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EDITORIAL

Dear Readers of the European Journal of Transformation Studies,

you are holding the journal's volume, which is very special for me as a Guest Editor due to the fact that it is dedicated to the 100th anniversary of Ukrainian-Polish friendship of independent states. I am heartily grateful for such opportunity to Professor Arkadiusz Modrzejewski and the Editorial Board of the European Journal of Transformation Studies.

Century – it is rather small period of time in the history of mankind. However, it was not easy for our countries. It comes about the time of building interstate relations through the challenges of wars, divisions of territory, ambitious of national leaders, interethnic insults. Nowadays, we do have a right to state on celebrating 100 years of friendship between Ukraine and Poland.

Vasyl' Stus Donetsk National University, which is represented by me, demonstrated its civic position and relocated from occupied Donetsk to Vinnytsia in order to save its right for implementation of the state principles and their mission in Ukrainian education, to keep national traditions with faith in Ukrainian Donbas and unbreakable Ukrainian spirit. It is rather symbolically that meeting between the president of the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic, Symon Petliura, and First Marshal of Poland, Józef Pilsudski took place in Vinnytsia in 1920. Moreover, here, in the heart of Ukraine, Józef Pilsudski said the legendary words: "There will be no independent Poland without independent Ukraine". The above has become a testament for plethora generations of Poles and still known as one of the postulates of Polish diplomacy.

100 years ago, Poland and Ukraine were allies during the war with Soviet Russia. Unfortunately, the history repeats itself today. Nowadays, Ukraine is in the state of war with Russian Federation, meanwhile Poland supports Ukraine in the international arena and in its fight for its territorial integrity, national interests, and national unity.

The Poles remember all the crimes of the Soviet Russia, grief of the World War I, the tragedy and betrayal during the World War II. The Poles, like no one else, understand Ukraine today. During the 20th century, they have repeatedly experienced injustice and consequences of the criminal actions of the Soviet Government. The Prime Minister of Poland, Mateusz Morawiecki, emphasized the following in his statement on December 29, 2019: "Executioners and victims, who are guilty in violent crimes, cannot be confused with innocent civilians and invaded countries. We must defend the truth together for the sake of joint past and in the memory victims". Ukrainians and Poles are aware of the difference between friendship and brotherhood, between occupation and military assistance, between victory and peace.

This volume contains scientific investigations of Ukrainian, Polish and American researchers, which are dedicated to modern Ukrainian-Polish relations in terms of political transformations and social changes. Such investigations are the author's view of people, who are not afraid to tell the truth that is necessary for maintenance and strengthening of bilateral relations between Ukraine and Poland, search for new measuring of the neighbourhood and developing the new level of positions in the international arena.

I sincerely hope that these scientific developments will facilitate the establishment of constructive cooperation between scientific schools of Ukraine, Poland and the world. Thus, we will be able to create conditions for development of the global political science, increasing the level of political awareness, constructive communication, critical thinking and strengthening of intercultural researching dialogue.

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PRO MEMORIA

Paweł Adamowicz
(1965-2019)

Mayor of Gdansk City
(1998-2019)

PAWEŁ ADAMOWICZ (1965-2019) THE MAYOR OF GDANSK AND HIS SELF-GOVERNMENTAL LEGACY

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Abstract

In contemporary world politics, especially Polish politics, there is an increase in aggressiveness in the language of politics. Political adversaries divide society and influence the radicalization of its views. Individuals who are deprived of intellectual reflection and give in to hate speech become a threat to social order. The Mayor of Gdańsk, Paweł Adamowicz, has become a fatal victim of a dangerous phenomenon which is allowing verbal aggression in politics, which turns into aggressive actions.

Key words: *local-government, language of politics, hate speech, verbal aggression, political murder*

INTRODUCTION

Paweł Adamowicz's figure, his life and professional path was closely related to politics. Apart from political elements, the biography of the President of the City of Gdansk includes his identification and education.

Pawel Adamowicz described himself as a Gdansk citizen. He was born on 2nd November 1965 in Gdańsk to a family resettled from the Vilnius region (now Lithuania, until 1939, a Polish territory). Both of his parents were active community activists in Gdańsk, among others, involved in the reconstruction of St Brigid's Church in Gdańsk. He also had an older brother, Piotr, who was involved in anti-communist activities. Paweł Adamowicz grew up in Śródmieście district on Mniszki Street near the Polish Post Office building, which is the place where Polish postmen were attacked by Wehrmacht soldiers in September 1939, St. Brigid's Church, which

is the place where masses of solidarity for striking shipyard workers took place, the Jan II Sobieski monument, which is the place where anti-communist demonstrations took place. Paweł Adamowicz grew up in an environment and in a place whose space was filled with the spirit of patriotism. The city centre is also a district where numerous traces of the Kashubian community living in Gdańsk have been preserved. All these factors contributed to the fact that Paweł Adamowicz perceived his multidimensional Gdansk identity through the prism of a native Gdansk citizen, a native of a family of settlers, a citizen of Gdansk who understood Polish but also the multicultural specificity of his city. He included a specific credo in the statement: "I am a citizen of Gdańsk, jo jem z Gduńska, Ich bin ein Danziger, I am from Gdańsk. [Adamowicz 2008]. He expressed his understanding of the multiculturalism and openness of Gdańsk as the city's mayor by initiating and providing organizational support for many events presenting and promoting various cultural groups living in the city.

The International Congresses of Gdańsk citizens enjoyed great popularity, during which both Gdańsk citizens from other cities and countries and descendants of pre-war Gdańsk residents living in other countries took part. For the numerous Vilnius community settled in Gdańsk after World War II, Kaziuki Gdańskie, a market inspired by the traditional fair held in Vilnius, was organized. Paweł Adamowicz also took care to preserve the Kashubian heritage in Gdańsk. A jubilee 10th Kashubian Congress was organized in the city and plaques with the inscription " Gduńsk historiczno stoleca Kaszeb " were placed on the city's corners. Carefully but noticeably Paweł Adamowicz cared about the memory of Gdańsk from the interwar period. A symbolic reference to that period in the history of the city was the transfer of the seat of the City Council to the building where from 11 February 1920 to 1 September 1939 the seat of the League of Nations High Commissioner in the Free City of Gdańsk was located. During holidays or important events, two preserved traditional trams Bergmann from 1927 and the Ring from 1930 with "Danzig" signs ran in the city.

The multiculturalism of Gdańsk as a heritage of the city's earlier belonging to the Kingdom of Poland, the Principality of Prussia or the Free City of Gdańsk corresponded with the current policy of openness towards other nations and cultures. On the initiative of Paweł Adamowicz, the Gdansk Model of Integration of Immigrants was developed and implemented in the city. The family of origin, place of birth, knowledge of the history of the city and the region caused that Paweł Adamowicz, as the Mayor of Gdańsk, perfectly understood the specificity of the city and felt its cultural pulse. [Michałowski 2018]

The city of Gdańsk, under the rule of Paweł Adamowicz, owes its specific order and organizational culture to his education. The whole educational path was realized by the future president in Gdańsk. Here, he began his education at Primary School No. 50, then attended the renowned Gdańsk I High School nr 1 and studied law at the University of Gdańsk. After graduation, he was employed as an assistant at the Faculty of Law and Administration. He also completed an apprenticeship which resulted in passing an exam and obtaining legal counsel qualifications. The academic career of the future Mayor of the City of Gdańsk was crowned by taking up the post of the Vice-Rector of the University of Gdańsk for Students Affairs, which he held between 1990 and 1993.

1. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Paweł Adamowicz came into contact with the world of politics relatively early. Already in high school, under the influence of his brother, he became involved in the activities of the democratic opposition. The first of his major roles was to distribute leaflets and magazines among the students of the school and the youth of Tricity. As a high school student, he started publishing. Initially, he presented the wall newspaper "Emblem" in the school display case, then he was the editor and co-publisher of the periodical "Jedynka", in which he published the first anti-communist texts. During his studies, his attitude as an activist of the democratic opposition clearly intensified. It adopted an institutionalized form of participation in organizations that were protesting against the socialist reality of students. He was an active member of the Lech Bądkowski Gdańsk Political Club, the "Dean's" Political Thought Club, the "Liberal Congress" of Gdańsk Academic Association. He also continued to publish, being the editor of "ABC" magazine. During his studies, his worldview was shaped by the circle of Tricity's oppositionists, with whom he remained in constant contact. His main mentor was Aleksander Hall. It was in his apartment that Paweł Adamowicz participated in meetings organized by Gdańsk oppositionists such as Donald Tusk, Grzegorz Grzelak, Bogdan Borusewicz, Janusz Lewandowski. [Śliwiński 2012].

He also took part in underground lectures by Jadwiga Staniszkis, Ryszard Legutko, Paweł Śpiewak, Stefan Kisielewski. Therefore, he cooperated with the leaders of the democratic opposition and independent intellectuals. Later on, the political paths of many of them were separated, but for Paweł Adamowicz the period of his studies was the time of his political formation. The pluralism and differences of views, as well as the culture of disputes, which he observed as part of his activity in the oppositionist circles, equipped the future mayor of Gdańsk with respect for different views and, above all, with the ability to distinguish the presented views from a person. It seems that he acquired the ability to disagree with someone else's views while maintaining respect for that person. This feature will continue to characterize him until the end of his life, also in the period of active political dispute in which he participated with the current authorities in the country.

Apart from their intellectual value, Paweł Adamowicz's political struggle had a practical dimension. In 1988 he headed the student strike committee at the University of Gdańsk. It was an occupational protest for the legalization of the Independent Students' Association and a solidarity strike in support of the strike taking place in the Gdańsk Shipyard. A member of the strike committee was also the later Polish Deputy Prime Minister Przemysław Gosiewski. [Łupak 2018]

Thanks to his active attitude, Paweł Adamowicz started to function in the political environment in Gdańsk. Between 1990 and 1993 he was a member of the Liberal-Democratic Congress, a member of the National Congress and a vice-president of the Gdańsk region of this group. Then, from 1994, he was a member of the Conservative Party, where in 1997 he was the chairman of the voivodship board. At that time, the party was headed by the mentor of Paweł Adamowicz, Aleksander Hall. In 1997, the Conservative Party was incorporated into the emerging Conservative-Popular Party. In the new grouping, Paweł Adamowicz served as a member of the provincial board and political council in Warsaw. In 2002, Paweł Adamowicz joined the Civic Platform and took over the leadership of its structures in Gdańsk. He was a member of the party until 2015, when he suspended his membership due to irregularities related to

his financial statement. Since then, until his death, he remained a non-partisan local government member associated with the All for Gdańsk association.

Throughout his life, Paweł Adamowicz went through a number of stages. In the early stages, he was associated with the conservative and Christian community and was co-organizer of the First and Second Liberal Congresses. However, the turn of the 1980s and 1990s was a time when the opposition circles did not have crystallized differences in world views or economic ideas directly resulting from the definition of political doctrines. There was a kind of semantic disorder, whose main goal was to distinguish and say goodbye to socialist circles. The separation of conservative and liberal views was achieved later in the Polish right and centre-right circles. Paweł Adamowicz, however, went beyond the definition framework. As a Catholic and conservative, he was able to take an active part in the "Equality Parade" or advocate the admission of emigrants to Poland. His attitude expressed a certain maturity manifested in his ability to include elements of the current reality in his declarative views. He did not dig into the doctrine, contesting or fighting against other attitudes or views. His conservatism was syncretic. Paweł Adamowicz had the ability to integrate seemingly contradictory values. Importantly, he also had the courage to present and defend his beliefs. It can therefore be said that Paweł Adamowicz's attitude, which was based on a conservative worldview, evolved over the years. [Lis 2019].

2. LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY – CITY COUNCIL

In 1990, Paweł Adamowicz, a candidate from the list of the Civic Committee, was for the first time elected to the City Council of Gdańsk. In the same year he became a delegate to the Local Government Seym (provincial assembly) of Gdańsk Voivodeship and for a year served as its vice-chairman. It was a representative body of the community self-governments from the area of the Gdańsk Province, performing mainly consultative functions. In the Local Government Seym (provincial assembly), Paweł Adamowicz's activity as a lawyer focused on organizing the activity and then leading the Local Government Appeal College of the Gdańsk Province. [Ustawa 1990] As a councillor of Gdańsk and a delegate to the Local Government Seym, he was involved in the establishment of local law, while as the chairman of the College, he considered appeals against administrative decisions of the mayor and the mayor of a specific town or community. These early experiences translated into the ability to understand the meaning of an administrative decision and its consequences. It was of a great educational value because it made us aware of the importance between the current political decision and the far-sighted local government decision. It was then that Paweł Adamowicz pointed out that the city should be managed and not ruled, i.e. a ruler should be more of a manager than a party functionary. [Adamowicz 2018] During the next term of the Gdańsk local government in 1994-1998, Paweł Adamowicz was the chairman of the city council. Entrusting this position was the crowning achievement of his previous local government activities. As a councillor, he knew the specifics of the functioning of the city council as a resolution-making body of local government. The experience he gained in the local government council gave him the ability to position a particular local government in comparison with others in the region and to understand the importance of cooperation between particular municipalities and cities. In turn, when he headed the Self-Government Appeal

College of the Gdańsk Voivodeship, he understood how important it is to make good laws prudently. Despite his still young age, he was already a self-government man with extensive experience and great skills. The function of the city council chairman entrusted to him made it possible to supplement his qualities with much-needed public recognition. Favourable conditions for this were created by the 1000th anniversary of Gdańsk in 1997, where Paweł Adamowicz, as the chairman of the city council, actively participated in the setting of the ceremony.

3. MAYOR OF THE CITY

In 1998 Paweł Adamowicz was elected for the third time a councilor of the city of Gdańsk. At that time he had a very good position in the local government resulting from his experience, knowledge, skills but also from being recognizable and popular. Additionally, he had a strong political background and the support of the Metropolitan Archbishop of Gdańsk. The Solidarity Electoral Action Committee, from which he was running, had won the parliamentary elections in Poland a year earlier and enjoyed considerable support in society. All these elements resulted in the fact that Paweł Adamowicz, who was 33 years old at that time, was elected by the City Council as the Mayor of the City.

Subsequent local government elections were held in accordance with the new electoral law, according to which mayors and town mayors were elected in direct elections. In 2002, Paweł Adamowicz ran for the Civic Platform election committee. In the second round he defeated the Democratic Left Alliance candidate Marek Formela and gained support of 72.3% of votes. In the next elections in 2006, running from the same committee, he received 60.9% of votes in the first round. He repeated this achievement in 2010 winning 53.78% in the first round. He also ran from the Civic Platform committee in the 2014 elections, beating the candidate of the Law and Justice committee Andrzej Jaworski in the second round with a result of 61.3%. In his last election in 2018 he was an independent candidate running from the All for Gdańsk committee. In the second round, he won with the Law and Justice Committee candidate Kacper Płażyński with 64.8% support.

To sum up, Paweł Adamowicz served as the Mayor of Gdańsk from 1998 to 2019. He won all the direct elections in which he competed, but the election results indicated a downward trend with each subsequent term. For many people in Gdansk, he was the only city leader they knew. During his term of office, Gdansk developed economically, culturally and socially. In 2012, the city hosted football tournaments as part of Euro 2012, and in 2016 the city took part in the competition for the European Capital of Culture. Paweł Adamowicz was not free from ambiguities and inaccuracies and probably also from mistakes in public action. Many people saw Paweł Adamowicz as a man who had his own vision of the development of Gdańsk. Sometimes these visions were criticized constructively, but recently his presidency has been subject to increased personal criticism.

The culmination of his more than 20 years of presidency was the establishment of the Gdansk Metropolitan Area and the adoption of the Gdansk Model of Integration of Immigrants. The Gdańsk Metropolitan Area, currently the Gdańsk-Sopot-Gdynia Metropolitan Area, is a formula of an association comprising of 57 local governments from the area of the Pomeranian Voivodeship, under which joint initiatives of supra-local importance are undertaken. Mayor Paweł Adamowicz spoke about the Gdańsk

Model of Integration of Immigrants: "We want to give immigrants a chance to build a decent, normal life here. We want to prevent their exclusion. Many people from Gdańsk also went out into the world looking for these values. We are convinced that counteracting exclusion, sensible hospitality and openness is a guarantee of building a community based on traditional Gdańsk values: respect, tolerance, justice and solidity." [Fedas et all 2016: 3]

4. MURDER OF THE MAYOR OF GDAŃSK

The Mayor of Gdańsk, Paweł Adamowicz, was stabbed with a knife on 13th January 2019. The attack took place during the 27th Final of the Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity. On the next day, at the University Clinical Centre in Gdańsk, he was pronounced dead. This tragic event is situated in the current political situation in Poland.

The Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity is a nationwide charity event which took place for the first time on 3rd January 1993. It is organized by a foundation of the same name, whose founder and president is Jarzy Owsiak. The formula of this undertaking is characterized by the fact that in the first half of January the Grand Finale takes place, during which money for a specific charity purpose is collected. The main idea is to provide help in medical care for newborns, children and recently also the elderly. The Foundation buys medical equipment for the collected funds and donates it free of charge to hospitals all over Poland. Indicatively by 2020 the total amount collected by the Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity is over 1 billion PLN. The Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity follows the tradition of social charity based on the collection of voluntary donations from individuals by volunteers acting free of charge. The Foundation does not benefit financially in the form of grants from the state budget or other forms of support from the government.

The 27th Grand Finale of the Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity in Gdańsk was crowned with the concert "Gdańsk for Orchestra". The last words spoken from the stage by Pawel Adamowicz just before the attack sounded: "Gdańsk is generous, Gdańsk shares the good, Gdańsk wants to be a city of solidarity. I would like to thank you for all this, because - in the streets, squares of Gdańsk - you donated money, you were volunteers. This is a wonderful time to share your good. You are great. Gdańsk is the most wonderful city in the world. Thank you!" It was a declaration by the Mayor of the city but also an active participant because during the 27th Final of the Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity Paweł Adamowicz was a volunteer and collected the amount of about 5500 PLN. After his murder, an action called "Let's fill up the last can of the Mayor for the Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity" was initiated and the amount of about 16 million PLN was collected.

5. THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO THE MURDER

The tragic event of 13th January 2019 was described by the killer himself as a political act. From the scene, holding up the murder weapon in a triumphant gesture, he said: "Hello! Hello! My name is Stefan W... I was innocent in prison. I was sitting innocent in prison. The Civic Platform[1] tortured me. That's why Adamowicz died."

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[1] Civic Platform - a Polish political party founded in 2001. In the years 2007-2015 she won the parliamentary election twice. The politicians of the Civic Platform were: Prime Minister of the Republic

The killer served a prison sentence for a bank robbery during which he used a signal pistol. The court classified this act as an armed robbery, which Stefan W. did not accept. He considered the sentence to be unjust and transferred the responsibility to the then ruling political group. Stefan W., left prison a month before the murder and most probably did not know that Pawel Adamowicz formally withdrew from the Civic Platform and was elected the Mayor of Gdansk as an independent candidate. [Włodkowska, Wojciechowski 2019], [Włodkowska 2020]. Therefore, there is a thesis about the political background of the murder, because the perpetrator wanted a spectacular murder of a leading Civic Platform politician and not Paweł Adamowicz personally.

Political killings, although not frequent, are always associated with strong emotions. In Poland, the most identifiable politically motivated murders are the assassinations of President Gabriel Narutowicz, Minister of the Internal Affairs Bronisław Pieracki, Solidarity chaplain Fr Jerzy Popiełuszko, Law and Justice office worker Marek Rosiak. The memory of the victims is still alive in Polish society. Unfortunately, they function properly in the collective memory of their killers: Eligiusz Niewiadomski, Hryhorij Maciejko, Grzegorz Piotrowski, Ryszard Cyba. Currently, in view of the ongoing trial of Paweł Adamowicz's killer, he functions as Stefan W. [Nowosielska 2019] It seems that the murder of Paweł Adamowicz, or basically its spectacular course, as well as the taking over of the microphone by the perpetrator and the public introduction and confession of guilt, was the aim of putting him in the spotlight. Political murders are, on the one hand, an attempt to physically eliminate a particular representative of the opposing political force, on the other hand, a spectacular attempt to manifest the killer's political views, or an ordinary attempt to make him appear in the collective consciousness as a person committing a spectacular act.

CONCLUSIONS

Paweł Adamowicz's idea was open and tolerant Gdańsk. He often spoke about the need to build a community with respect for each and every person. He conducted a policy that fostered multiculturalism and diversity while preserving the traces of tradition. He created an inclusive Gdansk identity. In public debate, he did not cross the boundaries of cultural language and respected his interlocutor.

In spite of his membership in political parties and being a member of their governing bodies, Paweł Adamowicz never stood as a candidate in parliamentary elections or held any function in state administration. In the last years of his life, he was a non-partisan self-government activist.

In view of the above, it is difficult to understand Stefan W. The question arises as to how he formed his opinion about Paweł Adamowicz as a prominent politician of the ruling camp in the previous parliamentary term of office.

There is a presumption that a kind of mechanism of transfer of the hate from the speech of hatred to the plan of action may have worked. In the current political dispute in Poland, the language of public debate is becoming more and more violent and sharper. There is a consent for symbolic aggression against the adversaries of political life [Tökölyová, Dĕd 2019: 18-19]. The clearest illustration of this

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of Poland Donald Tusk and President of Poland Bronisław Komorowski. At present, it is the largest political group opposing the ruling "Law and Justice" party in Poland.

phenomenon was the fact that the prosecutor's office discontinued the investigation of people who placed images of MEPs on gallows [Polityka 2019 a].

In the public discourse there were also invectives addressed to Paweł Adamowicz to discredit him. One of the MPs, disapproving of his policy, addressed him "Mr. Adamowicz, Gdańsk is not a "Free" German city but a Polish city! The central authority for it is Warsaw, and not Berlin you are not the German governor of Gdansk, but only its poor Polish servant and you have POLISH responsibilities".

Pawel Adamowicz often criticized the social and political reality created by those currently in power in Poland, and he often went beyond for the mayor's position. However, he had the right as a citizen to have his own opinion and articulate it publicly. There were no personal invectives in his message to specific individuals. [Polityka 2019 b]

Paweł Adamowicz, who died on 14th January 2019, became a victim of political murder because he was a public figure, associated with the Civic Platform.

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CENTUVERSARY OF

POLISH-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS

THE SPREAD OF SHADOW NORMS BEYOND STATE LEGAL SYSTEM: CHALLENGES OF A GLOBALIZED SOCIETY

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Abstract

The article analyzes the functioning and distribution of shadow norms in the globalized world. Shadow rules are classified according to their scope and degree of danger. Legal and social mechanisms of counteraction to shadow norms are considered. It is concluded that the mechanisms of combating shadow norms in a globalized society of different degrees of danger differ diametrically. Thus, in order to combat shadow norms that exist before or in parallel with legal norms, it is advisable to use social mechanisms. But, measures of legal responsibility should be strengthened with regard to illegal shadow norms.

Key words: *shadow norms, shadow law-making, underground activities, globalization, globalized society*

INTRODUCTION

Shadow norms are an integral part of the regulatory array, as much as we do not want to deny it. Sometimes they are society's response to unprofessional actions of state bodies, and in this sense, signal problems of state regulation; sometimes they

are clearly illegal and require a legal overreaction. But, regardless of how they will be considered: in the legal or non-legal sphere, – their functioning in society generates persistent negative patterns and stereotypes of behavior. It is worth recognizing the fact that shadow norms have been at all times and within all social systems, that is, so they have been a problem of every state. But modernity poses new challenges to legal systems. As a result of globalization, economic and cultural mutual penetration, such a phenomenon as convergence in law leads to the manifestation of the features of one legal system in another. This often enriches the legal system and stimulates its development. But, unfortunately, not only positive phenomena tend to borrow. Directly in this context, it is necessary to consider informal rules of conduct as "migrating" from one state to another, and sometimes rising to the supranational level. Thus, shadow rules cease to be a problem of certain legal system and just domestic legislation, but become a common challenge. This makes the issue of shadow law-making promising and necessary for research.

1. LITERATURE REVIEW, DEBATABLE TERMS AND MAIN CATEGORIES

The sphere of shadow law and shadow lawmaking can be defined as extremely controversial, which is also reflected in the terminology used.

It should be noted that shadow phenomena are often considered in other social and economic sciences, but not in legal ones. In particular, numerous publications are devoted to the phenomena of the shadow economy [Schneider 2013; Schneider & Williams 2013; Pickhardt & Pons 2006; Birks 2010; Mosiej 2004; https://ungc.org.pl 2018; Mosiej 2016; Masiukiewicz 2012; Alińska 2016], sometimes they are explored in the context of management [Russell 2010], labor [Bigaj 2013] and corporate law [Hobson 1998; Effron 2012]. But in the general theory of law, the analysis of shadow social manifestations is an infrequent phenomenon, although in recent years scientific interest in the mentioned problem is increasing significantly, as the influence of shadow regulators is increasing too. This diversity of sectoral approaches, as well as research within different legal systems, has given rise to a significant variety of terminology used.

Thus, in the sphere of legal research, the terms "shadow law", "shadow norms", "shadow rules", "shadow law-making", "informal norms" (rules, law-making), "unlawful rules" (behavior) [Ovchinnikov, Mamychev & Litvinova 2015], "shadow politics", "shadow authorities", "shadow government" [Axelrod 1992], "grey zone", "illegal rules" (behavior) are often used. Sometimes they are referred by authors as synonyms, and researchers emphasize this; sometimes they are used in the same or diametrically opposite context by default, without additional justification; and sometimes these categories are correlated in a certain way, based on a particular study (most often as part and whole or as cause and effect).

Let's look carefully at the specifics of the above categories and determine which terms in which cases will be the most appropriate.

Undoubtedly, shadow law-making deserves consideration in the context of social norms, which has been repeatedly demonstrated in the scientific literature, by E. A. Posner, for instance [Posner 2000]. At the same time, it remains an open question what nature these social norms are.

Quite often in special scientific papers, informal law-making is understood as the creation of norms that do not belong to the sphere of legislation, but generally belong

to the sphere of law (for example, rules formulated in court decisions, administrative bodies, as well as local legal and corporate norms) [Eisner 2002], also, there may be no variations of the formal law-making [Chalmers & Leverick 2017].

The distinction between formal and informal institutions has been conceptualized in several ways [Helmke & Levitsky 2003: 8]. One common distinction is state-societal. According to this approach, "formal institution" refers to state bodies (courts, legislatures, bureaucracies) and stateenforced rules (constitutions, laws, regulations), while "informal institution" encompasses civic, religious, kinship, and other "societal" rules and organizations [Eckstein & Wickham-Crowley 2003]. A problem with the state-societal distinction is that it fails to account for a variety of informal institutions, including the informal rules that govern behavior within state institutions and what Ellickson calls "organization rules," or the official rules that govern non-state organizations such as religious orders, political parties, and interest groups [Ellickson 1991: 31].

In spite of the absolutely fair statement, that "indeed, law is a complex structure, and its perceived legitimacy varies widely, over cultures, times, and domains of its everyday instantiation" [McAdams & Nadler 2008: 866; Sarat & Kearns 1993: 9; Suchman 1997: 486–90; Calavita 2001], it will not be about alternative legal mechanisms and procedures in this scientific paper [Tyler 2013; Hutchison 2006]. On the contrary, in this case, shadow norms (rules) will be understood as rules of conduct that are not legitimized in any way. Not those contained in any sources of law. But those that have an informal, unwritten character, extend their effect to a wide range of social relations and actors, exist before the law or in parallel with it.

On this basis, for the purposes of this study categories "shadow law", "shadow norms", "shadow rules", "informal norms" (rules) will be treated as synonyms. Phenomena such as the "shadow economy", "shadow politics", "shadow authorities", "shadow government" and others will be used as an external expression of shadow norms in various spheres of social life.

Nevertheless, terms "unlawful rules" (norms, behavior), "illegal rules" (norms, behavior) will be referred to as part of the shadow norms that exist in society not just in parallel with official law, but in clear contradiction to it. That is, it can be qualified as an offense and even a crime.

There is no doubt, that shadow law clearly refers to the negative type of formation of the law [Калинин 2011: 19], but the categories "shadow law-making" and "informal law-making" can be used only with a certain degree of conditionality, since law-making is initially understood as an official procedure for the legalization of norms and a certain state subject of such legalization. However, although shadow norms are not officially fixed, but widely used, for social research it is possible to use this category by analogy.

2. METHODOLOGICAL BASIS OF THE STUDY

There are many problems in assessing the scope of shadow regulation, its nature and the degree of danger of specific regulators. In relation to the shadow economy, many direct and indirect methods have been developed, while such diversity is not observed for the shadow law. In addition, the representativeness of the data can always be questioned, since the entire field of study is "in the shadows". But this does not mean that the study claims to be inaccurate, because sometimes indirect methods,

complementing each other and confirming the data, provide reliability and complexity of the result.

Thus, the work can definitely be used dialectical method, since the shadow norms are in the plane of different social subsystems. Accordingly, only interdisciplinary research "on the border" of law, economics, sociology, psychology, political science, information technology in their interaction can clearly demonstrate these negative manifestations. This, in turn, leads us to use the integrative method, which in a globalized world makes it possible to realize the integrity of phenomena.

Also in the work the general method of comparison, as well as the method of legal comparativistics are admissible. They are absolutely necessary, since shadow norms due to globalization do not stay long within the same social and legal system. That is, at a minimum, they must be detected in advance to effectively counteract them in the future. And the analysis of other legal systems for this purpose is an excellent prerequisite.

One of the basic methods of scientific research is content analysis, carried out according to the semantic and quantification indicators of structural components of information in real life and virtual space. This will make it possible to identify the most "painful points" for society in the field of shadow norms, and in addition, will present a visualization of possible and most typical solutions to such situations in the world practice.

Also, the study will not be complete if we do not use the formal legal method, which will help to analyze the individual legal mechanisms that are provided in the legislation and other sources of law of different countries to combat shadow norms. In this context, it is useful to analyze their effectiveness or, conversely, inefficiency, along with the reasons for this.

The logical continuation should be the use of the legal modeling method, which will provide an opportunity to predict certain consequences of appropriate legal actions in the field of shadow norms. Such a methodology will allow to formulate the most effective mechanisms of fight against different types of shadow rules, and considering their national or supranational level.

3. THE STATE LAW-MAKING AND THE SHADOW RULES MECHANISM FORMATION: ASPECTS OF THE RATIO

In order to reveal in detail the mechanism of shadow norms occurrence, it is impossible not to turn first to the analysis of law-making in its classical sense. Namely, as the activity of the state represented by its public authorities and officials to create legal norms.

As is well known in the theory of law, a legal norm does not appear "from scratch", and state authorities and officials in democratic states should not create legal norms simply at will. The complex process of law formation begins long before its official registration, still in society. And law-making is only the final stage of the formation of law. The formation of law begins even when some new relations appear in society, which become quite common and consequently require certain regulation. But it is not a fact that this regulation will be legal in the beginning. Rather, on the contrary, people themselves will respond to the need and create rules of behavior that fit some common situation. When the above-mentioned rules of conduct become quite common in society and known to a wide range of people, from this point on it makes

possible to talk about the formation of so-called actual rules. They are not legal, but such norms regulate the vast majority of relations in society. And only some of them subsequently move to the level of law through the procedure of law-making. That is, the role of a competent, rational subject of law-making activity should be an opportunity to "discern" those relations that most require settlement, as well as those behaviors that are already used by society to regulate behavior (actual norms). To reliably reveal these relationships and common rules of behavior, a large number of methods are used (or should be used), including content analysis, various variations of opinion polls, the method of expert assessments, and so on. However, most of the actual norms remain at the level of society, not rising to the level of the state.

Thus, as stated earlier, in the process of law creation can be nothing insignificant, every detail plays an important role. It is necessary to distinguish the category "formation of law" (law creation) and "law-making" ("legislating"). The first of them refers to all the stages of the emergence of legal norms, considering their emergence in society. Meanwhile law-making represents the final stage of the formation of law, its official recognition and approval of state authorities. The formation of law is constantly and continuously simply because social life and social relations also are continuous. Specifically in this plane should be sought social conditionality of the legal norms. Legal regulation may have a high degree of efficiency only in the case when it comes from the actual rules of conduct, which in one form or another are formed in society before institutionalize them. This does not mean that they exist in structuralizing and formalised form, but in essence they are clear, reasonable, fairly common and recognized by many members of society [Mikhaylina & Palaščáková 2018: 350].

Now let's look at where the shadow norms come from. The point is that the actual norms are heterogeneous in nature. Some of them are positive, create the right behaviors and act as prerequisites for the creation of legal norms. But even in the absence of institutionalization, they operate in parallel with the legal norms and (or) complement them. Others create negative models of behavior and act in conflict with the law to varying degrees. This correlation could not have gone unnoticed in previous legal studies. So, some authors [Voigt & Engerer 2001] "define four kinds of relationships between ... rules: neutral; complementary; substitutive (non-compliance is sanctioned either by the state or by private individuals); and conflicting" [Chavance 2008: 61]. Accordingly, shadow norms are understood as those actual rules that relate to the law on the basis of the third or fourth method of the listed. Also it may be added that informal norms may not contradict "explicitly" the letter of the law, but it is necessary to contradict its spirit. That is, the commitment to shadow regulation in any case indicates a low level of legal awareness of a certain subject.

The causes of shadow law can vary significantly. Starting with absolutely illegal norms of interaction in criminal communities and ending with such the rules of behavior, which are formed as a "response" to the low social conditionality of legal norms. Due to various reasons and types, opposition to shadow norms should also be carried out taking into account these features, which will be discussed further.

4. MANIFESTATIONS OF SHADOW NORMS IN DIFFERENT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND CONSEQUENCES OF GLOBALIZATION

External manifestations of shadow norms are striking in their diversity. Starting with the ones that seem harmless enough. So, in Ukraine for decades drivers warn each other that police officers are on duty ahead, using a short activation of dipped-beam headlamps. This seeming innocuousness is quite deceptive, since in fact such behavior of drivers characterizes the general attitude to state bodies in Ukraine, where public authorities are not at all popular; they are feared rather than respected. Therefore, people consider it quite normal to warn each other about the "danger". That is, this behavior should be an important signal to the state that its mechanism is functioning incorrectly. And the most correct actions of the state in this case, obviously, should not be repressive actions, but adequate motivation to reform state bodies, that is, to remove the prerequisites and causes of the above-mentioned behavior.

This gives us the opportunity to come close to one of the most debated problems in the theory of law and branch of jurisprudence. It is "a pervasive concern in legal studies is the role of a coercion" [Goetz 2006: 2]. And in the field of shadow regulation research, the issues of state coercion and its limits are indeed characterized by ambiguity. As the scientists rightly believe: "during the past ten years we have seen the emergence of a number of "reforms" which have sought to resolve this multifaceted problem by imposing greater control on the rulemaking arena" [Cooley 1984: 894]. Although these words were written in the 80-ies of the last century, they have fully retained their relevance now. Unfortunately, rulemaking and legal practice follow the path when certain social prerequisites are ignored for a long time, but after reaching an invisible limit in perception, the legal reaction is carried out in the form of legal responsibility (including criminal) and sometimes in the form of violation of even basic human rights and freedoms.

Such shadow norms directly concern, in particular, the issues of migrants and refugees (phenomena that have arisen as a result of local problems and globalization at the same time). Thus, the majority of EU Member States have been demonstrated comprehensive tolerance and till certain time have been implemented an "open door" policy, not taking into account the fact that migrants and refugees often create compact human settlements (which complicate assimilation). Within such locations, it is often the social rules and moral stereotypes of the host country not dominate, as a stable group of people tries to live by "their own laws" in another country. These rules of conduct are frequently occupied a competing position not only with the social standards of the host country, but also with its legislation. And tellingly, most often, they win in this opposition. This is hardly a surprise to scientists who are investigating the issues of shadow rules creation, because "the relevant community may be a village, a nation, an ethnic or religious group, or an organization such as a political party, legislature, or state bureaucracy" [Helmke & Levitsky 2003: 26]. But this argument has long been unpopular in the policy of "open doors", although on its basis it was possible to prevent enormous number of problems, using a greater extent promoting of assimilation; replacing in time the informal rules of a certain community by their own rules of behavior; suppressing behaviors that are in clear contradict to national legislation. And finally, using more balanced approach to the criteria of migration policy.

But now, when it becomes obvious that shadow norms among migrants have become so all-encompassing, and public policy oftentimes becomes powerless against them, the fight not rarely begins to be carried out completely anti-legal methods, including an infringement of the basic human rights (such as the right to security and even to life, which is observed when states in the face of their bodies deliberately refuse to save drowning refugees). But this could have been avoided if shadow norms in the global context had been investigated in advance, rather than post-factum! Whereas "in order to draw "general lessons" from the transformation processes so far, the challenge of diversity has to be faced, and more inductive analysis has to be done of the variety of experiences that have surfaced" [Chavance 2008: 58-59].

One of the greatest amounts of shadow norms are concentrated, probably, in economy, and find external expression in shadow economy which in the modern world is in the public eye. The issue is truly transnational and one that requires effective action. So, "the vast majority of UK taxpayers pay what they owe, but a small minority seek to evade or avoid paying their fair share" [www.gov.uk 2016]. what does that say about developing countries, where the shadow economy is almost a sad norm of life, covering government officials, business at all levels and ordinary citizens. In particular, according to various estimates from 60 to 80% of the economy of Ukraine are in the shadows. This state of the economic system threatens the stability of society, its development, undermines the material component, without which it is impossible to implement any state programs and social initiatives.

Moreover, shadow norms in the economic sphere have reached their apogee, representing a fairly formalized and structured instructions. Firms offering illegal cash-out services (essentially tax evasion) have a so-called "financial discipline" that public authorities might envy. With stunning detail, it is indicated in what terms customers must provide documentation for cashing in, in what order and form. These rules are well-known and widely used, that is, it can be recognized as a classic shadow law.

However, in fairness it should be noted that the motivation in minimizing taxation differs from one entity to another. In a completely fair statement, "one way of identifying informal institutions is to look for instances in which the similar formal rules produce different outcomes and then attribute that difference to informal institutions" [Helmke & Levitsky 2003: 26]. Thus, it is easy to see that small and medium-sized businesses minimize their taxes banal in order to survive, since the tax legislation of Ukraine provides for a sufficiently high burden on enterprises (up to 80% of income [www.ubc.ua/Links/tax.html 2019]) in combination with the most complicated procedure of their administration and minimum of social guarantees for the country population. In addition, if we take into account that lending for business in Ukraine is available only at a rate of at least 20% per annum, tax evasion becomes, though illegal, but understandable and to some extent logical phenomenon. It is a product of the low economic and social conditionality of law. Big business is completely different. Tax evasion in this sector of the economy occurs more out of inertia, as well as to maximize profits. Accordingly, the fight against these shadow norms cannot occur in the same way, using the same means.

It is necessary to separate outwardly identical manifestations occurring for different reasons, and approach to their decision with different mechanisms. Thus, in most cases it is quite sufficient to eliminate the prerequisites for the existence of these phenomena. While legal liability should be treated as a last resort and be engaged or

in the case when the elimination of the reasons did not help, or in the case of absolutely unacceptable activities for the state. There is no doubt that this criterion is quite subjective and will vary significantly depending on the specific state, but in a globalized society in the near future, states need to be ready to develop at least partially unified criteria. Such as, in economy, as an example, can be cited actions aimed at to hide or disguise the origin of funds derived from illegal activity.

It should be mentioned that sometimes the state itself plays not last role in the formation of shadow norms. Periodically shadow methods (to a certain extent by passing the law) are used by state bodies, which in general creates a negative practice, as it forms the illusion that the state can do what ordinary subjects of law cannot do according to the strict legislation of this country [Nienaber 09.09.2019]. However, with regard to the cited resource, at the same time, it should be noted that it is possible to argue about the methods, but globally this mechanism was used for the benefit of the investment climate and the financial well-being of the state. But not all shadow norms emanating from the state are as harmless as in this particular example. Therefore, the use of shadow regulation by the state blurs the line between what is allowed and what is not allowed, which ultimately makes informal norms even more dangerous.

In modern society, the focus of shadow rules is politics, including international. And researchers not in vain argued, that "in some cases, the relevant community [for creation informal norms] is a political elite, the boundaries of which may be difficult to define" [Helmke & Levitsky 2003: 26]. "In electoral democracy, participation based on any of these types of preferences is valued. Voters are asked for outcomes, not reasons. ... In rulemaking, the formal legal requirements of data-driven analysis, reason-giving, and consideration of alternatives reduce the risk of outcomes that are "wrong" because of low-information, low-thought decision-making" [Farina, Newhart & Heidt 2012: 135-136]. And politicians are happy to achieve the results, without taking into account the reasons and the means used. This is what allows us to discover in politics perhaps the most fundamental and ingrained layer of shadow norms.

Moreover, political shadow rules can be defined as the most "viral" and prone to the greatest spread. In addition, they easily penetrate to the supranational level. So, J. Greenwood and C. Roederer-Rynning more recently conducted a representative and revealing analysis of shadow norms in the EU legislative process [Greenwood & Roederer-Rynning 2019]. Attempts to minimize shadow influence and shadow agreements are also actively discussed [Laloux & Delreux 2018; Kohler-Koch & Quittkat 2013].

Consequently, "transformation processes occur within the social and power relations at the global level as part of the struggle and the endeavour to establish a new structural order" [Akşit 2006: 20], and shadow regulation is actively involved in this process. As has been demonstrated in this scientific work, as a result of globalization, there is practically no sphere of public life that would not be "affected" by shadow norms. And, it is argued, the fight against informal rules should be carried out, taking into account the social sphere of their distribution, the national or international aspect (manifestation in another legal system or even at the supranational level), as well as the degree of public danger. Moreover, preventive measures (ideally not by legal methods) should prevail over combat measures of a legal nature, including criminal liability.

CONCLUSIONS

The conducted scientific research raises questions that are relevant at the moment for the absolute majority of countries in the world, because, as practice clearly demonstrates, shadow norms are a problem not only for developing countries, but also for recognized world leaders. In addition to the "internal" shadow regulation, which is "a product of one social and legal system, it is supplemented by new informal norms from the outside, which occurs as a result of globalization and convergence of law. Borrowed norms are always more difficult to deal with because they are "alien" to a particular system. This means that the tools of counteraction "grow" not together with the shadow rules of behavior, but must be formed quickly, spontaneously or also borrowed from another social and(or) legal system. Of course, for these purposes, legal comparative studies should rise to a fundamentally different level. But the theory of legal and social systems should not stand still either. In particular, the development of the essence, types and levels of shadow norms, depending on the criterion of their public danger, will be aimed at structuring methods of countering and "playing ahead" in the process of globalization.

In particular, it should be noted that informal norms may not contradict "explicitly" the letter of the law, but it is necessary to contradict its spirit. That is, the commitment to shadow regulation in any case indicates a low level of legal awareness of a certain subject.

Shadow norms have different degrees of danger, although in general all of them can be characterized as a negative phenomenon in the legal system. But on truly dangerous can be recognize only "illegal", although even they in certain conditions can fulfill positive role (function) and to point to shortcomings of legislator.

The fight against shadow norms should be carried out in stages. First of all, the causes of their occurrence should be scanned and leveled. As a rule, it helps to get rid of a significant part of the" household" shadow norms. And most often these reasons are visualized in a non-legal plane. Although legal and non-legal mechanisms work most effectively in a complex. A firm legal response is appropriate if the causes are neutralized, and the negative model remains (either because of its extreme profitability, or as a negative stereotype). In this case, legal liability may be the right decision.

Shadow norms are a dangerous phenomenon even within one legal system, but the globalized world presents us with new challenges, since shadow manifestations, as well as other cultural and anti-cultural phenomena, tend to spread and reveal themselves in other states and even at the supranational level.

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MIGRATION PROCESSES IN MODERN UKRAINIAN-POLISH DISCOURSE

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Abstract

The purpose of the article is to determine the specifics of Ukrainian-Polish discourse on migration processes, that consists in symbolic interactions as depictions of state policies, at the centre of which is human capital and strategies for its conversion. The preservation and development of its human capital in the context of globalization movements is a question of protection of national interests and the capacity of the economic foundations of society for Ukraine and Poland. Migration processes, as an objective indicator of a globalized world, are political in nature and can be the result of state policy, both as a country of motivation for migration and as a concerted action of states that are interested in getting a new human capital. External and internal factors of migration of Ukrainians through the prism of state decisions, the state of

social protection of the population, educational opportunities and business prospects for youth are actualized in the conditions of increasing interest in the renewal of the human capital of Poland.

Key words: *Ukraine, Poland, migration of Ukrainians, state policy, migration policy*

INTRODUCTION

Global and local strategies for the development of political territories in the XXI century are formed and implemented around the instruments of human capital conservation and management. It is a limited resource that can accumulate, convert, reproduce in new forms, change its liquidity, determine the state of the world order and influence in it intergovernmental political institutions, states of the world, global cities and public institutions. Migration processes, as an objective indicator of a globalized world, are political in nature and can be the result of state policy, both as a country of motivation for migration and as a concerted action of states that are interested in getting a new human capital. External and internal factors of migration of Ukrainians through the prism of state decisions, the state of social protection of the population, educational opportunities and business prospects for youth are actualized in the conditions of increasing interest in the renewal of the human capital of Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Russia, Germany, Romania.

Comprehensive analysis of current migration processes in Ukraine, theoretical and applied labour aspects of migration, assessment of the extent of migration and the impact on the demographic, social, economic, political development, forecasting migration processes, immigration studies in Ukraine and integration of immigrants became the subject of scientific research of Ukrainian scientists Dragunova T., Libanova E., Malinovskaya O., Poznyak O., Homra O. and a number of researchers: demographers, political scientists, internationals.

Global trends in the development of the world indicate a further increase in population mobility and the intensity of migration processes. For example, migration in Ukraine has intensified over the past 25 years, and its trends and types have changed. The signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and obtaining the visa-free regime in 2017 became a catalyst for a plethora of reforms, including the field of migration policy. However, the annexation of Crimea and the war in the East of Ukraine caused substantial forced movement of the population, economic crisis and changes in migration flows abroad. In particular, under modern conditions, migration processes not only affect the economy, society, development of the state as a whole, but also become the result of the state policy in various fields of public life and an indicator of the effectiveness of state institutions. In addition, migration processes can influence the discourse between states by strengthening strategic partnerships or vice versa, with the influence of external actors, reformatting the established system of bilateral relations.

The Ukrainian-Polish discourse on migration processes consists in symbolic interactions as depictions of state policies, at the centre of which is human capital and strategies for its conversion. The preservation and development of its human capital in the context of globalization movements is a question of protection of national interests and the capacity of the economic foundations of society for Ukraine and Poland. The specifics of such discourse and the assumptions about further

trends in migration processes have become the subject of author's scientific exploration.

1. MIGRATION PROCESSES IN UKRAINE AND THE SCENARIOS OF THEIR DEVELOPMENT

The task of regulating migration in modern Ukraine is becoming increasingly relevant and is considered among the strategic priorities of state policy, due to the spread of the negative results of the migration movement, its irreversibility for the productive part of the population. The migration situation in Ukraine in recent years has become a relatively independent factor, exacerbating the imbalances of economic and social development in certain regions and the country as a whole. There is an urgent need to develop and implement effective public policies aimed at preventing migration losses and minimizing the negative effects of migration.

Migration trends are dependent on a complex of factors, the level of which determines its current intensity and prospective indicators. In order to determine the degree of influence of key factors on the intensity of migration movements and migration balance, the tool of correlation-regression analysis has been used. The subject of the analysis is to investigate the impact of social, economic and political factors on the process, forecasting indicators, that characterize migration in Ukraine.

Migration processes are an indicator of the impact of socio-economic, political, national, religious, military factors under which the number of displaced people increases. It is related to a permanent or temporary change of residence for non-population dependent causes.

The key economic indicators that influence migration processes are gross value added; gross value added per person; capital investments; foreign investments; budget revenues; budget expenditures; consumer price index; volume of production; volume of sales; investments in fixed capital; export-import of goods and services, etc. Among the most important social indicators that are indicators of the development of migration processes are the following: human development index; population and its structural indicators; natural population growth; income of the population; the level of economic activity, the number of unemployed; unemployment rate; average monthly salary; volume of consumption of goods and services, etc.

For a comprehensive assessment of the impact of the economic component of state policy, we consider it advisable to choose *an indicator of capital investment*, which generally characterizes the effectiveness of the economic policy of the state through the dynamics of domestic and foreign investment.

In order to determine the degree of impact of economic indicators on the social sphere of society and to identify symmetrical or unbalanced socio-economic development in the context of a direct factor in the migration activity of the population, it is advisable to analyse the *Human Development Index (HDI)*. The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary indicator for assessing the long-term progress of human development in three main areas: 1) a long and healthy life, 2) access to knowledge, 3) a decent standard of living [UNDP Ukraine 2018].

In order to assess the political situation in the country, it is advisable to analyze the results of the study entitled "Development of democracy in countries in transit (Nations in Transit)". *Development of democracy in countries in transit* (Nations in Transit) is the research and rating that characterize the level of democracy development, the state of

political rights and civil liberties in the European and Asian countries of the former socialist bloc - "countries of transit". In order to assess the political situation in the country, it is advisable to analyse the results of the study "Development of democracy in countries in transit (Nations in Transit)" [Freedom House 2018].

An effective indicator will be the balance of external migration (the difference between the number of persons who arrived in the country and the number of persons who left from there in the same period of time), which directly affects the population of the country and is an indicator of social and social losses, economic state policy and political situation in the country.

The socio-economic and political indicators selected for the study are presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Socio-economic and political indicators influencing the development of migration processes (2002-2017)

Period	External migration balance, thousand people (y)	Capital investment, billion USD (x_1)	Human Development Index (x_2)	Democracy development rating in in countries in transit (1 to 7) (x_3)
2002	-33,791	6,9796	0,689	4,92
2003	-24,210	9,5657	0,699	4,71
2004	-7,615	14,2334	0,706	4,88
2005	4,583	18,1760	0,715	4,50
2006	14,245	24,8028	0,721	4,21
2007	16,838	37,3240	0,729	4,25
2008	14,879	42,7966	0,733	4,25
2009	13,447	19,4728	0,727	4,39
2010	16,133	22,7575	0,733	4,39
2011	17,096	30,3338	0,738	4,61
2012	61,844	34,1949	0,743	4,82
2013	31,913	31,2615	0,745	4,86
2014	21,099	18,4543	0,748	4,93
2015	9,250	12,4961	0,743	4,75
2016	7,846	14,0576	0,746	4,68
2017	8,126	16,8489	0,751	4,61

[Freedom House 2018, UNDP Ukraine 2018, Derzhavna sluzhba statystyky Ukrainy 2018, Derzhavna sluzhba statystyky Ukrainy 2019]

It is advisable to apply mathematical and statistical methods to create a model of migration processes. The study of the impact of external migration balances (in thousands) on selected economic, social and political indicators includes quantitative estimates that can be obtained using correlation-regression models. All factor

indicators ($x_{1...}x_n$) are presented as momentary series of dynamics, so a factor of time must be taken into account in order to correctly interpret the results of the calculations and the obtained relationships. Thus, it is advisable to introduce the indicator t into the model.

In order to identify the dependencies between selected socio-economic indicators affecting the development of migration processes and the balance of external migration, it is advisable to identify the correlation between two characteristics: the balance of external migration and capital investment, the index of human development, the rating of the development of democracy in countries in transit. Determining pair dependencies is a necessary step in the study of complex multi-factor relationships. The practical importance of paired dependencies is that from the set of all factors in the first stage, the most important are distinguished and their impact on the change in the performance indicator is evaluated.

Previously calculations show that capital investment, human development index, rating of democracy development in transition countries have a more significant impact on the external migration balance. This conclusion was made on the basis of the analysis of the correlation matrices of each equation, the calculation of the relative error of approximation (should be low) and the coefficient of determination (should be high) and the MNC index (should be maximum). Thus, the correlation matrix of correlation analysis to identify the dependencies between these indicators has the following form, which is presented in table 2.

Table 2: Correlation matrix for indicators: external migration balance (y), capital investment (x_1), human development index (x_2), democracy development rating in in countries in transit (x_3)

	y	x_1	x_2	x_3	t
y	1	0,697300	0,755659	-0,118090	0,566950
x_1	0,697300	1	0,419013	-0,496350	0,124313
x_2	0,755659	0,419013	1	-0,036930	0,942704
x_3	-0,118090	-0,496350	-0,036930	1	0,164401
t	0,566950	0,124313	0,942704	0,164401	1

[Freedom House 2018, UNDP Ukraine 2018, Derzhavna sluzhba statystyky Ukrainy 2018, Derzhavna sluzhba statystyky Ukrainy 2019]

The correlation between external migration balance (y) and capital investment (x_1) is high positive (0.6773), external migration balance (y) and human development index (x_2) is very high positive (0.7557), the external migration balance (y) and the rating of democracy in transition countries (x_3) are weakly negative (0.1181). The coefficients indicate a close relationship between the indicators and confirm the accuracy of the chosen model.

The paired dependencies presented here indicate that there is a rather complicated complex effect of a number of factors on the external migration balance (y). Therefore, complex multivariate econometric models are modelled along with pair dependencies. Let us analyse what degree of influence on the external migration balance (y) have

the indicators: capital investment (x_1), human development index (x_2), rating of democracy development in transition countries (x_3).

The optimal approximation of the generated dependence is represented by a multivariate regression dependence, which is calculated in the form of linear regression and meets the criteria of statistical probability and accuracy, and the choice of factor traits is determined by the density of paired dependencies.

All the metrics presented collectively determine the external migration balance (y), so multiple regression models calculated in the form of linear dependencies may be more objective:

$$y = -1743,842 + 0,323x_1 + 2326,985x_2 + 22,624x_3 - 6,297t$$

where y – the balance of external migration, thousand people;

x_1 – capital investments, UAH billion;

x_2 – human development index;

x_3 – rating of development of democracy in the countries of transition (from 1 to 7);

t – the time factor.

The multiple determination factor (R^2) is 0,81, so the resultant factor-dependent indicator is 81,0%. The multiple correlation coefficient of 0,9 indicates a strong (close) relationship between the indicators. That is, in aggregate, all factors included in the model, by 81,0%, determine changes in the balance of external migration, with the factor x_2 (human development index) having the most significant stimulating influence. The minimal relative error of approximation and the high coefficient of determination indicate a close correlation between the indicators and a high level of statistical accuracy. A high level of certainty indicate that the model can be used for analysis. If capital investment increases by $ 1 billion, the external migration balance increases on average by 0.323 thousand. If the index of human development increases, the balance of external migration on average increases by 2326,985 thousand. If the rating of the development of democracy in the countries of transition (from 1 to 7) increases, the balance of external migration on the average increases by 22,624 thousand people.

The analysis has confirmed a high degree of dependence of migration indicators on effective public policy aimed at ensuring a high standard and quality of life, effective use of human potential, ensuring a comfortable social environment for the population. Thus, the obtained calculation method allows to estimate the external and internal capabilities of the country to form and strengthen its economic potential, which is necessary for a sustainable increase of the gross value added, growth of industrial and agricultural production, strengthening of the national economy in order to provide a real basis for improving the standard of living of the Ukrainian population.

Among the factors that have the greatest impact on the balance of external migration, and those whose impact is justified on the basis of the calculations, the most influential is the human development index. This once again confirms the need to develop effective tools of public and contractual regulation of social and economic spheres. Thus, the development and use of labour potential, which depends directly on the implementation of programs and concepts (including strategies for demographic development, directions of development of labour potential contained in the current legislation), state and regional employment programs, improving the level

and quality of life of the population, creating conditions the interest to live and work in Ukraine, will reduce the negative migration trends, slow down the outflow of economically active population outside the state. Recommendations, measures and programs to implement these documents should be the basis of state policy.

In order to build scenarios for the development of migration processes in Ukraine, let's make a prediction of the migration intensity coefficient and the migration balance for 2018-2025.

There are three scenarios for the development of migration processes in Ukraine in accordance with the future tendencies of its socio-economic development: realistic, pessimistic and optimistic.

Scenario 1 is realistic: if the main indicators of economic development in Ukraine in the long run stabilize at the level of 2016-2017 (do not improve significantly), the transition of temporary external labor migration into irreversible form will increase, the magnitude of departure abroad will increase. There will be a diversification of the geography of migration from Ukraine, in particular some of the people who work in Poland will try (after consolidation in the Schengen area) to find work in more prosperous EU countries, first of all in Germany. Intensive migration processes throughout the country will also be observed.

Scenario 2 is pessimistic: if the socio-economic situation worsens, migration from Ukraine will be even more intense, with the departure of highly qualified specialists. Under these conditions, it is possible to stop reducing the number of people working in Russia, since even this area of labour migration will remain economically viable.

Scenario 3 is optimistic: in the terms of socio-economic development and improvement of the internal situation, the scale of long-term labour migration is stabilizing. If the policy is implemented, some long-term migrants may be returned gradually. At the same time, the flow of immigrants from the Afro-Asian region to Ukraine will increase. Over time, Ukraine will be able to make a 'migration transition', to transform itself from a donor country of population and labor into a recipient country, as has already happened with Southern European countries and is now happening in a number of Eastern European countries.

Thus, problems related to migration processes require complex actions and implementation of systematic strategic measures aimed at solving them. strategic management is forward-looking and creates an opportunity for timely response by public policy instruments to the changes that are taking place in the economic, social and political spheres. Therefore, the solution of migration problems requires the development and implementation of strategic directions of state policy adjustment in the context of preserving the human capital of Ukraine, aimed at promoting the socio-economic development of the country's territories; job creation; improving the investment climate; more efficient use of the intellectual potential and human resources of the country.

2. ARE THE UKRAINIAN MIGRANTS IN POLAND THE LOCOMOTIVE OF POLISH ECONOMY OR "OVERRUN"?

World trends indicate a further intensification of migration processes, in particular, the burning issue for most countries of the world is the loss of human capital and the searching for ways to preserve and replenish it. Migration from Ukraine is the result of both state policy, including migration, of Ukraine, and of the policies of the

neighbouring countries. Ukraine and its human resources are an attractive target for the policies of its immediate neighbours, who seek to replenish and strengthen their human capital with minimal risk and expense.

The dynamics of migration of Ukrainians is influenced by external and internal factors, among which the most important are the state policy of Ukraine in various spheres of public life and the state policies of the recipient countries, which aim to increase human capital at the expense of expatriates and labour migrants.

Since Ukraine gained independence, migration processes within the country and abroad have not been the subject of analysis and condition for adjustment of state policy. Under current conditions, since 2017 due to the visa-free regime with the European Union, the opportunities for international mobility of Ukrainians have increased significantly.

Migration flows from Ukraine have different vectors and causes that determine the direction of movement. After the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the war in Donbass, the migration flow to Poland increased significantly.

The main external factor in the migration of Ukrainians is Poland's state policy on overcoming the demographic crisis within the country. Thus, according to the average of the latest UN forecast (2017 report), Poland's population will decrease by almost 17 million by the end of the century [United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2017].

Given the low likelihood of fertility increases and the nation's "aging" processes, migration is perhaps the only real way for Poland to maintain population numbers at current level, to conserve and increase its own human resources. According to estimates, to maintain the current population, "old Europe" (EU-15) should attract over 47 years 47 million immigrants (949 thousand per year) [United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2017]. Under these conditions, population decline and labour shortages make these countries more open to immigration, and their state migration policies are not just pragmatic, but selective and aimed primarily at attracting highly skilled migrants.

At the same time, the situation inside Ukraine creates conditions for the growth of migration flows to other countries or within Ukraine itself.

Poland, which receives the largest migration flows from Ukraine, is the closest neighbour and has many things in common – language closeness, similarities of minds, compactly living national minorities, common history and historical memory, family ties and origin. These factors create favourable conditions for Poland's migration policy towards Ukraine. The state migration policy of Poland is a deliberate complex of measures, decisions and actions of the institutions of power to encourage Ukrainians to move, especially repatriation of their compatriots, in order to replenish their human capital and labor resources [Nagornyak T., Pachos I. 2018: 24].

After 2014, Poland became the main destination for migrants from Ukraine, including labour and educational migrants. Ukraine and Poland are linked by territorial, linguistic, cultural proximity, common history and historical memory, good neighbourly relations and mutual support in the international arena. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, migration processes between countries intensified.

Among the reasons why Ukrainians choose Poland as their destination is higher wages than in Ukraine, higher standards of living than in Ukraine, lack of adequate work in Ukraine, better social conditions, safe living conditions [Pomorskie 2018].

The National Bank of Poland conducted a large-scale survey on Ukrainian migrants to Poland in 2015. The hypothesis that the increase in the wave of migrants from Ukraine occurred due to a sharp deterioration of political and economic situation in Ukraine was confirmed. Therefore, Ukrainians who had never left Ukraine before, including people from the occupied territories of Ukraine, started to migrate to Poland. Forty one point three percent of respondents came to Poland for the first time in order to find a job in 2014–2015 [Narodowy Bank Polski 2016].

It is worth noting that over the last 15 years this country has been solving the problem of outflow of its citizens to the EU countries and is keenly lacking in labour. Despite the recent spread of anti-immigrant sentiment in Poland, many Poles still understand the crucial role of Ukrainian immigrants in their country's economy [Bartczak B. 2018]. After all, Ukrainians actually occupy jobs that have become vacant as a result of widespread departure of Poles to EU countries with higher wages. According to the results of the study of the company Employment and Consulting Work Service, a third of Polish firms face problems in the recruitment, especially of the representatives of the working professions [Pomorskie 2018]. 39% of companies plan to hire Ukrainians.

The growth of the Polish economy and the interest of Polish employers determine the state policy of Poland to increase the opportunities for employment and relocation of Ukrainians to Poland. The migration of Ukrainians aimed at finding employment in neighbouring state can be divided into two unequal groups [Malynovska O. A. 2015]. The first one is a relatively small group of people who get employed for a long period of time, including professionals, teachers, doctors and skilled workers. In addition, Poland promotes and encourages employment of such people. After all, these are categories of people who are not required to obtain a work permit.

The second category is Ukrainian labourers who work seasonally and temporarily in Poland. There was a simplified procedure of obtaining work permit until 2018. For instance, about 763 thousand work permits (788 thousand of their total) were granted to the Ukrainians in 2015 [Narodowy Bank Polski, 2016]. This indicator exceeded the indicator of 2013 by 104,5%, and in the previous years it barely exceeded the level of 200 thousand. In order to reduce the percentage of illegal employment since January 1, 2018, the procedure for obtaining permits for seasonal and temporary work has been changed and become paid. However, the employment permit for seasonal work is valid for 9 months, and its registration is much simpler than usual.

With the introduction of the visa-free regime of Ukraine with the EU, Ukrainians are given another opportunity for simplified employment in Poland. Holders of biometric passports entering Poland without a visa are entitled to work temporarily without issuing a work permit, but only based on an employer application registered with the local authority. Since 2007, this application has been the basis for obtaining a 6-month work visa during the calendar year for citizens of the Eastern Partnership countries and Russia. However, now biometric passport holders can independently, without intermediaries and bypass visa procedures, seek employment after arriving in Poland. If they plan to do so for longer than the 90-day visa-free entry, they need to contact the Foreign Office for an extension of their stay.

However, the provision on the legal work of foreigners in Poland for a period of a minimum of 5 years under a valid visa and/or a residence permit for a specific period

of time is still in force. It provides the foreigner with the right to apply for the issuance of a residence permit at the place of residence. At the same time, in December 2017, the President of Poland signed a law which provides the foreigners from outside of the EU with the right to obtain a certificate for temporary residence in Poland under the condition of transferring a company from another state to Poland [Rzeczpospolita 2017]. Such step is aimed at creating new jobs.

Apart from the above-mentioned measures of the state policy of Poland, it should be emphasized that the entry into force of the Act on the Pole's Card of 2008 was the most important strategic step in the Polish policy of attracting migrants. The Pole's Card was introduced in order to compensate for the moral and material losses of former Polish citizens and their descendants who were forcefully moved outside the borders of their homeland due to the change of borders. The law facilitates the provision of the Pole's Card to citizens of the CIS and Baltic States. This document provides an opportunity to obtain a long-term, multiple-entry national visa free of charge, as well as D type Schengen Visa after the accession of Poland to the Schengen zone that allows moving freely in Europe.

In fact, the Pole's Card is an effective tool for restoring human and labour resources of Poland. It has several advantages (the possibility of staying in Poland without a work permit; legal employment without a work permit; doing business under the same conditions as Polish citizens; free medical care; free higher education; 37 percent discount on travel by train, etc.) which make it desirable for Ukrainians.

At the end of 2017, the Act on the Pole's Card was amended. A certain simplification was introduced, with the person wanting to obtain the Pole's Card no longer required to prove the fact of their ancestors' Polish citizenship. It is now sufficient to prove that the person or their ancestors are of Polish origin, or evidence three years of activity in organizations of the Polish national minority [Internetowy System Aktów Prawnych 2017].

In total, according to the estimates of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, 101,000 937 Ukrainian citizens received a Pole card from 2008 to 2017. As of 2008, as a rule, 8.5-10 thousand citizens of Ukraine received a Pole card every year. Instead, during 2016 - 2017 there was an increase in the number of documents issued to Ukrainian citizens - more than 13 thousand annually [Ukrinform, 2018]. And in June 2019, the President of Poland, Andrzej Duda, signed amendments to the law on the Pole Map, which provide for this document to be extended to all countries of the world. According to the Prime Minister of Poland, Michal Dworczyk, "extending the Pole's card to the whole world should serve to return Poles to Poland. It is estimated that around 20 million Poles live in the world, about 1-1.5 million of whom live in the countries of the former Soviet Union, the rest in Europe and America, and the Polar Map will be largely distributed to them" [Konkurent, 2019]. Such expansion of the field of influence of the Pole card indicates that the Pole card during the years of its existence and operation in the 15 countries abroad of Poland, which emerged or recovered after the collapse of the USSR, has become a truly effective tool for replenishing Poland's own human capital.

In recent years, Poland has been constantly changing its procedure for obtaining citizenship: until 2012, Polish citizenship could only be obtained by decision of the President of the country. Since 2012, the rules have changed - a foreigner can be recognized as a citizen if he or she fulfills certain criteria and applies for citizenship.

For example, from August 2012, a Polish citizen can acquire a foreigner who has lived in the country for 3 years (previously it was 5) on the basis of a permanent residence permit, knows Polish, has a stable income and housing, and in 2016 acquired changes that allow Polish nationals to obtain Polish citizenship within a year of permanent residence in Poland. In fact, Poland has legalized dual citizenship, because no legal act provides for a waiver of the previous one. In February 2018, a new mandatory criterion for obtaining Polish citizenship was introduced - passing the B1 proficiency test. This requirement complicates the citizenship procedure somewhat, and it also applies to those applying for EU long-term resident status.

Nowadays, the Polish state policy is aimed at attracting human resources from abroad, especially due to migration crisis in the EU and reluctance to host refugees from Muslim countries. Migrants from Ukraine have become the instrument of manipulation for Polish politicians in disputes with the EU concerning the distribution of Middle Eastern migrants. Due to the large number of migrants from Ukraine, including those who left the territory due to military actions in the East of Ukraine, Poland claims to have grounds for refusing the acceptance of other foreigners. For example, at the beginning of February 2018, Polish Prime Minister M. Moraviecki on CNN stated that Poland allegedly welcomes tens of thousands of refugees from the Donbass region, where the war is ongoing [Kacprzak I. 2018]. However, in 2017, Poland granted refugee status to 56 Ukrainians, not tens of thousands. Thus, Poland is trying to refuse asylum to Middle Eastern refugees.

Social reasons (family ties, family reunion). For instance, there is a special procedure for foreigners in Polish legislation that provides family members of foreign citizens, who legally reside in a European Union member state, with the right to move and reside in the corresponding country in order to preserve family unity, in other words, the family reunification policy.

As for the social direction of state policy in Poland, the Polish legislation provides a special procedure for foreigners that provides family members of foreign citizens, who legally reside in a European Union member state, with the right to move and reside in the corresponding country in order to preserve family unity, in other words, the family reunification policy [HFHR, 2016].

In the cultural sphere Poland conducts an active policy of repatriation. In 2000, the Sejm of the Republic of Poland adopted the law on repatriation, which determined the procedure for the return of Poles to their homeland. In 2017, the law was amended in order to simplify the procedure and conditions for the return of Poles. A "repatriate" was defined as a person who arrived in Poland on the basis of a Polish national visa and intended to stay in this country permanently. In addition, a special state institution that deals with repatriates as well as centres for linguistic adaptation, providing financial assistance, housing and tax benefits, were established [Internetowy System Aktów Prawnych 2017]. 260 repatriates from Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Ukraine returned to Poland in 2017 [Polske radio, 2017]. Due to the changes in the repatriation law, it is anticipated that the number of the returning Poles will increase.

In terms of attracting educational migrants, Poland has also been successful thanks to a purposeful state policy of recruiting campaigns, granting scholarships for higher education, internships for scholars and degree holders, creating preferential conditions for entry and education of Pole card holders and more. The number of

Ukrainian students in Poland has been steadily increasing, especially since 2014. Studies on foreign students in Poland (including Ukrainians) and graduates of Polish universities find that Ukrainians are predominantly planning to stay in Poland or other EU countries, and only a small number are planning to return to Ukraine [CEDOS, 2018].

Nowadays, Ukrainian migrants are filling gaps in the Polish labour market, paying taxes and supporting the Polish economy, with virtually no integration support. Regular studies are being conducted on the attitude of Poles to particular peoples, including Ukrainians. In its research, the Institute of Public Affairs indicated an increase in positive attitudes towards Ukrainians from 2000 to 2013. But their latest research shows that sympathies have declined by 20% compared to 2013 [Kucharczyk J., Łada A. 2018]. Such changes can be explained by the "policy of historical memory" that the party "Right and Justice" has been implementing in relation to Ukraine since coming to power in 2015. In addition, anti-Ukrainian rhetoric of some politicians has intensified since 2014, and the reluctance of some of the society to accept the growing significant presence of Ukrainian citizens on the Polish labour market has increased. This situation exacerbated the old stereotypes about Ukrainians - the "culprits of the Volyn' tragedy", "he lowest-skilled workers", "the Ukrainian-domestic workers" and gave rise to a number of new ones, such as "come out", "return to your Ukraine", "Ukrainians take jobs in Poles". Although Ukrainians in Poland have long ceased to fill only the niche of low-skilled jobs, the success stories of Ukrainian men and women who have built careers in Poland are increasing [Iwaniuk O. 2019].

In addition to the fact that the ruling party "Right and Justice" is flirting with the marginalized population on nationalist sentiments and Polish messianism, anti-Ukrainian sentiment has intensified at the expense of external actors since 2014.

With the onset of the war in eastern Ukraine, the Russian Federation has stepped up its influence to strengthen anti-Ukrainian sentiment, thus continuing the hybrid war against Ukraine. Typical measures used by Russia for anti-Ukrainian influence in Poland (as well as anti-Polish in Ukraine) are: support for certain political forces; vandalism regarding Ukrainian monuments in Poland and Polish in Ukraine; street actions (marches, protests, etc.); hooliganism against diplomatic missions (Polish in Ukraine); explosions and other attempts at small terrorist acts; information manipulation: Internet controls, fakes, alternative media, attacks on computers of Polish agencies from Ukrainian servers, etc. [Zarembo K. 2019].

This is the latest tool to become the most effective in the age of the Internet and social networks. Russia is spreading anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland through online controls and some niche portals, the most famous of which is Kresy.pl (in Polish expert circles, the site is jokingly called Kresy.ru). Founded in 2008, the site has grown in popularity since 2014, when publications on Euromaidan, Crimea and Donbass began to appear there.

The results of a 2017 survey conducted by the Polish Ukrainians Association with the assistance of Stefan Bacteria's Fund, testify that after 2014 the amount of information containing hate speech has begun to increase rapidly and the destruction of graves for rallies and deliberate slander aside Ukrainian leaders have intensified [Mniejszość ukraińska i migranci z Ukrainy w Polsce Analiza dyskursu. Związek Ukraińców w Polsce, 2018]. Western politicians and journalists draw attention to

this, but in Poland, because of the dominance of historical narrative in Ukrainian-Polish discourse, it is often ignored the fact, that history has become an element of the anti-Ukrainian information war. For example, half and more comments are negative concerning the information about Polish-Ukrainian history on the Internet. However, if the topic is about the economy, then there are only 20% of negative thoughts about Ukrainians.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Assessing the indicators of economic, social and political development, forecasting scenarios for the migration processes of Ukraine, the extent of migration of Ukrainians to Poland, the state policy of Poland, especially policy in particular directions, the authors come to the following conclusions.

1. Quantitative analysis of the dependence of the migration movement on economic, social and political factors based on the construction of the appropriate economic and mathematical model, determination and comparison of the direction and degree of influence of each of the selected factors, can be the basis for forecasting of three scenarios of the migration movement dynamics in Ukraine, each of which is conditioned by the probable performance of socio-economic policies.

2. Migration processes (in particular, external ones) are the result of public policies. On the one hand, a negative migration balance is an indicator of weakness, inconsistency of the state policy of the donor country. On the other, it is the result of an effective state migration policy of the recipient country. The decrease or increase in the number of migrants is the result of socio-economic, educational, migration state policies.

3. According to both official and unofficial estimates over the last 10-12 years, migration of Ukrainians to Poland has more than doubled. This is facilitated by the clear policy and deliberate strategy of the Polish state institutions on the restoration of human capital, replenishment of labour resources, rejuvenation of the nation, survival and further strengthening of the Polish economy at the expense of the gradually assimilated migrants.

4. Discourse of historical memory dominates in the Ukrainian-Polish discourse. In addition, the intervention of an external actor, the Russian Federation, in the formation of anti-Ukrainian feelings in Poland leads to a deterioration of the situation of Ukrainian migrants, a lack of support for their integration into Polish society, and a decrease of their personal security level during their stay in Poland.

5. The question of human capital maintaining and providing of the sufficient opportunities for development and conversion to a real national value is now facing public institutions in both Ukraine and Poland. Global migration trends demonstrate the outflow of human capital to global cities and comfortable living areas. Reduction of national population and depletion of the intellectual capital of the nation-states is an actual trend of the countries of Eastern Europe.

Summarizing the different points of view on the factors that influence the formation, conservation and development of human capital, as well as the factors that affect the migration of Ukrainians, in particular the Polish state policy, we can formulate a number of recommendations for an adjustment of the state policy in the context of preservation of Ukraine's human capital:

1. Alignment of national legislation in the field of development and preservation of human capital in accordance with the international normative legal acts. Development of a national strategy for the development and preservation of human capital for five years and a plan for its implementation, considering migration threats.

2. Realization of a census in order to determine the real population size and structure. Assessment of the current demographic status of Ukraine will be the basis for the most effective reforms and measures in all spheres of country life.

3. Development of the own model of migration processes in Ukraine, especially the model of external migration. Ukraine should concentrate on the mechanisms of detention and return of migrants, as well as the support and protection of the rights and freedoms of Ukrainian migrants abroad, in particular in Poland.

4. Implementation of mechanisms of return and support of repatriates, providing them with decent living and working conditions. In particular, to provide benefits and support for scientists by means of creation conditions for realization their intellectual potential for the benefit of Ukraine.

5. Creating a program and mechanisms for the return and transfer of business of migrant workers to Ukraine, as well as for businesses of foreign citizens (tax benefits, simplified procedures for obtaining residence and citizenship certificates).

6. Design of a strategy of the state sustainable innovative development and a mechanism for providing it with personnel. Creating favorable and safe conditions for foreign investment. Supporting small and medium-sized businesses to create new workplaces, especially in small cities, as well as developing self-employment.

7. Development of the measures for birth rates increase and mortality rates decrease, life expectancy increase through the promotion of healthy lifestyle and improvement of material well-being and living conditions.

8. Reformation of secondary, vocational and higher education. Reduction of the gap between secondary education and higher education. Program introduction for the support of the development of science in higher education institutions (both fundamental and applied) in order to preserve national intellectual capital and attract foreign ones. Creation of the conditions for cooperation of higher education institutions with the business that produces innovative products. Creation of the program to support talented and young scientists, updating the terms of competitions for grants receiving for research, ensuring transparency of such competitions.

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THE ATTITUDES OF POLICE OFFICERS IN GDANSK CITY TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS

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Abstract

The migration crisis in Europe has shown the condition of migration policy in individual countries. In recent years local governments have taken over initiative in the issue of immigrant integration which used to be the responsibility of governments. The article analyses the Immigrant Integration Model introduced by the Gdansk authorities, a programme addressed to immigrants living in the city, which is innovative in Polish conditions. The research conducted among officers of the Municipal Police Headquarters is described, in which attitudes and opinions about immigrants residing in Gdansk were checked. Postulates of officers, the implementation of which may improve the safety of immigrants, were analysed.

Key words: *migration crisis in Europe, public opinion, police, Gdansk , Immigrant Integration Model*

INTRODUCTION

Migrations have been part of human history since the dawn of civilisation; they have become a key social, economic and political problem of the 21st century [Kešeľ, Sedlák 2018]. Currently, they can be defined as mass, multidirectional and variable phenomena; according to various criteria they can be divided into, e.g. (a) legal and illegal, (b) forced and voluntary and (c) permanent and temporary. There are various reasons for migration, e.g. economic (the need to change living conditions, to find a new, better-paid job), educational or related to ensuring security (escaping threats, acquiring refugee or asylee status). European countries are seen as rich,

guaranteeing rights and freedoms to individuals, where legal regulations regarding foreigners are clearly defined [Wójcik-Żołądek 2014: 12-17].

At present Europe is dealing with a migration crisis caused by a mass influx of immigrants from the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa to the Member States of the European Union and the European Economic Area. This has been the largest migration wave since World War II. The causes can be found in the civil war in Syria which has lasted since 2011, as a result of which several hundred thousand people have been killed and millions have been forced to leave the country, moreover, increased migration from Libya, caused by the destabilisation of the country after the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi. The main migration routes from Afghanistan, Syria or Eritrea lead through the Mediterranean to Spain and Italy, and the overland route passes through Turkey. Migrants use, among others, one of the three migration routes, the first is the Western Mediterranean Route, leading from Morocco to Spain, the second is the Central Mediterranean Route, leading from Libya and Egypt to Italy, and the last is the Eastern Mediterranean Route from Turkey to Greece [Modrzejewski, Raczyński 2019: 2-3].

The migration crisis has caused severe economic, political, cultural and especially security consequences in European countries. It has revealed the weakness of the European Union institutions, as well as of political ties between the Member States [Modrzejewski 2016: 170]. There are acrimonious political disputes on the European Union forum. This uncontrolled influx of migrants has caused particular controversy in the Visegrad Group countries, including Poland [Mihalik, Jankola 2016].

Debates on the migration crisis became more intense in September and October 2015, i.e. during the campaign before the parliamentary elections. At that time, the topic of refugees was politicised, it was used by the rival parties (Civic Platform - PO and Law and Justice – PiS) to mobilise the electorate, which caused strong polarisation of the Polish society as far as the acceptance of refugees was concerned [Raczyński 2018: 319-320]. The topic became dominant, Internet forums were full of hate speech, in autumn 2015 demonstrations of supporters and opponents of refugee admission to Poland marched through the streets of cities. Michał Bilewicz from the Centre for Research on Prejudice at the University of Warsaw claims that "the so-called refugee crisis in Poland is mainly a crisis of attitudes that are much more a result of fears than of a rational calculation of the benefits and costs associated with the inflow of refugees from the Middle East and Africa" [Bilewicz 2015].

Poland does not have much experience in integrating refugees, however, given the growing number of migrants arriving in Europe, the European Commission adopted a programme of the relocation of around 60,000 people, of which Poland was to receive 3,600. In September 2015, the Commission submitted another proposal in which the number of people to be relocated increased twice to 120,000 people, which obliged Poland to accept over 9,200 people, in addition Poland was compelled to accept 5,000 people from Italy and Greece. The Polish government, headed by Ewa Kopacz, agreed to receive 7,000 refugees. Unfortunately, no compromise was reached with opposition groups that fuelled fear of refugees. The government side clearly declared the admission of refugees, not economic emigrants. This decision was met with harsh criticism of the opposition, Law and Justice accused the government of submission to Brussels and insufficient defence of Poland's interests. The Law and Justice party won the elections held on 25 October 2015, and the new government

led by Prime Minister Beata Szydło finally reneged on the pledge made by its predecessors [Raczyński 2018: 319].

Until the migration crisis in 2015, the issue of refugees did not arouse negative emotions in Poles. A survey conducted by the Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS) in May 2015 showed that Poles demonstrated a significant level of openness to international migration and the presence of foreigners [Kowalczuk 2015: 1-15]. However, already in the second half of 2015 there was a decline in the declared stance and a strong increase in the negative attitude towards refugees. This shift in approach was caused by the way the topic of the migration crisis was presented, it became a political problem. According to a CBOS survey conducted in July 2018, 60% of Poles were against the influx of migrants to Poland. Almost a third of respondents (29%) thought that Poland should accept refugees until they were able to return to their country of origin, and every twentieth (5%) was of the opinion that free arrival and settlement of refugees in Poland should be permitted [Bożewicz 2018: 1-15]. It is important that from May 2015 onwards, respondents participating in cyclical surveys have opposed the plans of the European Commission regarding the relocation of refugees [Łodziński 2017: 84].

Considering the moods accompanying the migration crisis in Europe, I conducted research on the attitude of Polish police officers towards migrants and refugees residing in Poland. The research covered officers working at the City Headquarters in Gdansk. The aim of the study was to demonstrate attitudes of the police force to migrants and refugees, especially to present prejudices and stereotypes occurring in this professional group. It should be borne in mind that Gdansk is a specific place on the map of Poland. It is the first Polish city to create the Immigrant Integration Model, which was developed by a cross-sectoral and interdisciplinary task force on the immigrant integration model, which began its work in May 2015, on the initiative of Mayor Paweł Adamowicz [Resolution No. XXVI/673/16 of the Gdansk City Council of 30 June 2016 regarding the adoption of the Immigrant Integration Model in the city of Gdansk]. It is important to get to know the attitudes of police officers because they are an important element in the immigrant integration system. Moreover, the success of activities undertaken in this area depends also on them. Hence, the research has a practical value, it enables diagnosing the needs of the police force in the conditions of the intensification of the immigration phenomenon.

1. GDANSK'S IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION MODEL

The rapid influx of migrants, which Europe has been facing for several years, has resulted in significant radicalisation of far-right parties and anti-immigration movements, which is not conducive to developing solutions in this area. In this difficult moment, European cities have started working on the development of local integration policies [Matusz-Protasiewicz, Kwieciński 2018: 132-133]

Gdansk is the first city in Poland that adopted a document on the integration of immigrants by a resolution of the City Council. It contains areas and directions of activities aimed at establishing an effective city policy on the integration of immigrants and refugees, as well as guidelines for its implementation. Analysing several factors, such as economic development, labour market demand and demography, it can be concluded that the influx of migrants to Poland is inevitable [Matusz-Protasiewicz 2016: 79-80]. The authorities of large cities in Poland have been trying for several years to create their own strategies, mainly due to a large number

of migrants settling in cities, the lack of specific integration activities undertaken by national authorities, they are also a response to the growing anti-immigration sentiment or an attempt to fill a gap in the labour market by encouraging migrants to settle in specific cities [Raczyński 2019: 226-228].

Over the last four years, there has been a significant influx of economic migrants to Gdansk. They are mainly Ukrainian citizens, however, due to differences in the legal status, it is difficult to specify the number of outlanders. According to data from the Office for Foreigners, as of 1 January 2019 372,000 foreigners had a valid residence permit in Poland [https://udsc.gov.pl/statystyki/raporty-okresowe/raport-roczny-legalizacja-pobytu/2018-2/, accessed 2020.02.23]. The statistics do not include short-term stays, mainly of Ukrainian citizens who arrive on the basis of a declaration of employment. The increase in the number of foreigners is beyond doubt, despite the difficulty in accurately estimating their numbers in cities.

In 2015, Mayor Paweł Adamowicz justified the creation of the document on the integration of immigrants as follows: "Migration has now become a global challenge. Also for Gdansk. This is why I have established a task force to develop the Immigrant Integration Model. Now is the best time to address the challenges of migration and use its potential" [Fedas, Siciarek, Olech 2017: 2]. *The Immigrant Integration Model* was adopted by a resolution of the City Council in 2016. The document is quite extensive, a lot of space is devoted to definitions and explanation of the complexity of the process and its areas. The basis for the document is the concept of integration, referring to three main areas: legal and political, socio-economic and cultural.

The immigrant integration strategy was developed on the basis of a participatory model, the Gdansk authorities worked closely with a group of immigrants living in Gdansk, NGOs, which, thanks to funds obtained from European projects, could collect data on the needs of individual groups of migrants, in addition, they used the experience of international organisations such as the IOM or the UNHCR or the EUROCITIES network. Gdansk universities were an important partner for the city authorities, an example of which is the plan for establishing the Centre for Migration Research at the University of Gdansk, which was postulated in the strategy, whose task would be to analyse the local dimension of migration. Work on the document lasted for several months, it was based on numerous meetings with residents, consultations with significant people in Gdansk, study visits, conferences and seminars. Consultations were also held online.

An important element of the consultations was the EUROCITIES mentoring visit to help Gdansk to become an integrating city, an important goal of this visit was the issue of social communication, establishing contact with residents and the public in the field of migration and integration. EUROCITIES chose Barcelona and Ghent as well as UK's MigrationWork organisation to provide mentoring and pay a visit to Gdansk. Representatives of the two cities, a process facilitator from MigrationWork and a migration and integration leader from EUROCITIES prepared a report with 11 recommendations for Gdansk on building the residents' perception of diversity. [Fedas, Siciarek, Olech 2017: 14–15].

Originally, the model assumed the introduction of specific solutions for immigrants already staying in Gdansk, so that their problems were solved faster and more efficiently. Such a concept does not preclude work on implementing measures targeted at new immigrants arriving in Gdansk, which facilitated preparation for the anticipated increase in migration in the coming years.

The Immigrant Integration Model indicates the main directions and areas of activities leading to more efficient and effective pursuance of integration policy in the local government.

The overall goal of the Immigrant Integration Model (IIM) assumes "the development of a migration management system in public institutions and social purpose organisations in Gdansk, and the enhancement of the integration of immigrants in the following areas: education, culture, social assistance, housing, counteracting violence and discrimination, local communities, employment, and health" [Fedas, Siciarek, Olech 2017: 43]

All the priorities are presented in detail, tasks and activities, the implementation of which is to contribute to achieving the objectives set, are discussed in the document. Local government entities participating in the integration process are: City Hall, Tax Office, Labour Office, Municipal Family Support Centre, the police, educational institutions, including language schools, NGOs, volunteers.

The implementation of the Immigrant Integration Model is the responsibility of the Immigrant Integration Model Implementation Team, set up by a resolution of 15 May 2017 adopted by the Mayor of the City of Gdansk. The team is to operate on the basis of three entities:

- Steering Committee, composed of representatives of the most important Gdansk institutions and organisations, key for implementation of the IIM.
- Managing Group consisting of leaders of eight thematic areas where the IIM will be implemented, moreover it can be joined by experts in areas not specified in the model.
- Integration and Migration Forum consisting of the largest possible number of institutions, organisations and individuals ready to implement immigrant integration measures in Gdansk. [Resolution 810/17 of the Mayor of the City of Gdansk of 15 May on appointing the Immigrant Integration Model Implementation Team]

The IIM document is the executive implementation plan of the Operational Programmes within the Development Strategy "Gdansk 2030 plus" [Fedas, Siciarek, Olech 2017: 17]. It also provides for making assessments every two years on the basis of hard and soft outcomes specified in the model, which will be a basis for changing and improving the adopted solutions. Funding for the immigrant integration model comes from municipal and external funds which are enumerated in the City Council Resolution, and the most important of them are the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Office for Foreigners Funds or the Regional Operational Programme of the Pomeranian Voivodeship [Resolution No. XXVI/673/16 of the Gdansk City Council of 30 June 2016 on the adoption of the Immigrant Integration Model in the city of Gdansk].

Financing such ambitious integration activities only from the city budget is not possible, which is why projects implemented by non-governmental organisations under various calls for proposals, also from European funds, are important. It is obvious that European funding cannot be regarded as a permanent element of the Immigrant Integration Model, as the uncertainty of their acquisition has a fundamental impact on the continuity of activities assumed therein [Matusz-Protasiewicz, Kwiecński 2018: 137-138].

Cooperation with European institutions was strongly emphasised in the document, already in the early stages of document creation, as mentioned earlier, the experience

of European partners was used, in particular of EUROCITIES, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organisation for Migration. In addition, the strategy provides for strengthening cooperation with public and private institutions in Poland, including cities active on the National Platform of Cooperation for Integration. Showing the possibilities of cooperation and potential stakeholders situates the Gdansk document in the framework of multi-level management [Matusz-Protasiewicz, Kwieciński 2018: 138].

The Immigrant Integration Model is a significant step in implementing local migration policy, but not the only one. The city of Gdansk had previously acted in the area of immigrant integration, an example of such activities is the European Solidarity Center, where in 2014 the Civic Education and Practice Programme for Immigrants Living in Gdansk was implemented [https://www.ecs.gda.pl/title,Imigranci_w_Gdansku,pid,67.html: accessed:2020.02.25]. The programme supported the activation of immigrants in the public sphere, a group often overlooked by the state, local governments or some civic or social programmes, deprived of an opportunity to participate and decide on issues relevant to it. There were also other initiatives, such as: "the programme of volunteering at cultural institutions/organisations as a migrant integration tool, the Foreigner's Club at the European Solidarity Centre Library, or the conference entitled Code of good practices for business owners willing to hire foreigners: how to put theory into practice, organised as a result of joint efforts of the Employers of Pomerania, the International Organisation for Migration, the District Employment Office in Gdansk, and Work Service S.A. with the support from the Pomorskie Province Office in Gdansk" [Cyboran 2018: 138].

In Poland, migration policy decisions are generally made at the governmental level, they do not translate into decisions in multi-level governance, local governments do not have or have little experience in building migration policy, which is why Gdansk's initiative is so outstanding. The Immigrant Integration Model is a comprehensive document proposing specific actions at the local level to support immigrants living in Gdansk. Within a few years, the implementation of its stipulations has led to allaying city citizens' social unrest caused by the phenomenon of migration. The creation of a new policy should launch strategic processes defining the main goals and the way of allocating resources necessary for their attainment, followed by operational processes responsible for effecting the planned activities, and finally learning processes that gradually accustom the environment to the changes that have been started by the first two processes [Cyboran 2018: 137-138].

Migration as a phenomenon presented in a properly prepared public policy can become a new educational platform for a modern citizen, it can shape individuals in acquiring attitudes, skills and knowledge thanks to which they can effectively participate in solving local and other problems related to contemporary public policy [Cyboran 2018: 138].

2. THE ATTITUDE OF OFFICERS OF THE GDANSK MUNICIPAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS TO IMMIGRANTS IN THE LIGHT OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

The research was conducted in 2019 at the Municipal Police Headquarters in Gdansk, which employs 194 officers. 62 people took part in the study (32% of officers employed) – 16 women and 46 men, aged 20 to 55, who have direct or indirect contact with immigrants; they are officers working in the Prevention Department, Investigation Department, Operations and Detection Department, Police Staff of the

Municipal Police Headquarters in Gdansk. Participation in the study was voluntary. The research is not representative, although it may indicate a tendency of shaping attitudes among Gdansk police officers [Matuszczak, Matuszczak 2011: 35].

The respondents' task was to complete a questionnaire (which is a type of a written interview, where a categorised questionnaire is filled in by the respondent) consisting of 11 questions prepared by the researcher and based on questionnaires used by the CBOS to survey public opinion on migrants [Kowalczuk 2015:1-15]. The question sheets were anonymous, the questionnaires were not only not signed, but they also did not contain questions that would enable the identification of the respondent on the basis of his/her answers, which is generally conducive to giving honest answers [Chodubski 2013: 153-154]. These were questionnaires in paper form, including single-answer questions and one descriptive query. The survey was a one-time study of the given group, and it took participants 10 to 15 minutes to complete. Before completing the questionnaires, the respondents were familiarised with the research procedure and instructions. During the study, there were no disturbing events that would affect the completion of the question sheets. Each respondent completed the survey by themselves. Finally, 62 correctly filled-in questionnaires were collected.

Moreover, 6 in-depth interviews were carried out with officers from the Intervention Section of the Prevention Department of the Municipal Police Headquarters in Gdansk in order to obtain a more complete picture of the motivation of behaviour and attitudes of police officers. 38 officers are employed in the Intervention Section, these are people who have direct contact with citizens and during the service respond to emergencies reported by the public. The primary goal of the study was to get to know their opinion about immigrants, refugees or in general foreigners staying in Poland, in particular in Gdansk, with whom officers have direct contact during the performance of their duties.

The conducted interviews may enable the acquisition of knowledge that is more comprehensive than individual experiences [Kayle 2012: 79], therefore the aim of the research was also to learn about the social situation and to examine sentiments, define prejudices and stereotypes prevailing among officers of the Municipal Police Headquarters in Gdansk.

The specific goals of the survey were focused on such aspects as:

- The perception of migrants and foreigners residing in Poland by law enforcement officers.
- Police officers' attitudes towards migrants in their immediate, including private surroundings.
- Officers' subjective assessment of the number of crimes and offences committed by migrants.
- Problems encountered in the daily service in connection with migrants.

The first question addressed to the respondents was whether they agree or not with the statement that the presence of foreigners increases cultural diversity and makes people more open to others. Respondents largely agree with this statement, the answer "definitely agree" was given by 24% and "rather agree" by 27% of the respondents. On the other hand, the answer "definitely disagree" was provided by 23% and "rather disagree" by 5% of the respondents. 21% abstained from giving an opinion, choosing "hard to say" or "neither agree nor disagree". The next question was whether free movement of people to other countries to work there was beneficial

for all countries. 74% of replies were positive, 34% strongly agreed with the above statement, and 40% rather agreed. The reply "rather disagree" was given by 13% of the respondents, and 8% were strongly against.

The third question was whether the respondents personally know a foreigner living in Poland. 58% strongly confirmed knowing a foreigner living in Poland, however as many as 36% of the respondents gave a negative answer, and 6% answered "hard to say".

The most complex question was question number 4, which was broken down into several points. The answer to the question: how would you react if it turned out that a foreigner was to become your child's childminder, a priest in your parish, your daughter-in-law or son-in-law, boss at work, child's teacher, doctor, close associate, neighbour are shown in the chart below. The most welcome were foreigners working as a doctor at their clinic (41%), or as their child's teacher (40%), they would have nothing against a neighbour coming from another country (40%). It should be noted that a significant group of respondents – about 20% – abstained from expressing their opinion, ticking the option: "hard to say" in the case of each question. The respondents also manifested radical attitudes, although in a small percentage, and thus they were the most opposed to a foreigner who would be a priest in their parish (10%) or a childminder of their child (10%). In the remaining questions, 8% of the respondents were against, and in the question about the teacher – 7%.

82% of the respondents admitted that they had neither used paid services rendered by foreigners nor hired them, only 18% confirmed the use of paid services provided by foreigners. The replies to the question whether our country needs more migrants, people who come to Poland to settle down are much more varied. The answers "definitely disagree" (22%) and „rather disagree" were ticked by 40% of the surveyed people. On the other hand, 26% of the respondents gave their consent to the arrival of foreigners, unfortunately 33% chose "hard to say" and "neither agree nor disagree", avoiding expressing their opinion directly. Serving in the police is associated with frequent contact with people, including foreigners, so when asked whether they had had contact with foreigners during the service, the vast majority stated that they had (95%), 3% had not had such contact during service, and 2% did not remember such a situation. In the next question, the officers were asked to list the nationalities of people they had met during the service, they could name a few, the most frequently mentioned were Ukrainian, German, Norwegian, Swedish, Russian, Belarusian, British, and in several cases Dutch, Lithuanian and Chinese nationalities. In questions 9 and 10 the officers were requested to assess subjectively if foreigners are the perpetrators of crimes and offenses more often than Poles. In the case of crimes, 50% answered "no", 21% thought "yes" and as many as 29% did not express their opinion. In the question regarding offenses committed by foreigners, the answers were as follows: 32% believe that foreigners commit offenses more frequently than Poles, 40% believe that they do not, and like in the previous question, 28% of the respondents did not express their belief. The last question concerned the integration of foreigners in our country, whether according to the respondents' opinions, this process is fast. The responses "definitely agree" (3%) and "rather agree" (26%) were selected by a total of 29% of the officers, 25% were against this thesis choosing the answers: "rather disagree" (14%), "definitely disagree" (11%), as many as 46% ticked "hard to say" (23%) and "neither agree nor disagree" (23%).

In the interviews carried out with the officers from the Intervention Section of the Prevention Department of the Municipal Police Headquarters in Gdansk, who have direct contact with the public during their service, the respondents stated that they have a positive perception of expats, who, in their opinion, are needed because of the rapidly growing economy and a labour shortage. They also believe that the state should support their development, but point out that such assistance should be addressed to qualified specialists, otherwise they do not give their consent to state support of economic migration. They point to threats resulting from an excessive influx of migrants, such as deterioration of the labour market, creation of the employers' market, lack of jobs for Poles, increase in the number of hate crimes, spread of diseases transmitted by foreigners, or lack of cultural assimilation. As law enforcement officers, they expect support from state and local government institutions in relation to work with migrants in the form of courses and training for officers to be able to verify the authenticity of documents entitling foreigners to stay and work in Poland, language courses, or interpreter service provided at every police station. Furthermore, they believe that all migrant should receive training in Polish law so that they are aware both of their rights and duties. Such a solution would significantly contribute to reducing the number of crimes and offenses committed by foreigners.

CONCLUSIONS

The above data, collected by means of questionnaires and conversations held with police officers working at the Municipal Police Headquarters in Gdansk, show that they generally have a positive attitude towards foreigners. As mentioned earlier, the Gdansk authorities have long pursued policies that support migrants, involving police officers in these activities. The Immigrant Integration Model, initiated by Mayor Paweł Adamowicz, murdered in January 2019, is the next step in these activities. Gdansk universities also care about preventive protection of their students from other countries by organising a series of meetings with the police aimed at familiarising them with our regulations or presenting procedures to follow in situations when they have been victims of a crime or misconduct. In the light of this research, the attitude of Gdansk police officers can be considered uplifting, positively fitting in with the pro-immigration image of the city. As the migration policy of the city of Gdansk is developing, it is also important to gradually satisfy the demands formulated by the police officers, which can translate into an increase in the level of security, especially of immigrants and foreigners residing in the city and the region of Pomerania.

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UKRAINE IN THE TERRITORIAL MIGRATION SYSTEMS: CURRENT STRUCTURAL-QUALIMETRIC ASPECTS OF THE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract

A characteristic feature of the new economy of the 21st century is the wide-scale transformation of the social relations in the sphere of labor and employment. Human migration that leads to the quantitative and qualitative changes in the numbers, structure, organization of the migrant workers flows holds a special place that is shown by the role of the migration capital in the development of national economy of

the states and their separate regions, generates appearance of the new mechanisms of regulation in the market, etc.

Migration factors predetermine formation of the relatively new phenomenon in modern economy – territorial migration systems (TMS) that in terms of economy are interpreted as the regional labor markets, determined by the effect of the additional agreements and labor contracts. These systems play a special role in terms of the perspectives of regulation of the sustainable economic development and enhancement of the competitiveness of human capital. Formation, territorial organization, development of TMS depend on the effect of the factors of both, external and internal environment. As the result, each of the systems acquires its own characteristics of its integrity, independence, designation, effectiveness of the performance of its functions.

The examples of this can be the Ukrainian-Polish, Ukrainian-German territorial migration systems (TMS) the appearance of whose characteristics can be observed against the background of considerable volumes of the present day Ukrainian external migration, deepening of professionalization and division of labor in the trans-border labor market, formation of infrastructure of migration services market, etc. Taking into consideration the high educational level of the Ukrainian workforce, regularities and particularities of the development of economic, social and demographic, political. Cultural ties between Ukraine, Poland and Germany, interests and opportunities of the implementation of achievements of economic knowledge in the practice of international economic relations as the economy of postindustrial (new), information (digital), innovation (network), Internet (virtual) era where knowledge becomes the determinant resource, product and source (factor) of the economic growth – the study of the state, factors of the formation and development UGTMS is exceptionally important not only from the standpoint of resolving structural-qualimetric problems of employment of population in Ukraine, growth of the level of income of citizens, but also from the standpoint of elaboration of the new foreign policy of Poland and Germany for the sake of stabilization of economic and political situation in Europe under the conditions of the changing world.

Key words: *workforce, labor market, labor potential, migration flows, labor migration, territorial migration system, structural-qualimetric analysis*

INTRODUCTION

The subject of the formation and development of the territorial migration systems (TMS) becomes more and more important for the development of modern economy and politics. It is of great importance for building the future of Europe, that at present time this continent is suffering from the dramatic increase of the numbers of refugees and displaced persons due to the chaos in the Middle East and the fragile balance in the Asia-Pacific region, the unmanageability of cyberspace, uneven socio-economic development of the EU member states and non-aligned countries, etc.

In the existing situation, TMS can become not only a simple regulator of migration flows, but also an additional tool for stabilization of the economic, socio-cultural, daily life of the populations of their member countries and outside their borders. On

the one hand, they appear to be exclusively a phenomenon of the market economy, regulated by the laws of labor supply and demand of labor migrants' workforce, as they are conclusively interpreted as regional labor markets, determined by the effect of the additional contracts and labor agreements. On the other hand, under the conditions of the specific geospatial environment they become the object of geo-marketing and geo-analytics, geo-economy and geopolitics, a phenomenon that cannot exist apart from the historical, demographic, social, geo-cultural, even value-based factors of the development of human civilization. In any event the TMS must be effective and efficient. When implementing the idea of modeling the development of TMS on the example of labor markets of such countries as Germany, Poland and Ukraine, the issue arises of harmonization of economic interests of individual states, launching at the border of the systems of migration filters of corporate crime, construction of analytical and other systems of structural-qualitative, developing, digital and other similar types of marketing of the labor market of labor migrants (what it involves are the state indicators, factor indicators and response indicators), etc. The chances for success are increased by strengthening the firmness (as opposed to disruption) of the cross-border (East European) labor market, the ability to consume and produce innovations more effectively.

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1. METHODOLOGY AND THE STUDY SAMPLE

A study of the historical sources of the formation and development of TMS theory show that at present it is practically impossible to identify a single founder of ideas. Scientific "migration" opinion on this issue "sprouted" on different continents depending on the circumstances.

In one case, a number of foreign scholars consider A. Mabogunje, an urban scientist who studied the patterns and peculiarities of Nigerian migration processes in the context

of "village-city" on the principles of the general theory of systems (in the 70's of the 20th century.) as the founder of the fundamentals of TMS theory) [Foundations for Urban Development in Africa 2006]. In particular, he defined the migration system as a set of specific places interconnected by the flows of individuals, goods, services and information that facilitate further exchange, particularly, activation of migration between these places [Mabogunje 1970]. He argued that migration systems bring together people, families, and communities in space and can be described as transnational or translocal communities. It is believed that it was from his publications that such scientists as A. Porters, M. Kirz, G. Zlotnik have drawn the knowledge and adapted the idea to the study of the processes of international migration [de Haas 2007]. The second group of scientists is convinced that the origins of TMS theory ideas are in the works of P. Gutkind (1962), J. Saul (1968) A. Richards (1952) - where the meaning of the migration system is reduced to a self-regulating mechanism within the broader social system [Bakewell 2012].

Another group of researchers names P. Levitt, J. Fowcett, D. Gurak, M. Kritz, L. Lima who, in their opinion, have developed the macro-level theory of migration systems (according to their definition migration systems consist of the countries (or regions of certain countries), between which there takes place a relatively numerous exchange of migrants, characterized by existence of appropriate mechanisms ensuring relationship between activation of the flows of people and the flows of goods, services, capital, ideas, information) [Hein de Haas 2007].

It would be absolutely unfair to ignore achievements of the Soviet scientists who, under the conditions of the « iron curtain» also worked to clarify the role of migration relationships in the construction of the workforce employment systems, construction of the patterns of the territorial organization and development of the population settlement system of the Soviet Union. The fundamental difference between their studies and the studies of their Western colleagues was that attention was focused not the man as the purpose of modeling TMS (in the totality of its migration and other needs), but the state, that in the command-and-control manner determined freedom of mechanical movement (the man as the means of achieving the goal). Accordingly, starting from the 30's of the 20th century because of the mass organization of the collective farms the problem of economic displacement of the population in rural areas became topical. Its discussion turned into a wide-ranging scientific debate, recorded in publications and periodicals of this period (peasants were artificially "tied" to the land because of absence of their passports). Such scientists as S. Udachin, O. Hauke, S. Chayanov substantiated the types of internal economic systems that had been subsequently implemented in the process of formation of the network of collective farm settlements. In particular, A. Hauke considered an ideal location of a settlement (as a rule one) from the standpoint of the "rent location"considered the location not in the center of the land use territory, but shifting it towards the higher level center to optimize internal and external migration (transport) flows. Some scholars are inclined to believe that A. Hauke's ideas are consonant with the later developed provisions of V. Kristaller's theory of central places [Lola 1985]. In the 30's of the 20th century the problems of internal economic rural settlement in the zone of influence of the cities became the focus of geographers who tried to explore the "urban environment" and the network of cities as the settlement systems, taking into account their role in the territorial division of labor. (N. Baranski). But the greatest impetus for a comprehensive study of population migration was organization in the USSR in the early 60's of mass development of the patterns and

projects of district planning of the local settlement systems. An own school of planners-researchers, headed by I. Bogorad, was formed in Ukraine. They initiated a new trend in the study of agglomeration (study of problems on the basis of inter-settlement pendulum links. D. I. Bogorad summarized the experience gained in the practice of urban planning in his works "District planning. The problems of planning industrial areas" (1960), "Constructive geography of districts. Fundamentals of district rayon planning" (1965). In 1963, S. Kovalev in his monograph "Rural Settlement" attempted to present a holistic view of the geography of settlement in the rural areas of the USSR, typology of local systems. This work stimulated the study of the hierarchy of settlement systems, study of migration links of urban and rural settlements in their unity (V. Pokshyshevsky). The accumulated experience in the study of the settlement systems in the design urban planning organizations when developing master plans of cities, district planning of administrative districts, industrial and resort territories could not be used due to the secrecy of these works, although in the future many of these ideas formed the basis of the concept of territorial organization of the society, wherein the principles of hierarchical step-by-step placement of the systems of infrastructural networks objects were laid down, calculated migration determined radii of daily, periodic and occasional public service, etc. (B.Horyev) [Yevdokimenko, Sadova, Shevchuk 1995]. Theoretical aspects of inter-settlement service of the population over time have been perfected in the functional, organizational, structural and functional methodological areas of migration studies.

At present, the modern TMS theory is mainly associated with the macro-level study of the organization of economic relations. The works of P. Levitt (Transnational Migration) [Levitt 2004], J. Fawcett (Transnational Migrations from the Standpoint of Geographical Distribution of Types and Categories of Relations) [Fawcett 1989; Pyatkovska 2018], D. Massey (Synthetic Migration Theory) [Massey 1990], R.Billsborrow [Billsborrow, Oberai, Zlotnik 1998], M.Kritz, G.Zlotnika, L. Lima, etc. are designed to integrate different concepts of international migration, to prove that stable migration flows form a single space in which countries-donors and countries-recipients of the migrants are united by common ties and dependencies, mechanisms of activation of the flows of people and flows of capital, goods, services, information. They are formed and developed under the influence of related factors of historical, cultural, demographic environment, scientific and technological achievements, dissemination of economic experience and technologies, etc. Migration within the TMS has the ability to change general conditions for reproduction of the migration process. In these systems, migration is simultaneously the cause and the result of systematic interaction between countries [Ivakhnyuk 2012). From the standpoint of the theory and practice of development of international relations, management of migration by the state analysis of the functions of the TMS (redistributing, mobilizing, stimulating, labor saving, etc.) is exceptionally important. If the redistribution function ensures the internal equilibrium of the system, then labor saving function ensures a specific "regeneration" of the labor potential of migrants. An interesting role is played by the TMS mobilizing function.

The basic feature of the current migration mobility of the population is that this process is institutionalized, evolving from a simple social movement into a structured social organism, and later − into a subject and a tool for regulating human economic activities. The potential of labor migration, which is gradually accumulating within the framework of the functioning of migration movements of the population, can "work" both in the forward and reverse mode. This is facilitated by institutionalized subjects of migration

relations that interact with each other, build internal relations, find common interests, "produce" their own goals and objectives, "develop" the principles and forms of the organization of their activities and perform certain functions. They can lobby for the solution of migration problems (in Ukraine for example, the Law of Ukraine "On Foreign Labor Migration" of November 5, 2015, №761-VIII). Practically institutionalized subjects of migration become primary elements of *territorial migration systems (TMS)* [Sadova, Knyazev, Andrusyshyn 2013].

In the special literature, TMS studies are conducted on the basis of various scientific and methodological approaches. It is well-known that they are interpreted as a *certain common space* in which countries of departure and destination are connected through migration (a "complex" migration theory) or as a *set of links of the migration sphere* at a certain level of the organization and development of relations of the population migration activity (different types), that is, as main elements in the overall network of higher-ranking systems, taking into account their forms of organization, functions, system-forming features (a legal status), and others. The position of Douglas Massey (USA), who in the framework of the "synthetic" migration theory (the end of the 20th century), conceptually approached migration as an ensemble of entrepreneurs, enterprises and services, that being motivated by aspirations for financial gain, facilitate and support international migration, deserves special attention [Massey 2003]. He led the essence of the concept of TMS to regional labor markets, marked by the operation of additional agreements and contracts. The scientist from Switzerland, Paolo Ruspini, having used a number of theories, namely, the theory of regional specialization and international trade (A. Smith, D. Ricardo), the theory of central places (W. Christaller), the ideas of spatial organization of the economy (A. Lösch), the generalization of regionalists (W. Isard, T. Rainer), the neoclassical approach (P. Samuelson, S. Enke), offered theoretical foundations of the organization of the European TMS [Ruspini 2010].

In economy, an institutional theory is a good foundation for the study of *TMS* that provides both macroeconomic and regional (local) analysis of transactional migration costs (indicating that the growth horizons of such systems will take place until the costs of their internal management exceed the cost of market transactions). The theory of a regional economy makes it possible to organize the internal structure of TMS, to determine its supporting framework (a set of places of concentration and localization of self-organized communities of migrants, their centers of organization, especially large and medium settlements, along with lines of communication between them), to distinguish the main spatial forms of the latter one. The TMS support frame acts as a combination of all its constituent parts (an integration function into a holistic system). Scientific centers of scientists of Kyiv, Lviv and other cities are working in Ukraine at the intersection of multidisciplinary approaches to TMS research. Interesting results are related to the studies of A. Gaydutsky, O. Kupets, E. Libanova, O. Malinovskaya, O. Pyatkovskaya, S. Pyrozhkov, I. Pribitkova, M. Romanyuk, M. Fleychuk and others. Despite the existing achievements, migration problems are rarely considered from the point of view of economic modernization and the formation of TMS, and the launching of mechanisms for the functioning of the latter. If these problems are solved, there can be a shift in the sustainable development of the state and society as a whole. The study of the problems of formation and development of TMS involves analysis of its component structure, factors of migration activity (genetic, demographic, socio-economic, cultural, geospatial, etc.), performed functions (redistribution, orientation, stimulation), positional properties of place-territory attachment, compactness, centrality,

differentiation, configuration, shape, orientation, homogeneity, heterogeneity), and time-distance (duration, uniqueness, irreversibility). With complex analysis of the parameters of functioning and development of TMS (indicators of their status, indicators of factors, indicators of response), we can achieve qualitatively new positive results not only in terms of ensuring the sustainable development of these systems, but also the sustainable development of society and the state as a whole.

The authors of this article focus on the structural and qualitative contribution of individual countries to the formation of TMC "Ukraine-Poland-Germany". Particular emphasis is placed on Ukraine's place in ensuring this process.

2. THE RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH

2.1. Structural contribution of individual countries to the formation and development of TMC "Ukraine-Poland-Germany"

The study includes an analysis of the demographic characteristics of migrant workers, their wages and employment / unemployment rates, and a comparison of the obtained results with the values of the indicators against the background of the corresponding indices by local residents by selected countries.

2.1.1. Statistical and demographic measurement of the contribution of residents of donor countries and recipients to the formation of TMC "Ukraine-Poland-Germany"

Ukraine. Modern Ukrainian labor migration is a powerful source of TMS formation. Scientists point to the following total numbers: according to some data - 5.9 million people (according to the Migration Report of the UN Special Commission, 2017) [International migration report 2017]; by others - 4 million people or 16% of the country's population [Center for Economic Strategy 2018]. The number of Ukrainians who work outside the country at one time is (among those who pay taxes in Ukraine): - 3 million (according to the IDSD of NASU) [Libanova 2018] and - 2.6-2.7 million (according to the Center for Economic Strategy). Over a period of 15 years (2002-2017), 6.3 million people left Ukraine and did not return (3 million left the western border, 3.2 million left the eastern) [Center for Economic Strategy 2018]. The duration of work abroad of the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian migrant workers which returned home does not exceed one year (29% - worked more than a year, 14% - several years) [Sociological group "Rating" 2017]. In 2015-2017, labor migration to Poland reached 38.9% of the total. The most recent surveys show that the numbers do not go down (up to 900,000 people in the third quarter of 2019) [Mirror of the Week 2019]. For reference, labor migration to Germany reached 0.8% of all migrants in 2015-2017.

The risks and, at the same time, positives to the Ukrainian labor market were: visa-free status with EU countries, simplified procedures for obtaining a work visa for Ukrainians in Poland, no language barrier and other instruments of influence on the migrant. At the same time, research by migration experts who have their own point of view on migration mobility of the population is interesting. In particular, a person who is prone to migration is considered to have a higher level of human capital than one who leads a stationary lifestyle. Accordingly, a migrant person is more likely to be an entrepreneur, ready to changes, re-emigration when the necessary conditions arise.

Poland. Poland's demographic contribution to the development of TMS has its own peculiarities. Interestingly, an analysis of the dynamics of the Top 20 largest countries in the world by origin of international labor migrants 2000-2017 [International migration report 2017] fixes a lot of labor problems of its economy. Poland's ranking has recently moved from a relatively distant 17th place to a 12th place, while Ukraine has moved up from a 5th to a further 8th place. This means that the main focus is on the population with a very high upward mobility. The intensity of the increase of Polish labor migration has led to the leaching of entire cohorts of the Polish workforce beyond the national borders of Poland and even the TMS (rates are higher than in Ukraine). This workforce has not been found to have complete replacement. Ukrainians are also more inclined to develop the German labor market. This fact has been drawn by analysts from an international migration organization. The swift "nudity" of Poland's national labor market is a challenge for a Polish employer seeking access to the Ukrainian workforce. International redistribution of labor logically leads to the launch of new schemes for the fight for demographic human resources.

Germany. Germany's demographic contribution to the formation of TMS has its own dimension. Thus, the number of inhabitants decreased by an average of almost 130 thousand people a year due to low values of natural reproduction in Germany in 1991-2018, while due to mechanical movement - on the contrary increased by an average of 290 thousand people a year. Migration in this country has played a role of the main stabilizer factor of the population and its demo-reproductive structure, thus reducing the negative effects of the demographic crisis.

Foreigners of Germany. According to official statistics from the German statistical office, at the beginning of 2018, every fifth person in the country is a migrant. From the 82 million inhabitants, about 9.2 million are foreigners and another 9.4 million have accepted German citizenship. The migration surplus amounted to 1,139,400 people, which testifies to the significant migration attractiveness of the region in 2015 alone. The considerable inflow of human resources into Germany and their partial naturalization influenced the reproduction of the entire population of the state and made its mark in the gender-age structure. The results of the calculations show that every fourth man and fifth woman between the ages of 18-40 is a former migrant. Only over the age of 70 is the number of foreigners relatively small. Geographically, the highest share of foreigners is in the southern federal states: Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg and Hesse and the cities-states of Berlin and Hamburg (Graph. 1a).

The geospatial configurations of the settling boundaries of the potential of migrant workers in the charts using the Ukrainian context are similar (Fig. 1b).

2.1.2. Statistical and economic measurement of the contribution of remuneration of labor migrants from donor countries and recipients to the formation of TMS "Ukraine-Poland-Germany".

The main economic factor in the formation of TMS is the remuneration of labor migrants. The study of its role in the process of systematic formation implies a comparison of this indicator with the earnings of local residents (both at a given date and in dynamics).

Graph 1. The quantity of foreigners and Ukrainian foreigners in the population of 100.000 people of 2017 from the perspective of Federal Lands of Germany

Source: https://www.destatis.de

Poland. The average level of payment of the employed population has increased 3.5 times and amounted to almost UAH 30 thousand as of 2017 in Poland over the period 2010-2017, while in Ukraine - only UAH 7.1 thousand. The average of the minimum wage set by the state in Ukraine for the period 2010-2017 lagged 6 times behind the values of a similar indicator in Poland. It is clear that the imbalance in wage levels, combined with Ukraine's territorial proximity to Poland, has led to an increase in the intensity of migration flow and a transfusion of human resources from Ukraine to Poland, and subsequently, under favorable circumstances, may result in continued migration to neighboring Germany.

The results of a retrospective analysis of the conditions of the formation and development of local TMS should be added as well. The situation described to a certain extent explains the conditions for "incorporating" the mobilization function of the Ukrainian-Polish TMS into work. The results of the retrospective analysis of the conditions of the formation and development of this system should be added to the above mentioned information. The fact that the territories located along the state Ukrainian-Polish border are traditionally characterized by a significantly lower living standard than those located far from the periphery. The analysis of indicators in dynamics shows that this situation in recent decades has provoked constant emigration of the population. Thus, based on the calculation of the synthetic indicator of living standards, it was established that, from the Ukrainian side, even at the time

of the economic crisis (in 1998, when external centers of migration attraction of the labor force were losing their activity), the emigration of the labor force continued to correlate with indicators of the level of urbanization, the unemployment rate and the number of economic entities. At the same time, the situation changed quite a lot in the next years. Initially, Poland's accession to the EU became a factor in the change (2004). The next step was to simplify the rules of crossing the border (including the "Agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Government of the Republic of Poland on the rules of the local border traffic of 25 February, 2009" and "Simplification of the employment in the territory of Poland for citizens of Ukraine of June 11, 2017"). The number of Ukrainians who have been employed in Poland since the change in legislation is increasing [Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 2009]. There are special centers for servicing migration needs, the infrastructure of migration services of the local Ukrainian-Polish TMS is developing.

Germany. During the observational period of 2006-2007, the level of average wage for Ukrainians who live in Germany, was five times higher than average wage in Ukraine. For example, in 2006 a Ukrainian migrant earned 713 euros – or 4518 Ukrainian UAH - for his job at the exchange rate of 6,33 UAH for one euro, while in Ukraine it was 1041 UAH

In 2017 there were 1174 euros or 35224 UAH at the average wage of 7104 in Ukraine. The results of statistical and cartographic analysis of formation, the territorial organization and development TMS "Ukraine – Poland-Germany" make it clear that there is a tendency of "settlement" of Ukrainian labour migrants in the zone of Eastern and Southern lands of Germany. The revealed signs of asymmetrical process exactly follow the situation of Ukrainian-Polish TMS (picture 1).

Ukraine. Leaving their motherland, Ukrainians are occupied with less qualified job abroad. For example, an average salary level of German Ukrainian migrants is not comparably high and it varies between 35-40% from the salary of ordinary worker. At the same time, the average level of renumeration for work in Germany is twelve times higher than in Ukraine (chart 1).

2.1.3. Statistical-economical measurement of a contribution of occupation/ unemployment of labour migrants from donor and recipient countries to the formation of TMS "Ukraine-Poland-Germany".

Another important indicator which shows a real situation in labour market of TMS is a level of occupation/ unemployment of labour migrants and local citizens. The dynamics of a value shift of a given indicator of surveyed countries demonstrates common tendencies to decrease. However, Ukraine falls behind in the speed of indication shift.

In comparison with Germany, Ukraine falls behind two times according to the speed of indication shift of unemployment level, and 1.5 times in comparison with Poland. The unemployment level in Germany as well as in Poland is decreasing in the background of constant vacancies growth. Even during the hardest for European Union times in 2012-2013 when the unemployment level constantly grew, it was decreasing in FRG [Zagranportal 2019]. German economics supplies an existence of almost 4,8 million working places in other EU countries.

Potential migrants, when deciding to move from Ukraine to Poland or Germany for work or study, try to improve the material well-being of their families and families, in

other words, to maximize the personal economic benefits of migration, which is one of the factors in the functioning of TMS.

The personal economic benefits of Ukrainian migrants as a result of employment abroad can be calculated in monetary terms. For example, we have used the methodological approach of comparative analysis, which is based on an algorithm for calculating earnings growth rates in Germany and Ukraine for a specific period of time. The results of the calculations clearly confirmed the existence of significant differences in the levels of remuneration in Ukraine and Germany. Ukrainian employed migrants, working in Germany in 2017, received income in the amount of almost 7.2 billion UAH. And under the condition of employment in Ukraine - could earn only 1 billion UAH., Which is seven times less (Graph . 2).

Chart 1. Comparative situation analysis in the labour market of Ukraine, Poland and Germany in 2010-2017

	2010	2014	2015	2016	2017	2017/2010
POLAND						
Average wage (UAH/month)	8,507	14,184	22,648	26,300	29,739	3,5
Unemployment level, %	12.4	11.4	9.7	8.2	6.8	0.4
Minimum wage (UAH/ month)	3,475	6,309	10,142	12,007	14,098	4,1
Inflation index, %	102. 9	99.2	99.6	100.4	101.8	103.9
Balance between average wage and wage of occupied Ukrainians in Poland	0.95	0.92	1	0.85	0.84	-
GERMANY						
Average wage, UAH/ month	24,574	41,385	65,591	78,736	85,777	3,5
Migrants labour wage, UAH/ month	13,324	21,908	34,720	41,646	45,636	3,4
Ukrainians labour wage, UAH/month	8,995	15,417	22,727	30,810	35,225	3,9
Unemployment level, %	7.6	5	4.6	4.1	3.8	0.5
Minimum wage, UAH/month	-	-	34,889	40,740	43,206	-
Inflation index, %	101.10	100.90	100.30	100.50	101.80	110.2
UKRAINE						
Average wage	2,250	3,480	4,195	5,183	7,104	3,2
Unemployment level, %	8.8	9.7	9.5	9.7	9.9	1.1
Minimum wage	869	1,218	1,218	1,378	3,200	3,7
Inflation index, %	109.1	124.9	143	112	114	208.3
POLAND/UKRAINE						
Balance between the wage of those occupied in Poland and average wage in Ukraine	3.8	4.1	5.4	5.0	4.1	-
Balance between unemployment level in Ukraine and Poland	0.7	0.9	1	1.2	1.5	
Balance between average wages in Poland and Ukraine	4.0	5.2	8.3	8.7	4.4	

GERMANY/ UKRAINE						
Balance between the wage of those occupied in Germany and average wage of those occupied in Ukraine	10.9	11.9	15.6	15.2	12.1	-
Balance between occupied Ukrainians in Germany and average wage of those occupied in Ukraine	4.0	4.4	5.4	5.9	5.0	
Balance between the unemployment level in Ukraine and Germany	1.2	1.9	2.1	2.4	2.6	
Balance between minimum wage in Germany and Ukraine	-	-	28.6	29.6	13.5	-

Only in 2006-2017. As a result of employment received 27 mlrd. UAH income, at the same time, provided that if they lived in Ukraine, they would earn a salary of 4 billion. UAH Personal economic effect of the functioning of TMS in 2006-2017. In absolute terms, it is almost 23 billion. UAH or 0.8% of Ukraine's GDP in 2017.

Thus, the structural contribution of individual countries' workforce to the process of formation and development of TMC "Ukraine-Poland-Germany", although different, but obvious.

Graph. 2 Dynamics of the level of income of employed Ukrainian in Germany, estimated volume of income of Ukrainian employed in Germany under the condition of employment in Ukraine and the number of employed Ukrainian in Germany in 2006-2017.

Source: own processing according to the Data of the GSS in Ukraine from 2006 to 2017

2.2. Qualimetric contribution of individual countries to the formation and development of TMC "Ukraine-Poland-Germany"

The study of the qualitative contribution of the potential of labour migrants to the formation and development of TMS involves comparative analysis of its educational, vocational (professional) components, health, morality, activity (passionarity), organization, working time with the relevant characteristics of the environment. The main focus is on comparing the first two components, and considering the intermediate location of the Polish labour market on the TMS map, the analysis is based on the example of contribution of Germany. These are calculations regarding the educational structure of migrants and local residents (country of destination), the assessment of the employee's qualifications and the level of work he will perform in the country of arrival. donor of TMS (Ukraine), and from the point of view of receiving migration benefits from the arrival of human capital with certain qualitative characteristics for the recipient country of TMS (Germany). The legitimacy of this formulation of the problem is also due to the fact that in practice, at present, there is a deepening of the links with the employment of the Ukrainian labour force on the part of Germany.

2.2.1. Migration losses of Ukraine's human capital from labour migration to Germany: an educational dimension

The information on the structure of external Ukrainian labour migration, which was collected by the state statistics bodies in Ukraine, in different years, was based on the specifics of the methodology of collecting indicators. Yes, a sample survey on external labour migration was conducted in Ukraine in 2008 [State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2009], 2012 [International Labour Organization, 2013] and 2017 [State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2017]. Only the last two surveys make it possible to draw conclusions about the status and structural changes in the development of TMS based on the level of education of Ukrainian labour migrants (Graph. 3)[2].

2.2.2) Migration losses of human capital of Ukraine from labour migration to Germany: professional qualification dimension

There are quite clear changes in the vocational qualification priorities in the western vector of migrant labour displacement of Ukrainians, especially in Germany. Thus, at one time (2003), Germany accepted more than 300,000 temporary workers from Central and Eastern Europe to work in agriculture and forestry, as well as in the hotel and restaurant business for up to 4 months [German Federal Ministry of the Interior 2005). In 2010, 76.9% of all Ukrainian workers in Germany worked in unskilled jobs [Germany Migration Profile Light 2013].. Instead, current trends are increasingly shifting towards skilled workers at different levels of education.

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[2] In the first modular sample survey of the State Labor Migration Service in Ukraine in 2008, it did not identify Germany in significant migration countries, so the data were not generalized.

Graph. 3. The level of education of Ukrainian migrant workers in: a) 2010-2012; b) 2015-2017, %

Source: authors' calculations for [International Labour Organization, 2013; State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2017] The calculations show that the overall situation regarding the level of education of Ukrainian migrant workers is changing. Thus, in 2010-2012, the share of workers with tertiary education reached 90%, while in 2015-2017 - just over 30%. Instead, the structure has shifted in favour of people with vocational training. Filters policy in the German labour market has yielded results today: breeding individuals with educational and qualification skills increases the duality in the labour market.

The information on the level of qualification of Ukrainian labor migrants with the requirements of the performed work is indicative. Some trends in the loss of educational qualitative characteristics of Ukrainian workers in Germany are being traced, as almost 25% of them worked on jobs that require less than qualification and 33% on jobs that do not require qualification. A quarter of migrants worked in the new country according to their qualifications. Instead, in Poland - only 16% of migrant workers from Ukraine worked according to their qualifications. In terms of professional groups, 31.4% of all Ukrainians working in Germany have jobs as professionals, specialists, technical employees, and 37.3% - skilled workers with the tool. Germany, compared to other countries, offers less employment to Ukrainians in the simplest professions, while in Poland more than half of Ukrainians (51.7%) work in the simplest professions. Thus, it can be stated that, with some loss of qualification, Ukrainians in Germany are still largely implementing their knowledge and skills at different levels of vocational qualifications.

 Comparison of the above data makes it possible to conclude that workers with higher professional qualifications leave for Germany, since under favourable conditions on the German labour market, some of them still have to lose knowledge and skills in lower-skilled jobs. Higher losses are borne by Ukraine in the vector of labor migration to Poland, since there workers are much less likely to find work in accordance with

their qualifications. Thus, it is unambiguous to conclude that the quality of labour losses for Ukraine.

3.2. Benefiting from the labour migration of Ukrainians to the German economy

Another focus of attention is on gaining benefits from Ukrainian labour migrants for Germany. The inclusion of foreign labour in the German labour market and the high economic activity of German workers have led to the highest employment rate in the German economy since 1991. Also important is the contribution of migrant workers. In 2017, the economic activity rate of 20-64-year-old migrant workers from non-EU countries was highest in some German regions, along with the UK and Turkey, at over 85% (Germany Migration Profile Light, 2013).

In 2018, 9586 Ukrainians arrived in Germany for legal employment World migration report, 2018], accounting for 3.6% of all arrivals for this purpose (Table 2).

Table 2. Characteristics of Ukrainians who arrived in Germany in 2018 with official work permits*

Characteristics	Number of arrivals, thousand Persons	In% of all arrivals in Germany for this purpose	Rank in the ranking of countries leading in number of arrivals for this purpose
Total	9,576	3.6	8th place (after India, China, Bosnia and Herzegovina, USA, Serbia, Russia, Kosovo))
Including			
-work as a specialist	8,213	3.9	8th place (after India, China, USA, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia, Serbia, Turkey)
Among them: with the Blue Card	2,181	4.3	5th place (after India, China, Russia, Turkey)
-work without qualifications	1,247	2.3	8th place (after Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Northern Macedonia, Serbia, USA, Albania, Australia)

Source: Authors' Summary [World migration report, 2018]

Among third-country nationals who are entitled to work, there may also be grounds for a residence permit issued for humanitarian and family reasons, which gives such a right. Therefore, the involvement of Ukrainian migrants in the German labour market may be better characterized by the number of persons participating in social insurance. Thus, as of September 2018, the number of Ukrainian migrant workers who paid social security contributions was 44,797 people (2.5% of all foreign workers in Germany), which is 3395 or 8.2% more than in the corresponding last year.

Germany benefits from labour migration due to restrictive and relatively rigid state policies on unskilled labour or unconfirmed by German labour qualification documents. Yes, the employment of workers with the tool requires a formal German education, there is a rather rigid system of certification of skilled labour, language requirements. Significant weakening applies only to the IT sector with 3 years' experience. There remain preferences for persons with a scientific degree. This policy is reflected in the qualifications of workers from Germany from other countries: 82.5% work in workplaces, which according to the International Standard Classification of Occupation corresponds to 2-4 skill levels (medium and high). In 2019, Germany has further eased barriers to entry of skilled labour into its labour market, which will in the long run increase the contribution of migrant workers to the German economy.

CONCLUSION

The territorial migration system is a social phenomenon that can play an important role in regulating sustainable economic development and enhancing the competitiveness of human capital. It is treated as a regional labour market, determined by the effect of supplementary contracts and employment agreements.

The territorial migration system promotes the harmonization of conditions for the realization and development of migrant labour potential. It has its own structure, performs redistribution, mobilization, stimulation, labour-integration and other functions. If the redistribution function ensures the internal equilibrium of the system, then labour-saving is a specific "regeneration" of the labour potential of migrants. An interesting and important role is played by the mobilization function of TMS.

The potential of labour migration, which gradually accumulates within the TMS, can "work" in both reverse and inverse modes. This is facilitated by institutionalized actors of migration relations who interact, build internal relationships, find common interests, "produce" their goals and objectives, "work out" the principles and forms of organizing their activities.

The territorial migration system, which is being formed and developed within such countries as Ukraine-Poland-Germany, is characterized by general and specific features of formation and development. At present it is growing its own infrastructure network and is actively institutionalized.

On the part of Ukraine, the factors that influence the development of the TMS under study are: economic (insufficient level and cost of living, unsatisfactory social and living conditions, etc.), environmental (forced displacement from the relevant disaster zones), socio-demographic (high youth migration mobility), social and professional (loss of motivation for high-productivity work, limited professional career, etc.). All these socio-economic and demographic processes adversely affect the sustainability of the development of the TMS under study. At the same time, the trend of increasing migration between Ukraine, Poland, and Germany is not just an interstate character, but also a new phenomenon in the lives of TMS agents.

In the current situation, TMC Ukraine-Poland-Germany becomes a kind of platform for modelling the situation related to improving the effectiveness of the migration policy of the donor country. With regard to recipient countries, the potential of migrant workers is drawn to the selective nature of migration policy (a phenomenon caused by the legal and other institutional barriers of countries with different levels of economic

development, as well as by new schemes for international relocation).

The formation, territorial organization and development of the modern TMC "Ukraine-Poland-Germany" should be studied from the point of view of the safe imperatives for the development of a common European home, the introduction of new standards of economic behaviour and consumption of goods, the creation of conditions for the development of new migrants of science and technology; the spread among them of fashion for the second education, the cultivation of the qualities of mutual respect and tolerance.

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INNOVATIVE EMPLOYMENT IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE MODERN LABOR MARKET

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Abstract

The article explores the specificites and common features of development of modern labor markets of Ukraine and Poland and determines that the expansion of the innovative type of employment is a productive solution of typical problems. The theoretical and methodological approach to identification of features, scales and intensity of the expansion of innovative forms of employment, which includes: systematization of criteria of attribution to innovative employment; a comprehensive system of innovative employment indicators; grouping of factors of priority influence

on the nature of employment and expansion of employment of the innovative type; analysis of the current situation on the labor market and forecasting of transformational shifts for timely identification of innovative forms of employment with the aim of scaling and sufficient regulation, is substantiated. In modern conditions of development of national economies there is an obvious tendency of gradual decrease of the employment rate of the population in the production and services sectors, instead of the significant increase of the employment level in the knowledge sector.

INTRODUCTION

Under today's conditions of development of the national economy, tendencies of a gradual decline in the level of employment in the manufacturing sector and, conversely, a significant increase in the level of employment in the service sector are becoming more and more visible. The above changes lead to changes in the structure and nature of employment, which greatly affect the state of the labor market and form new trends in its transformation. The structural changes taking place in the modern economy have certain regularities, namely: an increase in the share of high-tech manufacturing, telecommunications, financial and business services; emergence of new technological processes, usage of new technology, new types of raw materials and the production of new types of products; decrease in the share of the manufacturing sector and the growth of the service sector, deconcentration of industrial production, and shift in its sectoral structure. They form the strategic sectors of the national economy at the present stage of development, and are also the main causes of changes in the structure of employment in the labor market. Problems of employment are the subject of research by many scholars. Characteristics of the nature and role of employment in the economy can be found in the writings of A. Smith, D. Ricardo, T. Malthus, J.-B. Say, J. St. Mill, K. Marx, A. Marshall. Problems of the functioning of the labor market, employment and unemployment are investigated in works by L. Walras, J. M. Keynes, A. Phillips, M. Friedman, T. Veblen, J. Galbraith. Significant contribution to economic economic research of employment in Ukraine and the countries of Eastern Europe was made by M. Beblavi, L. Beztelesna, K. Bendukidze, O. Grishnova, E. Libanova, L. Lisogor, M. Mahay, K. Oblouy, V. Onyienko, M. Svenchytsky, M. Shalenko, G. Schleifer, I. Stefanets and others. At the same time, the problem of identifying innovative types and forms of employment is pending and requires the development of effective tools and regulatory methods that should become the basis for providing a professional qualification balance in the labor market.

PRESENTATION OF THE MAIN RESEARCH MATERIAL

The modern realities of the development of the European Union countries show the existing sustainable tendencies to expansion of the creative sector of economies, an increasing part of the gross domestic product is responsibility of innovative sectors, the main resources of that are man and his mind. There is an active rebuilding of the

labor market structure, and the number of people employed in industry and services is gradually decreasing in favour of an increase in science, education and information technology. These trends are most evident in the developed countries of Western Europe - Switzerland, Sweden, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Denmark, Belgium, Finland and Norway (the share of the employed in the quaternary sector of economy in these countries is more than 20%). The countries of Central Europe, which demonstrate more moderate progress in the development of innovation and the expansion of innovative employment, in particular Poland and Ukraine, are not left aside of these processes. Thus, over the last ten years the share of employed Poles in the quaternary sector of the economy grew on 2% and runs as high as 15.8%. In Ukraine, these rates are less slow, an increase equals 1.2% and specific gravity of 13%, with the EU average in 19% [Eurostat 2019].

In general, the labor markets of Poland and Ukraine are similar in type and nature of problems and challenges. Typical common problems are: a gradual increase in the average age of the economically active population, characterized by negative indicators of natural reproduction of the population and an increase in life expectancy.

There is a constant outflow of highly skilled workforce (Polish workers are traveling extensively to Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Ukrainians - to Poland, Slovenia, Italy and the Czech Republic) in order to find a higher level of earnings and job prospects. The deficit of highly skilled workers, which has arisen on a background migratory processes and also unwillingness of young people to get unprestige in society professions, is urgent [Buerger, Broekel and Coad 2012]. There is a low level of economic activity and motivation to learning among the younger generation, which is not interested in working in the current employment conditions and needs more flexible and remote forms of work. A lag of level of competence of current and perspective workers from the requirements of workplaces, which are under act of the growing technological changes related with introduction of innovations, is also encountered.

All this intensifies the necessity of search of approaches of adjusting of public policy toward the diffusion and promotion of the transition to innovative types and forms of employment that can partially solve the current problems in this sphere. That is why the identification of new features of the employment sector and the definition of prospects of its regulation is relevant and needs more detailed study. Based on the theoretical and applied research, it is advisable to propose the following algorithm of determining innovative types and forms of employment (Fig. 1).

Stage I. Conducting a study of employment in order to identify its innovative types and forms, determine factors affecting the development of employment.

The structural changes taking place in the modern economy have certain regularities, namely: the increase in the share of high-tech manufacturing, telecommunications, financial and business services; emergence of new technological processes, usage of new technologies, new types of raw materials and the production of new types of goods; decrease in the share of the manufacturing sector and the growth of the service sector, deconcentration of industrial production, and shift in its sectoral structure. They form the strategic sectors of national economies at the present stage of development, and are also the main causes of global changes in the structure of employment in the labor market.

Fig. 1. Algorithm of determination of innovative types and forms of employment

Sourse: Author's own processing.

Changes in the structure and forms of employment affect the value system of a modern employee and deepen differentiation in the labor market. Informatization and intellectualization of the economy requires highly educated, highly skilled workers with a high communicative potential, able to produce new knowledge, ideas, methods and capable of learning, endowed with critical thinking, ready to change, free from stereotypes, endowed with such features of character as: purposefulness, perseverance, responsibility, discipline, innovation, adaptability, self-control, resistance to neuro-psychological overloads, high level of efficiency.

Stage II. The grouping of factors that have the most significant impact on the development of innovative employment.

An important methodological task is to determine the factors influencing the process of development of innovative employment and their classification as stimulators and disintegrators, taking into account that the forms and proportions of employment are dynamic, they change under the influence of many macro-, meso- and microeconomic parameters. Based on the research of scientific works it is expedient to distinguish the following groups of factors that have the most significant impact on the development of innovative employment: socio-economic, political-legal, industrial, cultural and institutional.

Socio-economic factors are economic reforms, leading to changes in socio-economic condition of the state, the presence of the shadow economy, economic activity, providing the supply of labor resources in the labor market. The group of socio-economic factors includes: general socio-economic conditions, quality of life, working conditions, material conditions and level of social protection, etc.

Political and legal factors influencing the innovative employment, regulate the legal aspects of employment and labor resource utilization, encourage entrepreneurs to create innovative jobs. These factors influence internal and foreign political stability, the main priorities of state development. The group of political and legal factors should include public administration, social, labor rights and guarantees that characterize the level of observance of rights and safeguards established by law.

Cultural factors are based on the general level of culture and mental characteristics of the population and appear as the labor potential of the population, the culture of work and employment behavior. Readiness for innovation, initiative, creative work, and desire to raise the vocational and educational level should characterize the labor mentality and be characteristic of modern workers.

Production factors affect employment through innovative industrial economic structure, its change and development and through innovative processes in enterprises. *Institutional factors* affect employment through the regulation of social institutions and legal system to ensure employment issues.

Based on the research, it is expedient to allocate legal, organizational and economic methods among the methods of regulation of innovative employment of the population. *Administrative methods* regulate the legal means that make an impact on social and labor processes in employment. *Organizational methods* of regulating employment contributes to the implementation of measures for the organization, effective management and control activities of the state towards the development of innovative employment. *Economic methods* of regulation of innovative methods of employment are a set of economic measures through which a government directly and indirectly influences social and labor processes in the workplace, contributing to significant economic results.

Stage III. Identification of factors that determine the nature of employment, and the characteristic features inherent in innovative employment (Fig. 2).

In the context of existing types, forms and types of employment, it is advisable to distinguish the following factors that determine the nature of employment, as well as the characteristic features for each factor that will determine the innovation of employment:

- for types of employment: education (science, higher, vocational or secondary education), the type of professional activity (older, mature or modern (young) profession), the nature of work (regulated, spiritual or innovative work), skills (active social, basic cognitive, unique professional or managerial competencies);

- for forms of employment: the organization of working time (flexible working hours or regulated), organization of the workplace (traditional or non-traditional office workspace), specific labor utilization (classic or innovative approaches to social and labor relations);

Fig. 2. Factors and characteristics that determine the type of employment

Classif ication	Factors that determine the nature	Characteristic features	The nature of employment

Type of employment

Educational level
- Scientific education
- Higher education
- Professional education
- Secondary education

Type of professional activity
- Outdated professions
- Mature professions
- Modern (young)profession

The nature of labor
- Regulated work
- Innovative work (aimed at producing new ones)
- Spiritual work

Skills
- Active social competencies
- Basic (cognitive)
- Unique professional
- Managerial competencies

Innovative type of employment

Form of employment

Organization of working time
- Flexible working hours
- Regulated working hours

Organization of the work place
- Traditional (office) space
- Unconventional working

Specificity of labor usage
- Classical approaches to the organization of social-labor
- Non-traditional forms of social-labor relations
- Non-traditional approaches to hiring and fulfillment of labor functions

Innovative form of employment

Type of employment

Type of economic activity
- High-tech activity
- Average tech-productivity
- Low tech-productivity

Contribution to the development of the economy
- Socially useful labor
- Socially useless labor

Labor productivity
- Highly productive work
- Low productive labor

Contribution to human development
- Develops human potential
- Does not affect human
- Destroys human potential

Innovative form of employment

Sourse: Author's own processing.

- types of employment, economic activity (high, middle, low-tech activities), contribution to the economy (socially useful or socially useless work), productivity (high-performance or low-labor), contribution to human development (developing or destroying the human potential).

In the presence of a certain set of characteristics, it can be determined whether employment is innovative or not. For example, the type of employment in which an employee needs a high level of education, active social and unique professional competencies, in which innovative work and modern young people are present, should be considered innovative.

Stage IV. Identification and systematization of criteria for assigning to innovative employment.

At the present stage of development, the main criteria for assigning to innovative employment should be considered as follows:

functional and informative: creative nature of work; high level of intellectualization of labor, usage of the latest innovative technologies; high level of communicative (communicative potential); production of new knowledge, ideas and methods; ability to learn, self-improvement; critical thinking; readiness for change; possibility of solving problems in non-standard ways, non-standard, non-template thinking, rejection of stereotypes; adaptability (ability to adapt and adapt to modern production requirements), purposefulness, openness, mobility; competencies (adapted for innovation); degree of comfort of working conditions, possibilities of professional self-realization;

organizational and economic: increasing the share of high-tech industries, telecommunications, financial and business services; reducing the share of the manufacturing sector and the growth of the service sector; creating economic opportunities for the population through the development and implementation of economic policies aimed at developing new innovations and preserving existing jobs; dissemination of information technologies; formation of modern skills and competences in modern educational institutions of all levels of accreditation and forms of ownership, stimulation of their creativity, activity and initiative; increasing the motivation of employees to innovate labor; creating effective incentives for innovation, development of competition in the workplace; growing the needs of the economy in innovation work; growing demand for highly skilled workers in the priority sectors of the economy;

technical and technological: the emergence of new technological processes, usage of new technology, new raw materials and new products; creation of a proper material and technical base; creation of favorable conditions for the development of creative potential of all subjects of employment relations - employers, hired workers, intermediaries in the labor market; increase of state and corporate financing of innovations; increase of state investments in science and education, support of enterprises financing training and vocational retraining of employees; balanced usage of tools and tools for adjusting the employment system.

Stage V. Development of methodical bases for creation of a complex system of indicators of innovative employment.

When conducting research on innovative types and forms of employment, it is necessary not only to perform its qualitative analysis, but also to establishing relevant criteria and indicators. In modern literature, the problems of evaluating new processes in the field of employment in the transition to an innovative and creative

economy are not disclosed. Statistics record only the change in the individual proportions of the distribution of labor resources (in particular, sectoral, educational and vocational and qualification). The analysis of most radical shifts is mainly qualitative.

An analysis of forms and types of innovative employment requires the development of scientific tools that allow for a quantitative and qualitative assessment of the current state and degree of its development. It involves the development of methodological, methodical and analytical foundations for the creation of a comprehensive system of indicators of innovative employment and its effectiveness from a socio-economic point of view. In developing such a system, it is advisable to follow requirements: ensuring the flexibility, transparency and availability of indicators and indicators in relation to different measurement conditions; analysing a sufficient number of factors that determine the formation of innovative employment; developing common approaches that will provide a unified methodological basis and comparability of indicators for interstate analysis of the processes of development of innovative employment.

It should be borne in mind that it is impossible to evaluate innovative employment with any single absolute or relative indicator. A set of variables to measure the employment of an innovative type should ensure that representative results are obtained. It is interesting to distinguish the following groups of indicators:

1. Proposals for the distribution of labor resources according to participation in socially useful work, which characterizes the level of labor innovativeness and identifies the directions of ensuring full employment. It was established that the increase of the level of innovation of labor contributes to increase of incomes of the worker, payment and working conditions, quality of life, increase of free time.

2. Structure of employment by types of economic activity, characterizing innovative employment. Under the current conditions of the national economy branch structure of employment is characterized by low productivity and needs to increase employment in the service sector and science.

3. Professional qualification structure of employees, exhibiting a degree of balance and combination of abilities of individuals and society's needs for skilled workers. Detection of the vocational qualification frame structure enhances the efficiency of intellectual capacity usage and ultimately the economic and social development of society.

4. Employment rate that characterizes the dynamics of the working age population in terms of demographic, social and economic changes in society. Ways of increasing employment is the motivation of people to productive, innovative and creative work, business, state supported job creation.

An important indicator determining the types and innovative forms of employment is the employment of economically active population. The structure of social production there is characterized by a significant reduction of the proportion of material production (industry, agriculture, construction) and increase in the share of the service sector (trade, financial activities). The larger is the share of profitable and progressive economic activities, the higher the productive employment.

Exploring priorities in the field of innovation employment it is advisable to distinguish areas and indicators of determining the level of realization of economic interests in the field of employment (government, employers andworkers). The indicators determining the level of realization of economic interests are the growth rate of gross

domestic product, gross domestic product at constant prices, employment, unemployment, the ratio of real wages and living wage for the employee, amount of social benefits, loss of working time, etc. The indicators determining the level of realization of the economic interests of employers are output per worker, working hours as a percentage of the fund of working time, turnover and number of employees in hazardous and dangerous working conditions and so on. The indicators determining the level of realization of the economic interests of workers are the dynamics of the average wage, ratio of the average wage and subsistence minimum level of salary arrears and so on.

Under modern conditions for workers it is a more important to receive high income from labor, work in satisfactory conditions, to have a professional growth but what is also important is the freedom of choice of occupation and place of work. For companies it is important to obtain high revenues through intensification of labor. For the state the primary purpose is to promote sustainable economic growth, improve living standards of employees by ensuring high productivity of employment, improving the competitiveness of the national economy, job retention and creation of new workplaces.

In developing the methodology for innovative types and forms of employment following groups of factors and conditions that are characteristic of innovative employment were determined:

1. Forming an effective state policy aimed at development of innovative employment (fostering appropriate level of institutional support to facilitate the development of innovative employment; providing support for innovation-active enterprises, fostering self-employment, promoting innovative employment through tax incentives and direct costs, increased spending on science, education).

2. Encouraging people to innovative work (improving the quality of human capital, ensuring adequate public support of innovative progressive labor practices, focusing on the development of innovative forms and types of employment, formation of innovative work culture, focusing on labor mobility and flexible use of intellectual potential in the workplace).

3. Improvement of the system of education (providing a sufficient amount of qualified specialists, formation of an innovative type of employee, development of new forms and types of education, formation of innovative skills, creativity, ability to work in a team, innovative susceptibility).

4. Financial and organizational support for innovative employment in enterprises (spreading innovation-active enterprises that introduce staff development programs, creating a favorable climate for innovation enterprises).

5. Improvement and development of science, financial and organizational support of scientific activities (development and implementation of measures to improve quality of research activities, ensuring the process of perception and adaptation knowledge, creating new knowledge and technologies).

It is advisable to distinguish two approaches to building innovation indicators determining the types and forms of employment:

building a system of indicators, each of which reflects certain aspects of innovative employment (technical, informational, economic, educational, professional, institutional and social indicators);

building an integrated (complex) indicator by which you can judge the degree of innovation of employment at a given level. Forming an integral indicator can also be based on several sets of indicators.

Identification of innovative types and forms of employment in modern conditions is possible by studying the system of indicators of employment. Fig. 3 shows a system of indicators determining the innovation types and forms of employment, which can be analyzed on the basis of official statistics. The scheme consists of the following units: indicators to determine types and innovative forms of employment, as well as indicators that reveal the content of the specified factors.

The proposed definition of indicators of innovative types and forms of employment can be divided into following units:

technical-informational (the number of PCs per capita, share of the business Internet users, number of PCs per 100 employees (including Internet access), capital-labor proportion, availability of high-performance jobs, value of fixed assets per worker, introduction of new fixed assets per employee, degree of depreciation of fixed assets), *economic* (GDP per capita, GDP per person employed, number of patents per employed, proportion of GDP generated in hi-tech branches, share of GDP generated in intellectually-intensive areas of non-production sphere, average monthly wage in intellectual fields in relation to the subsistence level, level of economic activity, employment by economic activity, the distribution of employees by level of education and economic activities, level of productivity labor, level of entrepreneurship, innovation activity);

educational and professional (the number of university students per 10,000 population, average duration of training of employees, proportion of graduate and doctoral students in employment, proportion of staff with higher education, proportion of workers advanced training or trained, quality and innovation of educational programs, proportion of workers that are engaged in innovative work, proportion of staff employed in research and development by total employment in the economy, share of spending on training in the cost structure, share of employment in hi-tech industries, share of employment in professional and social services);

institutional (a legislative framework to support innovation employment, the number of programs and concepts that contribute to the development of innovative employment and the availability of new technologies institutional structures in the labor market, innovative organizational culture, recruitment for new technologies);

social (focus on innovative labor practices and motivation, focus on education, training and labor mobility, commitment to highly intensive work, ability to implement innovative potential in the workplace).

Within the definition of innovative types and forms of employment should be considered not only quantitative parameters of employment of innovation, but also its quality characteristics. To identify innovative employment quality parameters a method of peer review can be used (poll workers, employers, government officials) that will further formalize and make the process convenient for data collection and analysis.

Stage VI. Analysis of the current situation in the labor market and forecasting its development in the short and long term for the timely identification of innovative types and forms of employment.

Fig. 3. The system of indicators determining the innovation types and forms of employment

	Indicator	Sub-indicators
SYSTEM OF INDICATORS OF DETERMINATION OF INNOVATIVE SPECIES AND FORMS OF EMPLOYMENT	*Technical-informational*	Number of PC per capita; The share of Internet business users; The number of PCs per 100 employees (including Internet access); Power-to-weight ratio; Capital-labor ratio; Availability of high-performance jobs; The cost of fixed assets per worker; Putting into operation new fixed assets per worker; The degree of depreciation of fixed assets.
	Economic	GDP per capita; GDP per employed; Number of patents per employed; The share of GDP created in high-tech industries; The share of GDP created in the intellectual sectors of the non-productive sphere; The average monthly wage in the intellectual branches in relation to the subsistence minimum; Level of economic activity; Employment by type of economic activity; Distribution of employees on the level of education and types of economic activity; Level of labor productivity; Level of enterprise; Level of innovation activity.
	Educational and professional	Number of students per 10,000 population; Average length of training of the employed; The share of postgraduate students and doctoral students in the number of employed; Share of staff with higher education; The share of workers who have increased their qualifications or received training; Quality and novelty of educational programs; The share of employees engaged in innovative work; The share of personnel employed in research and development, in the total number of employees in the economy; The share of expenses for training of personnel in the structure of expenses; The share of employed in the sectors of high-tech production; The share of employed in the field of professional and social services.
	Institutional	Availability of legal support for innovative employment; The number of programs and concepts that promote the development of innovative employment; Availability and introduction of new technologies for the work of institutional structures in the labor market; Innovative organizational culture; The presence of new staffing technologies.
	Social	Orientation to innovative labor practices and motivation; Orientation towards education, professional development and labor mobility; Readiness for intensive high-performance work; Possibility of realization of innovative potential in the workplace.

Sourse: Author's own processing.

In last decade there are constant changes in the structure of employment by economic activity, the most significant of which is the exceed the share of employment in the service sector over the share of employment in the agricultural sector due to the movement of the source values and wealth from the sphere of material production to the production of intangible knowledge. Therefore, for early detection of innovative types and forms of employment the analysis of the labor market and forecasting of its development in the short and long term is necessary.

Stage VII. Providing conditions for the development of innovative employment.
Prerequisites for promoting the development of innovative employment should be:
improving the legal framework that regulates and promotes relationships between entities and the state;
providing high quality labor resources formation, improving their professional skills, experience, ensuring a high level of innovation, mobility and adaptability of workers;
improving scientific and technological level and innovativeness of the economy;
developing innovative, flexible forms of employment, which is a reserve increased employment;
increasing labor market flexibility and production expansion of the service sector;
increasing the share of high-tech industries, growth of the service sector;
creating economic opportunities for the population through the development and implementation of economic policies aimed at developing new innovative and preservation of existing jobs;
stimulating creativity, activity and initiative of workers to ensure formation of the necessary skills and competencies;
the spread of new technology, new raw materials and new products;
increasing public funding in science and education.

Stage VIII. Monitoring changes in forms and types of employment with a view to timely identification and support from the state and business
Innovative employment contributes to the high level of economic development, improving the competitiveness of the national economy, providing quality of life of the population receiving work income greater than the minimum required for the reproduction of resources of labor, improving working conditions, providing professional growth, improving enterprise competitiveness, job retention and creation new workplaces.

Innovative employment determines needs of the economy for skilled workers and the needs of the workforce in jobs with appropriate working conditions, providing a balance of supply and demand in the labor market. The state should build appropriate employment policies, given the principle of consistency of economic development, which includes the coordination of social and economic policy with employment policy at all levels.

Monitoring of employers requirements for candidates for vacant positions and related improving of the content of the education system. Optimal in this situation could be the creation of the "bank of competences" with employers and professionals in the field of education; key task of the "bank" is collection and update by interviewing managers of different industries, information on the competencies, knowledge and skills needed for workers of different professions. The existence of the mentioned "bank" will create and adjust the curriculum according to the current needs of employers and maximize the quality and efficiency of the education system.

Thus, the current components of the state policy related to the development of

innovative employment should be: stimulating entrepreneurship; providing financial support to enterprises that carry out a policy of creating new innovative jobs; supporting domestic and foreign investment aimed at providing innovative labor; providing regulatory support to SMEs; promoting self-employment.

CONCLUSIONS

In modern conditions of development of national economies there is an obvious tendency of gradual decrease of the employment rate of the population in the production and services sectors, instead of the significant increase of the employment level in the knowledge sector. Changes in the structure and forms of employment affect the value system of a modern employee and deepen differentiation in the labor market. Informatization and intellectualization of the economy requires highly educated andhighly skilled workers with a high communicative potential, able to produce new knowledge, ideas, methods and capable of learning, endowed with critical thinking, ready to change, free from stereotypes, endowed with such features of character as: purposefulness, perseverance, responsibility, discipline, innovation, adaptability, self-control, resistance to neuro-psychological overloads and a high level of efficiency. The article explores the specificites and common features of development of modern labor markets of Ukraine and Poland and determines that the expansion of the innovative type of employment is a productive solution of typical problems. Despite the similarity of problems and challenges, the Ukrainian labor market is inferior to the Polish, by level of the dynamism of transformational change, and also by the effectiveness of managerial and political decisions implemented by the government and social partners in sphere of support of the development of state employment policy. Poland's practice of forecasting the needs of the country's economy in a highly skilled workforce approaches to monitoring changes in the content and nature of work, an existing management training system and also measures regarding promote the development of creative sectors of the economy, can be a great example of reforming the labor market in Ukraine towards focusing on its balancing and supporting trends of the expansion of innovative types, forms and areas of employment. The methodology proposed in the paper is, first of all, the basis for assessing the volume of innovative employment in the countries, its nature and the existing gaps in state regulation of this field. The theoretical and methodological approach to identification of features, scales and intensity of the expansion of innovative forms of employment, which includes: systematization of criteria of attribution to innovative employment; a comprehensive system of innovative employment indicators; grouping of factors of priority influence on the nature of employment and expansion of employment of the innovative type; analysis of the current situation on the labor market and forecasting of transformational shifts for timely identification of innovative forms of employment with the aim of scaling and sufficient regulation, is substantiated. The current components of the state policy regarding to the development of innovative employment should be: stimulating entrepreneurship; providing financial support to enterprises that carry out a policy of creating new innovative jobs; supporting domestic and foreign investment aimed at providing innovative labor; providing regulatory support to SMEs; promoting self-employment. The versatility and complexity of the proposed approaches allows it to be used not only in economic systems that are in the nascent stage of the creative

economy, but also in those which have long ago embarked on this path and are actively producing new knowledge and expanding the number of people employed in innovative areas of the economy.

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REPRESENTATIONS OF THE PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS UKRAINIAN-POLISH RELATIONS IN WEB COMMUNITIES

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Abstract

This research demonstrates public opinion on particular aspects of Ukrainian-Polish relations in two aspects: historical and cultural. A commentary system on two Polish and Ukrainian Wikipedia articles is analyzed. The research methodology is based on synthesis, analysis, comparison, which allows to investigate the features, problems and possibilities of the web communities in the context of public opinion formation. It is concluded that web communities are a significant tool for both manipulating the

public in shaping and developing international communications, and for forming the united public opinion on international relations at the state and public levels.

Key words: *public opinion formation, source of social memory of the society, public opinion indicators, virtual communication*

INTRODUCTION

The current state of Ukraine's European integration is closely linked to the stronger development of international relations in the world political arena. Today, foreign policy of Ukraine is aimed not only at developing diplomatic relations between the states but, first of all, at establishing friendly relations between the societies, especially with the neighboring states. Due to historical processes, Ukraine has a significant layer of common historical and cultural heritage with other countries, among which Poland is a key strategic partner today. That is why it is important to analyze the public opinion on certain aspects of Ukrainian-Polish relations.

According to the current trends in the information society development, the scope of such analysis is increasing, mainly because of the virtual communication through web communities has an increasing role.

Today, diverse web communities are a unique element of the informational space in the political system and international relations. They are not just a form of communication, but an understanding of what is happening in the country and how the progressive part of the population in the region responds to it. If we define social networks as a kind of web forums, the "contingent" of such communities is quite diverse in all the criteria: age, education, professional sphere, etc. Often, social networks are used to shape public policy and manipulative practices of constructing political reality. However, in order to avoid this kind of manipulation in the planned analysis, it is important to choose a web community where political reality is not distorted. In our view, a tool for such analysis may be the publicly available, multilingual encyclopaedia "Wikipedia", where articles are created and edited by members of the online community. At the same time, as a rule, authors and editors of such articles are people who clearly analyse current trends in international relations and are able to distinguish true news from "fakes" and use the proven sources.

Analyzing the research of modern scholars it can be stated that the level of development of online encyclopedic resources today adds up to the general level of intellectual development of the society. Wikipedia's undeniable advantage over other electronic encyclopedias (Interpedia, Encyklopedia Internautica, Internetowa encyklopedia PWN, Ukrainian Electronic Encyclopedia, etc.) is its multilingualism. Ferron M. compares the scale and quality of each national Wikipedia's sector with the measure of a nation's contemporary social potential to create a new cultural product. "The complex of Wikipedia's language sections is a platform for competitions and representations of world cultures, an indicator of their current potential. Therefore, the strategic objectives of each national Wikipedia are commensurate with the place of one or another culture in today's global cultural space. The dynamics of Wikipedia's development, its quantitative and qualitative characteristics, are significantly correlated with the future of national cultures and languages" [Ferron 2011: 27]. Therefore, Wikipedia can be considered a tool for analyzing the development of a contemporary public opinion.

Foreign researchers interpret the web encyclopedia Wikipedia as a global "memory place". Citing the basic elements and basic characteristics of wiki and Wikipedia, scholars address four issues related to social memories research: collective memory, communicative and cultural memory, "memory place" and "soft break" [Pentzold 2007: 263].

Wikipedia article in individual studies is analyzed as a representation of crystallized collective memories that are specially constructed through direct editing of the article and comments on a related Wikipedia discussion page [Ferron 2011: 35].

1. THE ANALYSIS OF THE ARTICLE ABOUT POLISH-UKRAINIAN WAR

Table 1 provides an analysis of the visual and content levels of the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918-1919 (Wojna polsko-ukraińska) as of April 2019.

Table 1. Analysis of the visual and content levels of the article "Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918-1919" (Wojna polsko-ukraińska – in Polish)

Criteria of analysis	Article in Ukrainian Wikipedia	Article in Polish Wikipedia
The scope of the article	36 643 characters	15 899 characters
Volume of discussion	–	3 branches of discussion
Last editing time of the article	February 18, 2019	April 05, 2019
Number of main sections	1. Reasons and prerequisites 2. The course of hostilities 2.1. The battle for Peremyshl' 2.2. The battle for Lviv 2.3. The first attack on Lviv 2.4. The second attack on Lviv 2.5. The battle near Volodymyr-Volynsky 2.6. Volchukhiv operation 2.7. Further fighting 3. Consequences 4. Heritage	1. Mastery of Eastern Galicia by Ukrainians, street fights in Lviv 2. Battles in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia from December 1918 to March 1919 3. Fights from March to July 1919 3.1. The May attack of Józef Haller 4. After the fighting 5. Entente powers and ZURL and the question of Eastern Galicia
Number of related articles	1. Ukrainian Galician Army	1. Ukrainian Galician Army 2. Curzon Line 3. Participants of the Polish-Ukrainian war 4. Honorary Badge "Orlęta" 5. Commemorative Medal for the War of 1918-1921 6. Cross for participation in the War of 1918-1921

Source: Authors' research according to the articles in Wikipedia

Therefore, despite the significant difference in the volume of articles, it is necessary to analyze their content in more detail.

Quality of content. First of all, it is worth paying attention to the very definition of the concept of "Ukrainian-Polish war": in the Ukrainian version, the Encyclopedia presents this concept as an armed conflict between the Polish and Western Ukrainian People's Republics (after the Unification act – Western United Ukrainian People's Republics) in the territory of Galicia, which has spilled over into large-scale November 1, 1918 – July 17, 1919 [The Polish-Ukrainian War (1918-1919): article in Ukrainian Wikipedia]; in Polish Wikipedia, the Polish-Ukrainian War is presented as an armed conflict of citizens over nationality in Eastern Galicia, where Poles and Ukrainians live [The Polish-Ukrainian War (1918-1919): article in Polish Wikipedia]. In fact, contradictions in the interpretation of the issue are already presented in the definition of the main term.

While analyzing the text of the articles, we conclude that general historical events are transmitted according to established facts, but in each of the articles there is an imprint of national identity.

On the other hand, we should pay attention to the number of relevant articles to the Wikipedia's article. Such links indicate the relatability of content, relatedness and the link between related articles. So in the article "Wojna polsko-ukraińska" there are active links to the following articles: "Uczestnicy wojny polsko-ukraińskiej", "Ukraiński Generalny Komisariat Wojskowy", "Bitwa o Lwów (1918-1919)", "Walki o Przemyśl w 1918 term" , "Pogrom lwowski (1918)", "Obóz internowanych i jeńców polskich w Kosaczowie", "Ofensywa czortkowska" and others. Particularly noteworthy, in our view, is the article "Ukraiński Generalny Komisariat Wojskowy", which contains references to biographies of 502 participants in the Polish-Ukrainian War and articles about the cemetery of Polish defenders in Lviv and the Polish National Committee in Lviv. The biography of Ukrainian defenders has been scattered across various online resources, which make the search much more difficult.

The article "Polish-Ukrainian War 1918-1919" contains active links to the following articles: "Battle for Peremyshl'", "Battle for Lviv (1918)", "December Attack on Lviv (1918)", "January Attack on Lviv (1919)), "The Battle for Volodymyr-Volynsky (January 1919)", "Vovchukhiv Operation", "Soviet annexation of Western Ukrainian lands" and others. Thus, the topics of related articles is almost the same, which testifies the identity of the historical facts perception by Ukrainian and Polish society. Another indicator of content analysis of a wiki-article is **the number of references used**. So, in the Polish article there are 16 footnotes and 7 bibliography items. All references are made to Polish online sources and Polish researchers. As for the references in the Ukrainian article, there are 3 bibliography items, including the work of the famous Lviv researcher of the Ukrainian-Polish War, the historian Mykola Lytvyn. Thus, it can be argued that the article in the Ukrainian version of Wikipedia is more subjective, which makes it impossible to make a clear critical analysis.

Another criteria of content analysis of a article is the **presence of backlinks** – links in other sources to the article [Gabrilovich et al. 2007: 1608]. According to the statistics obtained from the analysis, 1063 references were made to the article in Polish Wikipedia and 835 references to the article in Ukrainian Wikipedia. At the same time, the number of links from this page in the Ukrainian article (1149) is much higher than in Poland (159). Such fluctuations in the statistics demonstrate the "power" of the articles content: the higher the number of links to an article, the more important the article is for the public.

With regard to the user-level analysis of articles, it is characterized by **the number of active users** (personalized editors and editors of articles) and **the number of edits and comments** (Fig. 1-6).

Fig. 1. Top 10 Editors by Editing the article «The Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918-1919» (in Polish)

Source: Authors' research according to the articles in Wikipedia

**Fig. 2. Top 10 Editors by Editing the article «The Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918-1919» (in Ukrainian)**

Source: Authors' research according to the articles in Wikipedia

Fig.3. Top 10 editors by volume of text added to the article «The Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918-1919» (in Polish)

Source: Authors' research according to the articles in Wikipedia

Fig. 4. Top 10 editors by volume of text added to the article «The Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918-1919» (in Ukrainian)

Source: Authors' research according to the articles in Wikipedia

Fig. 5. Statistics of editing articles about the Polish-Ukrainian war on Wikipedia in 2002-2019

Source: Authors' research according to the articles in Wikipedia

Fig. 6. Dimensions (number of characters) of edits made in the article about the Polish-Ukrainian War on Wikipedia in 2002-2019

Source: Authors' research according to the articles in Wikipedia

The activity of discussing an article is an indicator of its social significance. The article on this topic in Ukrainian does not contain any discussion. At the same time, there is a discussion on this article in Polish on three autonomous branches: «Discussion: The Polish-Ukrainian war», «This is a scandal» «article only about the war with WUPR». Despite such discussions, the number of commentators and commentators themselves (2 persons) suggests that modern Polish society, like Ukrainian, is not too interested in historical events.

Analyzing the wiki-articles on historical joint events in Ukrainian and Polish Wikipedia, we obtain the following results:

1. The time of articles creation on Wikipedia is different: the article in Polish was created 3 years earlier, which indicates that the Polish society is more aware of the need to inform a wide range of readers of the encyclopedia about these events;

2. The number of edits by year shows that the article in Ukrainian has undergone more editing during 2011-2018, while the article Polish has been edited most times in 2011. Such an analysis can be interpreted as an indicator of the quality of the article's primary text. That is, the content of the article at the stage of creation in Polish Wikipedia was of higher quality, which testifies to the higher level of knowledge of the author of the article about the described facts.

3. The number of active links to other articles indicates the extent of coverage of the study. Despite the slight difference in the number of such hypertext references in both articles, their subject is practically the same, which indicates the same coverage of the historical events considered.

4. The presence of backlinks demonstrates the degree of the article's importance to the society. Thus, with a small advantage (200 references), the figures of the article in Polish prevail. But, on the other hand, this is explained by the longer period of existence of the article.

5. The amount of references indicates the degree of disclosure of the topic. Taking this into account, it can be noted that the article in Polish has been expanded more fully;

6. The presence of inter-user comments provides information about the degree of interest of the topic in contemporary society. Therefore, it can be stated that historical issues don't greatly concern the modern citizens of both countries.

2. THE ANALYSIS OF THE ARTICLE ABOUT EUROPEAN FOOTBALL CHAMPIONSHIP 2012

For a more complete analysis of Wikipedia as a tool of public opinion it is important to carry out more analysis of articles which by nature are more relevant to a modern society. Such articles may be ones concerning contemporary political or economic relations or articles on culture and sports. In order to find a common ground for analysis, an article from the category "Culture and Sport" – "European Football Championship 2012" was selected. The reason for the review of the articles about the 14th European Championship is that the final part took place in Ukraine and Poland from June 8 to July 1, 2012. In addition, given the number of comments on the article and lively discussion, the article is relevant to a modern society.

Table 2.
Analysis of the visual and content levels of the article "European Football Championship 2012" ("Mistrzostwa Europy w Piłce Nożnej 2012" – in Polish)

Criteria of analysis	Article in Ukrainian Wikipedia	Article in Polish Wikipedia
The scope of the article	26 663characters	24 073 characters
Volume of discussion	11 branches of discussion	17 branches of discussion
Last editing time of the article	August 16, 2018	March 14, 2019
Number of main sections	1. Choosing the host country of the final stage of the championship 2. Preparation for holding 3. The prize 4. Cities and stadiums 5. Selection stage 6. Drawing of the final stage 7. Arbitrators 8. Warehouses of teams 9. Regulation of the final stage 10. The final stage 11. Statistics 12. Broadcasting 13. Attributes	1. Host selection procedure 2. Organization of games 3. Logo and symbols 4. The password of the championships 5. ball 6. Mascots 7. Tickets 8. Trophy 9. Cities and stadiums 10. Judges 11. Qualifying for Euro 2012 12. Qualified teams 13. Group stage 14. Cup phase 15. Goal 16. Individual awards 17. Cards 18. Television broadcasts 19. Official sponsors
Number of related articles	2	1

Source: Authors' research according to the articles in Wikipedia

Quality of content. Analyzing the content of the articles, we have come to the conclusion that, despite the preference for the article in Polish in the number of sections of 6 units, the essence of the issue is solved at the same level. In both articles, the same issues of organization and holding of the Championship are analyzed. The only difference is the consistency of the information. For example, in Polish-language Wikipedia the issue of logos and symbols is discussed in section 3 [European Football Championship 2012: article in Polish Wikipedia], and in Ukrainian-language Wikipedia – in section 13 [European Football Championship 2012: article in Ukrainian Wikipedia]. However, the content is not affected by the sequence.

Number of sources used. The Polish-language Wikipedia-article uses 63 sources that are links to other foreign online resources, including the UEFA official website. When creating the Ukrainian article about EURO 2012, the authors used 45 sources of various origins: domestic and foreign sites, including the UEFA official website. The analysis of the number of references showed that the authors approached the creation of the article thoroughly and used a sufficient number of primary sources.

Backlinks. There are 1493 external links to the Ukrainian-language article "European Football Championship 2012". At the same time, the corresponding article in Polish Wikipedia is cited in 1159 other online sources. Thus, the degree of

relevance of the subject matter to Polish and Ukrainian society is almost at the same level.

A **custom level** of article analysis is presented in Figures 7-12.

Fig.7. Top 10 Editors by editing the article "European Football Championship 2012" (in Polish)

Source: Authors' research according to the articles in Wikipedia

Fig.8. Top 10 Editors by Editing article "European Football Championship 2012" (in Ukrainian)


Source: Authors' research according to the articles in Wikipedia

Fig.9. Top 10 editors by volume of text added to the article "European Football Championship 2012" (in Polish)

Source: Authors' research according to the articles in Wikipedia

Fig.10. Top 10 editors by volume of text added to the article "European Football Championship 2012" (in Ukrainian)

Source: Authors' research according to the articles in Wikipedia

Fig.11. Statistics editing articles about the European Football Championship 2012 on Wikipedia in 2005-2019

Source: Authors' research according to the articles in Wikipedia

Fig.12. Dimensions (number of characters) of edits made in the article about the European Football Championship 2012 on Wikipedia in 2005-2019

Source: Authors' research according to the articles in Wikipedia

Figures 11 and 12 show that most of the edits were made in 2012 – the time of hosting Euro 2012. It is possible to assume that it was at this time that the most important information about the Championship was provided: a description of the composition of the teams, a description of the group stage, the results of the games and more.

The activity of discussing to the article. Unlike the discussion on the article about the Polish-Ukrainian War, the discussion about the European Championship 2012

is lively and rich in commentary. Comments to the article about the European Football Championship 2012 are divided into the following discussions: Questions; Lviv or Donetsk?; Image; Votes against; Explain to everyone; EuroBasket 2015; Euro boycott; Hey guys, for the saponification; Players surnames and names; Ukraine – England; Question about the number of views. Analyzing the texts of the discussions themselves, it is worth noting that the first discussion was formed in April 2012 (when preparations began for Euro 2012) and the last comment was dated July 2012 (the time of the Championship itself). In general, the activity of comments by years is as follows: 2007 – 16 comments, 2008 – 1 comment, 2011 – 5 comments and 2012 – 20 comments. All active commentators are Ukrainian-speaking. Thus, the biggest peak of the discussion activity is the beginning of Championship preparation and at the time of the event itself.

As for the discussions in the Polish article, they are grouped into the following sections: Match results, Referee, Scorers, Match results, Supporters, Scoring, Admission, Media rights to matches, Top scorers, from Wikipedia: Report an error in the article, Missing Groups, Litany with road numbers. If in the Ukrainian article there were comments of the beginning of Championship preparation, in Polish article – all available comments are recorded as of 2012 immediately. A negative feature of the discussions in the Polish article is the inaccessibility of a large number of links related to the passage of bots. Bot is a program that checks the quality of articles, compliance with their individual formal criteria, and make minor edits as needed (mark-up correction, bug fixes, internal structure refinement, link validation) [Spezzano 2019: 49]. Each new topic for discussion was created by a different user, which confirms the fact of interest of the society and the need to discuss various issues.

As a result of a visual and content analysis of the wiki article about the European Championship – 2012 in Polish and Ukrainian, the following results were obtained:

1. The time of creation of articles on Wikipedia, as in the analysis of the previous article, is different: the Ukrainian article was created at the beginning of preparation for Euro 2012, and the Polish – 2 years later. So, Ukrainian society reacted more quickly to the information about the holding of Championship in Ukraine. This is supported by the commentary in the first discussion, dated as early as April 18, 2012: Ukrainians were wondering if the Championship would really take place in their country and whether or not it was a fake event.

2. The number of edits by year shows that both articles were most frequently edited by users in 2012. It was during the competitions that the largest information stream about the Championship was observed, which is sufficiently stated in the articles.

3. The number of active links to other Internet resources in both articles is large enough. That is, the breadth of coverage is quite significant.

4. The number of backlinks demonstrates that the article is more relevant to Ukrainians because it is cited in more sources than the Polish version of the article.

5. The number of references indicates that the content of the Polish article is revealed more deeply and with more perspective than the content of the Ukrainian article. The same result was obtained in the analysis of the article about the Polish-Ukrainian war.

6. The presence of inter-user comments provides information on the identity or non-identity of the common interests of Ukrainians and Poles in the Euro-2012 Championship. If the Polish society is more interested in the results of matches,

meetings, referees, then for the Ukrainian society, first of all, the issues of local character are important: the choice of the stadium in Ukraine, the result of the match Ukraine – England, etc.

CONCLUSIONS

Nowadays, the Internet is being used more and more extensively in the interest of informational influence. It provides ample opportunities to influence the formation of public opinion, political, economic and military decisions and enemy's information resources and disseminate specially prepared information (misinformation). In our analysis, it is necessary to assume that the authors of articles and commentaries on Wikipedia are politically unengaged representatives of a society. This is due to the fact that information drives in the usual social networks (Facebook, twitter etc.) are more likely to influence the development of general public opinion than in the Wikipedia community. The primary reason for such information drive is aimed to awaken the consciousness of the average citizen, who will not immediately come to meaningful conclusions. Users of this electronic encyclopaedia are more responsible for creating articles and comments.

Taking into account the fact that public opinion performs a number of functions (evaluative, orienting, educative, regulatory, social control function, regulation function) and assuming that Wikipedia's articles are created by "Internet Intelligence" it can be argued that the analyzed articles perform an orientation function and comments and discussions about them perform an evaluative function.

Table 3 presents indicators of public opinion as a result of the analysis of discussions to Ukrainian and Polish articles on two different topics. One method of sentiment analysis (Sentiment analysis, Opinion mining) is selected on the rating scale – the use of a scaling system whereby words usually associated with negative, neutral or positive tonals are assigned numbers according to the scale.

Table 3. Indicators of Wikipedia public opinion analysis of historical and cultural events of the two countries

Evaluation criterion (scale)	Article about the Polish-Ukrainian war		Article about the European Football Championship 2012	
	Ukrainian article	Polish article	Ukrainian article	Polish article
Orientation of opinion within one discussion (-1…1)	0	0,5	0,5	1
Intensity of opinions of users (0…1)	0	1	1	1
Stability of users' opinions (0…1)	0	0	0,5	1
Information saturation of comments (0…1)	0	0,5	1	1
Social support of users (-1…1)	0	0	0,5	0,5
Co-orientation (degree of public interest) (0…1)	0	0,5	1	1
The degree of accuracy of the comments (0…1)	0	1	0,5	0,5

Source: Authors' research according to the comment's statistic of articles in Wikipedia

The table shows that the issues of events that are a historical common past are not of much concern to a modern society. There is a little interest in history among Polish users. This interest is directed more towards identifying the initiators of an armed conflict. The discussions of such users are not sufficiently saturated with evidence, which may indicate that they are not fully aware of the issue.

With regard to current events, network users are more active in expressing their opinions. Stability and intensity of thought, high level of information commentary are observed. The degree of public interest has reached the highest scale (co-orientation is 1). In the criteria of directionality and stability of thought, within the same discussion of the users themselves, the indicators of Polish and Ukrainian society differ slightly: comments in the Polish-language article about the Football Championship have a clearer direction and stability of the opinion, while the opinion expressed in the comments on the same Ukrainian-language article is often influenced by the discussion itself.

Thus, analyzing the discussion aspect of Wikipedia articles on cultural and historical aspects, it can be argued that contemporary society is not too concerned with historical issues but, instead, it is more interested in contemporary events. However, it is important not to forget the fact that precisely through historical events there is a manipulation of society by ambiguous interpretation of socially significant historical facts. For example, the beginning of the Polish-Ukrainian War in the two online encyclopaedias (Ukrainian and Polish) is interpreted somewhat differently. These interpretations, as we have already noted, have a national imprint of each of the states. Of course, for the average citizen, such a difference in the formulation of the fact may not have an important role, but for the creation of a negative information reason (such as inciting hostility between neighbouring states, which are now strategic partners), even such a difference can serve as an initial stage of misunderstanding. We should not forget about "herd instinct" in web communities and a great deal of trust in the information published online. The latter is proved by the Wikipedia online encyclopaedia.

However, it should be understood that web communities can significantly improve the effectiveness of public self-organization mechanisms - that is, contribute to the emergence of the civil society. New forms of communication between the state and society create the preconditions for the development of civil society institutions and organizations that ensure the social capital of all participants of a particular communication.

Therefore, it should be understood that the web community is a new, but very dynamic phenomenon of the information society (the formation of which happens in Ukraine and in other countries of the world), whose problem area requires further research in various aspects, including political ones.

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SOCIAL NETWORKS AS A FACTOR IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN UKRAINE

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Abstract

The article examines the role and importance of social networks in the process of the formation of civil society in Ukraine. There is a parallel with the events of the "Arab Spring", in which social media has been an important factor in political processes. It shows how social networks, including Facebook, were actively used to organize people during the Ukrainian "Revolution of Dignity". Positive and negative factors of influence of social networks on the political life after the revolutionary events are analyzed, the role of facebook and instagram in the 2019 presidential election campaign and in the subsequent domestic political life are highlighted. In addition to various socio-cultural and communication functions, social networks have become a catalyst for political change, a platform for active civic engagement. There is a significant level of influence of social networks on the course of political processes, which was manifested in the active promotion of new practices of public participation, consolidation and self-organization of Ukrainian civil society. It is substantiated that in the context of democratic media policy, the role of social networks as an important factor in the development of civil society will increase.

Key words: *social networks, civil society, political processes, Revolution of Dignity, Presidential election of Ukraine, media policy*

INTRODUCTION

Today, in the context of civil society development in Ukraine, its democratization and the emergence of a new type of political culture, the internet and, in particular, social media are an integral part of this process. Social networks have become a powerful tool that controls the actions of the authorities and enables the mobilization of people in case of violation of the national elite of the country's political interests [Tökölyová, Dêd 2019: 17-19].

Great distrust of the usual media, such as television, radio, newspapers, has made it possible for social networks to become a widespread medium between readers/viewers and sources of information, narrowing to some extent the field of customized information policy in traditional media. For the first time, we started talking about the interconnection and interplay of social media and civil society during the events of late 2010 in the Arab countries, dubbed the "Arab Spring". In these states, protests have been initiated and coordinated through the social networks Facebook and Twitter. A certain phenomenon in the development of European civil society was the circumstances in Ukraine in 2013, called the "Euromaidan" or the "Revolution of Dignity".

The events in Ukraine logically continued the trends that have emerged in the Arab countries, when social networks became the driving force for changes in the political order in the country and its geopolitical course. In this situation, a very important component was the absolute freedom to use the Internet and the number of users of social networks in Ukraine. Thus, according to "We Are Social" and "Hootsuite" agencies, there are about 40 million Internet users in Ukraine, 17 million of which are social network users, including 13 million are Facebook users [We Are Social 2019].

The trend of increasing influence of social media on socio-political processes was clearly manifested during the 2019 presidential campaign in Ukraine, when popular Ukrainian actor and comedian V. Zelensky, who ran for President of Ukraine, made the most of social networks to win elections. In fact, his entire election campaign unfolded on social media in an interactive format – from the election announcement, the writing of a joint voter presidential candidate program, the formulation of election slogans, to the announcement of election results; all this Ukrainian citizens for the first time could hear and observe on its official pages-profiles in Instagram, Facebook, YouTube, and only then on television, radio and newspapers.The rapid and widespread increase in the impact of social networks on political processes, forms of social communication and civic engagement of the general population determines the importance and relevance of research into these issues. It should also be noted that the events explored in this article (namely, "Revolution of Dignity", President election 2019 etc.) are recent in nature and have not yet been fully scrutinized by scholars, although there is a scientific and public demand for their research.

1. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review of this document is based on the work of well-known media theorists, political philosophers, sociologists, political scientists to study the issues impact of the internet and social media on the dynamics of political processes, as well as the emergence and development of civil society in Ukraine. In particular, the concept of "Information civilization" of A. Toffler were of great methodological importance for our study. As you know, in his work "The third wave. From industrial

society to a more humane civilization"(1980), he outlines the concepts of the three civilizations (waves) of social development, namely the agrarian wave, the industrial and the post-industrial, paying particular attention to the analysis of the latter (the lust one). According to A. Toffler, post-industrial civilization or the age of the information society is characterized by a shift in value-oriented economic orientations from industrial production to the value and importance of scientific knowledge, information, the widespread nature of the worker and his mobility. A defining feature of this period, A. Toffler considers, is the proliferation of computer communication, which is beginning to have a significant impact on the cultural, economic and political development of society. The scientist continues and deepens such thoughts in the work "Predictions and Prerequisites" (1983), where he focuses his attention on the formation of the structure of the information society. Also important for our study is the work of "Powershift" (1990), because in this work A. Toffler describes the processes of influence of new communication systems on political protests, analyzing changes in political conditions under the influence of new information technologies. The scientist points out that revolutions are the main factor of these changes and democratization of societies, which are caused by the development of new knowledge by people and the availability of information. It is noteworthy that particular emphasis in his work is on the region of Eastern Europe, which is the object of our study.

Problems of the information society, communicative practice and globalization are addressed by Spanish researcher M. Castells. In "Galaxy Internet" (2001), he analyzes how the Internet has become a universal medium of communication in all spheres of life. Thus, when researching a network society, the researcher noted that the information age dramatically increases the productivity of the population of the earth, which in his opinion will lead to a decrease in consumption and will give a person greater responsibility for the political, spiritual and environmental spheres of life. The impact of information on economics, socio-political relations and culture has been detailed in his trilogy "The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture" (1996), "The Power of Identity" (1997) and "End of the Millennium" (1998). In these books, M. Castells also explores the political, social, and economic factors of social development, and finds that computer networks in the current information age have had a decisive influence on the processes mentioned above. The researcher considers that the active use of Internet networks in public and political life is promising.

In his numerous publications, American theorist F. Fukuyama describes and thoroughly analyzes civil movements in the world. In his book "The End of History and the Last Man" (1992), – he argues that humanity moves from the stage of authoritarianism, dictatorship, socialism to liberal democracy, where the personal freedom, free-thinking and sovereignty of every nation and people are promoted. The researcher also analyzes the reasons for changing the social and political order in the world and concludes about the crisis of ideas when old principles and ideals were no longer accepted by society and new ones were not offered. Analyzing the formation and development of a democratic society, the researcher has given the work "State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century" (2004), in this work he analyzes the strong (military) states, their economies, governments and, in contrast, the weak. F. Fukuyama opposes excessive government interference in civil society activities, noting the possible negative effects of government pressure on public institutions that manifest themselves in the degradation of market relations and civil institutions.

On the use of social networks as a mechanism in political games, the historian N. Ferguson writes in his work "The Square and the Tower: Networks and Power, from the Freemasons to Facebook" (2017). Thus, the researcher in this work talks about the term "network", and also focuses on the confrontation of the current power in different countries and the spontaneous democracy of social networks. The scholar demonstrates the role and importance of networks in contemporary political and historical processes.

A well-known didgerate scientist J. Lanier, the author of the term "virtual reality" in his work "You Are Not a Gadget" (2010) introduced the concept of "Generation of Facebook". This term is used today to describe and analyze the specific activity of users of Internet networks, including the analysis of protest sentiments that first arise and spread on social networks, and then turn into street protests. Researcher S. Orlov deals with the problems of "Arab Spring" events, in his article "The role of social networks in organizing protests during the Arab Spring" (2014), he analyzes the impact of youth on these events. An interesting opinion on the events of the "Arab Spring" is expressed by the scientist Chen Di, in his article "Social Networks and their Impact on Events in the Arab Countries (2010–2013 gg.)" (2013), in particular he indicates that due to these events the role and the level of popularity have grown facebook in arab countries.

About the social media, as the first source of information during the Ukrainian "Revolution of Dignity", described by Ukrainian researcher A. Samus. The analysis of information content distributed by twitter users of the Euromaidan period was made by Ukrainian media researcher O. Kosova, as well as American scientist, professor of political science at New York University, J. Tucker. In the context of political events in other countries, the role of Twitter in protest sentiment was studied by American media researcher C. Shirky, his main ideas were outlined in the book "Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations" (2008).

Y. Zakalskaya writes about the social network Facebook as the leader of information influence. The possibility of social media as a multifunctional tool for influencing social and political processes is explored in their monograph "Social Networks as a Factor of Civil Society Development" (2013) by scientists O. Onishchenko, V. Gorovy, V. Popik. The impact of fake information during various protest events, including Euromaidan, is explored by researcher Khoma N. in her article "Role of social networks in coordination protests" (2014).

A brief survey of scientific publications/research, on the one hand, showed the considerable interest of scientists in this field, and on the other, showed that the influence of social networks on the modern processes of deployment of civil political activity in Ukraine is still not well understood.

2. METHODS

The methods we use in the research process are determined by the stated purpose and objectives. This is, first and foremost, a historical method by which the impact of television and other media on the emergence and development of civil society before the emergence of the internet and social networks was analyzed in a historical retrospective. Also, the statistical method of research was used in the work, by which we were able to obtain information about statistics of the number of Ukrainian users of the Internet, as well as a statistical index of the number of subscribers and page visitors on social networks of candidates for the President of Ukraine. The content-

analysis method investigated the forms and levels of influence of social networks on political processes during the "Revolution of Dignity" and the 2019 presidential campaign. The conceptualisation method was used to identify the main trends and factors behind such an impact, as well as to explain the context and implications of the internet's role in the events mentioned above.

3. RESEARCH RESULTS

The formation of civil society in Ukraine is a complex, painful and long-lasting process, on the one hand, and on the other – a necessary component of the existence of a democratic state and the nation as a whole. For a better understanding of the concept of "civil society", we will define what is meant by this term. Thus, according to the United Nations: "civil society is the third sector of society, along with government and business. It comprises civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations"[1]. In our opinion, the concept of "civil society" refers to a state of society in which the fundamental rights and freedoms of man are freely exercised through various forms of social activity and self-organization. First of all, a balanced model of interaction between the state, society and citizens on the basis of democracy, respect for rights and freedoms, free access to cultural and social goods, to real participation in political processes is the basis of forming a so-called democratic governance.

In Ukraine, we could observe the beginnings of civil society in the 1990s. In the process of the struggle for independence, during the so-called "Revolutions on Granite" and the "Orange Revolution". But these manifestations of democratization and the fight for civil rights and freedoms were hampered by the birth of an oligarchy, which appropriated strategic economic resources and put pressure on the authorities, realizing through their representatives their own political and economic interests, and creating an advanced system of oligarchic media. Almost every powerful TV channel, the vast majority of print media, and later the online media, were controlled by a large oligarchic business.

The processes of democratization and awakening of civil consciousness in the neighboring countries of Eastern Europe have developed more successfully. And new information and communication technologies, notably telecommunications and computers, have had a major impact on these processes. In his work, Powershift (1991), A. Toffler describes these processes as, new communication systems or new ways of using old systems around the world serve to challenge government (and sometimes topple it) [Toffler 1991: 423-424]. The researcher also refers to the founder of the Polish trade union "Solidarity", and later to the President of Poland (1990-1995), Lech Walesa, who was a participant in the events of the overthrow of the communist regime in our neighboring Poland. According to Lech Walesa, the political upheavals in Eastern Europe can be described as, these reforms are the result of civilization – computers, satellite television (and other innovations) that offer us alternative solutions [Toffler 1991: 423-424]. It can be argued that the period described by researcher Alvin Toffler and analyzed by L. Walesa, is the time of the emergence of civil society both in Ukraine and throughout Eastern Europe.

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[1] United Nations. Civil Society [online]. Available at:
https://www.un.org/en/sections/resources-different-audiences/civil-society/index.html

Already a completely new form of development, civil society has acquired, along with the progress of the Internet and, in particular, social networks. Digital 2019 report finds in the past year social media use also jumped almost 9% to almost 3.5 billion people [We Are Social 2019]. According to the Cambridge dictionary, social network is defined as "a website or computer program that allows people to communicate and share information on the Internet using a computer or mobile phone"[2]. In this context, it is appropriate to mention sociologist M. Castels, who in his work "Galaxy Internet" says that ...the Internet becomes a basic means of communication and organization in all spheres of activity, it seems quite natural that social movements and political process used and will use Network [Castells 2002: 87].

We first started talking about the interconnection and interaction of social media and civil society during the events of late 2010 in Arab countries, dubbed the "Arab Spring" or the "Facebook Revolution" [Gumenyuk 2015: 318]. The peculiarity of these events is that traditionally closed socially and politically, as well as a fairly conservative Arab society has risen to protest over the change of political system and the introduction of democratic reforms. Perhaps the most important and decisive role in the rapid spread of these shares was played by social networks such as facebook and Twitter.

Researcher of the role of social networks in the events of the "Arab Spring" S. Orlov notes that the success of social media is related to the audience they were targeted, because the main users were and still are young people who are receiving or have already received education, but unfortunately not can use it within an old corrupt system of national governance [Orlov 2014]. It is the combination of opportunities to disseminate information quickly and to organize people through internet networking and, in fact, to stimulate youth activism, which still plays an important role in the reform and democratization of Arab society.

At the same time, it should be noted that at this time the information policy of the countries in which the events of the "Arab Spring" took place was aimed at maximally one-sided loyal to the ruling class. That is why social networks have become a mouthpiece that has made it possible to cover completely different perspectives. The newly formed English-speaking social groups within the Facebook network were aimed at communicating important events in the states to ordinary citizens as well as to the political and public elites of Western Europe.

Speaking about the importance of social networks in the events of the "Arab Spring", it is worth noting the theory put forward by the researcher Chen Di in his article "Social Networks and their Impact on Events in Arab Countries (2010-2013)" [Chjen 2013: 189-194]. The scientist points out that it is not social networks that have influenced the aforementioned events, namely due to the events of the "Arab Spring" the popularity of networks in Arab countries has increased [Chjen 2013: 189-194]. In our opinion, rather, it is a two-way mutual influence. To confirm, we provide statistics on the number of Internet users before and after the "Arab Spring". Thus, according to the website "trading economics", Egypt had about 25 million users in 2010, compared to about 35 million in 2012, according to these statistics, we can see a rapid rise in the number of network users[3].

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[2] Cambridge dictionary. Social network [online]. Available at:
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/social-network
[3] Egypt - Internet users. [online]. Available at:
https://tradingeconomics.com/egypt/internet-users-wb-data.html

On the one hand, a sharp increase in network users may indicate an increase in people's need for free access to information and broadcast, free exchange of views, and real impact on political processes in the country. On the other hand, we return to the issue of value orientations and the issue of becoming an information society ideology. For modern people, free access to information, freedom statements, including those critical of the authorities, become a valuable benchmark that has displaced former traditions of trust in official media, state political leaders and undeniably belief in their authority.

A steady tendency of influence of social media on the development of various forms of political activity and self-organization of civil society is revealed by the events in Ukraine in the period 2013-2019. In particular, the influence of social networks was actively manifested during the Ukrainian Revolution, dubbed the "Dignity Revolution". Today we can say that these events have changed the geopolitical vector of Ukraine, from the direction of cooperation with Russia, which limited our economic, cultural and historical rights, to the European integration of Ukraine [cf. Modrzejewski 2018: 70-76]. The main reason for the withdrawal of people to the Maidan was the refusal of the Ukrainian authorities to sign an association on Ukraine's membership in the European Union. This event was a formal cause for protest, although the reasons for dissatisfaction with the current government were much greater – lack of reforms, widespread corruption and numerous abuses, low living standards of the majority of the population against the backdrop of enrichment of oligarchs and their control over economic and political processes and more.

In an interview with "Ukrayinska Pravda", describing civil society during the "Euromaidan", American scientist F. Fukuyama notes that, "First of all, i was surprised that civil society in Ukraine did not give up after the failure of the Orange Revolution. You have maintained and strengthened your ability to organize yourself and to exert pressure on the authorities" [Najem 2014]. Social media became an effective tool of such self-organization. Their ability to provide information quickly and freely played a key role in uniting and grouping people during the "Revolution of Dignity".

The impact of social networks, their ability to mobilize and unite the public is convincingly borne out by the fact that a single online publication made it possible to unite a huge number of people in the fight for the protection of their civic dignity. So, on November 21, 2013, after a brutal massacre in the center of Kyiv over protesting students protesting against the abolition of the course for European integration of Ukraine, MP of Ukraine Mustafa Nayyem published on his Facebook and Twitter pages: "We meet at 10:30 pm Independence Monument. Dress warmly, take umbrellas, tea, coffee and friends. Perfection is welcome in every way!" [Nayyem 2013]. Practically, from the aforementioned post, the mass actions of the Dignity Revolution began, and in the course of several months it took unfolded in front of millions of internet users. With live streaming online, for the first time in the world, millions of citizens of Ukraine and the world were able to watch and experience revolutionary events online. Many thousands of people left their homes and traveled to the Maidan to take part not only in virtual but also real revolution related events. It was in social networks that appeals for help were spread, thanks to which a powerful civil volunteer movement was self-organized and coordinated, which later demonstrated its high efficiency not only during the revolution of Dignity, but also

during the long military operations in the East of Ukraine, when operational nationwide assistance was provided to the wounded and families of fallen soldiers.

Social media has become a versatile platform where you could both get information about events and provide the necessary messages to rally people to protect protesters. A Ukrainian scientist A. Samus believes that, "social networks have contributed to the viral dissemination of information about protests, so they are often the first source of information for Ukrainians" [Samus 2016: 123]. Such information spread so quickly that not everyone could even process it, let alone feedback.

J. Tucker, a professor of political science at New York University, shares the same opinion. He analyzed the above phenomenon for the authoritative newspaper "Washington post" and noted that: "from a more personal point of view, if you want to follow the developments in Ukraine in the coming days, just keep an open channel on Twitter. The #Euromaidan hashtag will give you more information than you can process" [Tucker 2014]. This quote may indicate how strongly at that time a person was creating content for the media mentioned.

It can also be stated that thanks to the creation of public English-language pages on Facebook and hashtags on Twitter, instant information has spread to the global political and public space, which gave great hope to the protesters and their fast response from foreign politicians.

The Ukrainian media researcher O. Kosova notes in this regard that, "in January 2014, the Ukrainian hashtag #digitalmaidan was first among the world leaders of Twitter trends" [Kosova 2015: 25]. By the way, Twitter became the platform for ideas to develop the square during the most difficult times, and especially, a place where famous public figures, musicians, athletes could briefly activate protest actions, become informal leaders for every protester. Thus, social networks provided an opportunity to support civil protest in Ukraine by world politicians and public institutions. While on the international arena, the largest amount of information about Ukrainian revolutionary events was broadcast via Twitter, then in Ukraine, a very powerful informational influence went through the Facebook network. Scientist Y. Zakalskaya writes that in the years of the revolution, "Social networks came out on top among agents of information influence, with the Facebook network being the leader, in which Euromaidan actually began" [Zakalska 2016: 86].

One of the reasons that Facebook became the leader of information influence could be that the trust in the Russian resource VKontakte has significantly decreased. This social network, which was a leader among Ukrainian users before the revolutionary events, lost its popularity and, most importantly, its influence on Ukrainian citizens during the events of 2013-2014. After the revolutionary events due to the powerful information influence of Russia through all its information resources, in fact, launched the propaganda war against Ukraine, the Vkontakte network was generally blocked in accordance with the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of April 28, 2017[4].

This blocking is carried out in the framework of Ukraine's sanctions against Russia imposed as a result of annexation of Crimea and aggression in the Donbas. It is aimed at ensuring information security of Ukraine. From the perspective of today, it can be

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[4] Rishennya Rady nacionalnoyi bezpeky i oborony Ukrayiny [online]. [Available at: https://www.president.gov.ua/storage/j-files-storage/00/40/30/6f76b8df9d0716da74bb4ae6a900d483_1494864914.pdf

stated that thanks to this decision, Ukrainians have become better protected against Russian propaganda, but this is only a partial information protection that Ukraine has received by following its user majority on the Facebook network.

Researchers O. Onishchenko, V. Gorovy, V. Popik in the monograph "Social Networks as a Factor of Civil Society Development" write about social networks in revolutionary events not only as a lever of information protection, but also about a strong tool for call to action, as well as protection against physical violence. Scientists say that, "...opportunity download videos from the protests across smartphones in most cases hinders the opposite side from the use of direct violence" [Onyshhenko, Gorovyj, Popyk 2013: 88].

In this case, you can not quite agree with the scientists, because uploading videos of scenes of violence did not stop the mass shootings of protesters on the Maidan and the adjacent streets of Kyiv. In the subsequent revolutionary events, which were accompanied by constant photo and video coverage, unfortunately, we observed violent actions by law enforcement agencies against protesters. That is, it may indicate that social networks were a medium among people, aided their activation, provided moral support, but could not always protect protesters from physical violence.

Another problematic aspect of the use of social networks in protest events was the inability to control fake information, which constantly came to the network from Euromaidan opponents, in particular, from the ruling authorities. This fake news or yellow journalism, such as information about fascists, Nazis, as well as people who want to organize a coup in the country, were systematic and aimed at suppressing and subsequently destroying revolutionary sentiments. In support of this thesis, it is worth citing the opinion of researcher Khoma N., who in his article "Role of social networks in coordination protests", writes that social media changes the mechanisms of collective action in society. They demonstrate instant responsiveness (for example, broadcasts streaming), but are not safe from fiction and biasses [Homa 2014: 66-72]. The propaganda and mentioned fake information was dangerous enough, because apart from the usual political talk shows, this information was mostly found on social networks on public pages of politicians, public figures, journalists, bloggers and anyone with access to the Internet.

Therefore, despite their democratic nature, social networks can also be used for political manipulation. British researcher Neil Ferguson in his work, "Square and Towers. Social Relations From Freemasons to Facebook" says that social networks were to become a platform for free expression of opinion, and became a powerful mechanism in political games [Ferguson 2018: 592]. You can agree with the researcher, but in turn, it is noted that the internet network is a product of the evolution of other media – such as television, radio, photography and more. These traditional technologies have always had an impact on political processes and protests. A. Toffler, already mentioned by us, has been focusing on the role of the media in overcoming the Ceausescu dictatorship in Romania. He says that, if Ceausescu studied the role played by the new global media system, such as the overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, he would have realized that media control in his country could no longer keep the people in the dark ... [Toffler 1991: 425].

In this case, it is advisable to draw parallels with the situation in Ukraine during the "Revolution of Dignity", since the then President of Ukraine V. Yanukovych and his political environment also did not foresee the situation that might occur in the event

of the use of armed force against protesters. The Yanukovych team underestimated the role of the internet and, in particular, social networks, in society.

But the President of Russia V. Putin made the relevant conclusions on the analysis of the Ukrainian experience. In August 2019, Moscow was swept up by protests against opposition candidates' admission to city council elections. Information about protests and calls for support was immediately spread by social networks, to which the authorities responded by blocking internet and social networks in Moscow. This information is confirmed by Elizabeth Fokht of the Russian service BBC News. She noted that: "Disruptions to the Internet network began shortly before the official launch of the actions. After that, most of the numbers of the main operators operating in Moscow could only make voice calls" [Fokht 2019].

It is worth noting that the events described in both Ukraine and the Arab countries clearly showed the level of influence of internet communications on civil society. As M. Castels rightly pointed out: ...the Internet is also turning into a lever of social transformation through the tools of business organization and communication... [Castells 2002: 91]. Such social transformations, in turn, created a new "Generation of Facebook" (a term that was introduced into the scientific circulation of J. Lanier) [Lanier 2010: 43-44]. Today, the community of users of this network is gaining an outline of a kind of social movement that can quickly organize itself and counter the threat to the national, political and cultural security of its country and its people.

The significant influence of social networks on political processes, and in particular on the political activity of a large number of citizens, is particularly pronounced during the presidential election campaigns. So, in Ukraine during the 2019 presidential election, where the experienced politician and fifth President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko and well-known actor of the humorous genre V. Zelensky met in the second round of elections, we could observe a new phenomenon when social media became almost the main tool, by which V. Zelensky, who had no previous political experience, won the presidential race. Sociologist E. Golovakha, in an interview with "Ukrayinska pravda", calls Zelensky's victory, which gained 73.22% of the vote, an "elektoralnyj Majdan" [Rudenko 2019].

Let's try to analyze how strongly social networks have influenced the choice of Ukrainians and how social media is served after the elections in Ukraine's political and civil life. It is worth noting that most of the presidential candidates have been and still are active users of social media and are covering their activities on social networks. A specific feature of the campaign, organized by the team of V. Zelensky, was its complete transfer to the internet space in the form of daily dynamic interactive communication with the public on the networks Instagram, Facebook and YouTube. Official statements, successful implementation of the idea of involvement of a large number of citizens in the process of writing a political program of the Servant of the Party, video speeches after public events - all this was posted on the official Instagram channel and distributed to millions of subscribers. The main task was to get the votes of the traditionally least active segment of voters – the youth.

To better understand the technology of using social networks and internet technology in general in the 2019 election campaign, let's analyze the official web pages, profile of Facebook and YouTube of the current President of Ukraine V. Zelensky and his predecessor and main contender in the election of P. Poroshenko. Based on the analysis done by Yuriy Alyabyev, a Google Analytics and Google AdWords specialist in online marketing [Alyabyev 2019].

Thus, on the official website of V. Zelensky, the overall average traffic rate was 673.9 thousand visits, shortly after the site's appearance there was a sharp rise in popularity – up to 2.65 million visits a day, but subsequently this figure decreased. For comparison, the traffic of P. Poroshenko was far behind in quantitative terms and amounted to only 53.9 thousand visits [Alyabyev 2019]. After the announcement of the official information about the nomination of V. Zelensky, the attention and activity to his person increased greatly, everyone tried to get the maximum information about the candidate, his program and further actions. For many people, he was seen as a completely new political figure, unrelated to the old system. This candidacy has been linked to hopes for real political and social change, updates to the governance system, ending the war, removing social and political tensions, and more.

V. Zelensky's official social networking site Facebook during the election campaign had 349 205 subscribers, P. Poroshenko – 2 404 047, but V. Zelensky's YouTube profile during the election period had 222 704 subscribers and 11 478 425 views, P. Poroshenko on Youtube had 22 841 subscribers and 31 750 622 views, it should also be noted that V. Zelensky's pages were created in January and March 2019, while P. Poroshenko's pages were in March and April 2014 [Alyabyev 2019]. From this information, we can conclude that despite the fact that the official website, pages on Facebook and YouTube of V. Zelensky were created five years later than P. Poroshenko, the coverage area, the number of visitors and subscribers several times larger than Facebook. P. Poroshenko had the advantage of the number of subscribers on the social network Facebook, but this network was used more by candidates for informing on the course of the campaign than for direct communication with people, which was the main focus of V. Zelensky.

His main task was to reach the most troubled voter, who rarely goes to the polling stations – the youth. That is why the most popular social networks – Instagram and YouTube – were used among the youth audience, because it was these two platforms that gave the Zelensky team the opportunity to interact effectively with potential voters. Short videos of your workday, everyday life and family leisure, appeals to a wide audience to write slogans for campaigning, collective drafting of the election program – these and other well-thought out and well-implemented original techniques gave the feeling that it would not only be a victory for V. Zelensky, but also every one of those who responded to these calls and took an active virtual part in the activities of the networking community of the so-called "Ze Team". Features of his presidential campaign also included minimizing communication with journalists and professional politicians and experts, and possibly avoiding large-scale interviews, and if they did, they were largely thought-out and complementary.

This kind of approach to campaigning is described in the article: "What a TV box set may tell us about the future" written by Jonah Fisher for BBC News. He says about V. Zelensky: "His chosen method of communication has been social media, where he posts a steady stream of upbeat videos – a mix of him working out in the gym, joking with friends, and getting briefed by a team of advisers" [Fisher 2019]. Thus, the current President of Ukraine wanted to show that he is radically different from the old political elite as a native of the people, as a modern and creative personality. Social media has become a tool to help everyone get as close as possible and make it clear to a person that he or she is directly involved in a dialogue with the candidate, without the traditional mediation that other politicians already familiar with television, radio and advertising portraits (so-called billboards).

Today it can be stated that the techniques of coverage of political activity through social network accounts instead of the usual television, radio and newspapers were used by the Zelensky team not only during the election period, but also after the official inauguration for the post of President. First of all, this is well evident in the work with journalists – representatives of traditional media, whose role as an important medium between people and politicians is gradually being leveled. The journalist Ian Bateson writes about it for the site "The Atlantic", talking about V. Zelensky's team that, – "they have openly said they do not need journalists in their efforts to communicate with the public, opting instead for social media and slickly produced "interviews" carried out in-house" [Bateson 2019].

The active use of internet communications and, in particular, social internet networks, helps to accelerate the process of socialization of society and the development of various forms of e-democracy. According to "Oxfordlearners Dictionaries", digitization is the process of changing data into a digital form that can be easily read and processed by a computer [5].

As it is known, e-government is an important structural element of e-democracy (it provides network interaction of state bodies with citizens and various non-governmental organizations, increases efficiency and ease of access to public services); e-Parliament (realizes networking between parliamentarians and citizens on the basis of the principles of accessibility, openness and effective public scrutiny of discussion and decision-making); system of electronic petitions (ensures prompt collectivity of citizens to state bodies of all levels) and so on.

New information and communication technologies enable different forms of electronic participation of the public in political processes, provide new opportunities for expanding citizens' participation in the formation and implementation of state, regional policy, and solving issues of local importance. Through social networks, calls for e-petitions are widespread, public organizations (NGOs) raise funds for the implementation of social-cultural projects (crowd-fonding/crowdsorsing), important political initiatives are formulated and discussed and a heated debate is unfolding between supporters of a political leader movements, etc. Compared to traditional media (TV, radio, press), the internet space of social networks offers much wider opportunities for interactive communication between civil society actors.

The team of the sixth President of Ukraine V. Zelensky is planning to further accelerate the processes of socialization of the society, in particular, it was announced the implementation of the large-scale program "Country in a smartphone", which provides digitization of ID-cards, diverse data in the fields of medicine, taxes and business, as well as electronic system A "social elevator" that will focus on attracting creative people to the President's team through an open online competition system [Ukrayinska Pravda 2019].

This reformatting of the country's management is aimed at the gradual displacement of the old over-centralized bureaucratic system rooted in the Soviet heritage. Instead, it should create a new decentralized, democratic system of efficient horizontal management, with a structured model of a computer network.

But this, in turn, will have both positive and negative consequences. The positive thing will be that older people will learn to work not with paperwork, but with

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[5] Oxford learnersdictionaries.Digitization. [online]. Available at:
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/digitization

electronic using the latest technical means, the Internet and the same social media. In this way, the development of the people will take place and the system of providing services to public and private bodies will be simplified. Although it is worth noting the unwillingness of some older people to move from the usual paperwork to electronic, as well as their unwillingness to master the necessary skills to use the latest technological means.

Mass involvement of broad sections in the creation of information content has certain negative points – not always a sufficient level of quality of this content, both in terms of its content and form of submission, and in terms of limited ability to verify it. American writer and media communications researcher Clay Shirky even introduces special term – amateurization. In his book Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations, he says that today every amateur becomes a photographer, journalist or reporter, resulting in a lack of professionalism and overall quality of information [Shirky 2008: 327]. Thus, instead of content and truthfulness of news or analytical material, we obtain speed and superficiality.

CONCLUSIONS

Having studied the problem of influence of social networks on the development of civil society in Ukraine, we can draw a number of generalizations and conclusions.

The problem of becoming a civil society today is especially urgent for Ukraine, which faces many contemporary challenges, including – the presence of socio-political conflicts within the country and Russian aggression from outside, difficult economic situation, inhibition of reforms due to partial preservation of the old bureaucratic system of governance, insufficient the middle class, the strong influence of the oligarchs on politicians and the media, the growing influence of populist ideology and the manipulation of the consciousness of the general population tions, etc. But, in spite of unfavorable conditions, civil society in Ukraine continues its progressive development in effectively counteracting these negative trends.

The effectiveness of new forms of social communication practices and strategies of civil society depends to a large extent on the use of modern information technologies and, above all, public media and social networks, as well as the modernization of state media policy. The emergence and widespread adoption of new information and communication technologies have contributed to the development of new forms of citizen participation in political processes. Compared to traditional media (TV, radio, press), the internet space of social networks offers much wider opportunities for interactive communication between civil society actors.

As the world and Ukrainian experience has shown, the latest information and communication technologies allow different forms of remote electronic participation of the public in political processes, provide new opportunities for real influence of citizens and public organizations (NGOs) on the formation and implementation of state policy at all levels. In today's Ukraine, along with traditional forms of political governance, there is an intensive development of various forms of e-democracy, the emergence of which is linked to the emergence of a network society. The media become a universal mediator in the interaction between politicians and voters. An important task of media politics at the present stage is to create optimal conditions for the development of information democracy as a perfect model of political interaction that meets the needs of the digital age. In this context, we can talk about the emergence of a new type of civil society, which is based on a new kind of political

communication and interaction based on the free access of citizens to online computer media technologies.

At the same time, one must be aware that media virtualization of socio-political interaction opens the space for simulation (in the sense of J. Baudrillard), increasing the possibilities for manipulation of mass and individual consciousness in the interests of certain political forces and oligarchic groups, whose interests they represent [Tökölyová, Modrzejewski 2013: 37-47]. These forces seek to control not only the traditional media (press, radio, television), but also modern social computer networks: either through direct bans and censorship (mostly in undemocratic countries), or through manipulation through a dedicated staff of hired "bots" , fake pages, news sites, blogs and more. Therefore, the effectiveness of e-democracy depends not only on the level of informatization of society, the qualitative parameters of media technologies, but also on the level of development of citizens' consciousness and culture, their education and civic activity, critical thinking, recognition of the priority of democratic values.

The period of active development of civil society in Ukraine coincided with the widespread spread of the Internet and, in particular, social media networks such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, etc. In addition to its diverse socio-cultural and communication functions, social networks have been a catalyst for political change, a platform for active civic engagement, through which it is possible to unite, coordinate, act, and see the total number of people who support change.

The social and political influence of social internet networks first became apparent in the events of the 2010 "Arab Spring". In 2013, public statements by politicians and information on the course of events catalyzed a powerful civil protest movement in defense of Ukraine's European choice and its own civic and national dignity, known as the "Dignity Revolution", which can be seen as a continuation of a trend that began in Arab countries. replacements of the internal political elite, as well as geopolitical changes. The events of the "Dignity Revolution" have demonstrated that Ukrainian civil society is progressing in its further development and practical implementation of the drive for democratic change.

Of particular note is the role of social networks such as Facebook and Twitter in Ukrainian political events. For the most part, Facebook has captured the intra-Ukrainian segment of users, becoming a space for free communication, discussion and online distribution of events. Twitter, in turn, has become a forum for defending the aspirations of Ukrainian civil society abroad; through this network, information about Ukrainian political events was instantly disseminated in the European and global public space.

The impact of Internet technologies and, in particular, of social networks on the further development of civil society in Ukraine in the post-revolutionary period does not lose its intensity. A striking example was the election campaign, organized and successfully conducted by the team of Presidential Candidate of Ukraine V.Zelensky. In the course of this campaign, it was demonstrated that a person without political experience, without even presenting his election program, won a 50% victory over the experienced politician – former President P. Poroshenko, through social media networks without large investments.

Therefore, we can state the limiting level of influence of social networks on the course of political processes, which was manifested in the active promotion of new practices of public participation, consolidation and self-organization of Ukrainian civil society

in the events of the "Revolution of Dignity" and further democratic changes in internal and foreign policy. We can assume that under the conditions of democratic media politics, the role of social networks as an important factor in the development of civil society will increase.

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STANISLAW ORZECHOWSKI ROXOLAN AND UKRAINIAN-POLISH CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL THEORY OF LATE MEDIEVAL EUROPE

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Abstract

The article analyzes the theoretical and political legacy of the great Ukrainian-Polish thinker of the late Middle Ages, Stanislaw Orzechowski Roxolan, as a prominent representative of «Catholic Rus'». The historical conditions of his outlook and political views are revealed, as well as personal connections with outstanding thinkers of Europe of that time.The thinker's interpretation of the issue of the need to take into account the value grounds for conducting international politics and foreign policy priorities, the problems of civilizational interaction of Christian Europe with the Muslim East are distinguished. The basics of the ideas of optimal social stratification of the Rzeczpospolita («res publica») society, which will ensure the stability of the state, are presented.The approach of the scholar to the issue of the principles of the organization of a successful state, the optimal organization of state power, fair justice, the relation between the power of the church and the king is covered.

Key words: *government, state, king, republic, law, Polish state, Rus'-Ukraine, political thought*

1. FORMATION OF POLITICAL VIEWS OF THE THINKER

The formation of a modern Europe values and principles is incomplete without an analysis of the intellectual input of the general public that have made and continue to contribute to its spiritual treasury, often against the mercantile and pragmatic aspirations of political leaders.

The appeal to history, the intellectual achievements of predecessors, provides additional arguments in favor of building a common European home for all peoples who refer themselves to the European spiritual tradition.

The history of Ukrainian-Polish relations is rich in examples of successful integration into the processes of creation of a pan-European cultural space.

For the Ukrainian intellectuals in the 15th-17th centuries, Poland acted as a «cultural transitor», linking them to pan-European processes, and for the nobility - the «Rzeczpospolita» (United Commonwealth of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania or Latin – «res publika») project was a convenient tool for preserving and protecting their privileges and social interests.

The incorporation of Western Ukrainian lands into the Polish state in the 14th century was a complex and contradictory process, which was accompanied by major changes in society.

The local political elite sought rapid incorporation into the ruling class of the Polish kingdom and aimed to accede to its privileges both politically and economically. The Polish authorities were interested in ensuring the loyalty of the descendants of the local aristocracy as quickly and as firmly as possible to their new suzerain. It was done by granting government positions, related status, and material benefits to those who would be converted to the Catholic denomination.

Like every social phenomenon, Polonization and Catholization of the Ukrainian grand people, besides the downside, had some positive consequences. Catholicism, along with Latin, opened the doors of Western European universities to young representatives of the Western Ukrainian aristocracy. Thousands and thousands of them were educated at the highest standards of the time. Ukrainian names can be found in the lists of students not only of the universities in Krakow but also in Prague, Bologna, Padua, Wittenberg, Paris and other leading universities in Europe. The flow of Ukrainian youth to the centers of education was so great that in many European cities there were even special dormitories for students «from Ruthenia».

The transition to Catholicism has also become a serious social elevator. According to I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov «At the end of the XV and the first half of the XVI century many talented, but needy small nobles and townspeople of Rus' origin in Galicia and Lithuania, in order to receive a Western humanistic education, had to convert to Catholicism and go to Italy at the expense of a bishop or a monastery. It is clear that the Orthodox clergy did not encourage visits to «inhabitants of Latium». It explains that such prominent educated representatives of Western Rus' of that period Stanislaw Orzechowski Roxolan, Pavlo Rusyn from Krosno and Francysk Skaryna were Catholics» [Golenishchev-Kutuzov 1963: 10].

At the same time, some of the young nobles and burgesses who converted to Catholicism and were educated in Western Europe, under the influence of the ideas of the Renaissance and the Reformation, were not going to give up their national roots and thus creating the phenomenon of «Catholic Rus'».

One of the most prominent political thinkers of European scale who represents «Catholic Rus'» is Stanislaw Orzechowski Roxolan. (1516-1566). He was born in the village of Orzechowce in the Przemysl district of the Ruthenian Voivodeship in a family of nobles and a daughter of an Orthodox priest. He received his initial education in Przemysl, later he studied at the leading universities of that time in Europe, in Krakow, Vienna, Wittenberg, Padua, Bologna, and improved his knowledge in Rome, Venice and Leipzig. One of the mentors of a talented young man from Ukraine was the prominent German reformer Martin Luther who even hosted St. Orzechowski for the duration of his studies. He was familiar with many of his prominent contemporaries – Albrecht Dürer, Lucas Cranach the Elder, Gasparo Contarini, Cardinal Commedoni and others.

The issues of St. Orzechowski Roxolan's relationship with the intellectual elite of Europe at that time became relevant in modern Ukrainian science in connection with memorial events - the celebration of two important historical milestones: the 500th anniversary of the birth of the thinker and the 500th anniversary of the Reformation, of which the scientist was a contemporary. Although mostly, they are devoted to his religious views and facts of his biography. The most interesting, in our opinion, is the scientific exploration by D.Virskyi «Luther's Ukrainian Student: Stanislaw Orzechowski Roxolan» (2017), which details the scientist's biography, education and his relationship with the «father» of the Reformation.

Stanislaw Orzechowski Roxolan was an outstanding European scholar. His works have been repeatedly reprinted in various European capitals and were popular with contemporaries. Unfortunately, only a small part of the scholar's creative heritage has been translated and published in modern Ukrainian. Much more of his works were published and analyzed in Poland, where Orzechowski is considered to be a Polish scholar. However, despite the belonging to the Catholic denomination, he never forgot his national roots and origins.

«A prominent political writer of the XVI century Stanislaw Orzechowski Roxolan was a patriot of his nation and constantly emphasized that he was «Ruthenian» (Ukrainian). There is no work, not even a letter, in which he did not consider it necessary to recall his Ruthenian origin. At the same time, he treated other nations with respect and call savages, worthless, wretches those who tried to pit a Pole and a Ruthenian against each other. On every occasion he reminded the king of the deprivations of his native people, urged him to become a defender of Rus', to be sympathetic towards the Ukrainians, to listen to their requests. He defended the rich spiritual and cultural traditions of the Ukrainian people, their glorious historical past to which he constantly addressed in his works» [Ohorodnyk, Rusyn 1997: 207].

2. THE ISSUE OF CIVILIZATIONAL INTERACTION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

Among contemporaries, St. Orzechowski Roxolan's most famous and popular two speeches are called «On the Turkish Threat», in which he raised the important issue for Christian Europe at the time to curb the expansion of Muslim Turkey. The scholar, speaking about the threat that the Turkish offensive brings to European civilization, appealed to the Polish King Sigismund and proposed to create a coalition of Christian rulers who, for the sake of common cause, must act as one united force.

Both editions of this speech were very popular in Europe at that time. According to D. Nalyvaiko «... the great resonance of Orzechowski's speech was aroused in Western

Europe, where there was the concern about the Turkish conquests of the first half of the 16th century, especially on the Danube. After some time they were reprinted in Basel (1551), in Frankfurt am Main (1584), generally they were reprinted many times in Western Europe during the second half of the seventeenth century and the last Roman edition is dated 1663» [Nalyvaiko 1984: 172].

Considering the problem of the clash of Christian and Muslim civilizations, Stanislaw Orzechowski Roxolan raised the question of the role of the religious-value factor in interstate relations. «Do not believe in any agreement, allegiance or union with Suleiman. Because if your vision does not deceive you, you will clearly see not only the numerous deceptions, falsities and crimes of the Turkish but also sufficiently convincing evidence that Suleiman does not adhere to any agreement, no virtue does not bother him and there is nothing to keep him from war» [Orzechowski 1988a: 93]. Noting the disadvantage for Poland of the agreements concluded with Turkey, Stanislaw Orzechowski Roxolan advises King Sigismund to refuse to implement them. However, in order to justify the refusal, he finds the argumentation acceptable to the European tradition and norms of international law: «Not by words but by deeds we must determine the price of virtue of laws and agreements. And if certain agreements are not fulfilled, if they are not equally adhered to by both parties or if the agreement breaks at least partially by at least one of the contracting parties, the other may also fail to comply with the agreement» [Orzechowski 1988a: 102].

Failure to abide by the treaties will inevitably lead to war with the Turks. Although the king of Poland, according to the scholar, had every chance to create a powerful anti-Turkish coalition of European Christian monarchs and had to do everything possible for its formation, the main guarantee of future success in the war is the readiness of the state. «The state and the power of kings usually holds on the two greatest and most powerful benefits. One is the happiness that is given by some divine power, the other is the prudence given by nature. The latter, though inferior to the former, is, however, much greater than all the benefits to be granted to man. In fact, these two are very big and high in human life, which is why it is far less common to be given them both by God to one» [Orzechowski 1988a: 95].

3. OPTIMAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SOCIETY IN THE RZECZPOSPOLITA

Preparation of the state for the coming war involves bringing it in order and its best arrangement. At the same time, Stanislaw Orzechowski relies on the concept of the ideal state of the ancient Greek philosopher Plato according to which society must be divided into states, each of which performs its clearly defined function. «This arrangement should take into account the way of life; let one order be with the nobility, the other with the priests and the other with the peasants because their interests do not overlap. All classes on your behalf will have duties. But every nobleman must serve his country. Let the priest supply the warrior. May the peasant and the merchant also benefit. Let everyone support the republic at home and at war: when the nobility is at war, other classes remain at home. Some cultivate the field and others trade while others serve the God. In this division of responsibilities harmony in society is well manifested because everyone is the master of their own affairs and consequently a person's own self is the censor of own wealth» [Orzechowski 1988a: 107].

The problem of the organization of state power that would enable the best possible development of society and each of its members is one of the major in the theoretical and political heritage of St. Stanislaw Orzechowski Roxolan. He is devoted to most of his works, among which the centerpiece is «Instructions to the King of Poland Sigismund-Augustus» written in 1543 and modified in 1548. Most of his works are devoted to this problem, among which the central place is the «Instructions for the King of Poland Sigismund-Augustus» written in 1543 and completed in 1548.

In this work, scholar raises the issues of the essence and purpose of royal power and state, the organization of state life, the rights and responsibilities of government and citizens.

Referring to Sigismund-August, Stanislaw Orzechowski states that the main prerequisite for prosperity of the state and its residents is the confidence of the citizens that at the top of the governmental pyramid is a person who fully possesses the qualities, which are necessary for the ruler, and the first among them is wisdom. Following Plato, the scholar believes that it is the wise philosophers who can properly control such a complex organism as the state. If the king does not meet this ideal, then the state and its citizens will face a variety of problems. «Do you know who you are? The King. Therefore, you are the ruler and I am subject, and therefore you are wiser than I am. If you are wise, then I am free, rich and happy. Well, if you are not wise? Then I'm a slave, a hobbler, an exile... As a result, you can already see, probably, how confident I am that your conscience begs for you to be able to study. Only in this way will you save me, who is in danger, motherland, rights and freedom...» [Orzechowski 1988b: 116-117].

Noting that government is one of the hardest pursuits in the world, Stanislaw Orzechowski Roxolan does not reduce the wisdom of a ruler to a certain amount of knowledge. Wisdom is a combination of mind and moral virtues which in turn arise as a result of the enlightenment of the monarch. Following Socrates, a scholar considers that one who possesses true knowledge cannot act against morality. «Above all, know that not every person is capable of being in power, but only the one who by nature desires truth and justice. But this is not enough. It is necessary to be inflamed by the science that will make this person both true and just. A person who neglects science will give nothing worthy of praise» [Orzechowski 1988b: 117].

4. FORMATION OF THE RULING ELITE

However, no matter how wise a monarch is, he will not be able to control such a complicated mechanism as the state. Therefore, according to the scholar, as well as the wisdom of the king, no less important for the prosperity of society is the question of whom he can rely on in his activities. The king's entourage must come from the finest people of the state. The king's entourage must come from the finest people of the state. At the same time, representatives of the generic aristocracy are the best because, according to Stanislaw Orzechowski Roxolan, the heirs of ancient families are responsible not only to the king and own conscience, but also to the memory of the ancestors, maintaining the honor of the family. But aristocratic origin alone does not give a person the right to hold responsible public positions on which the fate of its citizens depends. This right must be deserved by real affairs in which the essence of a human is shown. Therefore, the thinker does not deny the possibility of holding senior management positions in the state to those who don't have glorious ancestors,

but in the name of the motherland has earned this right by own life and achievements.

Addressing the King, Stanislaw Orzechowski Roxolan essentially creates a list of qualities that any contender should have for the inclusion in the political elite of the state: «Be sympathetic to good men who care about the state, pay more attention to their request than at the request of those who seek positions with a bad intention. In addition, when the people, who are prone to drunkenness, emasculated and depraved, begin to demand honors from you, tell them frankly that you give public positions only to men who are honest, noble and reserved: those who can speak the truth, act courageously and who are not groveling toadies, not emasculated or drunk. Moreover, the people of another kind are not worthy of honor, but of punishment» [Orzechowski 1988b: 136].

The worst option for the subjects will be if the king surrounds himself not with decent citizens, but with groveling toadies. They, by flattering the king, will not admit to him advisers and will promote the usurpation of all power by the king and turn him into a tyrant. «If you take care of everything in the country, you will not be a king, but an unhappy subject. Whoever is a good husband and loves his country, let him warn the king against such actions, because such his acts are contrary to law and are unlawful. The toady won't tell this king. And for the advisers, he will make a rather famous rope of tyrants – a sentence about the insult of the majesty. But reassure the king that justice is upheld, because the king must not be subject to such a right. And he who abstains from this commits a crime against the majesty of the king» [Orzechowski 1988b: 120].

Such a bold statement against the possibility of infinity of royal power is largely explained by the very nature of the organization of state power in the Polish state, which is evident from its very name – Rzeczpospolita that is «the cause of the nation», or Latin – «res publika». The power of the Polish king was limited to the Seim which represented the interests of the nobility and the clergy and to the Senate, consisting of representatives of the aristocracy. «All secular power is first and foremost divided into the King and the Senate, and these two guards (both, I say!) are awarded» [Orzechowski 1988b: 117].

5. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF SUCCESSFUL STATE ORGANIZATION.

According to St. Orzechowski Roxolan, the King must first and foremost have a duty to protect the interests of his state and his subjects. He is a kind of guardian of the kingdom. This determines his place of residence - the border of the state from where there is the greatest military threat and ways to gain the favor of subjects. After all, a monarch who can provide the conditions for the peaceful existence of citizens will undoubtedly obtain their authority and commitment. In addition, without the commitment of subordinates, no king can, according to the scholar, consider his power protected from the intrigues of adversaries.

«You already know who to live with and where. Now - since your whole life is neither single nor private, but shared and public, you need to take the utmost care in order to attract the affection of those people among whom you rule. It is the sole protection of kings. The power of the king is weak and uncertain without the favor of his subjects» [Orzechowski 1988b: 117].

The question posed by St. Orzechowski Roxolan about the need for the monarch to gain the favor of his subjects leads him to the need to solve the issue «Who is more powerful in the state: the law or the king?» The answer to this question, according to the scientist, distinguishes the enlightened monarchy from tyranny.

Referring to Sigismund Augustus, the thinker states that the law «... is itself the ruler of a free state, but silent, blind and deaf. By means of in, one person is chosen, whom we call the king. This person is the mouth, eyes and ears of the law. If the law could listen and talk, no one would elect a king; for the law teaches itself what to do. And because it cannot do all this, it chooses a mediator – a king» [Orzechowski 1988b: 124]. However, the function of the king in relation to the law, as noted by St. Orzechowski Roxolan, is not limited to its interpretation. The king is a defender of the law in a state that allows society to escape tyranny. In addition, the power of tyrants, says the scholar, has never been long.

The free state (as the ideal of a state organization), according to the thinker, must be based on a fair trial, based on the right based on morality. Law in the state, which are legal norms that ensure fairness, should be a necessary factor of a state organization and, together with ethics, be the foundation of the state.

Addressing the question of the role of law in the organization of relations between citizens of the state led St. Orzechowski Roxolan to the need to raise the question of natural law. He even wrote a work on this subject – «De jure naturae et gentium» («On Natural Law»), which, unfortunately, has not been preserved to this day, but thanks to quoting in the writings of other scholars and other works of the thinker, its basic ideas can be judged. According to I. Ohorodnyk and M. Rusyn «In his opinion, natural law is higher than human laws, which can be changed if necessary. To live in harmony with the laws of nature is to care for peace and tranquility in the state. He regarded natural law as the basis of natural law, refraining from encroaching on someone else's property, because then the state will appear cunning, betrayal, robbery, strife, violence against the weaker. He believed that the soul of the state is justice, which is that everyone is given what he owes: peace, freedom, the ability to fulfill his role and purpose with truth and faith. The absence or conscious violation of the above was assessed by Orzechowski as evidence of savagery, barbarism, despotism which are contrary to natural law» [Ohorodnyk, Rusyn 1997: 207].

Observance of natural law, in accordance with the concept of St. Orzechowski Roxolan, is the basis for the standard development of society, providing conditions for a decent life of its members. However, the realization of this ideal is not possible without observing the principle of the common good, that is, the good of the people who expressed themselves in patriotism, in service to the state and in the subordination of the personal interests of citizens to the idea of the boon to society.

If the interests of the individual dominate the national interests, then the state will not exist for more or less a long time: «"My" and "yours" are two sources of any disagreement in society. Because of them appear disputes and lawsuits, which are the origin of hatred. The hatred then comes from rebellion and after the rebellion comes the inevitable end to the state» [Orzechowski 1988b: 127].

According to V. Litvinov «Hobbes and Locke stated that the boon to society is the supreme law and the purpose of the state power. However, similar ideas are found in their predecessors, in particular St. Orzechowski, who, contrary to the teachings of Thomas and Augustine (according to whom the state is an instrument for the realization of the moral and religious goals of the individual), wrote that the purpose

of the state is to guarantee the rights and benefits of each individual, to whom the state has a number of responsibilities. But citizens, according to the thinker, have even more obligations to the state: his activity should be directed first and foremost to the interests of the state and society» [Litvinov 1988: 241].

Considering the issues of natural law, the restriction of the royal power by law, the mutual obligations of the citizen and the state, the underlying principles of the contractual concept of the state St. Orzechowski Roxolan approached these issues contrary to the ruling ideas of the time. He is one of the first European scholars to begin liberating political science from theology. He could not ignore the issue of the relationship between secular and ecclesiastical power.

Speaking to Sigismund Augustus, he noted that the king should distinguish between his personal and public life. In his personal life, as a Christian, he had to obey the spiritual precepts of his priest and in his public life all Polish clergy must do the will of their monarch in the interests of the whole nation and the state. This position of the scholar originated from his understanding of the state and the division of responsibilities in it.

CONCLUSION

Stanislaw Orzechowski Roxolan is an outstanding representative of the political thought of the Renaissance on a European scale. His views on the issue of the essence and origin of the state, the principles of the organization of power, have become a certain stage in the development of political thought and have cultivated in his ideological successors. «Orzechowski in this matter was the forerunner of such bourgeois thinkers as H. Grotius, T. Hobbes, J. Bodin and others. In Ukraine and Russia, the same ideas were later developed by polemicists, activists of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, in particular F. Prokopovych, whose library has St. Orzechowski 's historical work "Chronicle"» [Litvinov 1988: 244].

Assessing the role and importance of St. Orzechowski Roxolan in the development of European culture, D. Nalyvaiko notes: «Among the writers of the Slavic Renaissance, Stanislaw Orzechowski was the most famous in Western Europe in the 16th century. Numerous reissues of his Latin works in various countries of Europe, and their translations into other languages confirm this statement. However Orikhovsky in the XVI-XVII centuries had a high literary reputation in Ukraine and Belarus: moreover, his work had a significant impact on the development of literature, especially polemical. He was referred to by Christophor Philaleth in his "Apocrisis" and quoted several times by Zachary Kopistensky in "Palinode"» [Nalyvaiko 1984: 184].

Unfortunately, much of the work of St. Orzechowski Roxolan is inaccessible to the general public of Ukrainian readers, as most of them, written in Latin and partly in Polish, have not yet been translated or reprinted in Ukraine. However, despite the language of his writings, the scholar has always remained as a patriot of his nation. In many of his journalistic works, he advocated the interests of Rus', the Ukrainian people.

At the same time, St. Orzechowski Roxolan tried to combine the allegiance to his nationality and the idea of common good and service to the common state. He was one of the first representatives of the Ukrainian nobility to say of himself as a «Ukrainian (Ruthenian), a citizen of the Polish state». The combination of ethnic and

political patriotism allowed the scholar to find a compromise between the loyalty to his people and the desire to live in a powerful state of that time in Europe.

The figure of St. Orzechowski Roxolan is significant for understanding the involvement of the Ukrainian spiritual elite in the processes of contemporary European theoretical and political discourse based on the symbiosis of the traditions of Ukrainian and Polish political thinking in the late Middle Ages. He is a striking representative of «Catholic Rus'», a phenomenon that needs a further scientific study. The integration processes taking place in Europe after the end of World War II have a long prehistory. And the intellectual heritage of Central and Eastern Europe, its contribution to the development of modern European civilization, must be appraised and appreciated accordingly.

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PROMOTION OF UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW IN THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: AN EXPERIENCE FOR UKRAINE

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Abstract

Public diplomacy of the Republic of Poland since the beginning of XXI century became an important tool of state's foreign policy realization. This article is aimed on the analyses of multifaceted Polish public diplomacy which includes among other priority field of higher education promotion. One of the leading Poland's universities, University of Warsaw, had formed not only a brand of high level of educational services but became a world-wide famous center for science development, using most advanced technologies and instruments in the educational process. There were analyzed the promotional policy of University of Warsaw and main peculiarities of university brand creation. Main projects and initiatives of University of Warsaw in the field of promotion were presented in the current research. Main outcomes are presented in the form of recommendations to Ukrainian higher education institutions as they are only in the initial phase of promotional activities.

Key words: *public diplomacy, promotion, higher education, University of Warsaw, Poland, Ukraine*

INTRODUCTION

Current foreign policy of the Republic of Poland is realized based on the Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017-2021. This document covers the vision, mission, main instruments, areas and activities of foreign policy of the state. In 2001, Poland started first steps in promoting its state around the globe. Those actions were connected with the aspirations to join the European Union (EU). Thereby, spread of information about Poland, its culture and traditions reached plenty of countries, especially those, which had already been member-states of EU. At that time the understanding of

public diplomacy was limited to the spread of expedient positive information about Poland among the target audiences in foreign states. Such interpretation, as some of the scholars may argue, is close to propaganda. In some point, the concept of "public diplomacy" and "propaganda" are very similar. Both of the concepts have the main aim to influence foreign audience, but the core value of public diplomacy, comparing it to propaganda, is a long term activity with specificity to analyze how our state is perceived (it is important to listen to suck a feedback from foreign audiences). Current understanding as well as a process of public diplomacy implementation in Poland is actually based on the principle – our aim is not only to convince foreign audience in a target state to have positive opinion about the country, but to understand the "psychology" of audience in a foreign state. Such an understanding helps to "win hearts and minds" of people in foreign state [Nye Jr 2008: 94].

Even taking into account that the concept of public diplomacy is not a new one, still the theoretical and methodological background is limited in Poland. Practical aspects of Polish public diplomacy are presented by numerous scholars, but theory and methodology is based on American approach. It should be mentioned that an emergence of public diplomacy as a theoretical and practical concept had appeared in United States of America in the middle of XX century. The beginning of XXI century with intensive globalization processes gave an impetus to "new public diplomacy". New approaches to solving global problems required local actions based on people-to-people contacts. The concept of new public diplomacy was based on the same idea of influencing foreign audiences, but with more wide range of instruments. Since that time there was observed a spread of science, sport, development, digital, historical diplomacy etc. Poland as well is actively developing practically all areas of new public diplomacy. Among them the leading positions are in cultural and historical diplomacy. Those two fields are the most advanced, especially, as regards promotion of Polish culture, traditions, values, language, presentation of rich Polish history among target foreign audiences. But less attention is dedicated to the study of Polish science diplomacy as a part of state's public diplomacy course. Science diplomacy lies in the sphere of scientific cooperation between states and non-state actors (universities, individuals, NGOs, civil society groups). The main aim is to influence elites of the foreign state. Through main activities used under science diplomacy are: international students or/and academic stuff exchanges and mobility; providing grants for studying and research, etc. In the frameworks of science diplomacy, a special role is given to promotion of its higher education.

During recent years Polish higher education has formed its own brand. This statement is confirmed by a growing number of international students from all over the world, and particularly, from former Soviet Union states. "In the academic year 2017/2018, 37 829 Ukrainians and 6044 Belarusians were studying in Poland" [Study in Poland 2018].

High quality of education is not only the reasons, why youth chose to study in Poland. Quite important here is a complex and multilevel promotion of Polish higher education abroad. Such an activity is realized by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, group of governmental and non-governmental structures and, of course, by universities themselves. University of Warsaw is one of the leading higher education institutions not only in Poland, but in Eastern Europe as well. High level of promotional activities realized by University of Warsaw depends on the complex of measure that are undertaken by university

administration and each of its faculties/institutions as well. Understanding the system of promotion of University of Warsaw may serve as a good example for most of the Eastern European states, as well for Ukraine.

1. PROMOTIONAL POLICY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW

The Royal University of Warsaw (currently, the University of Warsaw) was founded "by a decree issued on 19 November 1816 by Tsar Alexander I". There were launched five faculties: Faculty of Law and Administration, Medicine, Philosophy, Theology and Arts and Humanities [University of Warsaw 2019]. During its long history of challenges, but with constant focus on improving, nowadays it is the largest university in Poland and one of the best research centers in the European Union.

In the beginning of 1990th the process of higher education internationalization started in Poland. First educational programs in English were created in main universities of Poland, considering the University of Warsaw [Pabian 2008]. Those actions contributed to the growth of foreign students and creation of the brand of universities. Meanwhile, EU actively involved in the process of EU higher education internationalization. A lot of scientific and educational programmes were initiated with the aim to form a positive and favorable image of EU to students and teachers all over the world. Among most known programmes was Trans-European Mobility Programme for University Studies (Tempus Programme). This programme was aimed on the promotion of "institutional cooperation between the EU and Partner Countries and focused on the reform and modernization of higher education systems in the Partner Countries of Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Western Balkans and the Mediterranean region" [Tempus Programme 2013]. It should be mentioned that the success of Tempus Programme was "mainly thanks to its soft convergence approach, it is perceived as beneficial for both sides, and to a certain extent is able to avoid apparent asymmetrical relationships" [Botonero 2013: 24].

Poland has joint Tempus Programme from its very beginning. Programme resources allowed Polish universities to purchase computer equipment and open a network of Tempus offices in several universities. An experience and international contacts gained under the Tempus Programme had helped Polish universities enter the international market for educational services and offer their own educational opportunities for foreign students.

Another programme that highly influenced the way of teaching at universities and transformed approaches to studying process was a student exchange program – Erasmus. Since 1987 its main aim has been to develop international cooperation between universities. Poland joined this programme in 1998, but an active participation of Polish universities in this initiative started in 2004, since Poland became a member of EU.

The promotion of EU higher education gave an impetus to "a value-based global governance model, and has involved a close interaction of actors in the milieus of high politics and academia" [Botonero 2013: 2]. There was created the brand of European education as one of the most open to foreign students and academic staff exchanges, trainings, studies, etc. EU was using its higher education as an instrument of soft power, spreading its culture, science and education with the help of different programmes around the world. Proving this fact there was an initiative of the European Commission in 2004 to create an Erasmus Mundus Programme. It was

aimed "to strengthen European cooperation and international ties in higher education by supporting high-quality master´s courses and encouraging exchanges between students and academics from all over the world and the European Union... as well as to restore Europe to a leading position on the international university scene" [European Commission 2018].

University of Warsaw was one of the first in Poland that started actively to participate in Tempus, Erasmus, Erasmus Mundus programmes and many other initiatives that were directed on sharing experience in the spheres of education and science, promotion of student's exchange and raising the level of educational services as well as in Poland and in EU. Also an understanding of necessity of University's brand policy creation helped open important departments within the administration.

One of the main structures in University of Warsaw that is responsible for the promotional activities and university brand is the Office for Promotion. This Office is engaged in organization of different promotional events and ceremonies. Most known of them are Open Day of University of Warsaw or Picnic for employees of this university. What is important to mention that besides promotional activities, this Office is carrying out advertising campaigns as regards university image, recruiting and post-graduate studies. Main instruments that are used to spread information about University of Warsaw are traditional and social media. Thereby, required messages are being disseminated through newspapers, radio, via profiles on Facebook, YouTube, Instagram and Linked In. The Office for Promotion is also responsible for distribution of promotional materials, including publications, clothing and different gadgets via University online brand shop. This structure assists in holding significant events at different faculties of the university and provides digital support as needed [Biuro promocji 2019].

Another important structure within the University of Warsaw is the International Relations Office. In common with different organizations and foreign universities this Office is responsible for organization or co-organization of events, meetings and visits of special guests to the University [International Relations Office, 2019]. The International Relations Office is involved in the whole process dedicated to the organization of the visits of delegations from foreign universities and creation of favorable conditions for the discussion of future cooperation with university. This may include presentation or getting acquaintance with the best university achievements, study tour in the main campus of university and library, organization of a thematic conference or concert. For example, during 3-7 June 2019 the International Relations Office organized "Cross-cultural communication. Resolving conflicts in an intercultural community". This event under International Staff Training Week gathered more than 29 participants from 20 countries [International Relations Office 2019]. Sharing experience was one of the main aims of this event. It helps develop a platform for mutual understanding and build people-to-people cooperation that is actually a core value of public diplomacy.

The next peculiarity, not only of University of Warsaw and its International Relations Office, but of most world prestigious universities in the world – is a series of introductory meetings for international students. Such meetings are organized for short term students, for example participants of Erasmus+ programme or different bilateral governmental agreements, as well as for students, who come for long term studies to gain bachelor's, master's or doctorate degrees. Introductory meetings are a very good practice and not just a way how to receive important information about

studies at a concrete university, but it's a practice of good manners. This is such an acknowledgment of a high level of university, where values and attitudes towards others are much more important than material goods. A confirmation of this fact is a program "Welcome Point" at the University of Warsaw. A special website was developed to acquaint students/employers with most important:

- *pre-arrival information* (as regards necessary documents, visa, terms of study, admissions, tuition fees, academic calendar, accommodation in Warsaw, health insurance, selection of courses, public transport in Warsaw, general information about Poland);

- *during stay information* (access to maps, guidebooks, movies about university; student card; legalization of stay; access to cultural, sport and touristic activities; huge list of possibilities: protection of students´ rights, exemption from fees, psychological and legal assistance, free courses of Polish language and possibilities to study other foreign languages with discount; access to university free WI-FI; international internships and library access);

- *information for PhD students* (basic information about Doctoral Schools: School of Humanities, of Social Sciences, of Exact and Natural Science and Interdisciplinary Doctoral School; accommodation; useful links, for example to Office of Doctoral and Post-Diploma Studies, etc.);

- *information for people, who are interested in working at the University of Warsaw* (grants for visiting guest lecturers; available positions for academic and non-academic staff; social benefits) [Welcome point 2019].

The University of Warsaw is actively promoting the idea of bridging cultures. That is why under the program "Welcome Point" at the University of Warsaw there are organized several important courses for long-term students, as Intensive Polish Language Course, Cultural Orientation Workshop and Communication and Multiculturalism workshop. The last one, for example, helps work with misunderstandings, improve cooperation in multicultural environment, enhance their communication and social skills [UW News 2019].

An interesting way of promotion of the University of Warsaw was created for alumni. It is called "Be our ambassador". Under this initiative, the University has a belief that alumni are ambassadors of the University of Warsaw that can help "to attract and educate the best students. Sharing experience and thoughts with friends and relatives may help the students make a transition to the University of Warsaw for a full-degree or visit the university within Erasmus+ or other exchange programme" [Welcome point 2019]. There are also special alumni groups of the University of Warsaw on Facebook and Instagram that helps them keep in touch and receive the latest information about the university.

During 12-14 May 2016 World Congress of the University of Warsaw Alumni was organized, which gathered outstanding scientists, writers, artists, journalists, politicians, social activists and even famous restaurateurs [Światowy Zjazd 2016]. This event was dedicated to the celebration of 200 anniversary of University of Warsaw. The idea was to show current students how diverse can be the professional life trails of University of Warsaw alumni.

But not only the Office for Promotion and International Relations Office are responsible for the promotion of University of Warsaw, promotional activities are also realized by each faculty. Some of them are very active in this field and have a group

of people/person that is responsible for foreign contacts and relations. They organize international conferences, meetings with foreign professors and other guests, elaborate programs for cooperation with prestigious foreign universities, take part in academic staff exchange programs. Universities, which are now of great interest for the University of Warsaw to cooperate with, are situated in East and South Asia, for example in People's Republic of China. Recently, the "Memorandum of Understanding" was signed between the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies of University of Warsaw and Srinakharinwirot University, the largest Thai University based in Bangkok. The Thai delegation also took part in the meeting with main authorities of the University of Warsaw and visited the main campus of the University of Warsaw [Aktualności UW 2019].

Promotion of Polish traditions is an integral part of the University of Warsaw. One of good practices that exist at some faculties of University of Warsaw is a "Christmas gathering". Before Christmas, around 15-20 December, some faculties organize an informal meeting of international students with professors. There they talk and share their ideas about studies, as well as they can try 12 traditional Polish dishes that are cooked for Christmas (Christmas Eve in Polish is "Wigilia"), such as carp, dumplings with cabbage, etc. For most international students it is a way how to get closer to Polish culture and traditions.

Promotion of scientific achievements is possible thanks to the University of Warsaw Repository. The purpose of this structure is to collect, disseminate and promote scientific works of the University of Warsaw scholars. The Repository presents the latest dissertations defended at the University of Warsaw since October 2012 [Repozytorium UW 2019].

2. PROMOTION OF VALUES VS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Public diplomacy is about spreading our traditions, culture, values, language, history among a target foreign audience with the aim to make a favorable image about the country. Main sources here are not only media, but also people-to-people contacts as they are a core value of public diplomacy. The University of Warsaw has worked out its own approach to the creation of its positive image – "being respectful to others" and "that all of us are equal". A special attention should be paid to the unique programs and initiatives that are launched at the University of Warsaw; especially the program "Równoważni" ("We are all equal") that is against discrimination at University. There was created an official web-site that gives a complex and comprehensive information about what discrimination is and how to find support at university or state institutions. Also this web-site provides information about equality and anti-discrimination projects and research implemented at the University of Warsaw, as well as information on current events on equality and diversity [Rownowazni 2019].

The problem of discrimination is very actual in each big city nowadays, especially among young people, who come to study from different parts of the world. During 2018 at University of Warsaw 42 477 students were enrolled, from which 2812 were international students and 2280 doctoral students, from which 287 were international doctoral students [UW Annual Report 2018]. Understanding the challenges that are connected with the growing number of international students the University of Warsaw is trying to promote studies based on the respect and equal

attitude to each employee or student. To keep this mission, the institution of Ombudsman was established at the University of Warsaw. The Ombudsman "is a fully independent and neutral university officer, to whom students, faculty and administrative staff may turn for assistance in matters concerning the University and its community, in an informal and confidential manner. The role of the Ombudsman is to support the staff and students in problem solving and control that all members of the academic community are treated fairly and honestly. The function of the Ombudsman is independent of the management structure" [Ombudsman 2019].

Another way that is showing a will of the University of Warsaw to protect students' right is an initiative of the Academic Legal Advice Office. Everyone, who is a student of the University of Warsaw, may have a free consultation in this Office as regards studies, different legal matters and all the problems that are in the fields of civil, family, labor or administrative law. Advisors that work in this Academic Legal Advice Office are mainly final-year students, graduates or doctoral students of the Faculty of Law and Administration of the University of Warsaw [Akademicka Poradnia Prawna 2019].

Constant improvement is one of the most important values of the University of Warsaw. In April 2018 there was initiated the University's Integrated Development Programme. The main idea of this programme is to improve quality of teaching, enrich the program of doctoral study and develop interpersonal and professional skills of students and employees as well as to modernize the administrational system [Zintegrowany Program Rozwoju 2018]. The University Integrated Development Programme is planned to be realized until 2022.

Another approach to support and develop entrepreneurial skills in students and teachers is realized under the Incubator of the University of Warsaw. This structure is a a section of the University Center for Technology Transfer. The Incubator of the University of Warsaw was established to support entrepreneurial attitudes and behavior in the academic community by enabling verification of practical, scientific, technological or social ideas in cooperation with experienced experts in safe business conditions. This structure supports "in the development of business and social projects in various stages, organizing workshops, trainings, meetings with experts as well as providing modern infrastructure and work space" [Inkubator UW 2019].

Popularization of Polish language is also an integral part of the University of Warsaw. Even if foreign students study in English programme, they have Polish language classes. Those lectures are also very informative, because they consider rich Polish culture and traditions. The Polonicum Centre of Polish Language and Culture for Foreigners is responsible for Polish language and culture courses throughout the academic year for foreign students, as well as other foreigners interested in learning Polish. It is important that these courses are planned in such a way that they meet specific requirements for long term and short term foreign students. The Polonicum Centre also organizes "ethnographic workshops (in cooperation with the Ethnographic Museum) relating to such customs as those associated with St. Andrew's Day, Christmas and Easter" [Polonicum 2019]. A lot of these lectures are presented by outstanding professors of the University of Warsaw.

With the idea of sharing best practices, in 2018, the University of Warsaw, Sorbonne University, Charles University and Heidelberg University signed a common declaration regarding the formation of 4EU, a European University Alliance. This

structure is aimed to cooperate in the spheres of research, education, mobility of researchers and students. There planed several priorities among which are to:

- "create a unique academic environment for students, researchers and staff;
- remove obstacles to free circulation of individuals, ideas and best practices between their universities'
- enable shared platforms and expanded access to the resources of our universities to address large, complex challenges;
- integrate teaching and research to provide a world-leading experience for students from over the world where new ideas will thrive;
- create a common infrastructure that provides added value for the individuals as well as for each particular university" [European University Alliance 2018].

All those attitudes and initiatives of the University of Warsaw are reflected in the ranking that was prepared by the Educational Foundation "Perspektywy". According to this ranking and public opinion at all, University of Warsaw was marked as the best university in Poland [Ranking Szkół Wyższych 2019].

CONCLUSIONS

The University of Warsaw has built a unique form of promotion represented by a high quality organizational structure of promotional activities through which the Office for Promotion and International Relations Office and individual faculties play an important role in presenting the University worldwide. The brand of University of Warsaw, that was ranked as the best university in Poland, is built on its values, rich traditions and modern system of developed promotional activities.

Numerous programmes and initiatives organized by this University maintain its high ranking among the Central European universities and help gain its international recognition. Support of the students and their rights should become one of the priority tasks, especially in those universities of Eastern Europe, were transformations only have begun. Respect to different cultures and acceptance of different cultures is one of the key message that is spread nowadays at the University of Warsaw under the programme "Równoważni". Building of a cross-culture dialogue became an integral part of constant improvement of the University of Warsaw.

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BETWEEN TWO AGES: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI AND THE 'REAL' REVOLUTION

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Abstract

The Soviet Union entered Poland in 1945 promising to create a revolutionary society that would soon transform the world. The Polish-American academic Zbigniew Brzezinski argued that by the 1960s it was the United States that represented the world's only "real" revolution-having become the first society to enter the age of computer automation. In 1970 Brzezinski published his book *Between Two Ages* suggesting that the United States was pulling ahead of the Soviet Union in terms of high technology. At the same time the revolutionary dreams of industrial communism were coming to an end in Poland in a series of worker revolts along the Baltic Coast.

Key words: *Brzezinski, Soviet Union, Poland, technology, computers*

On May 8, 1945 a seventeen year old Zbigniew Brzezinski sat in his classroom at Montreal's St. Leon's High School. The announcement came over the loudspeaker that the Soviet Red Army had taken Berlin and the war in Europe had come to an end.

Brzezinski saw his classmates cheer and carry their celebration out to the streets-some waved British flags and others carried American flags. He was more concerned as several celebrated with the red Soviet hammer and sickle flag.

"There was a sense of being isolated in this uncritical euphoria and this notion that Stalin was the architect of a new world system," he recalled.

Those waving the Soviet Union might believe that Stalin had played a crucial role in the defeat of Nazi Germany-but others saw the Soviet Union represented a glorious new future of the system that level the injustice so industrial capitalism.

Brzezinski felt a sense of solitude that day knowing that his family would not be returning to Poland after the war.

"I felt that Stalin's totalitarianism was spreading," he remembered. "And there were few people at the time that realized what this portended not only for my original homeland-but more generally-for the West." [Interview with Author, 27 09 2003].

World War II had already been the defining moment of his young life. In October of 1938 his father departed Poland to accept a diplomatic posting in Montreal. In the summer of 1939 he was homesick and began to pester his father to return home for the summer holidays-and then there was no more opportunity.

The outbreak of war proved catastrophic for his native Poland. The young Brzezinski followed the war on the radio and discussed the situation with his family. The news got worse each year. And by early 1945 Stalin was pushing his vision of Marxist-Leninist history into the heart of Europe. And by the end of the war Poland had been quietly ceded to the Soviet Union's sphere of influence.

Stalin's Polish communists saw the war-ravaged Poland as the template to build a "New Civilization" based on the Soviet model of shock industrialization. The communist authorities hunted down political opponents while standing before maps indicating the modern steel and cement factories that promised to modernize what they considered a backward and feudal state.

In the autumn of 1945 Brzezinski entered McGill University in Montreal. He was intellectually combative and articulate and wrote his papers quickly-outlining the basic points on a yellow pad. At this time he developed an early view of the Soviet Union that would only sharpen in later years.

The Soviet Union did not represent a glorious future. Lenin's Great October was in fact a conspiratorial coup d'etat by a ruthless one-party state that became the model for other totalitarian states in the 1930s. This one-party police state had only been expanded by Stalin. And by the summer of 1945 this brutal system was being inserted on native Poland.

. Brzezinski, like millions of Poles in the West, thought the Western allies should have tried harder to keep Poland out of the Soviet orbit. Yet by the late 1940s he had already begun formulate a policy that would stay with him for the remainder of his academic career.

His thesis at McGill argued that the Soviet Union was not the single entity seen on Western maps. In reality it was the end product of 400 years of Russian imperial expansion. The Soviet Union was thus better understood as a myriad of conquered nationalities seeking greater latitude from Moscow. This, he began to postulate, was no longer a mere academic question. This was the great weakness of the Soviet Union-and potentially its Achilles heel.

In 1950 he embarked on academic career. He had no interest in becoming be a doddering old professor smoking a pipe in a tweed jacket. He wanted to influence American foreign policy in the great struggle that journalists had termed the "Cold War."

In 1950 he entered the PhD program at Harvard University seeking to implement these ideas. This was among several American programs set up specifically to develop of experts on the Soviet Union.

The graduate students debated the big questions about the Soviet Union: What was the nature of the Russian Revolution? Was Stalin's Lenin's natural heir? Had Trotsky betrayed the Revolution? What was the future after Stalin?

But the American public was speaking in more dire terms. The confrontation with the Soviet Union was seen as an ideological contest for national survival. The Soviet

Union claimed to be at the vanguard of a glorious proletarian revolution that would one day encompass the world.

And many concerned experts in the United States feared that this was a very real possibility. Shortly after World War II Stalin announced a "Five Year Plan" designed to rebuild Soviet industrial might. By 1950 many of the war-devastated regions of the Soviet Union had begun to produce at prewar levels. And in the production of what Lenin once called "the commanding heights"--coal, electricity, oil, steel- the Soviet Union was said to be outperforming the West.

This was coupled with a growing concern that the Soviet Union was determined to overtake West in the development of scientists and technicians. "While the democracies of the world including the United States are looking the other way," the New York Times gravely warned, "the Soviet Union and its satellites are training scientists and engineers at an almost feverish pace." [New York Times, 7.11.1954: 1].

In 1953 Brzezinski began his teaching career at Harvard University. He was not only a professor but part of a new intellectual arsenal in the Cold War. The term "Kremlinologist" gave a scientific tone to describe this new generation of scholars trained to diagnose the mysterious happenings behind the Iron Curtain.

At the same time Brzezinski was one of the millions enjoying the unexpected opulence of a postwar economic boom. In 1945 communist propaganda claimed the western "proletariat" was seething with revolutionary vigor. But ten years after the war the American system of industrial mass production had created the most productive economic system in the world.

The old American working class was hardly the vanguard of a world communist revolution. Indeed millions of American workers were settling into comfortable suburban housing developments in what sociologists began to call the "post-industrial society." The economy of "abundance" produced a hundreds of new products that fueled a revolution in consumer spending-ranging from automobiles, television sets, to modern kitchen appliances. The economic forecasters assured that the magic of Keynesian economics, which skillfully combined government spending with private industry, meant that the country had achieved the elixir of permanent and sustainable growth. [Hodgson 1978: 76].

But the most important development was the remarkable advances in the nascent American computer industry. In 1947 the research labs at Bell Telephone Laboratories introduced the first semiconductor device that used silicon to transfer current across a resistor. This marked the genesis of a revolutionary new era of electronic devices that began to change the fundamental nature of the American society.

At the same time the Soviet Union was making almost no progress in this area. This was due primarily to Stalin's official declaration that computers were part of a grand capitalist plot to exploit the working class. [McClellan 1998: 222].

When Stalin died in 1953 the Soviet Union still claimed to be leading a world communist revolution. But it hardly represented the worker utopia that was said to be the inevitable endpoint of history. Indeed, in February of 1956 the new Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev stunned the communist world with his dramatic "Secret Speech" that condemned Stalin for ruling with a "cult of personality" and betraying Lenin's original vision of the Soviet Union.

The speech led to a general relaxation of Stalin's tyrannical system. In August of 1956 Brzezinski toured the Soviet Union on a research grant. Upon his return he offered

his observations in a guest lecture before the Government 215 class at Harvard University.

Brzezinski stated that the Soviet problems were systemic rather than personal. The Soviet industrial productivity, he noted, was largely achieved by copying Western technology. The Soviet economic system was now hampered by "bureaucratic inefficiency and stagnation" in the political system and the public felt an "overwhelming, oppressive drabness of life."

The Soviet Union was mired in the dogma of an outdated 19th century ideology. The centralized system discouraged individual initiative and the experimentation with new methods and products.

"The living standard is low. Housing is poor, and very crowded, clothing expensive, and wages low, but many Russians are seemingly unaware of this and have no ideas of the enormous gap between their living standards and those of the West."

There was a significant new development in the Cold War. One member in the Harvard audience inquired if the Soviet Union was beginning to see communist China as a potential rival.

"I have no information on that," said Brzezinski. "However I met with a Swedish journalist recently returned from Outer Mongolia, where he had found rather intense competition between the Chinese and the Russians."

This budding Soviet rivalry with China in 1956 was overshadowed by dramatic the anti-Soviet revolts in Poland and Hungary. The Soviet Union, Brzezinski argued, was now expending significant energy merely trying to maintain an over-extended empire. This, he suggested, would provide new opportunities for the United States to wean the Eastern European states out of the Soviet sphere of influence.

The Soviet Union, however, was still capable of impressive technical achievements. In October 1957 Moscow announced the successful launch of the world's first artificial satellite. The beeping signal from "Sputnik" could be heard around the world from the small radio transmitter that circled the planet every ninety minutes.

The first shot in the "space race" created a sense of foreboding in the United States. "If they surpass us in technology in the years immediately ahead" warned Edward Teller "there is very little doubt who will determine the future of the world." [Newsweek, 11.11.1957]

President Eisenhower assured the public that the United States was making quiet progress on its own rocket and satellite programs. In 1958 Eisenhower supported the development of the National Aeronautic and Space Agency [NASA] that would become the face of the American space program.

There was also a less publicized agency that emerged in this era of national concern. There was a consensus that a nuclear attack could permanently disrupt the national telecommunications system. This led to the founding of the Advanced Research Projects Agency [ARPA] that in the ensuing decade would lead to dramatic leaps in computer technology-and provide the foundations for the modern internet system.

The Soviet Union, at the same time, was making far less progress on its computer industry. In September of 1959 Nikita Khrushchev toured the United States while proudly boasted of Soviet achievements in space. The Soviet leader was still basking in the recent announcement that the space probe "Luna" had become the first human-made object to make physical contact with the moon.

Despite these achievements in space, the Soviet Union was quietly falling behind in what in the long term would become an even more important industry. This was seen

when IBM executive Thomas Watson gave Khrushchev a tour of the company headquarters in the region known as "Silicon Valley."

Watson was especially proud of IBM's most recent "RAMAC" computer that could apparently take any date in history and recite the most significant events of that year-in ten languages-including Russian. The Soviet leader, however, seemed more impressed with latest advancements in the American kitchen.

"Father was staggered by the IBM cafeteria much more than by its computers," recalled Khrushchev's son, especially the new Formica table tops that could be wiped clean with a damp sponge obviating the need to launder table cloths. "You brush off the crumbs, wipe it with a cloth, and everything's clean," he told his son with evident amazement. [Carlson 2009: 196].

The Soviet Union, Brzezinski began to argue, may have been winning the early victories in the space race-but was failing to keep pace in terms of computer technology. Meanwhile the state-controlled centralized economy had created inefficiencies and the defense industry absorbed badly needed resources from the consumer economy.

Brzezinski contended that the validity of any revolution must be evaluated on whether it was historically relevant. It was thus the United States, not the stagnating communist states, that was paving the way toward the only "real revolution" in the world. The United States was leading the world into the unknown era shaped by the impact of technology and computer electronics.

This technical revolution had no dramatic origin story such as French revolutionaries storming of the Bastille in 1789 or the Bolsheviks seizing the Winter Palace in 1917. This was a gradual and accelerating technological revolution that would eventually prove more significant to the world than either of those events.

In 1960 John Kennedy campaigned for the White House promising to "Get This Country Moving Again." This was symbolized most famously by his dramatic pledge to land a man on the moon by the end of the 1960s.

Brzezinski admitted to a degree of hero worship for the young and charismatic president as representing the modernizing spirit of a new decade.

In 1960 Brzezinski moved from Harvard to Columbia University. That year he wrote *Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* which provided a detailed analysis of the Sino-Soviet split and the growing divisions in the communist world.

He was among the millions of suburban "white collar" commuters leaving their suburban homes to work in New York City. The new air conditioned glass and steel skyscrapers included the dramatic unveiling of the "World Trade Center" set in two twin skyscrapers that symbolized New York replacing London as the capital of world finance.

The American economy was indeed booming in the 1960s. Brzezinski's academic work began to speculate on what he called America's "Third Revolution" in science and technology. This revolution began with the technological advancements of World War II. After the war well-funded private and government research centers led to the development of nuclear power, a modern health care industry, three national television networks, a continental telephone system, a dynamic aerospace industry, and most importantly the dramatic and continuous evolution of the modern computer industry.

The massive government spending on the "space race" had the added benefit of providing "spin off" technology that trickled down to the average American consumer.

The business newspapers were full of stories praising corporate research teams that were devising better and faster ways of doing things. Even the cans of aerosol hairsprays that Jackie Kennedy used to control her famous bouffant hair were said to be a "spin off" of the space program. [Hodgson 1978: 6-7].

In 1964 Brzezinski was among the millions of visitors to the New York World's Fair. The corporate pavilions demonstrated how modern scientific research was related to the official theme of "Man's Achievements on a Shrinking Globe in an Expanding Universe."

General Motors displayed a future of "underwater cities" with a family submarine replacing the automobile for the daily commute. The representatives at ATT introduced a new era of "Touch Tone" telephones while RCA officials took the world out of black and white in their new "Color Television Communications Center." The Disney pavilion featured a remarkable life-like robot of Abraham Lincoln that moved with "audio-animatronic" technology originally developed for rocket launchers. [Margolis 1999: 107].

In October of 1964 Khrushchev was ousted from his duties for reasons of "age and deteriorating health" and his "harebrained schemes." This stunning event came at a time when academic fashions in the West assured that the Soviet Union was modernizing to the point where it would eventually "converge" and integrate with a larger European civilization.

Brzezinski thus disagreed with some of the more flattering profiles of the new collective Soviet leadership as "communists in a gray flannel suits" seeking to modernize their society. The Soviet Union, he said, was now ruled by a group of conservative bureaucratic "clerks" that would likely fall further behind the West in terms of science and technology. "As a group," he wrote, "it is uncertain, cautious, ambiguous, mired in party dogma, and moribund." [Brzezinski 1964: 22].

Brzezinski's 1965 book *Alternative to Partition* argued that the Cold War had reached an impasse in Europe. The United States should thus use its superior socio-technological advantages to take the offensive and bridge the gap across the Iron Curtain.

This topic dovetailed with his next research project-an unusual book that he would eventually call "Between Two Ages." He began to outline the more relevant questions of this new age of science and technology.

Was this an era that might be as difficult as the previous transition from the agricultural to the industrial society in the 19th century? Can computers and advanced science be used for humane purposes? Can advance science help reduce the growing divisions between the rich and poor nations? Could technology eventually lead to excessive social control-and will this society begin to lose its traditional religious and social values?

He concluded this transition to the "technetronic age" might be socially disruptive-but the modern society could not simply turn its back on these new developments in science and technology. As the first step, Brzezinski advocated the creation of "a community of developed nations" of Japan, Western Europe, and the United States to help ease the transition. This would include the financial and modern managerial skills to help relieve global problems such as increased urban poverty, air pollution, and the continued depletion of natural resources. [Vaughan 2009: 117].

Brzezinski saw the Soviet Union, on the other hand, as was entering an era of prolonged stagnation due to its inability to grasp the importance of the computer age.

These views could be seen in Brzezinski's 1967 article bluntly titled "Communism is Dead." He analyzed the Soviet Union using Marxist stages of economic growth to demonstrate that the Soviet Union was an inevitably doomed system-for historically determinist reasons. Leninism had become an "obsolete dogma" unable to cope with the "novel psychological and scientific dilemmas of the post-industrial, technetronic age." [Brzezinski 1967a: 13].

Yet by 1967 a new generation of young Americans seemed to be moving the other way. The revolutionary members of the "New Left" denounced the injustices of modern capitalism and the rise of dehumanizing modern technology. Indeed many young student rebels took to the streets claiming that revolutionary communism was the wave of the future.

Brzezinski countered that these student radicals were actually a "counter-revolution" that had more in common with the Luddites of 19th century England-or even the right-wing fascist movements of the 1930s that often sought a return to more simplistic values of the agrarian past. [Brzezinski 1967b: 18-21].

In May of 1968 student radicals at Columbia University occupied the office of the dean chanting Marxist slogans and waving red revolutionary flags. After a week of disruption the New York City police evicted the student rebels after wading through a barrier of faculty members sympathetic to the cause.

Brzezinski was not one of these faculty members. He was far more critical of the campus takeover which he attributed to spoiled children from the suburbs masquerading as actual revolutionaries. In a controversial article he advocated for stronger administrative discipline while dismissing the campus seizure as "the death rattle of the historical irrelevants." [Brzezinski 1968: 23].

And this "irrelevancy" was not limited to protesting students. The American society, he suggested, was slowly being divided between technocratic experts who ran the new machines-and the often socially privileged student protesters who were intentionally turning their backs on science and technology. He included his own academic profession in those that were becoming increasingly obsolete.

 "If we gathered a group from Route 128 near Boston-engineers, scientists, programmers, social planners-and they went out on strike, there would be an immediate political effect," said Brzezinski in 1968. "However if my colleagues and I all dropped dead today, there'll be big obituaries tomorrow, but no social effect." [New York Times, 4.12.1968, 93].

That same year of 1968 a political reform movement emerged behind the Iron Curtain. In January of 1968 Alexander Dubcek began a cautious program of liberalization. He emphasized that Czechoslovakia would remain a communist state -but would attempt to implement a "socialism with a human face" that would permit more political and cultural expression-and perhaps even closer contacts with the modernizing economies in the West.

The Soviet Union, after a period of hesitation, eventually sent troops into Czechoslovakia to put a violent end to the reform movement.

The Soviet Union, Brzezinski asserted in the days after the military crackdown, was now entering a period of prolonged stagnation-and if it failed to keep pace with the Western economies it was increasingly likely to implode along nationalist lines. [Vaughan 2003: 91].

"The present Soviet leadership was acting more like a fascist than a Communist government," he wrote in the days after the invasion. "It is to be remembered that

fascism was a radical, socialist, nationalist, and imperialistic movement." This military intervention, Brzezinski said, was the clearest evidence that the Soviet Union was not leading a dynamic and modernizing communist revolution.

The Soviet Union was in reality a reactionary and atavistic empire-failing to keep pace with the Western technological advances. "Before long," Brzezinski wrote, ""the contagion of freedom which is temporarily being snuffed out in Prague will spread to Kiev and Moscow." [Washington Post, 25.08.1968: 1]

President Richard Nixon came to the White House in 1969 seeking a more cooperative "détente" relationship with the Soviet Union. Brzezinski believed this was a misguided strategy noting that the Soviet Union was seeking closer ties with the West as a way to reduce the widening technological gap with the West.

Marshall McLuhan had famously coined the term "global village" to describe the more interconnected planet. Brzezinski saw the chaotic conditions of New York City as a more accurate metaphor for he called "global metropoltanization". In New York City there wealthy areas remained relatively safe while there was more crime and violence in the poorer sections. "In the world-city it is the same thing," he said. "No one is really in charge: thus you have a state of semi-anarchy."

In April of 1970 the world communist parties commemorated Lenin's centennial birthday. In Moscow Leonid Brezhnev gave a three hour speech extolling the virtues of the infallible leader of the Great October Revolution. Brzezinski countered that Lenin's real legacy was an ossified bureaucratic state.

He noted that fifty years after the "Great October" the Soviet Union still could not produce an economically viable automobile. But the real evidence was the Soviet Union was failing to adjust to the new era of technology. "It is even more ominous," he wrote in 1970, "from the standpoint of their technological competition with the West that today the United States has something like 60,000 computers in use in its economy while the Soviet Union has probably no more than 3,000." [U.S. News &World Report, 20.04.1970: 72].

The Soviet Union, however, would remain a serious geopolitical rival that would create more instability in what promised to be an increasingly chaotic world increasingly divided into rich and poor regions. These disparities in lifestyles were now transmitted instantaneously via a global satellite communications network pioneered by American technology. The Soviet Union, falling behind the West in terms of technology, was also likely to become more assertive around the world. [Vaughan 2009: 107-130].

In the summer of 1970 Viking Press published Brzezinski's book *Between Two Ages*. The United States, he would observe, was making the difficult transiton between the industrial age and the "technetronic age" shaped socially and economically by the impact of high technology.

The United States had experienced chaos and disorder in the 1960s partially because it was the first society to make the transition which challenged traditional values and institutions. He warned that these same dangers applied to the more "electronically intermeshed" world where the poorer regions had access to new information and were thus "susceptible to mass mobilization." [Brzezinski 1970: 36].

The world was about to become even more interconnected, he warned, noting that American computer specialists were at the time working on a "world-wide information grid" that he predicted would be available in 1975. "For the first time in history," he wrote, "the cumulative knowledge of mankind will be made accessible on a global

scale-and it will be almost instantaneously available in response to demand." [Brzezinski: 1970: 31].

These emerging global problems went beyond the powers of the traditional nation-state system. In the final chapter he urged the world's "developed nations" to combine their resources to combat these increasingly global problems.

At the same time he rejected the New Left radical movement as an obsolescent force that sought to escape these new developments in science and technology. "The New Left will become more the violent left," said Brzezinski, "because of its frustration." [New York Times: 12.08.1970: 20].

That scenario would also apply to his native Poland. By 1970 Polish citizens were becoming more aware they were lagging behind the West in terms of technology. At the time Poles were watching episodes of "Bonanza" and other popular American television programs. Indeed the medical drama "Dr. Kildare" was said to be so popular that Communist Party meetings were moved from the night it aired so party members could watch. [Time, 12.01.1968].

But this same party leadership seemed increasingly out of touch with the growing frustrations of the public. In December of 1970 a sharp increase in food prices-just before Christmas- led to a series of violent worker demonstrations along the Baltic coast.

The international press reported groups of angry workers marching through the streets chanting "We want food, we want food!" Other groups chanted revolutionary slogans before marching on the regional Communist party headquarters and setting it to flame.

In the end police units fired on hundreds of what the government called "counter-revolutionary" workers. The Soviet and Polish governments were especially concerned that the uprising was led not by intellectuals but the relatively well-paid ship-builders on the Baltic coast. [Newsweek: 28. 12. 1970: 24].

This was a long way from the utopia promised by the communists at the end of World War II. The early promise of communist industrial production had stagnated due to excessive centralization in heavy industry and a bureaucratic government wedded to a 19th century ideology still attempting to meet irrelevant and antiquated industrial quotas. A decade later the Polish workers would take their complaints further, signaling the beginning of the end of the Soviet empire. Vaughan: 1999: 3-29.

Brzezinski saw the Soviet Union has facing a difficult choice moving into the 1970s. They could implement painful economic reforms-or take the safer path of seeking trade and technology from the West. Either way he saw the Soviet future as increasingly bleak.

In 1970 he predicted what the future might hold-noting at some point in the next decade the bureaucratic political elite must embark on political reforms if the Soviet Union was to survive. But he did not feel it would be until early 1980s when the "first fully post-Stalin new political leadership" would begin to enter the political arena.

"An aspiring leader aged 45 in 1980 will have been only 18 at the time of Stalin's death, and 21 when de-Stalinization actually began in the Soviet Union."

But this generation would probably find its access to power blocked by a older generation of political leaders there would likely be a leader who would attempt to reform the system.

"The introduction of political pluralism will require at some point a deliberate decision to open the Soviet Union to competitive ideas, to let each Soviet citizen read what he

wants, to reduce the level of the party's ideological control, to decentralize decision-making and thus to share power with society; in effect, a major transformation of the system as a whole." [Brzezinski 1970c: 16]

Brzezinski was indeed prescient in his prediction, but even the reforming instincts of Mikhail Gorbachev could not save the Soviet Union. By the late 1980s the Soviet Union began to collapse along national lines-due in large part because the bureaucratic elite had long seized to be revolutionary-and ultimately failed to keep pace with the "real revolution" of science and technology.

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ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI – SOME OBSERVATIONS ON JUSTIN VAISSE'S BIOGRAPHY

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Abstract

In this paper the author takes up some significant aspects of the career of Zbigniew Brzezinski. Using Justin Vaisse's recent biography as his point of departure, Pienkos evaluates Brzezinski's place in American and Polish political history. He then discusses his contributions as an academic specialist on Cold War Soviet and East European affairs, as an influential figure in American foreign policy, and as a public-spirited activist on international political issues. He goes on to look at his relationship with the Polish ethnic community in America and his concern for Poland.

Key words: *Brzezinski's place in history, Brzezinski on 'Totalitarianism', The 'Peaceful Engagement' thesis, Brzezinski and Kissinger compared, Mentoring President Carter, Democratic party 'Hawks' and 'Doves', Brzezinski the 'Hawk'*

In 2018 the first full length biography of Zbigniew Brzezinski was published in the United States. Its author was Dr. Justin Vaisse, a policy analyst for the French government. In fact, two impressive works about him preceded it. One by Dr. Patrick Vaughan appeared in Poland in 2010. The other is a collection of essays published in 2013 by Professor Emeritus Charles Gati, a longtime Brzezinski friend and colleague[1] [Vaissse 2018; Vaughan 2010, Gati 2013]. Perhaps this panel will be another step in focusing greater attention on a public intellectual who, in Vaisse's words, was a true "grand strategist" in the field of international politics.

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[1] Brzezinski does merit greater attention. Vaisse notes that Henry Kissinger had already been the subject of twelve biographies by 2016.

Born in Poland in 1928, Brzezinski became a citizen of the United States in 1956, and died in the U.S. in 2017. His long career included his activity as prolific and influential author and academic, his political involvement and service as National Security Advisor to the President of the United States, and his many years after as a highly visible public intellectual.

This presentation was given in Poland. It thus seemed appropriate to place Brzezinski in the pantheon of great Poles of history. There is a way to do this. Back in 1943, in the darkest days of World War II, Stefan Mizwa, head of the Kosciuszko Foundation of New York, and Professor Oskar Halecki, a founder of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences of America, published an impressive work titled *Great Men and Women of Poland*. Were that book to be updated, Pope John Paul II and the Solidarity movement's Lech Walesa would be in it. Brzezinski too. Although he left Poland with his family in 1939 at age eleven when his father, a member of the Polish foreign service, was sent to Canada, Brzezinski's concerns, and his career, always revolved around Poland, its fate and its future[2] [Mizwa 1943].

Here is a second measure of Brzezinski's significance, this time as an American. Indeed, Brzezinski belongs to one of the smallest, most select of "clubs" – one composed of nationally recognized university scholars who went on to make the extraordinary leap into leadership positions in the American political arena. By my count, this "club" includes just four members," all of them political scientists. The first was Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson, who went on to become President of the United States. He was followed after World War II by Henry Kissinger, National Security Advisor, and then Secretary of State to two U.S. Presidents; Daniel P. Moynihan (Ambassador to the United Nations and later a U.S. Senator from New York), and Zbigniew Brzezinski[3].

Dr Vaisse gives great attention to Brzezinski's scholarship from his days as a young faculty member at Harvard University in the early 1950s, when Harvard had become the country's premier "cold war" university. In other words, it was a time when Harvard established itself as a key center for critically needed research and analysis on the Soviet Union, the United States' global rival after 1945.

Here, two of Brzezinski's works stood out. One was *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, which he co-wrote with Carl J. Friedrich in 1956. The second was *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (1960). Both publications became highly influential, in the academic community as well as in U.S. government circles. They are also central to understanding Brzezinski.

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[2] Other Poles who merit inclusion in such an updated work would have to include Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski and General Wladyslaw Sikorski. Besides Brzezinski, Americans of Polish origin with consequential careers in U.S. political life that involved Poland include U.S. Senator Barbara Mikulski, Gen. Edward Rowny, and U.S. Congressmen Roman Pucinski, Clement Zablocki, and Edward Derwinski, and possibly John Gronouski, a member of the U.S. Cabinet, an ambassador to Poland in the 1960s, and later the president of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences of America (PIASA). Charles Rozmarek and Aloysius Mazewski each played extraordinary roles as leaders of the organized Polish American community during and after World War II. For biographies of the Polish Americans noted here, see James S. Pula (2011).

[3] Looking to the future, Professor Michael McFaul is another possible "club" member. McFaul, a specialist on Russian politics, served briefly as U.S. ambassador to Russia in the Obama administration and remains a player in current Democratic party politics.

In *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, Friedrich and Brzezinski presented a systematic, comparative, and empirically testable analysis of the aims, character and aims of Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and Fascist Italy. In so doing, they went far beyond what had already appeared on this subject, most notably by George Orwell in his famous novel, *1984*, and *The Origins of Totalitarianism* by the philosopher, Hannah Arendt.

Their work clearly presented the thinking of both authors - together and individually. Friedrich's principle contribution was his list of what he saw as the six key characteristics that defined totalitarian regimes. His analysis, which Brzezinski supported, was controversial and quickly came under attack – from leftist scholars and political leaders who were incensed that anyone would dare to place the Soviet Union in the same camp with Hitler's Germany, its ideological opposite, then from historians and social scientists who had a field day in finding various faults with the list[4] [Friedrich & Brzezinski 1956: 6-10].

Brzezinski's specific contribution was somewhat different. He focused on the impact of the revolutionary movements of Bolshevism and Nazism. He saw them both as having the goal of destroying, and replacing, the traditional institutions and associations that had been essential components of the pluralistic societies they overthrew and whose existence defined what non-totalitarian regimes were all about. He called their effort the "totalitarian break through".

While Vaisse notes that Brzezinski later disassociated himself from using the controversial word, "totalitarianism" in his writings, the essence of his analysis remained. For him, the Soviet experience under Lenin and Stalin was nothing less than a monstrous calamity rooted in the Bolsheviks' success in penetrating, even destroying, the integrity of the voluntary institutions of pre-1917 Russia – namely the Church, the communications media, the fledgling political parties, labor unions and cooperatives, the private economic sector, even the family.

In the 1980s the consequences of that profoundly misguided effort were plain to see. By then the Soviet Union, aside from its superpower military might, was experiencing a general economic and societal decline with no end in sight. In fact, Brzezinski predicted its implosion in his work, *The Grand Failure*, published in 1989. Indeed, the legacy of over seventy years of Soviet communism can still be found in the Russia of today[5].

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[4] The six characteristics: a one party regime dominated by a single all-powerful leader; a regime that justifies its rule by its revolutionary ideology; a regime willing to apply mass terror on the society through its security police; a regime possessing a monopoly of weapons in the society; a regime completely controlling mass communication and propaganda; and one that is committed to total control over the economy. Critics of the "totalitarian syndrome" abound. For example, Norman Davies (1996: 945-948) lists 18 key features of Totalitarianism, not just six. See also Frederic Fleron (ed.) (1969) and Robert Burrowes (1969: 272-294).

[5] On Brzezinski on his "Totalitarian Break Through" thesis, see Friedrich and Brzezinski (1956), pp. 294-300. Also Brzezinski, (1989), The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century. New York: Scribners. Elements of post-Soviet Russian politics rooted in the Soviet past include the regime's dealings with legitimate opposition political parties, its control of interest groups, its management of the media, its handling of elections, and its treatment of its critics. A question still worth asking is how Russia might have developed had the Bolsheviks not come to power. This matter was first made as early as the late 1920s in a series of academic works by émigré authors gathered together by Professor Paul Vinogradov (1854-1925).

Brzezinski's *Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* was significant and for two reasons. First – his work ushered in the academic study of the states and peoples of "Eastern Europe" – that long ignored region lying between Germany and Russia. Second, and even more important, and as the book's title makes plain, Brzezinski laid out his view that the very idea of monolithic communism was a myth. Already as a young state department consultant in the early 1960s he was making the case that the Soviet imperium faced serious and growing problems in dealing with its supposed satellites in Eastern Europe. This led him to make what became his single most important contribution to U.S. government policy during the Cold War – the idea of "peaceful engagement" [Brzezinski & Griffith 1961: 642-654; Brzezinski 1965].

His argument for peaceful engagement was notable in avoiding the two prevailing U.S. views of the time about Cold War Eastern Europe. One had pushed the potentially dangerous dream of America's backing the region's "liberation" from Moscow's rule. The other in effect consigned them to Soviet domination[6].

Instead, Brzezinski focused on an inherent flaw in the Soviet imperial idea - the failure to appreciate the reality of the nationality factor in affecting, and infecting, Moscow's domination over the many and diverse peoples it ruled – in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania (and by inference the Baltic states and the Ukraine). Moreover, he foresaw that the post Stalin Soviet regime faced growing problems in maintaining its dominion over them, as state socialism's claim to be the highway to general prosperity and social equality faded away.

It followed that it was important for the United States to recognize this reality and to reach out and communicate America's solidarity of values with the peoples behind the iron curtain - and over the heads (or beneath the feet) of their bosses. Indeed, his idea hit home. Already in 1964 President Johnson was speaking about "building bridges" with the captive peoples of Eastern Europe – a phrase that was in essence what Brzezinski called "peaceful engagement."

What happened in and after 1989 in Eastern Europe and in the USSR itself was in large measure the realization of what Brzezinski had written about and predicted. Only the United States' involvement in the endless Vietnam war, followed by the effort of Johnson's successor, Richard Nixon, to establish a new order (called *détente*) in its relations with the Soviet Union in the early 1970s, detoured Washington away from doing more to promote peaceful engagement. (A gleam in the direction of "peaceful engagement" did come in 1975, with U.S. support of the "human rights" provisions in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, a step in the direction Brzezinski had advocated.)[7]. Two things ring out from this summary. One is the accuracy of Brzezinski's view about the future collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe and the amazing implosion of the Soviet Union itself. The second is the constancy of his argument.

Here Brzezinski's "essentialist" thinking differentiated him from his rival Kissinger, the "pragmatic realist." This difference is something Vaisse does not stress

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[6] On the "liberation" or "rollback" idea, see Laszlo Borhi (1999). For one expression of the idea of seemingly consigning Eastern Europe to Soviet dominion, see the debate over the so-called Sonnenfeldt doctrine in Donald Pienkos (1991: 170-171).

[7] President Johnson was advised to remain silent when the Soviet Army moved into Czechoslovakia in August 1968 to crush its post-Stalinist reform attempt to create a socialist society with a "human face". His decision was based on the futile hope that the Soviet leadership would respond by using its influence to bring about an agreement enabling the U.S. to make a face-saving exit out of Vietnam.

sufficiently, in my opinion, in his biography. But it is extremely important. An analysis of Kissinger's career shows clearly that his aim was always about serving as the sage counselor, who was ever ready to adapt his advice to the leaders he served. Interestingly, it was Kissinger who came to represent, in the public mind, the centrality of diplomacy in preserving, not changing, the international order[8].

Brzezinski was of a different mindset. However, despite being essentially right on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and in his commitment to America's role in promoting democracy abroad (and perhaps because of the way he expressed himself in and out of government), he, as Vaisse notes, never achieved the standing as a foreign policy expert enjoyed by Kissinger. Indeed, he was continually beset by critics who never ceased making their complaints about his "hawkish" "anti communism" - even when he was proven right about the collapse of communist rule[9].

Vaisse argues, and I think correctly, that Brzezinski, as National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, was the most significant foreign policy thinker and strategist in the four years of his administration. He also points out that Brzezinski was not only Carter's mentor on international issues in the years before he became a president, it was he who introduced Carter, a then obscure former one term governor from the mid-sized southern state of Georgia, to elite members of the American foreign policy establishment.

Here the question arises, one Vaisse does not deal with. Might Brzezinski have become secretary of state had Carter won reelection, or later? And if not, why not? In other words, why did he not follow Kissinger, who ascended to that office under two U.S. Presidents, Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford?

There are two explanations for why this did not happen. One involves Carter himself, a moralist in foreign affairs and a novice in foreign policy. His indecisive-ness led to his "balancing" things between Brzezinski as national security advisor and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who classical representative of old school, diplomatic thinking. Thus, despite Brzezinski's many contributions to Carter's presidency and his foreign policy, he was unable to fully overshadow Vance in battles where his assertive way of expressing himself, in and outside the White House, also made him powerful enemies. Thus, even had Carter been reelected in 1980, his chances in becoming secretary of state would have met with great obstacles. In this respect Brzezinski faced very different challenges from Kissinger who, after all, served a president, Richard Nixon, who was experienced and confident in his own direction of U.S. foreign policy. In

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[8] It was Kissinger as Secretary of State who advised President Ford to refuse to meet with the great Soviet dissident author Alexander Solzhenitsyn at the White House. Later he took a different, tough line on the USSR when Ronald Reagan, Ford's conservative successor, came into office. It is ironic that Kissinger received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1973 for brokering an agreement between North and South Vietnam that soon collapsed when the North conquered the South. In one of his latest works, World Order (New York: Penguin, 2014), he continues to emphasize the supremacy of diplomacy in preserving the international system, and slavishly praises the presidential leadership of George W. Bush.

[9] Indeed, Brzezinski's role in the amazing fall of communism and the end of the Cold War has received precious little recognition. Note, for example, the grudging piece by Strobe Talbot, a leading longtime critic, in "Vindication of a hardliner," in Time Magazine December 18, 1989. In mentioning his death, the same publication had this to say: "To understand Brzezinski, you first had to grasp his distrust of Moscow. The Polish-born Brzezinski worked for Democrats, although he was to the right of many Republicans when it came to the Soviet Union and communism." Time Magazine, June 10, 2017.

Kissinger Nixon found a talented and submissive advisor who posed no threat to him. In addition, Nixon simply ignored his own secretary of state[10].

But there is a second explanation for Brzezinski's problem. It concerned a matter beyond his control and involved the fissures plaguing the Democratic party after Vietnam – a party deeply divided between "Cold Warriors" who remained focused on the Soviet threat, and their opponents, whose memories of Vietnam turned them inward and made them suspicious of any confrontation that might lead to another war. Here Brzezinski was typecast as the "Hawk" and Vance the "Dove", with Carter, the moralistic, liberal/conservative, micro-manager somewhere in the middle.

Brzezinski's political leanings had indeed been shaped by his early embrace of the post World War II Democratic party. It was the party of President Truman and his secretaries of state, General George Marshall and Dean Acheson - the party of the Cold war anti-communist liberals. But thanks to the crisis afflicting the party over Vietnam, the Democrats were never the same after 1968. Brzezinski's career had to be adversely affected by this reality, since he had also supported the War. To many Democrats he was thus unacceptable.

Interestingly, Brzezinski refused to break with the Democrats - even after 1980, when Ronald Reagan, whose views on the Soviet Union and communism were very close to his own, became President. Only later, in the 1988 presidential election did Brzezinski endorse Reagan's candidate, vice president George H.W. Bush over Michael Dukakis. But this decision brought him no benefits. In the high politics of the United States, one's party loyalty – in good times and bad – is a prerequisite if one hopes to be appointed to office. Indeed, such loyalty did bring rewards to Brzezinski's protégé, Madeline Albright who, after years in the political wilderness, rose to be secretary of state.

On Brzezinski's Polishness, Vaisse, unfortunately covers this interesting subject only tangentially. He does point out that Brzezinski always identified with his heritage and the cause of a free Poland and notes that he rejected out of hand any "Americanizing" of his very Polish first and last name. But things then become more complicated. On the one hand, Brzezinski's patriotic feelings for his adopted country led him to become a U.S. citizen before he was thirty years old. And as an academic he avoided being "pigeonholed" as an *emigre* scholar. Rather, he always sought a larger stage – as a specialist in international affairs and Soviet foreign policy.

But to his critics, his Soviet views could never be disentangled from his Polish origin, this despite the fact that the aristocratic Brzezinski did not identify with the large, highly organized Polish community in the United States or its main political advocacy

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[10] Vaisse notes Brzezinski's many run-ins with others in his book. Early on, he was denied tenure at Harvard when Friedrich, his co-author on the Totalitarianism book, was one of those who withheld his support. Hodding Carter was one who publicly called him a "second rate intellectual." His enemies in the Carter administration were legion, as Vaisse acknowledges in noting the cold reception his memoir of his years as National Security Advisor received on its publication. Later he took on new critics, e.g., when he supported John Meerscheimer and Stephen Waltz in their right to publish their controversial book, The Israel Lobby and United States Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus, 2007). Here, see his comments in the exchange in the journal, Foreign Policy in 2007 and in the "Israel Lobby" entry in Wikipedia. In his last years, Brzezinski became a frequent guest on the daily morning cable TV politics show, Morning Joe, hosted by former U.S. Congressman Joe Scarborough along with Mika Brzezinski, his daughter. In one session Scarborough went on and on to express his opinion on a current issue dealing with Israel. After he finished, Brzezinski, to his daughter's shock, declared, "you don't know what you are talking about."

organization, the Polish American Congress. Indeed, he remained forever closer to post World War II Polish intellectuals in the U.S., many of whom belonged to the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences of America.

Brzezinski's distance from the Polish American Congress was unfortunate. Indeed, he might have benefited a bit by associating himself with that organization, which was led in the 1970s and 1980s by a number of well respected individuals, most notably Aloysius Mazewski, Andrzej Ehrenkreutz, Kazimierz Lukomski, and Jan Nowak-Jezioranski. Indeed they and Brzezinski held practically identical views on Poland, Eastern Europe, communism, and the Soviet Union[11].

With respect to the freedom and security of Poland itself, Brzezinski made at least two key and specific contributions. As National Security Advisor, he urged President Carter to support Solidarity in the Fall and early winter of 1980, a time when the new movement's very existence was threatened by Soviet military intervention. His effort came at a critical time, after Carter's demoralizing reelection defeat in November 1980. Indeed, the President's strong warnings to the USSR against intervening in Poland may have prevented a catastrophe. How different history might have been had the Soviets intervened, with a passive "lame duck" president in office, and no Brzezinski to advise him!

Second came Brzezinski's strenuous support of Poland's effort to enter NATO in the early 1990s. His speeches, op-ed essays, and TV appearances in support of NATO expansion figured favorably in influencing President Clinton's decision to support the expansion the Alliance[12].

In conclusion, Dr Vaisse is correct in discussing Zbigniew Brzezinski's inestimable contribution to U.S. foreign policy – as scholar, government official, and public intellectual. His role as a National Security Advisor does need to be remembered. But in looking at his entire career, Brzezinski's four tumultuous years under President Carter pale in comparison to his lifetime of career achievements as a remarkably visible, influential, vigorous, and prescient foreign policy thinker and advocate.

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[11] The Polish American Congress' President, the Chicago-born Aloysius Mazewski (1916-1988), its Vice President, Kazimierz Lukomski (1919-1991), Andrzej Ehrenkreutz (1921-2008), and Jan Nowak (1914-2005) – the latter three emigres from post World War II Poland - were all well informed and respected figures. Their biographies, and Brzezinski's) are in Pula, The Polish American Encyclopedia. The distance between Brzezinski and the Congress was symbolized, perhaps, in January 1978 when Brzezinski took the lead in inviting a number of PIASA members to the White House following President Carter's visit to Poland. At that reception several PAC leaders, including President Mazewski, were present. But they received no recognition from the President. Ironically, just two and a half years later – in September 1980 – Carter, in the midst of his tough reelection campaign against Ronald Reagan, was more than happy to speak in Chicago to more than 3,000 community activists at the banquet celebrating the centennial anniversary of the giant Polish National Alliance fraternal, which Mazewski also led. Indeed, his speech's contents were clearly shaped by Brzezinski. For the text, see Donald Pienkos (1984).

[12] Brzezinski receives only one brief mention in the impressive publication compiled by the PAC's Executive Director, Leszek Kuczynski (1999), Expansion of NATO: Role of the Polish American Congress, Chicago: Alliance Communications, another sign of the impact of this needless distance.

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