11 was for the United States (McBride, 2008). It is true that “A Little War Shook the World” (Ronald D. Asmus) (Asmus, 2010), but the Euro-Atlantic community failed to have a relevant reaction to Kremlin’s aggressive politics toward the European Security Architecture because Russia’s attack on a sovereign country was perceived as a manifestation of imperial reflexes and the Georgia government was a priori accused of escalating the conflict situation and excessive use of military force against the provocation of Ossetian separatists. In addition, Georgia, located in the peripheral part of Europe (which was considered more of an alternative energy corridor than the main artery, whose status Russia did not give up to anyone) from a strategic point of view, turned out to have less geopolitical weight for European countries than Russian energy (gas and oil), other raw materials, and Russian Investment markets.

Unlike the Western European countries Former Warsaw Block and post-Soviet Baltic States supported Georgia in different ways (diplomatic and economic support). Moreover, they argued to their Western European and American partners that Moscow’s aggression against Georgia was not an imperial reflex, but a deliberate and strategically calculated policy to undermine European security Central European countries. They insisted on strengthening security measures in Europe. The anti-Russian reactions of Eastern European countries did not go unpunished by Moscow. During the winter time, Moscow caused an artificial dispute with Ukraine over gas supply. In January 2009, the commercial dispute between Gazprom and the government of Ukraine turned into a crisis. Consequently, Moscow stopped the gas supply to Ukraine by locking those pipelines from which Eastern European countries were getting Russian Gas through Ukrainian transit. It was the first time that Moscow showed the power of energy sources in politics as a tool of pressure.

Barak Obama’s attempts to ‘restart’ tense relations with Moscow were unsuccessful. Even Obama’s administration’s decision to not deploy antimissile systems in the Czech Republic and Poland was not effective in deescalation. The next recidivism of Russian aggression was in Ukraine. In 2013, Ukraine’s pro-Russian government under the leadership of President Viktor Yanukovich made the sudden decision not to sign the Associated Agreement with the EU, which was a progressive and important event for Ukraine after gaining independence. Instead, Yanukovich declared the importance of establishing close economic and political ties with Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union led by Moscow. Russia was reluctant to improve EU-Ukraine relations, putting permanent pressure on Ukrainian politicians opposing Yanukovich’s decision and demanding a successful association process with the EU. Simultaneously, antigovernment protests sparked in Kyiv and time to time widened finally transformed into the Revolution of Dignity (the second revolution after 1991). Protesters demanded the resignation of the president and finalised the agreement with the EU. Yanukovich responded to them with violence but could not overrun the power and number by using hard power and was forced to flee to Russia (Bharti, 2022, p. 8-9).

After the revolutionary change of government and successfully ended process of association with EU, Russia pushes forward its hard power to punish Ukrainians for their decision. 23-26 February 2014 Russian masked troops without any state symbols on uniforms so-called “Little Green Men” invaded and occupied key strategic locations before being controlled by Ukrainian militants and law enforcement forces. At the same time, Russian minorities living in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions backed by the Kremlin declared independence and started a separatist war against Ukraine. The “soft containment strategy” of the EU was also ineffective. Besides the fact that, by the annexation of Crimea in 2014 as a result of which OSCE-based security norms and principles collapsed, some leaders of leading EU countries considered that Russia was too big a country for isolation and punishment. They believed that political dialogue and moderate economic sanctions were the best tools to deter Russia (Kramer, 2017, p. 23). Vladimir Putin, on the other hand, was convinced that Russia was an important strategic partner for the EU in energy trade, and investment and so integrated into the international economic system that the Euro-Atlantic community would tolerate “Russia’s legitimate aspirations for spheres of influence”. But the visions of each side were wrong and exaggerated. On the one hand, a soft containment strategy and ‘low voltage’ economic sanctions could not deter the Russian aggression, the result of which turned out to be a military invasion of Ukraine by Russian military forces on February 24, 2022, and the start of a full-scale aggressive war.

However, surprisingly, West reacted unanimously and without compromise. In response to the aggression, the Euro-Atlantic states and their partners and international institutions cut off bilateral and multilateral political and economic relations, imposed total sanctions and suspended or excluded Russia’s voting rights and even membership in international organisations. The tough and collective response from the West dispelled the illusion in the Kremlin that its other aggression would go unpunished. Subsequently, decades-long bilateral and multilateral relations between Russia and Western countries have collapsed in economic, political, military, strategic, and cultural fields. It can be said that relations and the index of trust between Russia and the West have fallen to the pre-1991 level. Officially in the Kremlin, the war is called a ‘Special Military Operation’, and its main goal is to prevent unknown threats from Ukraine (for example, neo-Nazism in Ukraine, Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic foreign policy orientation, which was declared an existential threat to Russia, etc.). But it is a fact that Russia’s strategic goal is to capture Ukrainian territories, especially the littoral regions of the Black and Azov Sea, the right bank of river Dnipro with its delta, and the city Kherson. If it acquires these territories, Russia would expand its borders to the west and will create a so-called buffer zone with respect to NATO. In addition, the above-mentioned areas are rich in industrial and rural resources and a present land bridge to the strategically important Crimea peninsula. At the meeting with the Defense Board of RF on 21 December 2022, RF Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu reported to President Vladimir Putin that “the Sea of Azov has again become

Russia's internal sea as it was during 300 years of our national history" (Putin P. o., 2022). If Russia succeeds and Ukraine loses strategically important Eastern regions and coastline, Ukraine would become an economically poor and geopolitically insignificant landlocked country.

### **NEW CONFRONTATION LINES AND REMAKE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE**

In total, the large-scale war in Ukraine put an end to the liberal international order based on collective institutions, norms, and principles established in 1991. Over the past 30 years, the European continent has faced one of the most acute crises, which has already led to significant changes and will continue to drive transformation. Observing current military and political events in the Black Sea region and generally in the Euro-Atlantic region, it is possible to figure out some important ongoing and expected transformations. Firstly, it should be mentioned that the era of partnership based on norms and institutions between Russia and Western countries in the field of European security is over. The primacy of power and new confrontation lines in the European region have returned. On 1 December 2022, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced at a press conference in Moscow dedicated to European Security issues that the old relations with the West will no longer be restored. He accused the West of creating new lines of confrontation and trying to hide the OSCE. 'If or when, at some point in time, our western neighbors and our former partners suddenly become interested in resuming joint work on European security, it will not happen. That would mean going back to what we had before, but there would be no business as usual.' (MFA of the Russian Federation, 2022). On 11 December 2022 Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia and the West 'have already arrived at a station named 'Confrontation', and we (Russians) have to be reserved, strong, to have underlying strength because we will have to live in the environment of this confrontation' (TASS, 2022). The second significant change is the emergency enlargement of NATO. The neutral states of the northern European region - Sweden and Finland, joined the alliance. As a result, NATO came close to Russia's northern borders of Russia and the balance of power in the Baltic Sea shifted in favour of NATO. Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin during her speech in Sydney (Australia) said that until Russia invaded Ukraine, Finland's priorities had to work bilateral relations with Russia and be close NATO partners, but not be a member. That was the best way to protect our nation." But after Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February, the priority of most Finns changed 'overnight' to security (Sullivan, 2022). Third, it should be emphasized that since the end of the Cold War, Europe and the world have never been so close to the threat of using nuclear weapons. Naturally, this circumstance will significantly change the security policy of Europe after the war and will continue to seek more nuclear security guarantees from Russia. Fourth, for the first time during its existence, along with normative power, the European Union acquire Smart Power

tools that are significantly transformative. Immediately after Russia began its war of aggression against Ukraine, the European Union announced that it would provide weapons to Ukraine through a new financing instrument, the European Peace Facility (EPF), marking the first time in EU history that the bloc provided lethal weaponry. Over the past six months, the EU has provided €2.5 billion to Ukraine through the EPF for arms and equipment (Calin Trenkov-Wermuth, Jacob Zack, 2022). In November 2022 the European Union launched a Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) to continue supporting Ukraine against the ongoing Russian war of aggression. The Council is launching today the European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) to continue supporting Ukraine against the ongoing Russian war of aggression. The purpose of the mission, formally established on 17 October, is to enhance the military capability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to allow them to defend Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty within its internationally recognised borders (Council, 2022). Fifth, the war accelerated the granting of the EU membership candidate status to the two countries of the so-called "Eastern Trio" - Ukraine and Moldova. What about the third member of Trio due to the oligarchic regime, Georgia, which was once advanced in reforms, was given a deadline and the so-called homework of de-oligarchizing and carrying out relevant reforms, as a result of which the issue will again be on the agenda. Sixth, the strategic importance of the Black Sea in the global economy was highlighted, especially in terms of providing Africa and South East Asia with cereals and providing an alternative energy corridor for Europe;

Moreover, there is no doubt that European security will be in a dynamic transformation mode in the coming decade. In parallel with NATO, the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) will be strengthened and enhanced. In June 2022, Denmark has already decided to become part of the CSDP through a referendum. Copenhagen official had previously refrained from cooperating with European partners in this direction. European countries in Russia's neighbourhood are already actively lobbying to increase defence spending and strengthen Europe's defense potential. During the visit to Kyiv 28 November 2022 Foreign Minister of Estonia called on its European partners to double their defence expenditure. "We would like to see European countries double their defense expenditure in the time of the Ukrainian war and after the war, and we are going to spend 3% of our GDP on national defense (Balmforth, 2022). Essentially, Moscow will also take retaliatory measures, creating new locked circles of mistrust and confrontation in the region. The area of clashes will remain the Black Sea region. Also, if the economic relations which are reduced by all-encompassing sanctions remain at the same poor level, it will be a factor of deepened confrontation between parties because both sides would have less reason to avoid escalation.

One of the important challenges to European security after the war would be gaining full energy independence from Russia. To complete this task, it is important to devel-

op alternative energy supply corridors. Presumably, in the energy balance of the European Union Russian oil and gas will be largely replaced by Azerbaijani and Central Asian (Kazakh-Turkmen) oil and gas, which would automatically increase the geopolitical importance of the South Caucasus-Black Sea Corridor, and its transit capacity, which was being built as an alternative corridor despite Russia's opposition for decades. The potential of the South Caucasus region to become a primary energy transit corridor for the EU may become the basis for the transformation of the European Union via enlargement to the east. With Georgia's accession to the EU, the European Union will acquire its own Trans-Caspian European Corridor for the transportation of Caspian oil and natural gas, as well as cargo from Central Asia, Iran (when its nuclear problem will be resolved in similar or more sophisticated forms than in 2015 and Iranian oil and gas will return to the world market) and China. Thus, in the new geopolitical reality, Georgia has a real chance to get EU and NATO membership.

Russia's aggression war against Ukraine increased the role of the United States in the security of European countries. This trend will continue in the following years because the US remains the only superpower with the military and economic capacity to deter Russia and ensure the security Euro-Atlantic community. Some European leaders admit that Europe is not strong enough without the United States. Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin during an address to the Lowy Institute, in Sydney, Friday 2 December 2022 stated that "we (Europeans) would be in trouble without the United States" (Sullivan, 2022) Facts and figures show (see the statistic data below, figure 1,2,3) that during wartime the United States provided much more effective and expensive military aid to Ukraine than the rest of the NATO countries. Moreover, the US has two advantages. First, it has the capacity to provide significant and decisive military assistance alone. Such a huge amount of military aid gives significant advantages to those involved in armed conflict. Second, the decision on military assistance is made only by the government of one state (by President and Congress), in contrast to collective organisations such as NATO or the European Union, where the provision of similar assistance depends on a collective decision, which can be interrupted due to a different opinion of one state.

Presumably, the participation of the United States in the Black Sea region will be even more active, especially in the matter of strengthening the security of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova and joining the Euro-Atlantic structures. On 7 December 2022, the Senate and House of Representatives of the US enacted a Bill (initiated by Senator Shaheen and Romney) named the "Black Sea Security Act of 2022" (S. 4509) where the US declared its strategic interests and policy aims regarding the Black Sea region. The bill clearly declares that:

- It is in the interest of the United States to support efforts to prevent the spread of further armed conflict in Europe by recognising the Black Sea region as an arena of Russian aggression;

- Littoral states of the Black Sea are critical in countering aggression by the Government of the Russian Federation and contributing to the collective security of NATO;
- The repeated, illegal, unprovoked, and violent attempts of the Russian Federation to expand its territory and control access to the Mediterranean Sea through the Black Sea constitutes a threat to the national security of the United States and NATO;
- The United States should continue to work within NATO and with NATO Allies to develop a long-term strategy to enhance security, establish a permanent, sustainable presence along NATO's eastern flank, and bolster the democratic resilience of its allies and partners in the region;
- The United States should work within NATO and with NATO Allies to develop a regular, rotational maritime presence in the Black Sea;
- The United States should also work with the European Union in coordinating a strategy to support democratic initiatives and economic prosperity in the region, which includes two European Union members and four European Union aspirant nations (Congress, 2022);

Regarding the declared interest, the Senate and the Representative House proposed several subsequent measures:

1. Actively deter the threat of Russia's further escalation in the Black Sea region and defend the freedom of navigation in the Black Sea to prevent the spread of further armed conflict in Europe;
2. advocate within NATO, among NATO allies, and within the European Union to develop a long-term coordinated strategy to enhance security, establish a permanent, sustainable presence in the eastern flank, and bolster the democratic resilience of United States allies and partners in the region;
3. advocate within NATO and among NATO Allies to develop a regular, rotational maritime presence in the Black Sea;
4. support and bolster the economic ties between the United States and Black Sea partners and mobilise the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and other relevant Federal departments and agencies by enhancing the United States presence and investment in Black Sea states;
5. provide economic alternatives to the PRC's coercive economic options that destabilise and further erode the states of the economic integration of the Black Sea states;
6. ensure that the United States continues to support Black Sea states' efforts to strengthen their democratic institutions to prevent corruption and accelerate their advancement into the Euro-Atlantic community; and
7. Encourage the initiative undertaken by central and eastern European states to advance the Three Seas Initiative to strengthen transport, energy, and digital in-

frastructure connectivity in the region between the Adriatic Sea, Baltic Sea, and Black Sea (Congress, 2022).

It should be noted that Washington played a similar role for Central European countries in the 1990s and early 2000s. “Our nations are deeply indebted to the United States. Many of us know first-hand how important your support for our freedom and independence was during the dark Cold War years. U.S. engagement and support were essential for the success of our democratic transitions after the Iron Curtain fell twenty years ago. Without Washington’s vision and leadership, it is doubtful that we would be in NATO and even the EU today“ (Valdas Adamkus, Martin Butora, Emil Constantinescu, Pavol Demes, Lubos Dobrovsky, Matyas Eorsi, Istvan Gyarmati, Vaclav Havel, Rastislav Kacer, Sandra Kalniete, Karel Schwarzenberg, Michal Kovac, Ivan Krastev, Alexander Kwasniewski, Mart Laar, Kadri Liik, 2009). This text was part of an open letter sent by Central and Eastern European (CEE) intellectuals and former policymakers to the Obama Administration in 2009. All in all, it is clear fact that after Barak Obama and Donald Trump created the illusion that the American Era is Over. But Joe Biden successfully realised that his ‘America is Back” by enhancing the US role in the security of the Euro-Atlantic region;


Simultaneously to the military and political rivalries, the lines of ideological confrontation will be clear and sharp. This is already clearly demonstrated by the messages of the representatives of the highest political elite of Russia. At the Defense Board of RF meeting on 21 December 2022 President Vladimir Putin stated that ‘Russians have always wanted to be part of the so-called civilised world. ‘After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which we (Russians) ourselves allowed to take place, we thought for some reason that we would become part of that so-called civilised world any day. But it turned out that nobody wanted this to happen, despite our efforts and attempts, and this also concerns my efforts, because I made these attempts too. We tried to become closer, to become part of that world. But to no avail... According to this speech delivered by Putin, there were two or several “worlds”. One is civilized where Russia was not allowed, and there is another that probably will emerge under Russia’s leadership and would be an alternative to the civilised world. In addition, Vladimir Putin blamed Western countries for attempting of maintaining the “brainwashing of the citizens of Ukraine and stimulating the neo-Nazi and extremely nationalistic ideology among Ukrainians. It became clear back then that a clash with these forces, including in Ukraine, was inevitable, the only question was when would it happens” (Putin P. o., 2022).

## **CONCLUSION**

Thus, after the end of the Cold War, the formation of an inclusive security system could not take place between the West and Russia. Although both M. Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin tried to integrate into civil society to form a European security system based on institutions, norms, and principles that a large part of the Russian


military-political establishment was still inspired by the primacy of force, the preservation of buffer zones and spheres of influence, which even during the collapse of the USSR, the Kremlin showed toward the newly emerging independent states in the neighbourhood, when through military-political intervention, sovereignty, and territorial integrity created existential threats. Observing the situation, a large part of the Euro-Atlantic community, as well as the former Soviet and socialist states, were convinced that the desire to return to the united European family and the attempt to integrate into the civilised world would lead to more or less internal political destabilisation, preservation of territorial integrity, and it was due to the integration into the global economic system and the overcoming of the acute economic crisis and the gain of time. Economically advanced Russia would return to the primacy of power (and did return) and would like to revise the post-bipolar order created in the region. Taking into account the mentioned reality, the Euro-Atlantic community based the European security system mainly on the institutions of the Cold War period (NATO, European Union), because the Security and Cooperation Organisation created in Europe at the end of the Cold War did not have the appropriate resources to deal effectively with the challenges. Basing the European security system on the Euro-Atlantic structures, their expansion to the east and the inclusion of the countries of Russia's neighbourhood in it led to a conflict with Russia inspired by the return of its lost influence on the international arena, which led to the collapse of the European quasi-security system based on the OSCE, the return of confrontational lines in the region, and the necessity of Euro-Atlantic order transformation.

**Figure 1. Government support to Ukraine - by type of assistance, € billion. Bilateral commitments January 24 to August 3, 2022.**




Source: Antezza, A., Bushnell, K., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., Kharitonov, I., Rebinskaya, E., E & Trebesch, C. (2022). "The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how?". Kiel Working Paper, No. 2218.

**Figure 2. Military aid (including financial) in €billion (top 20 of 40 donors) Bilateral commitments January 24 to August 3, 2022.**



Source: Antezza, A., Bushnell, K., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., Kharitonov, I., Rebinskaya, E., E & Trebesch, C.(2022) .“The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how?”. Kiel Working Paper, No. 2218.

**Figure 3. Military aid (including financial) in €billion (top 20 of 40 donors) Bilateral commitments January 24 to August 3, 2022.**



Source: Antezza, A., Bushnell, K., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., Kharitonov, I., Rebinskaya, E., E & Trebesch, C.(2022) .“The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how?”. Kiel Working Paper, No. 2218.

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## **ROUND TABLE**

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# **CSOS' HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE TO COUNTER RUSSIA'S UNPROVOKED AND UNJUSTIFIED INVASION**

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Civil society organisations (CSOs) are well-known for playing a key role in promoting fundamental rights, and thus, contributing to the functioning of democracies. At present time of challenges and threats, Ukraine can be regarded as a sort of political 'laboratory' in which Russia has been testing a wide range of measures to exert its immediate impact, and simultaneously as an excellent proof of Ukraine's resilience and fierce counter offensives. Furthermore, vulnerabilities of Ukrainian society point out high levels of insecurity stemmed from the Russia-fueled war; and consequently, resulted in highlighting key factors for supporting Ukraine's cohesion, strengthening its democratic identity and critical measures have been taken by the state and civil society to mitigate vulnerabilities.

Importantly, the capacity of population consolidation and civil society's self-organizing potential serve as a powerful tool for counteracting the humanitarian catastrophes in the context of RF's full-scale military invasion. Meta's ongoing efforts are taking extensive steps to help the community to access crucial resources, to exchange information, cooperate and take action to support people in need.

At present, civil society includes a wide and vibrant range of organised and unorganised groups, as new civil-society actors blur the boundaries between sectors and experiment with new organisational forms. The humanitarian construct of civil society organisations can be determined as one of the most vital aspects of the public management, whereas the humanitarian policy is explored in terms of identifying the

objectives, mechanisms, various programs and other measures aimed at protecting and ensuring basic human rights and needs, both at the level of individuals or small groups and at the level of large groups of people. Civil society organisations (CSOs) provide aid and supplies to refugees, displaced people and their host communities in conflict zones around the world, refugees, civilians in war-suffered areas, etc. The humanitarian component of civil society organisations is fully demonstrated when human life, health and other fundamental rights and opportunities are put at risk. Civil society organisations identified such following challenges as: armed conflicts, natural and man-made disasters, famine, acts of terrorism, discriminatory policies, and others. These challenges make it difficult for CSOs to promote and support human rights and their implementation. Beyond the impact that this has on the organisations themselves and on human rights, it can also have wide-ranging negative consequences for the democratic functioning of our societies. In this context, the humanitarian component includes various types of assistance, support and protection, they help “give a voice” to people on issues that matter to them, assist rights holders, monitor governments and parliaments’ activities, give advice to policymakers, and hold authorities accountable for their actions.

Civil society organisations’ assistance takes different forms that distinguish it from other activities of the non-governmental sector. First, the circle of ultimate beneficiaries of the humanitarian direction is formed by specific people. That is, the humanitarian component, both in its goals and in its practical forms, is most clearly focused on preserving human lives, health, and ensuring fundamental rights and opportunities. From this perspective, the effectiveness of the humanitarian component can be assessed. Secondly, the humanitarian component of civil society organisations is characterised by a combination of altruistic and rational principles. For example, an operation to provide free assistance in areas of hostilities, armed conflict and humanitarian catastrophes may also reduce the influx of IDPs or refugees from these areas. Civil society organisations’ humanitarian support offers a wide range of support, in particular: (1) assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons; (2) assistance to civilians in areas of hostilities, armed conflict and humanitarian catastrophes; (3) food aid; (4) assistance in creating a safe and enabling environment in which civil society can operate free from hindrance and insecurity.

Since Russia’s invasion began, unprovoked aggression, full-scale invasion made people flee for safety and suffered from shelling and air raids, the efforts of the entire civilised world are aimed at supporting and providing Ukraine with various assistance in countering the aggressor. According to the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, as of the beginning of March, our state received humanitarian aid to meet the living needs of people who were forced to change their place of residence or suffered from hostilities in more than 20 countries. Part of the humanitarian aid is also aimed at providing those who join the ranks of territorial defence. Ukraine has received humanitarian aid from organisations in Ireland, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Slo-

venia, Croatia, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Turkey, China and others.

The Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine reported that during March 2-3, 2022, Ukraine received more than 1,000 tons of humanitarian aid. Revenues include food (375 tons), clothing (147 tons), personal hygiene products (90 tons), medicines (35 tons) and other goods (324 tons).

According to the chairman of the National Bank of Ukraine K. Shevchenko, since the beginning of large-scale hostilities, Ukraine has received international support totaling about \$ 15 billion (as of March 10, 2022). It is worth noting that a significant part of this amount is humanitarian aid from governments and organisations of individual countries. In particular, the United States has allocated \$ 50 billion in humanitarian aid to Ukrainians suffering from the Russian war. The French government first announced the allocation of \$ 300 million, and then added another \$ 100 million to the amount of aid, thus increasing it to \$ 400 million. In addition, the Foreign Ministry stressed that the money is intended for Ukrainians who have suffered from hostilities. Switzerland has also decided to increase humanitarian aid to Ukraine and other countries in the region to 78.4 million euros. A quarter of this amount will be used to help Ukrainian refugees in neighbouring countries. Three quarters - to help those who remained in Ukraine. The United Kingdom has allocated about 355 million pounds in humanitarian aid to Ukraine. Germany, whose government has allocated 15 million euros, has also joined Ukraine's humanitarian aid. The National Bank of Poland has allocated \$ 950 million to Ukraine (subject to currency swap, increase in foreign exchange reserves).

Thus, continuously strengthening human rights protection, civil society organisations' humanitarian assistance is building blocks of safeguard against humanitarian catastrophes and a mechanism for managing the risks caused by military aggression. CSOs have raised concerns regarding safety and an adequate response to humanitarian conflicts and proceed with promising practices that can counteract these worrying patterns.

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## **ONLY TRUTH!**

Arkadiusz Modrzejewski

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The courage and dedication of the Ukrainian Nation can be seen from the first days of the war. Ukrainians are fighting, above all, for their right to exist as a sovereign political community and an independent state entity. They are fighting for their freedom and the right to decide about their fate. Let us not forget that they are also fighting on behalf of millions of Europeans and the entire Free World. Through their heroism, they have become a symbol of resistance against authoritarian power and the lies and crimes that have become an immanent feature of this power. During the round table meeting of scientists organized by Professor Anatoliy Kruglashov and the Chernivtsi Yuriy Fedkovych National University we have been asked to answer the question of what the academic community and people of the academy can do to support Ukrainians in their just fight against their country's invasion by a brutal and ruthless enemy, who will not back down from any crime to achieve its goal of the extension of Russkij Mir, which is a kind of civilizational mission by the authorities in the Kremlin.

We are dealing with an opponent that is not only ruthless, but also cynical to the core, intelligently exploiting the weaknesses of the West, the naivety of part of the Western political class and intellectuals, influencing Western societies through numerous lies, half-truths, fake news, and manipulation. Yes, we do live in a chaotic world, that liquid modernity as defined by Zygmunt Bauman. The infosphere is full of false information. Information chaos exists on an unprecedented scale. The voices of reason, based on scientific findings, mix with advice, private opinions and conspiracy

theories formulated by paranoid false prophets. The Internet and social media have become tools of propaganda warfare. The Russian Federation, like no other country in the world, and no other authoritarian regime, has perfectly mastered the art of war in the infosphere. Its propaganda spread by the so-called troll farms, which are in fact professional disinformation spreaders, has shaken the Western world in recent years. The victories and excellent electoral results of right-wing populists in many Western countries, including the USA; Brexit and the development of anti-vaccination movements provide perhaps the clearest examples of Russian influence on the mindset of Western societies.

Our duty as people of the academy, as researchers and scholars, academic teachers and intellectual leaders, is to tell the TRUTH. We must stand on the side of TRUTH and boldly preach it. In the face of Russian aggression against Ukraine, as well as the barbaric acts committed by Russian soldiers and mercenaries, we must call acts of bestiality by their proper names. Define crime as crime, rape as rape and clearly indicate who is the aggressor and who is the victim in this conflict. We cannot resort to euphemisms, moral nuances, and attempts to justify the aggressor. No reasons can justify the harm and suffering of the Ukrainian people since the first days of the war. We need TRUTH and it is our responsibility as people of science to proclaim it. Universal TRUTH, one that emerges from the very etymology of the word university - univeritas. In a few months, war will become more commonplace in Western societies, millions of refugees will become part of the local landscapes, perhaps they will begin to bother their hosts and even irritate them. But then we, scientists, and scholars, like no one else, will have the duty to remind everyone about the TRUTH. The truth about war, crime, the drama of the civilian population, the trauma of millions of refugees who live among us in our peaceful, relatively prosperous world. Because our vocation was, is and will be the TRUTH. And although learning the truth can be a great challenge and is achieved at the cost of many sacrifices and intellectual effort, the truth about the war we are witnessing, and millions of Ukrainians who experience it every day, is very simple. And only innate opportunism, stupidity or cynicism can obscure this truth. The TRUTH is a Ukrainian woman repeatedly raped by criminals in Russian uniforms. The TRUTH is an innocent child who, together with their parents, dies in a car from Russian bullets. The TRUTH is a tortured Ukrainian soldier defending his homeland against the invader. The TRUTH is Ukraine, drowning in blood. My words are perhaps too emotional. It is not a scientific treatise, for that is not my intention. I would like us, as an academic community, not to forget to proclaim the TRUTH. Let us not be afraid of the TRUTH. It is the meaning of our academic work. I would like to dedicate this short text to my old colleague and friend from high school, Ruslan Petrylak, who comes from Western Ukraine. I shall never forget his modesty and courage. And stubbornness - literally - to the point of suffering! If Ukraine has millions of such Ruslans, and I believe that it is so, Ukraine will never perish.

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# **HOW UKRAINIAN SOCIETY IS MOBILIZING AND UNITING IN THE LIGHT OF THE RUSSIA'S UNPROVOKED INVASION OF UKRAINE**

Natalia Rotar

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Undisguised, overtly destructive Russian invasion in Ukraine, grabs the whole world's attention. By all accounts for my native country, with topped death tolls, this war has become the bifurcation point of ultimate and irrevocable momentum of Ukrainian society's consolidation and unification and the end up with the concluding proof of the brand-new Ukrainian political nation's shaping. One of the most formidable and critical attributes of such processes are the Ukrainian citizens' unforeseen spirit of resilience, patriotism and fierce civil disobedience as effective tools of countering the Russian aggressor's policy in the temporarily occupied territories of the Azov Sea region: in Kherson region (cities of Kherson, Beryslav, Oleshky, Hola Prystan, founded by Zaporozhian Cossacks, the villages of Berezhanka and Nyzhni Sirohozy and others) and Zaporizhzhia one (the city of Melitopol).

Amid the manifestation of the Ukrainians' bravery and valour, we can daily witness mass protest rallies with the blue and yellow national flag of Ukraine and passionately performing the Anthem of Ukraine in the cities, where Russian troops have already entered. However, every single time the actions of civil disobedience are shifting to encompass as many different localities as possible to boost and bolster the morale of Ukrainians, who are forced to be under temporary Russia's occupation.

Chanting ‘Kherson is Ukraine!’ (a slogan indicating the name of a particular settlement, characteristic features of civil disobedience regardless of localization), ‘Shame on you!’, ‘Fascists (Ruscists)!’ ‘The Russian soldier is a fascist and an intruder!’, ‘Go home while alive!’, ‘The One, the only, the United Ukraine’, ‘Glory to Ukraine!’ ‘Glory to the Heroes!’, ‘Ukraine is above all!’ The Ukrainians strongly object to being “liberated”, because Ukrainians are absolutely free (from any (lingual, ideological, political or confessional discrimination) in a free democratic country. Importantly, consequential leaders of civil disobedience are recommended to avoid any verbal aggression, bullying or harassment in their messages, posts, slogans and posters. Politically correct and respectful manner of conveying the message is of paramount importance, so that the coverage of the active protests’ uprisings and riots against Russia’s invasion or “liberation” should not be blocked on the Internet or any media outlets.

It should be articulated that the local self-government’s stance has become an especially efficient toolkit of the Ukrainian society’s consolidation in the light of the Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, in particular, when Russian occupants were trying to organize a sham ‘referendum’ for a fake ‘people’s republic’ in Kherson. Noteworthy, in compliance with the legislation of Ukraine, under martial law, city councils strip off their powers. Russian invaders tried to take them over to legitimize their occupation, though. Facing such institutional functioning challenges, the deputies of the Kherson Regional Council, meeting via Zoom, in compliance with the required regulations, to confirm their decision-making and stressed that the city of Kherson, was, is and will be an integral part of a single state – Ukraine. So far, 44 deputies, the representatives of all political parties represented in the Kherson Regional Council of the VIII convocation have approved the relevant appeal to the President of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people, and claimed that they would never recognize the Russian’s ‘sham referendum’ to create a “people’s republic” in the Kherson region and consider it as improper and illegal. Significantly, the case of councils of Kherson region of all levels was launched to be spread.

Another vivid toolkit of protest against the Russian intruders was employed by the Henichensk City Council; the deputy resigned, demonstrating their sheer unwillingness to collaborate with the enemy. It should be stressed that in the course of the local self-government’s decision-making, the issue of making a special decision in the form of a Decree of the President of Ukraine or the decision of the Central Election Commission of Ukraine on the suspension of the activities of the local self-government in the temporary occupied territories in order to prevent the legitimization of the aggressor’s occupation was raised.

It was the daily demonstration of the Ukrainian society’s civil consolidation and unification of all political powers in the occupied areas as the consequence of the second large-scale wave of the Russia’s unprovoked war in Ukraine that led to a number of responds engaging peaceful acts of civil disobedience: (1) according to the General Staff

of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, taking into account the fierce resistance of the residents of the Kherson region, the occupiers are trying to introduce an administrative and police regime, for which units of the National Guard of Russia were introduced to the territory of the Azov Sea, and they illegally detained more than 400 civilians of Ukraine; (2) According to the 'Financial Times', citing the European intelligence agencies, the Russia's authorities instructed the FSB to prepare punitive operations and repressions to break the Ukrainian civilians' morale and resistance; (3) On March 11, Russian invaders kidnapped the mayor of Melitopol, I. Fedorov, and later the activist O. Gaisumova, who organized actions of disobedience; (4) In Nova Kakhovka, Tavria and Kakhovka, appeals of the so-called 'military commandant' are conveyed, in terms of establishing curfews, banning carrying weapons, holding meetings, rallies, pickets. But such occupants' orders would never undermine the strength of the Ukrainians' resistance.

It is critically essential to characterize the acts of civil disobedience in Ukraine as followed: (1) the rise of articulation and aggregation of politically significant public interests to preserve the statehood, territory integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and respectively, the associated right to an independent foreign policy; (2) nonviolent resistance to Russia's invaders, which is of a horizontal rather than, based on the employment of symbolic political actions methods aimed at achieving political results namely the liberation of Ukraine's territory from the aggressor; (3) subjects of civil disobedience are ready to take the responsibility for their acts and be punished for violating by requirements, which are regarded by the Russian occupiers as illicit, immoral and unjust; (4) the special nature of communication, i.e. the ability to construct communicative actions so that their goals and methods are equally read by subjects of civil disobedience, observers (primarily the international community) and the object of civil disobedience (the Russian aggressor). It should be emphasized, that the focal point of the Ukrainian resistance is its nonviolent nature, the fierce resistance of the Ukrainians on the temporarily captured territories of Ukraine is not a manifestation of their ideals, but rather a specific political practice that involves the interaction of all parties – both those who support and those who object, and those who doubt the goals and means of resistance or civil disobedience, highlights the unity of the Ukrainian nation and their readiness to self-sacrificing fight against the Russia's invaders at all costs.

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The scale and unexpected dynamic of Russia's aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, was a surprise for the entire international community. However, there had already been signals that could indicate that Russia would not stop at the 2014 occupation of Crimea or involvement in the armed conflict in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions in eastern Ukraine by supporting the self-proclaimed liberation forces. In fact, since 2014, we have lived with the feeling of apparent, illusory peace and security in Eastern Europe. It would seem that World War II in the 20th century was an experience that should never be repeated. For decades, Europe has built a community where the best way to anticipate and resolve any conflicts was to develop multidimensional cooperation among the several EU Member States and neighbouring countries. The strengthening of European peace, stability and security was to be served by far-reaching collaboration in the forums of numerous international organizations (EU, OECD, Council of Europe, OSCE, UN, etc.), the institutionalization of interstate relations, as well as the development of initiatives such as the European Neighborhood Policy. The latter also concerned the Eastern Partnership initiative,

including Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The overriding value was to be a dialogue based on respect for human rights and compliance with international law. Unfortunately, as recent events have shown, not all countries share this opinion, which has shaken European integration and the balance of international forces at the regional and global levels.

As ordinary people, Poles, whose nation has been affected by the brutality of World War II, we oppose any form of violence, especially that directed at innocent civilians - women, children, families, the elderly, the sick and all vulnerable groups. As researchers specializing in EU studies, knowing the genesis of the European integration process and understanding the EU's values, we can see the superiority of peace over war. Any war brings only destruction, pain and misfortune. It ruins what has been built hard for many decades and limits the possibility of developing people's well-being. The current humanitarian crisis in Ukraine caused by the Russian aggression and its consequences for other countries, such as Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Moldova, receiving many thousands of refugees, strengthens our conviction that the process of European integration should progress and include Ukraine and other countries willing to continue this cooperation.

Today, when the struggle for Ukraine's independence is underway, we would like to express our support and solidarity with our colleagues and friends from academic centres and research institutes in Ukraine, with whom we have had research and teaching cooperation for many years, including projects within Jean Monnet Actions of the Erasmus + Program. Despite the hostilities in Ukraine, our colleagues continue to conduct their scientific and research activities, which deserve admiration, recognition, and full support. It is a time when, in addition to humanitarian aid provided by universities and ministries, e.g. in Poland, it is necessary to involve our friends more widely in activities that internationalize their scientific and educational work. Polish universities and other academic entities in the world offer Ukrainian researchers the opportunity to work abroad, create scholarship and exchange programs for doctoral students and develop the possibility of continuing studies for students from Ukraine. These are essential activities, but they should not lead to a brain drain of Ukrainian higher education and the academic community. We still believe that Ukraine will be an independent and sovereign state that will soon have to deal with the country's reconstruction on a large scale - the technical infrastructure of its universities and research institutes and the social and academic fabric. Therefore, the solutions and support offered to researchers and students should be temporary, enabling them to continue their activity during the war and later return to Ukraine, to their home, to invest in future social, economic and scientific development.

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## Polgár István József

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It is extremely difficult to write or say anything in these very tense moments. It is especially hard to analyze a situation in which thousands of people, innocent civilians are dying, and thousands more are suffering. They are suffering because of the lack of food, lack of water, lack of heat, because missiles destroy their houses. It is hard to understand why thousands need to run and leave their homes. They must run for their lives in the unknown, and they must live in tents, in schools and different type of shelters offered by neighboring countries.

These days and weeks, families are falling apart and they do not know if they see each other again. Women and children become refugees. Fathers, husbands, brothers are sacrificed in this absurd war.

It is not easy to comprehend what is happening in our neighborhood, where people are being killed, cities, roads are being bombed, all this in 2022. With more than 20 years, after the closure of the barbaric war from the Balkans, we thought that a very long period of peace would come in Europe. We believed that such a thing, which we are witnessing now in Ukraine, is impossible.

Unfortunately, the reality is different. It is different because of the imperial thinking stuck in the dirt of the past, because of the idea of a certain national supremacy, which has been gaining strength over and over again and extending its dominance over other areas and populations.

Even though it is hard, we need to write, we need to speak, we need to make our voice heard. All this is very important in order not to be overwhelmed by the large

amount of news, which are making us to get used to the horrors. It is important never to forget that we are facing a brutal aggression that could cover the whole world. We need to talk loud about what is happening in Ukraine to understand what type of terrible things a lost politician and a narrow group can do. We need to show what drives these political leaders to order the army to kill. So, maybe in the future, we will react at the first signs, we will raise our heads and we will not let insane motivations to use power to take over power.

Attention, do not be misled, speaking about war is just a euphemism, a way to obscure the essence, which makes the unacceptable acceptable by naming it with our usual practice. There is no war in Ukraine; there is only insane destruction, murder, brutality, violent destruction of the normal life, refugees and suffering.

We are in the sadistic phase of this war, because at this moment, the Russian Federation does not need to attack, it does not need to conquer cities, but in this mode the civilians suffer the most.

It is our duty to seek for explanations, but not in order to make anything acceptable, but in order to equip ourselves with necessary knowledge and awareness that is indispensable to understand, to fight, to refuse and perhaps to prevent such events. The same amount of knowledge will block the way of fake news and manipulation through which all aggressive powers try to subdue the majority of people.

It seems that in Romania people are willing to understand all this. The threat from the border with Ukraine has led to an increase of confidence in NATO. On the other hand, unfortunately, the fear from the war increased nationalist tendencies as well. The actual situation means a defining moment for Europe, for freedom and for all states and people who love peace. Through its criminal aggression against the Ukrainian people and the sovereignty of Ukraine, Russian political leaders have brutalized the principles that underpin world peace and democracy.

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## **PREDICTABLE BUT UNBELIEVABLE. RUSSIAN WAR AGAINST UKRAINE**

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February 24, 2022 became a black date in the Ukrainian, European and, I truly believe in it, the world's history. To be honest, the Russian war against Ukraine started in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and occupying the part of Donetsk and Luhansk oblast' through supporting of separatists' enclaves there. Those events prompted Ukrainian-oriented people to leave their homes and to search the possibility for a new start in other regions of Ukraine.

But in eight years a new invasion started. The attempt for fast conquering (or blitzkrieg) of Ukraine has failed. And the expectations that Russian-speaking people will meet Russian invasion with "bread and salt" were failed too. From the first days of the war a "scorched earth" tactic has been used with increasing power. Only during the first day of the war around 160 air strikes were inflicted on Ukrainian cities and villages. And the war is continuing. In more than three weeks a number of Ukrainian cities and villages have been almost totally destroyed. Amongst them Mariupol, Kharkiv, Irpin', Bucha are the most horrifying examples of cynicism, inhumane cruelty and violation of international norms and obligations by the Kremlin. What are the Russian troops doing in Ukraine is really unbelievable: bombing of maternity houses and civic buildings, looting, killing of civilians (women, kids, elderly people), destroying

everything on their way and non-recognition of their actions by allegations “we did not know that this was not training”.

In this case the most painful question for all of us is as follow: how to stop this unbelievable aggression towards not only Ukraine, but the whole democratic world? And, in my personal opinion, it is necessary to unite our efforts in counteracting aggression at all levels – economic, political, informational, and of course, military one. Otherwise, Putin will not stop in Ukraine. He’ll destroy the democratic system as the basis of the world order. And he’ll do it by killing the wedge between western democracies through military-political blackmailing, including the fact that Russia is a nuclear state.

So, the only way for the democratic world is to unite and to give a worthy rebuff to the aggressor, recalling the historical lessons of the twentieth century, when the enmity of the aggressor led only to its intensification.

To conclude, I’d like to express my thanks to all of You, Your authorities for support and aid for Ukraine and the Ukrainian society.

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## **TERROR AS A MODEL OF RUSSIA'S WAR AGAINST UKRAINE**

Andrii Kutsyk

*University of Warsaw*

&

Maria Yuzyk

*University of Warsaw*

*The collective moral responsibility of Russian society and an international tribunal for the leadership of Russia as a just outcome of the war.*

At a time when Ukraine is trying with all its might to agree with Western countries (in particular, Germany) on the supply of tanks and aircraft, for further fighting with Russia at the front, Russia continues to terrorize the civilians.

Most recently, the demolition of the rubble of a high-rise building in Dnipro, which was hit by a Russian missile on January 14, was completed. According to the Dnipro regional military administration, 45 people were killed. (numbers may change, the number of dead may increase). It is important to understand that the massive missile attack was carried out on a weekend, when almost all residents of the Dnipro apartment building were at home. One of the missiles hit a residential apartment building, leaving many innocent people mutilated.

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, such an act of terrorism is not new. We have already seen and must remember how the Russians committed the genocide of Ukrainians in Buch, how they bombed the maternity hospital and the drama theater in Mariupol, how they hit the shopping center in Kremenchuk. And of course we

know and remember how the Russians systematically shelled and continue to attack Ukraine's energy infrastructure. All this is terrorism and genocide, and the rocket attack on a high-rise building in Dnipro only shows the systematic nature of this terror and its infinity.

All the above-mentioned things and circumstances show the face of this war, a war that has the spirit of terror, which Putin's regime is perpetrating against Ukraine with the tacit support of its society.

**All Russian wars are wars against the civilian population.**

We must understand that the previous wars of Putin's Russia, in particular the war in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, as well as the war in Georgia and Syria, were wars against the civilian population. The first thing the Russian army did when it entered the cities (if not destroying them first) was to loot, to kill civilians, and to rape. Apparently, this style of war is, on the one hand, a great flaw of the Russian army – an incurable disease – but on the other hand, it is simply an inheritance of the behaviour of the Soviet army. This model of behavior of the Soviet soldier was characteristic of his invasion/occupation of Budapest in 1956 or Prague in 1968. It was similar when the Soviet troops occupied Afghanistan; they fought with the civilian population, looted, and raped. If any of the well-known people in society pointed out these crimes, such as the human rights defender Andriy Sakharov in Soviet times or Anna Politkovska in the time of already independent Russia, then the Soviet and later Russian society harassed these people and continued to support the government and its actions. Impunity has become part of Russian society and its culture. This impunity partly has echoes in Russia itself: it is only worth mentioning the murders of Politkovskaya or Nemtsov. However, this impunity is mostly manifested in Russia's wars against other countries, in particular against Ukraine. This impunity must end.

**Russian society must go through the process of purification, just as German society once did.**

By supporting Putin's regime, Russian society becomes complicit in crimes and after Putin's defeat must undergo a cathartic process of confession and purification. We should not be supporters of collective responsibility in the legal aspect of this definition, but collective responsibility in the moral aspect is needed. German society supported its power practically from the beginning second world war until its end, and so does Russian society. German society went through a process of moral purification for many years, and the same should happen with Russian society. Only a collective admission of guilt and collective remorse can alleviate the future burden of moral responsibility for supporting the crimes of the Putin regime.

**The unpunished evil of the past becomes a double evil in the future. We had Nuremberg and The Hague. Now we need a new city and a new court.**

The non-condemned actions of the Russian army in the past, which according to international law can be qualified as terrorism and genocide, has led to the Russian leadership perceiving silence as international permissiveness. The collective interna-

tional measures have, at best, been weak, enabling largely unopposed new terrorist attacks against the civilian population of Ukraine.

Only the trial of Russia's political and military leadership will be able to restore justice and prevent a new war and war crimes by Russia against another sovereign independent state and its citizens. In this case, we are talking about the legal component of the crime, when every crime, every murder has its own name, has an observer and an executor. Each customer and executor must suffer a just punishment. After all, it wasn't Putin who dropped a bomb on the maternity hospital in Mariupol. It wasn't Putin who tortured and beheaded civilians in Bucha. And it wasn't Putin who pressed the button to launch a rocket at a high-rise building in Dnipro. This was done by specific people who have a name. All these people should suffer personal punishment. This is exactly how it was with the top leadership of Nazi Germany and with the perpetrators of crimes. This is how it was with Milosevic and his soldiers who were war criminals. This is how it should be with Putin's regime and people who were directly involved in killing and persecution of civilians. It's not about revenge, it's about justice and fairness. The guilt of every criminal must be proven by an international court, and if guilty, every criminal must suffer a just punishment.

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## **RUSSIAN WAR AGAINST UKRAINE: HOW TO FIGHT BACK AGGRESSION**

Anatoliy Kruglashov

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Dear Colleagues!

Russia launched war against Ukraine in February 2014. The first stage of this war was the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbass. At that time Kremlin pretended that it's not their responsibility but political initiatives of the local inhabitants who felt themselves threatened after the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine and wanted to see Putin as their defender. Soon after the illegal annexation of the peninsula, President V. Putin proudly announced that special operation in Crimea which led to its annexation had been preparing more than 10 years before. No doubt the same is true about the temporarily occupied territories of Donbass, where Russia announced the formation of so-called Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples' republics.

Proxy or hybrid war with a lot of victims had gone there for 8 years. Russia tried to infect Ukraine with separatist movements all over the country as well as with a non-stop propagated idea of a civil war in our country and tried to make an impression of their irresponsibility for the War on Donbass for domestic and foreign audience. However, it did not help Moscow get the desired goals of destroying the Ukrainian state and nation.

From the early morning of 24 February Kremlin began a full-scaled war in Ukraine. Still, again under a false flag of "a special military operation", horrors and cruelty of an unprovoked war came into our lands.

Ukrainian defenders try to do their best to stand against the aggressor. Sure, Russia had made the military preparation for years and it is much bigger than Ukraine. Ukraine is neither a member of the NATO, nor the EU, despite the fact that we have aimed at this for many years. Still, although we have got some support from our western allies and partners we crucially need much stronger support in our fight against the second largest army in the world.

Under these terrible circumstances the Research Institute of European Integration and Regional Studies, Chernivtsi Yuriy Fedkovych National University in cooperation with our partner Center of Eastern Europe, Marie-Curie Sklodowska University of Lublin invited some international scholars to take part in our discussion “War against Ukraine – the struggle for the future of Europe and the World”. The main points to discuss are as follow:

1. Your opinion on the Russia’s war against Ukraine.
2. Possible scenarios of the war solutions.
3. What should be done to end the war?
4. How should we cooperate as experts and analytics and researchers?

I am very pleased to see here my colleagues and friends from Georgia, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the USA. In the end of our talks we should agree on our further steps we should do together, including preparing a text of Appeal to International community and the most influential international organizations. I am sure, that this war will be victorious for the people of Ukraine and all who are guilty for committing the war crimes will be punished in the end. Of course, each of us is invited to share her/his opinions and suggestions with regard to the possible scenarios of resolving the Russian War against Ukraine as well as suggestions of the ways how to establish peace and security for Ukraine and whole Europe.

Finally, I am very grateful to everybody who agreed to take part in our Experts’ discussion. I’d like to address my special thanks to Professor Arkadiusz Modrzejewski who proposed to publish the notes of our meeting on the pages of “European Journal of Transformation Studies”, where he is the editor-in-chief.